Slavic Humanities and New Era for Eurasia

Date: 7 July 2016

Venue: Charles University in Prague



Hosted by

KASEUS Korean Association of Slavic-Eurasian Studies

KOREA FOUNDATION KF Korea Foundation

Charles University in Prague

Institute of Czech Studies & Department of Czech and Comparative Literature, Faculty of Arts

Sponsored by

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROK

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic

MK 매일경제 MBN Maeil Business News Korea

Backgrounds

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is entering into a new stage of its diplomatic relations, in which ROK is identifying itself as a middle power that is responsible for global issues with its world top 10 economic power. Park Geun-Hye Administration, established in February 2013, advocated the role of the middle powers in their contribution to peace and prosperity of the world.

The Park administration has sought to implement the Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD) hoping to improve the national prestige and the international recognition of the ROK. In this context, the foreign ministers' meeting between the ROK and the Visegrad Group in July 2014, which the Korean government had initiated to hold, could be a good example of the success of the MPD. The Visegrad Group was a multilateral cooperation entity, organized by the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia in an old city of Central Europe, Visegrad, in December 1991, seeking to accomplish common security and to improve mutual cooperation among its members. V4+1 foreign ministers' meeting between the KOR and the four Visegrad countries in 2014, just after a year of the establishment of Visegrad was an achievement of the MPD.

As is well known, President Park visited Prague, celebrating the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relationship between the ROK and the Czech Republic. President Park had a joint summit conference with the prime ministers of the four Visegrad Group countries, and there adopted a joint statement consisting of 34 provisions for developing mutual cooperation in various areas, such as the promotion of cultural exchange and formation of partnership for the IT, energy, unification, and regional governance issues.

The 2015 summit conference, following the 'V4+1' foreign ministers' meeting in 2014, has an important meaning in that it contributed to the construction of a new summit-level cooperation system and the development of multi-layered and multi-dimensional partnership with the V4 countries. At the same time, the summit conference demonstrates the International society's high expectation of the ROK as a bridge country coordinating relations between developed and developing countries, and even the highly enhanced international position of the ROK.

What could be the concept that the ROK pursue for the brand of the MPD in the 21th century? How was the Visegrad Group that marks its 25th anniversary in 2016 created, and which developmental path has it taken? What are the diplomatic performances and tasks resulted from the Prague 'V4+1' summit conference in 2015? Which are agendas and norms required for sustaining and strengthening the cooperative and multilateral dialogues between the ROK and the Visegrad Group? What are the opportunities and constraints for the improvement of investment and trade between the ROK and the

Visegrad Group? How strong is ripple effect of the 'Korean Wave' in the Visegrad countries, and which strategy should the ROK adopt for connecting the diffusion of the 'Korean Wave' to the increase of the 'Korean Premium'? Which political view does the Visegrad Group maintaining the diplomatic relation with the ROK as well as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) hold on the unification of Korean Peninsula?

In this point of time when the performance analysis of the 2015 Prague 'V4+1' Summit conference and corresponding careful follow-up measures are required, an academic effort to find answers to the above questions seems to have a great implication in providing the ROK desirable ways to enter the market of the Central Europe and set up an adequate goal of the MPD.

The KASEUS which has studied the Slavic and Eurasian space systematically on the basis of the above critical mind, while initiating to produce and provide relevant academic discourses, aims to hold an International conference in the title of "The ROK's MPD and the 'Visegrad 4+1' Cooperation" in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, where the 2015 summit conference was held, with the Korea Foundation and the Czech Institute at Charles University in Prague.

Although the Visegrad Group is located over 10,000km away from the ROK, we can see that the countries are in fact very important partners for the enhancement of the ROK's diplomatic prospect and increase of national benefits in various areas, such as the unification, inter-Korean relations, new market creation, global partnership, and cultural development, given the historic and present relations between the ROK and each of V4 countries.

- All the four V4 countries consisting of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary went through a successful transformation from the socialist regime to a market democracy in the late 1980;
- All the V4 countries have maintained the official diplomatic relation with the ROK as well as the DPRK;
- A leading country of the Visegrad Group, Poland, as a member of Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) is currently accommodating about 2,000 North Korean workers;
- The V4 countries are playing a role of the driving force of the EU's investment and development with high economic growth rates, and at the same time this region is emerging as a new weapons and nuclear market for the ROK;
- The Visegrad Group is the second largest trade partner, following Germany, among the EU countries and the third highest investment area, following the UK and the Netherlands, for the ROK;

- The V4 countries are one of the major production bases of the Korean big businesses, such as Samsung, Hyundai, Kia and LG, etc., which means that they have deep economic connections with the ROK;
- The V4 countries are a typical region, where the 'Korean Wave' was autonomously settled down, and therefore can play a important role of the outpost for the ROK to raise the 'Korean Premium', namely the new International brand of South Korea.

Outline

1) Theme: The ROK's MPD and the 'Visegrad 4+1' Cooperation
2) Date: 7 July 2016
3) Venue: Grand Meeting Room, Main Building at Charles University in Prague
4) Hosts: The KASEUS, The Korea Foundation, Charles University in Prague, Institute of Czech Studies & Department of Czech and Comparative literature.
5) Sponsors: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Maeil Business News Korea

Sessions		Duration	Participants
I	Registration (09:30~10:00)	30 mins..	Reception & Registration
II	Opening (10:00~10:50)	20 mins..	Opening Remark **Wan Suk Hong (Chairperson, KASEUS)**
			Congratulatory Speech 1 **Tomáš Zima (President, Charles University in Prague)**
			Congratulatory Speech 2 **In Chul Kim (President, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Welcoming Speech **Hayong Moon (Korean Ambassador to Czech Republic)**
		30 mins..	Keynote Speech **Lubomír Zaorálek (Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Czech Republic)**

Break (10:50~11:00)

Session 1 (11:00~12:40)

Ⅲ-1	Session 1 **'V4+1': Opportunities for Strengthening the Cooperation**	(11:00~ 12:40) Room 1	Chair: **Jae-Nam Ko (Korea National Diplomatic Academy)**
			Implications and Achievements of the 2015 '1(ROK) + V4' Summit Conference in the Czech Republic **Wan Suk Hong (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			A Comparison of Polish-German Reconciliation and Korean-Japan Reconciliation: Role of Korea in Regional Integration in NE Asia **Marcin Grabowski (Jagiellonian University, Poland)**
			Korean Model of MPD: MIKTA and '1+V4' Cases **Dongjoo Suh (Institute for National Security Strategy)**
			Discussant: **Junggi Kim (Hanyang University)** **Duckjoon Chang (Kookmin University)** **Seongjin Kim (Duksung Women's University)**

Ⅲ-2	Linguistics & Literature 1 (in English)	(11:00~ 12:40) Room 2	Chair: **Keunsik Kim (Chung-Ang University)**
			Verbal Representations of the Czech Pop Music Star Karel Gott: From the “Idiot of Music” (M. Kundera) to “a Sacred Idol in a Desacralized Reality” (M. Szczygiel)” **Petr A. Bílek (Charles University in Prague)**
			The Understanding of Reality in Kafka's *The Metamorphosis* and Nabokov's *Invitation to a Beheading* **Hye-Kyung Park (Hallym University)**
			The Issues of Food and Desire in Chekhov’s Writings **Seok Woo Moon (Chosun University)**
			Motivation for Non-projective Constructions in Czech **Inchon Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Discussant: **Seunghyun Seo (Sogang University)** **Olena Shchegel (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**

Ⅲ-3	Social Sciences 1 (in English)	(11:00~ 12:40) Room 3	Chair: **Bongchul Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			The Present Situation and Strategy of Development of the Tourist Industry in Croatia **Chul-Min Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			A Comparative Study of Romania and North Korea under the Communist Dictatorship **Jeong O Park (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			What’s Different about Corporate Governance in Korea and Eurasia? **Jae-Seung Baek (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Discussant: **Sang Joon Lee (Kookmin University)** **Hyun Sub Byun (Hanyang University)**

Ⅲ-4	Linguistics & Literature 2 (in Russian)	(11:00~ 12:40) Room 4	Chair: **Raisa Kulkova (Sang-Myung University)**
			Именование человека в русском и корейском языках: лингвистические и культурные контрасты **Karine Deponian (University of Suwon) &** **Raisa Kulkova (Sang-Myung University)**
			Slavic Alphabet (“azbuka”) between East and West **Vanja Stanišić (University of Belgrad)**
			Экзистенциальное мировоззрение в советском неофициальном искусстве **Hoon Suk Lee (Lomonosov Moscow State University)**

			Русские сравнительные союзы как отражение картины мира и русской ментальности **Natalia Okatova (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Discussant: **Hye Hyun Nam (Yonsei University)** **Janna Ballod (Seokyeong University)**

Lunch (12:40~14:00)

Session 2 (14:00~15:40)

IV-1	Session 2 **Middle Power Diplomacy & Visegrad Group**	(14:00~ 15:40) Room 1.	Chair: **Eva Eckert (Anglo American University, Czech)**
			The International Laws on the Cooperation of the Korea-Vesegrad Group: For further Relationship **Bongchul Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Quo vadis, V4? Problems and Prospects for the Visegrad Group **Sandor Kovacs (University of Szeged, Hungary)**
			Experiences of Transition in Visegrad Countries: Implications for Korean Unification **Seongjin Kim (Duksung Women's University)**
			Discussant: **Dong Joo Suh (Institute for National Security Strategy)** **Kyuchin Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)** **Marcin Grabowski (Jagiellonian University, Poland)**

IV-2	Linguistics & Literature 3 (in English)	(14:00~ 15::40) Room 2	Chair: **Ivana Bozděchová (Charles University in Prague, Czech)**
			Internationalization and Terminologization: Driving Forces of the Dynamics of Contemporary Czech Vocabulary **Ivana Bozděchová (Charles University in Prague, Czech)**
			Happiness in the Era of Globalization and Consumerism: On the Example of *Second Life* **Olena Shchegel (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Signs and Kundera's Drama Nonsense (Ptákovina) **Sunbee Yu (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Epic Singers in Eurasian Turkic Countries **Eunkyung Oh (Dongduk Women's University)**
			Discussant: **Hye-Kyung Park (Hallym University)** **Kyeng Min Han (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**

IV-3	Social Sciences 2 (in English)	(14:00~ 15::40) Room 3	Chair: **Chul-Min Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Cultural Interpretation of the Historical Testimony in the Age of Glocalization **Tchi-Wan Park (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Image Battles between USA and USSR in Olympics during Cold War Period **Wonyong Park (Pukyong National University)**
			The Transnational Migration for Medical Treatment of Russian Patients in the Far East: With a focus on the phenomenon of medical tourism to South Korea **Beomsoo Kim (Lomonosov Moscow State University)**
			Discussant: **Jeong O Park (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)** **Jae-Seung Baek (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**

IV-4	Social Sciences 3 (+Linguistics, in Russian)	(14:00~ 15:40) Room 4	Chair: **Liubov Podgornaya** **(International Academy of Business and Management, Russia)**
			The Overview of the Natural Gas and Oil Industry of Russia **Youngsik Kim (Gangneung-Wonju National University)**
			Особенности социального восприятия и положения женщин-мигрантов из России и Центральной Азии в Республике Корея **Seunghyun Seo (Sogang University)**
			Some Fragments Linguistic World-image within the Context Intercultural Communication **Liubov Podgornaya** **(International Academy of Business and Management, Russia)**
			Дилетант, любитель, профессионал, специалист: от лексического значения к общегуманитарному смыслу. **Nataliia Krashevskaia (Moscow State University of Geodesy and Cartography)**
			Discussant: **Chaimun Lee (Kyungpook National University)** **Byung Pal Ahn (Seokyeong University)**

Break (15:40~16:00)

Session 3 (16:00~18:00)

V-1	Session 3 **Economic Cooperation and Public Diplomacy**	(16:00~ 18:00) Room 1.	Chair: **Jozef Matula (Palacky University Olomouc, Czech)**
			Economic Development of in Visegrad Countries: A Model of Economic Cooperation among Middle Powers **Sang Joon Lee (Kookmin University)**

			Investment Policy of the Visegrad Group and Cooperation Directions between Korea and V4 **Hyun Sub Byun (Hanyang University)**
			Hallyu and `Imagined Communities` of Korean Fans: A Comparative Analysis of the Countries from the Visegrad Group **Valentina Marinescu (University of Bucharest, Romania)**
			Discussant: **Junggi Kim (Hanyang University)** **Jae-Seung Baek (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)** **Vladislava Mazana (Charles University in Prague, Czech)**

V-2	Linguistics & Literature 4 (in Russian)	(16:00~ 18:00) Room 2	Chair: **Tamara Kaplan (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Язык и власть – новый новояз постсоветского периода **Hye Hyun Nam (Yonsei University)**
			Проблемы передачи корейских имен собственных при переводе на русский язык **Tamara Kaplan (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Родство Алтайского языка с корейским языком: морфологический, семантический и лексикологический аспекты **Keunsik Kim (Chung-Ang University)**
			Об ономасиологической грамматике чешского языка **Milan Hrdlička & Mariia Dobrova (Charles University in Prague, Czech)**
			Discussant: **Karine Deponian (University of Suwon)** **Raisa Kulkova (Sang-Myung University)**

V-3	Social Sciences 4 (in English)	(16:00~ 18:00) Room 3	Chair: **Duckjoon Chang (Kookmin University)**
			Korea's New 'Nordpolitik' and Eurasian Cooperation: With a Focus on its Prospects for Promoting Unification of the Korean Peninsula **Duckjoon Chang (Kookmin University)**
			Communication and Boundaries: Texas and Europe at the Era of Mass Immigration through the Perspective of Personal Letters **Eva Eckert (Anglo American University, Czech)**
			A Narrative Approach to Identity Construction: The Case of the Korean Diaspora in Volgograd, Russia **Chaimun Lee (Kyungpook National University)**
			The Orientation of Islam in Dagestan **Sejin Jung (Hanyang University)**
			Discussant: **Eunkyung Oh (Dongduk Women's University)** **Youngsik Kim (Gangneung-Wonju National University)**

V-4	Lnguistics & Literature 5 (in English)	(16:00~ 18:00) Room 4	Chair: **Janna Ballod (Seokyeong University)**
			The Interlanguage Features of the Errors in the Russian Curriculum Vitae(CV) o Seokyeong University Students **Byung Pal Ahn (Seokyeong University)**
			Teaching Russian Language in Changing Educational Environment in South Korea **Janna Ballod (Seokyeong University)**
			The Color Symbol in Hungarian Folk Ballade **Kyeng Min Han (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)**
			Discussant: **Sandor Kovacs (University of Szeged, Hungary)** **Liubov Podgornaya (International Academy of Business and Management, Russia**

Dinner (18: 30~20:30)

List of Participants in International Conference in Prague

Name	Position	Affiliation
Beomsoo Kim	PhD Student	Lomonosov Moscow State University (Russia)
Bongchul Kim	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Byung Pal Ahn	Professor	Seokyeong University (Korea)
Chaimun Lee	Professor	Kyungpook National University (Korea)
Chul-Min Kim	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Dongjoo Suh	Senior Research Fellow	Institute for National Security Strategy (Korea)
Duckjoon Chang	Professor	Kookmin University (Korea)
Eunkyung Oh	Professor	Dongduk Women's University (Korea)
Eva Eckert	Professor	Anglo American University (Czech Republic)
Hayong Moon	Korean Ambassador to Czech Republic	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Korea)
Hoon Suk Lee	PhD Student	Lomonosov Moscow State University (Russia)
Hye Hyun Nam	Professor	Yonsei University (Korea)
Hye-Kyung Park	Professor	Hallym University (Korea)
Hyun Sub Byun	Research Professor	Hanyang University (Korea)
Inchon Kim	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
In Chul Kim	President	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Ivana Bozděchová	Professor	Charles University in Prague(Czech Republic)
Jae-Nam Ko	Professor	Korea National Diplomatic Academy (Korea)
Jae-Seung Baek	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Jan Wiendl	Professor	Charles University in Prague(Czech Republic)
Janna Ballod	Professor	Seokyeong University (Korea)
Jeong O Park	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Jozef Matula	Professor	Palacky University Olomouc (Czech Republic)
Junggi Kim	Research Fellow	Hanyang University (Korea)
Karine Deponian	Professor	University of Suwon (Korea)
Keunsik Kim	Professor	Chung-Ang University (Korea)
Kyeng Min Han	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Kyuchin Kim	Emeritus Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Libuše Heczková	Professor	Charles University in Prague(Czech Republic)
Liubov Podgornaya	Professor	International Academy of Business and Management (Russia)
Lubomír Zaorálek	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Czech Republic)
Marcin Grabowski	Professor	Jagiellonian University (Poland)
Mariia Dobrova	Professor	Charles University in Prague(Czech Republic)
Milan Hrdlička	Professor	Charles University in Prague(Czech Republic)
Nataliia Krashevskaia	Professor	Moscow State University of Geodesy and Cartography (Russia)
Natalia Okatova	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Olena Shchegel	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Petr A. Bílek	Professor	Charles University in Prague(Czech Republic)
Raisa Kulkova	Professor	Sang-Myung University (Korea)
Sandor Kovacs	Professor	University of Szeged (Hungary)

Sang Joon Lee	Professor	Kookmin University (Korea)
Sejin Jung	Professor	Hanyang University (Korea)
Seok Woo Moon	Professor	Chosun University (Korea)
Seongjin Kim	Professor	Duksung Women's University (Korea)
Seunghyun Seo	Professor	Sogang University (Korea)
Sunbee Yu	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Svatava Škodová	Professor	Charles University in Prague(Czech Republic)
Tamara Kaplan	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Tchi-Wan Park	Professor	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Tomáš Zima	President	Charles University in Prague(Czech Republic)
Vanja Stanišić	Professor	University of Belgrade (Serbia)
Valentina Marinescu	Professor	University of Bucharest (Romania)
Vladislava Mazana	Professor	Charles University in Prague(Czech Republic)
Wan Suk Hong	Professor / **Chairperson of KASEUS**	Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea)
Wonyong Park	Professor	Pukyong National University (Korea)
Youngsik Kim	Professor	Gangneung-Wonju National University (Korea)

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Chair: Jae-Nam Ko (Korea National Diplomatic Academy)

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Wan Suk Hong (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ A Comparison of Polish-German Reconciliation and Korean-Japan Reconciliation: Role of Korea in Regional Integration in NE Asia

Marcin Grabowski (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

≫ Korean Model of MPD: MIKTA and ‘1+V4’ Cases

Dongjoo Suh (Institute for National Security Strategy)

Implications and Achievements of the 2015 '1(ROK) + V4' Summit Talk in the Czech Republic

Wan Suk Hong (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

Ⅰ. Materialization of Korea-Visegrad Group Summit Talk

President Park Geun-hye of South Korea visited Czech Republic as a final country scheduled in her official overseas itineration in 2015. The purpose of the official visit scheduled to stay for 3-nights and 4-days was to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the treaty of amity between two countries and to participate in the 'Korea-Visegrad' summit talk to be held in Prague, Czech Republic, for the first time on December 3, 2015.



The Visegrad Group (V4) [1] refers to the multilateral consultative body of the 4-Central European Countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) converted respective political systems from those of socialistic ones to democratic ones. The consultative body was established to promote the common national security and mutual collaboration.

The countries comprising the Visegrad Group claim respective identities different from the other Eastern European Countries in respects of the geographical, historical, cultural, and religious aspects and, spontaneously define them as the 'Central European' countries.2 Therefore, the formation of Visegrad Group naturally symbolizes the revival of the 'Central Europe' as a newly appearing political body in the post-Cold War era. Simultaneously, the collaboration and improvement of the Visegrad Group also implies the consolidation of the regional identity of Central European countries of which color had been remaining faded.

The Visegrad Group has been showing active features most outstanding among multilateral

[1] The origin of Visegrad Group dates back to the mid-14th century (1335 A.D.) when the Mongolians invaded Europe. For the historical background of the origin and development of Visegrad Group, refer to following paper: Kim Yong-deok, "Formation and Developmental Outlook of the Visegrad Group – From 1991 to 2001 viewed from the Polish Standpoint", Journal of Western History, Vol. 37, pp. 117-143.

[2] Lee Gyu-Yeong, "Post-Socialism and Rediscovery of Central Europe", Korean Journal of International Relations, Vol. 40 No. 1 (2000), pp. 161-181.

consultative bodies established by each region in Europe and thereby growing as the one of pillars supporting current European Union. The group runs several regular multilateral consultative bodies at each level in the fields of political affairs, diplomacy, national security, defense, culture, environment, and education including the regular annual V4 Summit Talk and thereby consolidated the foundation of collaboration. In 2000, the countries in the group started to raise the common International Visegrad Fund (IVF) by financing respective 8-million Euros annually for purposes to promote the intra-group collaborative projects.



The Visegrad Group also shows active cooperation with external countries as well as with those in EU and NATO. Based on the initial principle postulated the maintenance of the original Visegrad Group, the group does not allow other countries to be a member thereof however, the group developed the body of the form of Visegrad Plus (V4+?) to cooperate with other countries. The new form of cooperation provided the Visegrad Group with the framework enabled the four Visegrad countries to collaborate with other partnered countries as a single group. The third countries in this case can be other individual countries or be other regional consultative bodies, sub-regional collaborative organizations, or international organizations.[3] The framework of the cooperation of Visegrad Group, that is, the 'V4+1', with Korea established at the official visit of president Park Geun-hye to Czech Republic in December 2015 was thus accomplished in this context.[4]

The joint summit talk of the Visegrad group and Korea held on December 3, 2015, the '1+V4' consultative body comprised of the summits of participative countries, was the first case in the history of diplomacy in Korea. This is also regarded as the new origin deployed the new horizon of Korean diplomacy, in terms of its type (the framework) and contents.

The reason behind this appraisal is based on the fact of the prompt progress originated from the diplomatic ministerial meetings between the V4 and Korea to the establishment of summit communication channel that brought forth the diplomatic relationship enabled the regular collaboration and interchange between countries to be backed up with institutional supports.


The '1+V4' joint multilateral summit talk held in Europe, the center of global political and economic order, by the initiative of Korea reflects the risen national status and improved international rank of Korea.

Then, what would be the meanings and significance of the realization of '1+V4' summit talk and the resulted international cooperation in terms of national interest of Korea? And what is the achievement of Korean diplomacy embodied through the Prague '1+V4' summit talk?

II. Implications of the '1(Korea)+V4' Collaboration

From the '1+V4' joint summit talk held on December 3, 2015, Korea and Visegrad Group announced the joint communique comprising 34 statements[3] that specified the reciprocal cooperation of the two parties in diverse fields. Together with the promotion of the cultural, economic, technical, and human interchange between both parties, the joint project plans involved with the Visegrad Fund and the establishment of working committee for the cooperation in fields of energy were included. The '1+V4' joint summit talk is significant in that it had prepared the turning point to encourage the multi-layered and multi-faceted partnership between the two parties. What is more than this is the significance in respect of the Korean diplomacy that the government of president Park Geun-hye had been searched for and accomplished finally as a middle-power state that expanded its scope of diplomatic relations into the central European region.

Figure 1) The First Korea-Visegrad Group Summit Talk Press Conference



Korea has been grown and finally became as one of the top 10 globally trading countries beyond the level of developing countries and entered into a stage of diplomatic reform requested by other countries to show its role and identity befitting its status changed so far. To reflect such requests into foreign policies, the government of president Park Geun-hye started in Feb. 2013 presented "the realization of the middle-power state capable of contributing to global peace and prosperity" as one of its major foreign political directives.

The diplomacy of middle-power state implies the reinforcement of Korean diplomacy on the global

[3] Joint Statement on the Occasion of the First Summit of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group and the President of the Republic of Korea. http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements/joint-statement-on-the (Date of Visit: May 30, 2015)..

dimension beyond Korean peninsula and Northeast Asian region. This connotes the will to be free from the "follower of the great-powers" to be become "an active player" with an independent voice to the world. Thereby the promotion of active communication with global countries and an escape from the frames of references depending on the United States or of the orientation to China were comprised therein as the directives of the diplomacy. These were thus prepared to grope for ways to secure self-directed national interest by avoiding the climbing on the bandwagons driven by other countries

As a part of such efforts, the government of president Park Geun-hye has been promoting the "Middle Power Diplomacy (MPD)" actively as the one of middle-power states to improve and advance its global standing and, the "MIKTA' organized in Sep. 2013 by the initiative of Korean government can be an appropriate case illustrating such efforts. The MIKTA is a multilateral consultative body of middle-power countries comprised of Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, Australia, and Korea organized for the advancement of common interest in global community. The MIKTA initiated by Korea has provided Korea with an important footing to express its voice to global society and to participate actively in the global governance.

The constitution of the consultative body between Korea and Visegrad Group can also be an important diplomatic event in this context. The summit talk held in Dec. 2015 expanded the diplomatic field of Korea from developing countries to middle-powers in central Europe. Contrary to the MIKTA where Korea was supposed to participate as one of those 5 constitutive countries, the "1+V4" summit consultative body was initiated by Korea. The Korea-Visegrad summit talk is the only one in a form of one-to-many summit consultative body except the Korea-ASEAN consultative body. This reflects the international standing of Korea that has been grown and being expected by global countries to become as one of countries capable of mediating or coordinating respective national interests.4

Beyond the advancement in diplomatic relation with middle-power countries, the significance of the multi-layered and multi-faceted collaborations with the countries of Visegrad Group appears in diverse features. Despite the long geographical distance between Korea and the individual countries of Visegrad Group over 10,000Km, the current and historical relationships of Korea with these countries enable these countries appear as important partners of Korea particularly in respects of following aspects. The diplomacy for the unification of Korean peninsula, the peace and inter-Korean relations on Korean peninsula, the making inroads in new market in central Europe, the establishment of global partnership, and the promotion of cultural prosperity.

Above all, the application of successful experiences of the transformation of national systems of these countries is of the primary issue. The countries of Visegrad Group experienced bitter domination and territorial separation by the global great-powers as they were enduring the two World Wars broke out in the 20th century. They boldly transformed into the systems of democracy and market economy from those of socialism and eventually became as the representative ones of middle-power countries in central Europe.[7] The experience of successful transformation of national systems of these countries can be exploited for the reunification of Korean peninsula as well as the experience of the reunification of Germany.

[4] Shin Beom-sik. "Critical Review on the Korea-Russia Strategic Partnership", Korea and World Politics, Vol. 26 No.1, (Seoul: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University).

Secondly, the significance can also be found in terms of the initiative of Korean government in the inter-Korean relationship in Korean peninsula for the peace and stability thereof. The countries of Visegrad Group like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary have been contributed to the peace and stability of Korean peninsula. In the end of the 1980s, Hungary established the official diplomatic relationship with Korea for the first time among eastern European countries. This establishment was ahead of the Soviet Union despite the opposition of North Korea in cooperation with the 'Nordpolitik' of South Korea promoted by president Roh Tae-woo who intended to expand the diplomatic relationships of South Korea with the Soviet Union and with Eastern European Countries. Poland and Czech Republic have been acted as the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) of Korean peninsula designated by North Korea since the armistice agreement of Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950.

In Poland, that has been keeping close relationship with North Korea since long ago, there are currently approx. 800 North Korean workers.5 All countries in the Visegrad Group had established the diplomatic relationship with North- and South Korea simultaneously. Poland and Czech Republic are currently the members of the "Peace Club" and have respective official residence in North- and South Korea while Hungary and Slovakia are the members of the "Peninsula Club" for which the ambassadors of both countries residing in Seoul also are in charge of the head of respective residential offices in Pyongyang, North Korea. In this respect, the close collaboration with countries in the Visegrad Group can contribute to the consolidation of the initiative of South Korea in current inter-Korean relationship as well as of the peace and stability thereof.

Thirdly, the Visegrad Group can be a bridgehead for Korean enterprises to make inroads in the market of EU appearing as a new blue ocean. The economic weights of the 4 countries of Visegrad Group have been growing steadily since their systematic national transformation from those of Socialism to current ones of Democracy in the end of the 1980s and thereby the countries are called the 'Motor of New Economic Growth of European Union'. The geographical advantages of these countries as the hubs of physical distribution centers connecting countries placed in the Western and Eastern regions of Europe have promoted these countries to be emerging as the bases of economic production in Europe on the ground consolidated by the high-level education cultivating good quality human resources. The motivators including the relatively lower wage level, the political stability, the preferable sovereign credit rating, and the business friendly governmental policies thereof have also contributed to the consolidation of the ground.[6] The locational conditions and invest environment thereof are enough to attract business interest of domestic enterprises.

In 2014, the magnitude of the trade of Korea with Visegrad Group ranked the second to that with Germany and the third in terms of investment next to those in United Kingdom and Netherlands. Contrary to the red figures of the trade balance of Korea with EU in 2015, the Visegrad Group solely allowed Korea to mark trade surplus that was supported by the domestic global enterprises like Samsung,

[5] Currently, only Poland and Malta among the members of EU accommodate North Korean workers. "The Biggest Daily Newspaper of Poland reported the 'Poor Realities' of North Korean Workers", Yonhap News Agency, April 14, 2016.

[6] Institute of Management Research, KB Financial Group Inc., "The Emergence of Visegrad Group (4 Countries in Central Europe)", KB Knowledge Vitamin, Vol 14-63, pp. 2-3 (Aug. 13, 2014).

LG, Hyundai and Kia Motors pioneered respective production bases therein.7

Finally, the significance can be found from the importance of Visegrad Group as an outpost to propagate the "Hanryu (韓流)" (the "Korean Waves") in Europe, the "Korea Premium" to be realized by an enhancement of the value of national brand of Korea.

The styles of culture and art in these countries like Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary etc. are all globally accommodated without exceptions. The "Korean Waves" of the KPOP, K-Cinemas, and K-Dramas are currently surged into these countries of strong cultural inheritance in central Europe and became popularized. In this respect, the Visegrad Group located on the crossroad connecting to the Eastern, Western, and Southern European regions should be taken care of particularly for the enhancement of the "Korea Premium" through the propagation of Korean cultural contents.

III. Noticeable Fruits of the Korea-V4 Summit Talk

The fruits president Park Geun-hye had acquired from the joint Korea-V4 Summit Talk can be viewed from several standpoints. The 34 statements contained in the joint communique thereof present the direction of an advancement of the partnership between Korea and Visegrad Group in terms of the 4 great frameworks of the Integration and Unification, the Joint Prosperity, the Global and Regional Governance, and the Cultural Flourish. The noticeable fruits harvested from the joint summit talk can be summarized as in the following.

Firstly, the '1+V4' joint meeting of foreign ministers of respective countries was routinized. In the third and fourth statements of the joint communique, the summits participated in the Korea-Visegrad Summit Talk specified the routinization of the '1+V4' joint meeting of foreign ministers to fulfill the increasing needs of political issues and those associated with national security as a way to encourage political conversations within both parties. The institutionalization of the '1+V4' joint meeting of foreign ministers can be taken as one of significant accomplishments in that it could provide each country with opportunities to expand the ways of practical multilateral cooperation.

Secondly, it is the publicly expressed support of the Visegrad Group to major foreign policies of Korea. The summits of the V4 expressed respective supports to the key agenda of the government of president Par Geun-hye comprising the "Plans for Peaceful Unification of Korean Peninsula and Trust Process of Korean Peninsula (statement #24)", "Plans for Peaceful Collaboration in Northeast Asia (statement #27)", and "Eurasia Initiatives (statement #29)" and, recorded them in each statement of the joint communique. The support to the "Plan of Peaceful Unification of Korean Peninsula" was not included in the press release that was adopted in the Korea-EU Summit Talk held in September 2015. Therefore, the expressive support of the 4 countries locating in the central region of European continent to the plan is particularly significant.

In addition, the V4 summits strongly denounced the development of nuclear bomb and missiles of North Korea in the joint communique and demanded North Korea to observe public commitments

[7] Currently, over 280 Korean enterprises entered into the four countries of Visegrad Group provide respective countries with the local job creation for over 100,000 employees.

specified in the joint communique announced on September 9, 2005 and to be in cooperation with the resume of the Six-Party Talk. The expressions of the denial of all actions of North Korea that increase the tension in Korean peninsula were clearly stated with the demand to implement recommendations included in the report issued by the UN Investigative Committee a year ago (statement #22). The expressed support of V4 countries to the foreign policies of South Korea associated with issues of Korean peninsula including the North Korean nuclear bomb development thus can be recorded as a significant diplomatic accomplishment in that it connotes the diplomatic advantage of South Korea to North Korea.

Thirdly, it is the preparation of the steppingstone promising the realization of remarkable myth of the export of Korean atomic power plants to central Europe following UAE. The countries located in central Europe actively promote the construction of atomic power plants as an alternative to the Russian weaponization of energy and increasing regulation on greenhouse gas emission in EU. This is the very background of the V4 countries rising as new 'Blue Chips' in the market of atomic power plant. The construction of atomic power plant is a high value-added and competitive solution promoting new economic growth of South Korea equipped with the state-of-the-art technology and price competitiveness for the 'Korean Atomic Plants' attracting interests of the V4 countries.

President Park Geun-hye discussed the ways for Korean enterprises to participate in the construction projects of atomic power plants budgeted approx. 15 billion USD currently in progress in regions of Temelin and Dukovany in Czech Republic in the Korea-Czech Republic Summit Talk and, she was able to obtain positive responses from Czech Republic anticipating the green signals to the projects. Poland and Slovakia are also known that the countries also intend to construct new atomic power plants or are in progress thereof as well as Czech Republic.8 The government of Korea established the plan to export atomic power plants to Czech Republic as a steppingstone for further export of atomic power plants to neighboring countries. The realization of the plan will give Korean economy prosperous fruits and new power for further economic growth.

The preparation of the steppingstone for the entrance into the market of weapons of V4 countries through collaborations in defense and defense industry could be the fourth fruit of the joint summit talk. The central European countries are currently under the umbrella of national security provided by NATO since 1999 as the countries joined thereto and became the member thereof. However, the regions situated geographically in between the East (Russia) and the West (America and EU) naturally induce potential worries about Russia to these countries. The military intervention of Russia to Ukraine in 2014 can be a good case for the Russia-phobic V4 countries to feel the necessity of armament expansion. Recently, the advancement of domestic munitions industry in South Korea recorded remarkable performance.

The domestic defense industry currently have been developed to the level that it could be the one of leading economic motivators for an additional new national economic growth and is expanding its global market of the world-class conventional weapons. The V4 countries currently promoting the modernization of respective military forces are interested in the competence of Korean defense industry demonstrated its excellence through advanced trainers and submarines construction. 9 Korean

[8] In August 2010, Korea and Poland concluded an Agreement on Nuclear Energy Cooperation intended for the operation of the first nuclear power plant in Poland in 2022.

[9] Kim Chul-min, "Analysis of Korea-Visegrad Group Summit Talk and Suggestions Thereof for Further

government is well aware of this situation and is consolidating the ground of collaboration in defense and defense industry with these countries through concluding the "National Defense Collaboration Agreements".

President Park Geun-hye cordially requested Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka of Czech Republic in the summit talk to consider the purchase of Korean helicopter "KAI KUH-1 Surion" in the defense acquisition project of Czech Republic intending to purchase the multipurpose attacking helicopters. The requests to encourage interest and cooperation of Poland in defense industry were also presented in the Korea-Poland summit talk.10 The "Agreement on the Protection of Military Confidential Information" was concluded in the Korea-Hungary summit talk with an agreement on the collaboration in defense and defense industries of both countries and the potential export of Korean multipurpose helicopters was tapped.

The fifth fruit can be the preparation of the bridgehead toward the propagation of the "Hanryu (韓流)" (the "Korean Waves") into the countries of strong cultural identities in central Europe. Korea and Visegrad Group stated (statement #15) to promote an advancement of the reciprocal cooperation in creative industries including those of music, opera, theatricals, cinemas, animation, literature, art, and exhibitions. The agreement implies the expansion of opportunities of making inroads into the market of central European countries that had been remaining as a relatively blind zone comparing to regions in Western Europe for the export of cultural contents. The "Hanryu (韓流)" comprised of K-POP, K-Contents, K-Foods, or K-Beauty appeared as one of motivators for new economic growth of South Korea by its convergence to technologies and thereby enhanced the value of national brand of Korea, that is, it now is creating the "Korea Premium". Thus the collaboration and expansion of opportunities to cooperate and interchange with V4 countries of traditionally strong cultural identities in fields of popular culture and contents industry can not only upgrade the level of "Hanryu (韓流)" with the expansion of cultural territory of Korea but can also facilitate the advancement of high value-added creative industries of Korea.

Besides, the consensus of potential participation of domestic enterprises in national projects of the construction of infrastructures in V4 countries was also derived during the summit talk. The projects comprises the construction of subways (~2020, approx. 43 billion USD), expressways, ITS (Intelligent Traffic System), and atomic power plants.11

Development", EREMiCs Specialists' Column, p. 3 (Dec. 17, 2015).

[10] In 2014, Korea and Poland concluded an agreement of the export of the 'K-9 Self-Propelled Artillery' to Poland.

[11] The 4 countries in Visegrad Group intend to invest in the construction of respective infrastructures as the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) of more than 3 trillion Euro that has been prepared to solve the socioeconomic unbalance between members of European Union became available for each country.

A Comparison of Polish-German Reconciliation and Korean-Japan Reconciliation: Role of Korea in Regional

Marcin Grabowski (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Korean Model of MPD : MIKTA and '1+V4' Cases

Dongjoo SUH INSS, Institute for National Security Strategy)

Ⅰ. Introduction

Scene #1: President Park Geun-hye visited to 3 African states(Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya) and France on May 2016. Her official state visit has brought many fruitful outcome across a wide range of sectors, ranging from security, business and developmental cooperation, through to the arts, sports and personnel exchanges, too. It was also evaluated to create on new diplomacy fields. The latest presidential trip also won more outcomes than expected for the Korean economy. In terms of business cooperation, Korea focused on cooperation in selected sectors, customized for each of the three African partners.

Scene #2: ROK as the second Chair(September 2014-August 2015) held the 1st MIKTA Senior Officials' Meeting(February), the 5th MIKTA Foreign Minister's Meeting(Adoption of MIKTA Vision Statement, May), the 1st MIKTA Speaker's Consultation(July) in Seoul 2015. In Korean stance, MIKTA is a successful case of middle power diplomacy. Now MIKTA as a cross-regional consultative platform is contributing on the global society and enhancing its role.

Scene #3: President Park met Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka on Dec. 3 2015 at Prague Castle where they discussed measures to expand cooperation between the two countries, following their agreement in February to build a more cooperation partnership. The two leaders adopted an action plan that run from 2016 to 2018 where they will implement the bilateral 'strategic partnership' agreed upon during the Czech prime minister's visit to Seoul earlier 2015. This plan includes specific measures to deepen their partnership in terms of diplomacy and national defense, in term of the economy and the business environment, and in terms of the arts and tourism, as well as in human resource management("Korean, Czech leaders expand partnerships on nuclear energy," www.korea.net)

And then, President Park met the prime ministers of the Czech Republic and three other central European countries, the so-called Visegrad Group(V4), and announced the joint statement. It marked the first time that Park has held summit talks with Czech Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka

and the Prime ministers of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. They agreed to hold close consultation in a wide range of areas, including climate change, counter terrorism and cyber security. Also Park held three separate meeting with the prime ministers of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

The ROK-V4 summit talks on Dec. 3, 2015 was seen to have served as an opportunity to enhance the friendship and cooperation between ROK and the V4, member states of the EU and NATO that have achieved successful regime change, as well as to solidify the ROK's foundation for middle power diplomacy on the regional and global levels.

Through these three cases, we are informed whether what features, how they are deployed in the Korean type's middle power diplomacy(MPD).

The current world political and economic order is being reshaping into the impact of the rising of China and appearance of G2, EU and US.'s sanction toward Russia, emergence of refugees in the Middle East, act of international terrorism and so on. Along with these changes in the international situation, the role and status of middle power such as BRICS, MIKTA, ASEAN, V4 is becoming critical.

Currently, ROK became the world's GDP over 11 countries, industrialization, democratization, national development leading to ICT society, so called 'miracle of Han River', is achieved. Korea now is interested in the public diplomacy, middle power diplomacy and want to contribute to the international community with various aid programs. ROK has the ability and willingness to pursue the MPD.

In this paper, I'd like to introduce and explain ROK's MPD with focusing on the ROK-V4 summit talks in 2015 and MIKTA. And then I will try to find on some policy implications and future tasks which have to overcome in order to make a great development between ROK and V4. I look forward to this paper contributes to the development of the relationship between ROK and V4.

Ⅱ. National Strategy Structure in ROK and Middle Power Diplomacy

At this chapter, I'd like to explain for the National Security Structure and Middle Power Diplomacy in ROK.

Korean administration as a national vision has established 'A New Era of Hope' which means "A new paradigm promoting a mutually reinforcing cycle of national advancement and happiness for the people". In this vision, administration priorities are composed of 4 sectors: ① Economic Revival, ② Happiness for the People, ③ Culture Enrichment, ④ Foundation for Peaceful Unification. Upon its inauguration, Park Geun-hye government ambitiously launched its 'middle power diplomacy' in conjunction with the Peace Process of the Korean Peninsular and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative as its diplomatic goals.(Lee, 2014).

On the basis thereof, the ministry of foreign affairs's foreign policy vision is the "realization of a happier Korean people, Korean Peninsula and global community." Under this vision, the Ministry seeks to achieve and build peace and shared development of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, a dependable Korea that contributes to the advancement of humanity and a fascinating country with happier people. To these ends, the Foreign Ministry carries out trust-building diplomacies in partnership with the people, focusing on the following policy tasks.:

1. Providing an impetus for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue;
2. Developing relations with major neighboring countries of the Korean Peninsular;
3. Promoting the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative and expanding cooperation with Eurasia;
4. Playing a role as s responsible middle power contributing to world peace and progress;
5. Protecting the safely and rights of Korean nationals residing aborad and expanding both public diplomacy and jobs diplomacy;
6. Strengthening the capacity for economic cooperation;

(www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/system/popop/index3.jsp)

Among them, we need to focus on 5 clause. The Korean government plays a role as a responsible middle power contributing to world peace and progress by taking following actions.: △ promoting world peace and human rights; △ coping with security threats; △ contributing to resolution of global economic problems; △ strengthening cooperative networks with major middle powers; △ promoting development cooperation that gives hope to developing countries.

On the other hand, the ROK government set the following five priority goals for its diplomacy in the Diplomatic White Paper 2015.: ① achieving peaceful unification and Trustpolitik; ② harmonizing and developing the ROK-US alliance and the ROK-China strategic cooperation partnership; ③ becoming a responsible middle power that contributes to achieving global peace and development; ④ ensuring the safety and protecting the interests of Koreans living abroad and expanding public diplomacy; and ⑤ boosting the economy though economic diplomacy.

In particular regard to ③, the ROK government led the discussions on global issues by actively conducting multilateral diplomacy. Korea chaired a number of major meetings and became a member of major UN councils such as the Security Council. Korea also hosted the MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting twice, in September and November 2015. As health became a big international issue because of the spread of the Ebola virus, the government succeeded in bringing the Second Global Health Security Agenda(GHSA) High-Level Meeting to Seoul to be held in 2015 and played a leading role in adopting the joint agreement about the Ebola virus as the Third MIKTA Foreign Minister's Meeting in September.

The ROK government also joined the international efforts to address 27 humanitarian issues including the Iraq, Syria, and Palestine issue. Furthermore, as part of its middle power diplomacy, the ROK government took an active part in the efforts for poverty eradication and inclusive growth.

As a country leading the Busan Global Partnership, Korea played the role of a facilitator in forming international standards for improving the quality of Official Development Assistance(ODA). The ROK government also broadened the scope of its diplomacy by expanding cooperation with European, Southeast Asian, Central and South American, and Middle Eastern countries.(MOFA, 2015 Diplomatic White Paper.)

ROK, as middle power state, has the intension to expand confidence on the world stage by its obligations and responsibilities to the international community, and get more cooperation.

In general, middle power countries perform mediator diplomacy, niche diplomacy, and roles of catalyst, facilitator, manager and so on.(Kang, 2013) ROK's MPD also promotes 3 directions as the followings; △ diplomacy as middle power, △ diplomacy toward middle power, △ diplomacy with middle power. Typical examples are MIKTA, Visegrad Group, Constructive Powers Initiative Meeting(CPI Meeting, 1.5 track) etc.

Ⅲ. ROK and MIKTA : member, concept, background and history, achievements

Characteristics of MIKTA are summarized such as 'A Cross-Regional Consultative Platform for Promoting the Shared Interests of the International Community', 'Open & Informal Consultative Group', 'Sharing the Core Values of Democracy and a Free Market Economy'. (MOFA, "MIKTA ; New Innovative Partnership", 2016; www.mikta.org)

[Members]

MIKTA is a cross-regional consultative group comprised of five middle powers; Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia.

MIKTA members range between the world's 12th to 18th largest economies in terms of GDP and have considerable influence in their regions. Five member neither belong to the G7 nor BRICS. They are also active participants in international organizations such as the UN.

[Comparison with MIKTA, G7 and BRICS]

	MIKTA	G7	BRICS
member	Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, Austalia	the US, Japan, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
combined GDP(US$)	5.8 trillion	35.5 trillion	16.97 trillion

share of the global GDP(%)	7.6	46	22
share of global population(%)	7.3	10.6	42.8
average GDP per capita(US$)	11,153	42,267	5,568
combined population(people)	around 523 million	around 752 million	around 3.05 million

[Concept and Operation]

The chair of MIKTA is selected by consensus among the member countries and serves a one-year term. 1st Chair was Mexico(Sep. 2013-Aug. 2014), 2nd was Korea(Sep. 2014- Aug. 2015), 3rd is Australia(Sep. 2015-Aug. 2016).

MIKTA is a cooperative mechanism of middle power countries with the will and capacity to contribute to advancing the shared interests of the international community.

MIKTA is an informal consultative group whose members can exchange views on key global issues in a flexible manner, and does not aim to form an exclusive bloc. In the long run, MIKTA is open to the expansion of its membership.

As a group of middle powers representing different regions of the world, MIKTA is a new innovative partnership that balances diversity with commonality. MIKTA members come from diverse cultures and regions. However, they all share core values such as democracy and a free market economy. In addition, MIKTA countries are like-minded on dealing with various global challenges.

[Background and History]

MIKTA is one of the Korea government's key initiative for pursuing middle power diplomacy and was officially launched at the 1st MIKTA Foreign Minister's Meeting in September 2013.

As noted above, Park administration set "fulfilling the role of a responsible middle power to contribute to the prosperity of mankind" as one of its four diplomatic goals. To achieve this goal, the government has placed the following three agenda at the center of its middle power diplomacy.

[Four Diplomatic Goals of the Park Geun-hye Administration]

o Fulfilling the Role of a Responsible Middle Power to Contribute to the Prosperity of Mankind
o Laying the Foundation for Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsular and in Northeast Asia
o Promoting Economic Revival through Economic Diplomacy
o Advancing the Cause of the People and Achieving Cultural Enrichment

The establishment of MIKTA can be regarded as a significant step towards building a network among middle power countries. As a trusted partner of both developed and developing countries,

Korea is well positioned to harmonize diverse interests in the service of the public good. To this end, Korea will strengthen its networks with nations that share common interests and continue to show leadership in setting the global agenda.

MIKTA tackles with key agenda items like health security, gender equality, sustainable development, climate change, terrorism, international civil aviation safety, regional issues and so on.

[Brief History of MIKTA]

o Sep. 25, 2013(New York); The 1st MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting
o April 13-14, 2014(Mexico City): The 2nd MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting
o Sep. 25, 2014(New York) : The 3rd MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting
o Nov. 15, 2014(Brisbane): The 4th MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting
o Feb. 27, 2015(Seoul): The 1st MIKTA Senior Officials' Meeting
o May 22, 2015(Seoul): The 5th MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting
(Adoption of MIKTA Vision Statement)
o July 2, 2015(Seoul): The 1st MIKTA Speakers' Consultation
o Sep. 26, 2015(New York): The 6th MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting
o Jan. 27-29(Canberra): The 2nd MIKTA Senior Officials' Meeting

[Achievement]

As a cross-regional consultative platform, MIKTA has initiated various cooperative projects to increase mutual understanding and deepen ties among its member countries.

In addition, MIKTA is striving to come up with joint position on major regional, global issues by holding free discussions. Finally, as an agenda setter, MIKTA is collaborating to offer constructive visions for the future.

[Flagship Cooperation Projects among MIKTA Member Countries]

Project	Overview
MIKTA Development Cooperation Workshop	o Discussion were held on issues related to the Post-2015 Development Agenda including ways to enhance development financing(Seoul, May 11, 2015) - MIKTA agreed to issue a joint statement on development financing on the occasion of the 3rd International Conference on Financing for Development(Addis Ababa, July 14, 2015)
Academic Network	o The 1st MIKTA Academic Network Conference was held and attended by the research institutes representing each MIKTA member(Seoul, May 11-12, 2015)
Exchange Program for Journalists	o Korea invited journalists from MIKTA countries an provided support so that they can cover the FMM and visit cultural sites on the occasion of the 5th MIKTA FMM(Seoul, May 22, 2015)
MIKTA Speakers' Consultation	o The 1st MIKTA Speakers' Consultation was held to enhance the public's understanding and generate political support ofr MIKTA(Seoul, July 2, 2015).

	- Member agreed to hold the 2nd MIKTA Speakers' Consultation in 2016 and adopted the Seoul Statement.
MIKTA Young Professional's Camp	o Korea invited graduate students in relevant fields of study form MIKTA member countries so that they can have discussion on MIKTA and participate in programs for increasing their understanding of the Korean culture(Seoul/Jeonju, July 6-11, 2015).
Short-Term Exchange Program for Students	o Australia invited graduate students form MIKTA member countries to participate in an exchange program at the Australia National University(Canberra, July 6-17, 2015).
MIKTA Junior Diplomat Exchange Program	o Australia launched an exchange program for junior diplomats with less than 2 years of working experience from MIKTA member countries(Canberra, August 3-October 2, 2015).
Cultural Exchange Events	o Korea held cultural exchange events in each MIKTA member country with the Korea Foundation as th organizer.

* MOFA, "MIKTA ; New Innovative Partnership", 2016.

ROK's various activities in MIKTA were symbolized on diversified, multilayered and multilateral paradigm of Korean diplomacy.(Kang, 2015) Through the diplomacy with MIKTA and toward MIKTA, ROK is accomplishing a middle power diplomacy and getting a diplomatic goals such as prestige, contribution on the world community.

In the future, we should strive to be institutionalized various meeting and consultation of the MIKTA. And then, future tasks are as follows : coordination of member states positions and interests, meaningful participation and performance enhancement and so on.

Ⅳ. ROK's Middle Power Diplomacy : Characteristics and Evaluation

Three directions of the ROK's MPD are as follows in the long term perspective. (1) Creation of middle power leadership and maintaining policy continuity. (2) Concentration of specific issues. (3) construction small scale multilateral cooperation system of middle power.

Action plans may include the following – △ establishment of MPD identity and presentation of vision, △ systemization and institutionalization of ROK type's MPD, △ choice and concentration strategy and niche diplomacy, △ connection of public diplomacy, △ creation of success stories and enforcement creative program development.

In general, ROK's MPD contains the following features and evaluation.

First, MPD is being promoted as authentic part of national agenda and some achievements are being made. As mentioned above MPD is well established as one of national tasks and has been evaluated that is well promoted as good correspondence to the international order reshaping. For instance, there is creation and institutionalization of MIKTA as a symbol and success story of middle power diplomacy.

Second, in terms of scope and subject MPD has not yet been completed. Although ROK is

actively engaged the middle power diplomacy in the international community such as MIKTA, G20, APEC, ASEM and so on, it is still insufficient. This remains a challenge in the future.

Third, new MPD program and network including globalization of Seamaul Movement, contribution of Post-15 agenda's creation, are well established as a progressive. This is expected to exert a greater effect when it is connected with Korean Wave and National brand with good image.

Fourth, ROK's MPD is dealing with such cross-border security, human right, international crime, ecological crisis, immigration, refugees, nuclear safety as the main agendas. It seems like focusing on the pan-global issues which are connected with the advantage of ROK.

Fifth, ROK's MPD are associated with public diplomacy. It suggests that it is important to create good image as well as favorable national brand including Korean Wave.

Finally, ROK's MPD is still in its infancy. There have not been finalized, including diplomatic subject, agenda, activity, goals, performance etc. Meanwhile, we know that there are positive elements and should strive to achieve better. Need to expand the area of diplomacy. It is also important to establish the identity as well as persistent as a national agenda.

Ⅴ. Conclusion : Policy implications and Tasks on ROK-V4

When viewed through the analysis above, policy implications and tasks on ROK-V4 are as follows;

First, the partnership and relationship between ROK and V4 has a future-oriented common interests that can be win-win. For example, there are economic cooperation, experience of regime change and providing implication for Korean Unification, Saemaul Movement and agricultural cooperation, cultural and emotional consensus including Korean Wave and so on.

Along with the economic cooperation, the Korean government vowed to share its developmental experience, such as its five-year economic development plans, with its V4 partners, in order to help these countries's developmental efforts. This is a great advantage for the development of relations between ROK and V4. Both sides should be concerned and need to continue to make good use them in the future.

Second, the relationship of ROK-V4 has a great momentum from the early stages because of starting of ROK-V4 summit. This is a form of partnership similar to the ROK-ASEAN, a multilateral consultative summit.

Recently, ROK and V4 held the third ROK-V4 meeting of deputy foreign ministers for political affairs and a working luncheon on June 14 2016. This was a follow-up of the summit. In the meeting, the two sides discussed in depth ways for the ROK-V4 cooperation as well as bilateral cooperation on North Korea and its nuclear issue situation in such regions as Europe and the

Middle East, and global issues.

The two sides reviewed the progress in the follow-up to the first-ever bilateral summit talks held in Prague, the Czech Republic, in December 2015 and agreed to continue close dialogue in a bid to advance the comprehensive cooperative ties between the ROK and the V4. The ROK-V4 meeting on June 14 is seen to have served as an opportunity to enhance the friendship and cooperation between ROK and the V4, member states of the EU and NATO that have achieved successful regime change, as well as to solidify the ROK's foundation for middle power diplomacy on the regional and global levels.

The follow-up is expected in the future want to expand foreign ministers meeting and high-level talks. The challenge is going to institutionalize and regularize these meetings.

Third, international issues and solution of current global affairs for both sides seems like the Blue Ocean. To meet the changing times, ROK and V4 will create a good image of the country to contribute to the international community. The two sides can also cooperate in climate issues, human right, terrorism, international health as well as cooperation in international organizations.

Fourth, as noted topics of the future, the two sides are expected to promote exchanges in the field of history and culture. V4 may have a unique history and culture. ROK, too, has a unique history and culture. Focusing on the youth in the future can continue to expand cultural exchanges as shown in the diffusion and exchange of Korean Wave including KCON.

On Dec. 2015 the first-ever K-pop concert in the Czech Republic was arranged in consideration of the fact that there are approximately 160,000 Korean Wave fans in the V4 states, but no such concert has ever been held. On June this year in France, a gala K-pop concert, part of KCON France 2016, took place in Paris, the first time for the KCON concert series to come to Europe. These concerts were evaluated as successful in terms of sharing cultural understanding. This is linked with K food, K education, K tour etc. and is promising field as public diplomacy. It will be expected to be part of a future public diplomacy division.

Fifth, the important thing is practical action of the joint statements adopted in 2015 summit. The joint statement contains a vision for future cooperation between Korea and the V4 and various cooperative projects as well as common position on key pending global issues and measures to work together to solve them. At that time, the two sides engaged in an extensive exchange of views on regional and global issues, including the situation in Ukraine, refugees and other European issues, as well as the situation in the Balkans and the Middle East, and a agreed to continue dialogue.

ROK was estimated to be achieved in the performance on enhancement of creative economic partnership, enlargement of trade and investment, strengthening of international cooperation etc. It is necessary to come out of this practice in the future. It is also important to have continuity of policy, regardless the domestic administration change.

Finally, this international conference in Prague will be the foundation for the development

between ROK and V4. In the civil sector and public diplomacy aspects, this will contribute to the promotion of mutual exchanges and understanding, particularly academic field.

Although the relationship between ROK and V4 is a small and beginning step, it expects to bigger leap forward. Both sides look forwards to continue to perform well for middle power diplomacy.

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III-2 Linguistics & Literature 1 (in English)

‘V4+1’: Opportunities for Strengthening the Cooperation

Chair: Keunsik Kim (Chung-Ang University)

≫ Verbal Representations of the Czech Pop Music Star Karel Gott: From the “Idiot of Music” (M. Kundera) to “a Sacred Idol in a Desacralized Reality” (M. Szczygiel)”

Petr A. Bílek (Charles University in Prague)

≫ The Understanding of Reality in Kafka's *The Metamorphosis and Nabokov's Invitation to a Beheading*

Hye-Kyung Park (Hallym University)

≫ The Issues of Food and Desire in Chekhov’s Writings

Seok Woo Moon (Chosun University)

≫ Motivation for Non-projective Constructions in Czech

Inchon Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

Verbal Representations of the Czech Pop Music Star Karel Gott: From the "Idiot of Music" (M. Kundera) to "a Sacred Idol in a Desacralized Reality" (M. Szczygiel)

Petr A. Bilek

Karel Gott (born 1939) has been the most popular Czech pop singer since mid1960s. Moreover, he has been the most popular icon of Czech popular and mass culture for decades. During these decades, he has been labelled as "The Golden Voice of Prague", "Sinatra from the East", "Golden Nightingale", "Divine Charlie" or "Maestro". Such labels have been aimed at distinct audiences and some of them worked just temporarily but Karel Gott have enjoyed his status of a star not only in the Czech cultural context but also in German speaking countries or in the former "Eastern Block" of the U.S.S.R. and the Communist satellite countries. His public image has been coined by hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles and interviews and eventually also by books on his life and career. His fame grew to stardom status hand in hand with the growth of TV broadcasting both in former Czechoslovakia and in Europe generally. He also explored all the potentials offered by commercial as well as public radios. He made a row of cameo appearances in films, occasionally reaching even for major roles. He participated in some popular films as the interpreter of the main theme song or major parts of their soundtracks. Though in recent years his popularity feeds more on the celebrity than the stardom pattern, he works as a topic of opinion all the three Czech post-communist presidents have been interviewed on. While Václav Havel, the first Czech post-communist president expressed somewhat reserved attitude[1] to Gott's career, lifestyle, and music, his successor, Václav Klaus, wrote two distinctive and highly appreciative texts meant as prefaces for the two distinctive books on Karel Gott. Recent president Miloš Zeman in an interview devoted solely to the topic of Karel Gott made a statement that any political regime that would ignore him would end up in a collapse sooner or later.

Karel Gott, however, made its way also into the canon level of belle lettres writings of the international context. In 1979, Milan Kundera published his first novel written for the international audience, *The Book of Laugher and Forgetting*. Karel Gott appears there as one fo the minor novelistic characters, brought into the fictional world of the novel by the autobiographical narrator:

> When Karel Gott, the Czech pop singer, went abroad in 1972, Husak[2] got scared. He sat right down and wrote him a personal letter (it was August 1972 and Gott was in Frankfurt). The following is a verbatim quote from it. I have invented nothing:

[1] However, he reffered to Gott as one of the symbols of cheap Communist culture in his one act drama *Audience* (1977). Havel repeatedly stated that his musical tastes prefer classic rock (and mainly underground music) over pop or jazz music.

[2] Earlier in the book, Gustav Husak is introduced as the president of Czechoslovakia following the Soviet occupation of 1968 and as the embodiment of a steep decline in hope for the narrator and his generation.

> *Dear Karel,*
>
> *We are not angry with you. Please, come back. We will do everything you ask. We will help you if you help us…*
>
> Think it over. Without batting an eyelid Husak let doctors, scholars, astronomers, athletes, directors, cameramen, workers, engineers, architects, historians, journalists, writers, and painters go into emigration, but he could not stand the thought of Karel Gott leaving the country. Because Karel Gott represents music without memory […] The president of forgetting and the idiot of music deserve one another. They are working for the same cause. (Kundera 1994: 181)[3]

Karel Gott functions here as an illustration of a large, pessimistic claim of the autobiographical narrator. All the world and European civilization in the first place suffer from a decline. The music as the illustrative sample of culture and civilization have declined from the peak era of classical music to recent pop, rock, and jazz music. Gott is incorporated into the novel as a mere synekdoche: He is a minor part, standing for the whole decline and reaching such depths of commercialism and opportunism that he stands for the "idiocy" of music going hand in hand with the idiocy of politics and manners of living.

More than twenty five years later, Polish journalist Mariusz Szczygiel wrote a book *Gottland* (2006), a reportage about 20th century Czech lands and its society and culture. His book marked a step towards the so called "new journalism" refocusing more on generalizing statements and abstractions instead of mere depiction of facts. *Gottland* has been translated into more than five other languages of large impact (French, English, Italian etc.) and it was awarded distinct prestigious awards as spreading through the European continent. Szczygiel's approach towards Gott puts him on a much larger scale than Kundera's. For Szczygiel, Karel Gott embodies most of the desires, projections, and self-explanatory attempts of 20th century Czechs. Gott is a "sacred in a desacralized reality" (Szczygiel 2014: 181). Using a linguistic pun that is intelligible in former Hapsburg monarchy countries ("der Gott" means the God in German), he explains that the Czechs as one of the most non-religious collectivities of Europe wiped out the social role of religion and eventually put Karel Gott on the empty spot in a style of a New Age religion that worships an individual of potentially magic qualities. Karel Gott implies the divine spirituality accessible by people who do not recognise any other divine power. Szczygiel uses Gott as a motif rooted so deeply in Czech mentality and history that Gott keeps reappearing throughout the book.

However, writing for the audience that does not share the same cultural encyclopedia, he needs to offer a definite description: 'Gott is the Czech Presley and Pavarotti rolled into one' (Szczygiel 2014: 173). Szczygiel's approach is based on a mixture of fascination and ironic distance. He is far from treating Gott as a synthesis of the classical and pop music or of European and U.S. music. The above

[3] Gott reappears once more in a later passage where the autobiographical narrator recalls an event where president Husak addressed children as the future of the country and, after his speech was delivered, Karel Gott stepped up to the podium and sang while he watched Husak, who was moved so much that the president's tears streamed down his cheeks. In contrast to the previous episode of Husak's letter which is narrated as a fact, here the narrator admits that this event is based on hearsay evidence, since he deliberately closed the apartment window as the event began.
Karel Gott appeared in French editions, *Le livre du rire et de l'oubli*, between 1979 and 1985 (and their later reprints) and in English editions, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, between 1980 and 1996. Then Kundera changed his translation policy and had even his Czech novels newly translated from the French editions. Thus in the new translation by Aaron Asher the name of Karel Gott has been changed to Karel Klos.

quoted phrase plays more with the notion of flexibility – the image of Karel Gott can be adapted and modified into anything needed for any particular discursive practices.

Such an approach allows, I believe, much more to build up on. It opens the way to approach Karel Gott and his public image, constructed by his recordings, concerts, public and media performances etc. as a typical stardom status, based on the concept coined by Richard Dyer. A star can function in public space either as a simple signifier: It signifies a stable, static and pre-defined type of meaning. That was the case of early 20th century Hollywood film production practices, making each star actor to stand for one distinctive quality or a trait. The same is the image of Gott constructed by Kundera: Gott stands just and only for the idiocy of modern popular and mass culture which declined from the high-brow culture of the past. Next to such practices, Richard Dyer identifies also a later film studio practice of making a star as a complex structured image. Such images are based on structured polysemy, e.g. the plurality if its meanings. In one specific context, just certain qualities enter the space of signification while in other contexts, another type of qualities can be put into the centre of the star image. We can thus witness the "multiplicity of meanings and affects, […] some meanings and affects are foregrounded and others are masked or displaced" (Dyer 3).

The way the star image of Karel Gott has been constructed by him or by his team in previous decades shows one more distinctive feature. As within the state socialism system of the Communist era the space for real stardom status had been eliminated, the stardom status of Karel Gott fed just from the feature of being absent in terms of the physical presence. Karel Gott spending most of his days on concert tours abroad or in music and TV studios was out of reach for standard audience. He was substituted by a simulacrum. The regime tolerated his lifestyle which in any other case would be deemed as decadent. The regime accepted that they "own" Karel Gott just partially. They did all they could to appropriate such a part of his potential and to use it for ideological propaganda purposes. However, they needed to hide facts they did not "own": The career and popularity of Karel Gott in Western Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and the other parts of the "bad" capitalist Western world. The other side of Karel Gott has been hidden or exposed just vaguely and fragmentarily until the collapse of Communist regime in 1989. Being an icon of the Communist regime, almost everyone expected that the political change would destroy his stardom status. However, the arrival of the new type of mass media, tabloid and soap opera newspapers and magazines allowed to refresh and uplift the image and stardom status of Karel Gott. The information about his luxurious private living estate, about his long lasting career and popularity in Western Germany and the other states of the capitalist world, the information about his love affairs or unorthodox worldviews allowed to cater his stardom status as a "hot medium value" for years. To go along with Marshal McLuhan's approach, the image of Karel Gott had been filled with new and new data for years and decades of the post-Communist era.

Such a new image, that did not require any new music performances, any novelty of styles etc., allowed to offer a new type of stardom – that of a sacred monster. The combination of the artistic status of a genius and of the everyman (coined by the tabloid news that presented Gott as a person doing the same things ordinary people do, but on a larger scale) brought an interesting appeal that triumphed over all the political engagements and, mostly, over the affirmation of Gott by the Communist regime. His new image since 1990s on has been based mainly on the notion of "a messenger of good news", on the notion of the entertainer who brings escape from any type of political or social constrains. With the

growing negative sentiments about politics generally and corruption or the idea of the social state particularly, Gott functioned like embodiment of mere pop "aesthetics", of fully de-political realm of pure entertainment. The image of Karel Gott had been continuously deprived of its former political meaning of the person used to support the Communist regime. Instead of that, Gott has been wrapped into the signification that could be phrased as a "pioneer of capitalism". It was Václav Klaus, the president of Czech Republic, who made such a claim explicit – in a preface to a book celebrating the 70th anniversary of Karel Gott's birth, he interpreted Karel Gott as one of the first capitalists born within the womb of Communism. The image of Karel Gott has been thus fully rewritten and turned upside down.

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The Understanding of Reality in Kafka's *The Metamorphosis and Nabokov's Invitation to a Beheading*

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I. Introduction

Nabokov's *Invitation to a Beheading* has often been compared to Kafka's works, especially his *The Metamorphosis*. Hyde sees in these two works "a combination of political and metaphysical allegory." (Hyde 129) Toker points out that in *Invitation to a Beheading* the Kafkaesque situation lends itself to a variety of complementary readings, that is, political, metaphysical and aesthetic readings. (Toker 123) According to Durantyae's opinion, it is not difficult to hear echoes of Kafkan steps in the early works of Vladimir Nabokov.

"Critics have detected faint echoes in his early Russia novels *The Eye*(1930) and *Despair*(1933) (see Hyde 104, 109; and Foster) and more definite sounds in *Invitation to a Beheading* (1938) In the latter novel, a harmless hero in an abstracted world is interred in a castle, brought before an incomprehensible tribunal, and charged with the vaguest of crimes ("Gnostic turpitude"). This thematic similarity was strong enough for Nabokov to protest in a 1959 forward to the English translation of the novel that he had not read Kafka until after he wrote it" (Durantyae 315)

In the forward of English translation Nabokov emphasized that he even did not know German and modern German literature at the time he wrote *Invitation to a Beheading*.

"Émigré reviewers, who were puzzled but liked it, thought they distinguished in it a "Kafkaesque" strain, not knowing that I had no German, was completely ignorant of modern German literature, and had not yet read any French and English translations of Kafka's works. No doubt, there do exist certain stylistic links between this book and, say, my earlier stories (or my later *Bend Sinister*); but there are none between it and *Le chateau* or *The Trial*. Spiritual affinities have no place in my concept of literary criticism, but if I did have to choose a kindred soul, it would certainly be that great artist rather than G. H. Orwell or other popular purveyors of illustrated ideas and publicistic fiction." (*Invitation to a Beheading* 6)

In this forward we also can find Nabokov's funny comments about his reviewers. He said that he could never understand "why every book of his invariably sends reviewers scurrying in search of more

or less celebrated names for the purpose of passionate comparison." During the three decades his works have been compared with works of "Gogol, Tolstoevski, Joyce, Voltaire, Sade, Stendhal, Balzac, Byron, Bierbohm, Proust, Kleist, Makar Marinski, Mary McCarthy, Meredith(!), Cervantes, Charlie Chaplin, Baroness Murasaki, Pushkin, Ruskin, and even Sebastian Knight."

When asked in an interview that "What about Kafka's work, and Gogol's. I am sniffing about for early influences", he replied: 'I do not know German and so could not read Kafka before the nineteen thirties when his *La metamorphose* appeared in *La nouvelle revue française*, and by that time many of my so-called 'kafkaesque' stories had already been published" (*Strong Opinions* 151-152)

Of course there are researchers that point out differences between these two writers.

"The world looks like an alien and artificial structure to the Nabokov hero as well; but instead of interrogating it in order to understand it better, he creates his own world and then tries to keep it safe from the hostile elements that surround him. Kafka's heroes must come to terms with guilt and despair; Nabokov's must reject such feelings." "Despite all the ambiguities in Nabokov, he is an author who 'validates,' and a man who could write, as Kafka never could. In short, Nabokov believes in the basic human decencies, and he thinks that it is relatively easy to communicate some sort of basic truth about them. These two writers saw the world very differently." (Rapmton 60,61)

II. The *Metamorphosis* and *Invitation to a Beheading*

In this chapter I will introduce basic outlines of two works to compare them. *The Metamorphosis* (Die Verwandlung) is a novella by Franz Kafka, first published in 1915. It has been called one of the seminal works of fiction of the 20th century. The story begins with a traveling salesman, Gregor Samsa, waking to find himself transformed (metamorphosed) into a large, monstrous insect-like creature. The cause of Gregor's transformation is never revealed, and Kafka himself never gave an explanation. The rest of Kafka's novella deals with Gregor's attempts to adjust to his new condition as he deals with being burdensome to his parents and sister, who are repelled by the horrible, verminous creature Gregor has become. (summary of Wikipedia)

The story consists of three parts. In part I, the main character Gregor Samsa wakes up to find himself transformed into a giant insect. Kafka wanted Gregor's form to remain indistinct. In a letter to his publisher Kurt Wolff on October 25th, 1915, Kafka worries that the illustrator for the volume (Ottomar Starke) "could want to depict the insect itself. Not that! Please; not that!" (*Briefe* 135) Kafka adds that "I must call upon my better knowledge of the story. The insect cannot be drawn. It can't even be shown in the distance" (*Briefe* 135) (Duraytyae 323)

In this part, the most interesting thing is that Gregor is not astonished by his transformation to insect but his worry about the consequences of his delay to the work. In part II, we can see that Gregor and his family are accustomed to this strange situation and their routine life begins. His sister Grete feeds him and cleans up while he hides under the couch, and Gregor spends most of his time listening through the wall to his family members talking. He grows more comfortable with his changed body. He begins climbing the walls and ceiling for amusement. Gregor's mother sees him hanging on the wall and passes

out, and annoyed father throws apples at Gregor. One of them sinks into his back and remains lodged there, paralyzing his movements for a month and damaging him permanently.

In part III, Grete has been asked to play the violin for three boarders, and Gregor creeps out of his bedroom to listen forgetting his horrible situation. Grete, who has by now become tired of taking care of Gregor tells her parents they must get rid of Gregor, or they will all be ruined. Understanding that he is a burden to his own family, Gregor slowly moves back to the bedroom and dies. Upon discovering Gregor is dead, the family at last feels a great sense of relief.

Invitation to a Beheading (Приглашение на казнь) was originally published in Russian from 1935 to 1936 as a serial in *Современные записки*, a Russian émigré magazine.[1] The novel takes place in a prison and relates the final twenty days of Cincinnatus C., a citizen of a fictitious country, who is imprisoned and sentenced to death for "gnostical turpitude." Unable to blend in and become part of the world around him, Cincinnatus is described as having a "certain peculiarity" that makes him "impervious to the rays of others, and therefore produced when off his guard a bizarre impression, as of a lone dark obstacle in this world of souls transparent to one another." Although he tries to hide his condition and "feign translucence," people are uncomfortable with his existence, and feel there is something wrong with him. In this way, Cincinnatus fails to become part of his society. While confined, Cincinnatus is not told when his execution will occur. This troubles him, as he wants to express himself through writing "in defiance of all the world's muteness," but feels unable to do so without knowledge of how long he has to complete this task. Indifferent to the absurdity and vulgarity around him, Cincinnatus strives to find his true self in his writing, where he creates an ideal world. Taken to be executed, he refuses to believe in either death or his executioners, and as the axe falls the false existence dissolves around him as he joins the spirits of his fellow visionaries in "reality." (summary of Wikipedia)

Cincinnatus C., a citizen of “a totalitarian anti-science-fictional dystopia” (Toker 123), is accused of an obscure crime called “gnostical turpitude” and described as “opacity.” He is guilty of being opaque in a world which demands glassy translucency. He is imprisoned in a fortress, condemned to death by beheading, and invited to collaborate in his own execution. His prison cell allows him the merest glimpse of sky, plus an inscription in the stone: ‘You cannot see anything. I tried it too.’ Actually this sentence reminds me a scene that Gregor was trying to see the outside street through a window of his room-prison. In some sense Grgegor was also imprisoned in his bedroom by his family.

Cincinnatus C. devotes his time in prison to trying to find out when his execution is to be and to contemplating the visionary world he builds in his imagination to supplant the real world to which he is denied access by his imprisonment. The journal he keeps is murkily metaphoric in its quest for the elusive truth which he feels is hidden at the heart of his experience. Hyde sees in this works a bitter satire on Soviet society: “The vulgarity is general throughout this prison ‘society’, and the censored newspapers suggest that the same combination of vulgarity and music-hall jocosity governs the world ‘outside’. It is a world of what in Russian is called poshlost(пошлость), a quite special kind of vulgarity.” Cincinnatus’ attempts to escape or to make contact with other people are endlessly frustrated, because all the characters are actors, and they just play their part. (Hyde 134)

[1] In 1938, the work was published in Paris, with an English translation following in 1959. While Nabokov stated in an interview that of all his novels he held the greatest affection for Lolita, it was Invitation to a Beheading that he held in the greatest esteem.

III. Kafka's Reality and Nabokov's Reality

Though Nabokov insists in the forward of *Invitation to a beheading* that he did not know German and had not read Kafka in the early years, he gives different information in other interviews. As to materials that Durantyae presented, Nabokov had uttered a lot of Kafka himself and his works. In an interview for the German weekly *Die Zeit* in 1959, his interviwer asked him if there were any German authors he did like. The answer apparently "came without the slightest hesitation": "Franz kafka. But not the mystical image of Kafka that has been erected by his friends but the real Kafka. I consider him one of the greatest European authors of our time, and I can always read and reread works like *The Metamorphosis* or *The Castle*" ("*Wer ist der Lolita-Author*" 6) (Durantyae 317) Nabokov said each year in his lectures on European masterpieces that Kafka was "the greatest German writer of our time" and that "such poets as Rilke or such novelists as Thomas Mann are dwarfs or plaster saints in comparison to him." (*Lectures on Literature* 255) In an interview from 1965, he drew up a personal list of "the greatest masterpieces of twentieth century prose," wherein Kafka's *The Metamorphosis* appeared in second place behind Joyce's *Ulysses*. (*Strong Opinion*s 57)

But it is not the purpose of this article to prove that Nabokov had read Kafka or not before writing *Invitation to a Beheading*. I will focus on Nabokov's reading of Kafka's work in his Lecture on Kafka.

His lecture on Kafka begins with a discussion on fantasy[2]: "I want to discuss fantasy and reality, and their mutual relationship." ""The Carrick," "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," and "The Metamorphosis": all three are commonly called fantasies. From my point of view, any outstanding work of art is a fantasy insofar as it reflects the unique world of a unique individual. But when people call these stories fantasy they merely imply that the stories depart in their subject matter from what is commonly called reality. Let us therefore examine what reality is, in order to discover in what manner and to what extent so-called fantasies depart from so-called reality. (*Lectures* 251, 252)

He takes three types of men walking through the same landscape – a city man on a well-deserved vacation, a professional botanist and a local farmer. "In every case it would be a world completely different from the rest since the most objective words *tree, road, flower, sky, barn, thumb, rain* have, in each, totally different subjective connotations. Indeed, this subjective life is so strong that it makes an empty and broken shell of the so-called objective existence."(253) Therefore, when he says reality, he bears in mind an average sample of a mixture of a million individual realities. "And it is in this sense (of human reality) that I use the term reality when placing it against a backdrop, such as the worlds of "The Carrick," "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," and "The Metamorphosis," which are specific fantasies." (253)

Durantyae explains that fantasy is reputable twin of reality in Nabokov's meaning. In an interview with Pierre Dommergues, Nabokov remarks: "The word 'reality' is the most dangerous word there is … The reality of art? It is an artificial, a created reality that is only reality within the novel. I do not believe in such a thing as objective reality" (Durantyae 322) As to Nabokov's opinion, "there is an average reality, perceived by all of us, but that is not true reality: it is only the reality of general ideas,

[2] In *Lectures of Literature* Nabokov turns from the generalities of fantasy to the particularities of Kafka's story. He devoted most of part of his lecture to interpret the details of literary structure, but in this study I will focus on his concept of reality and fantasy.

conventional forms of humdrummery, current editorials… Average reality begins to rot and stink as soon as the act of individual creation ceases to animate a subjectively perceived texture (*Strong Opinions* 118) And as a creative writer, he admits, "I tend more and more to regard the objective existence of all events as a form of impure imagination – hence my inverted commas around 'reality'" (*Strong Opinions* 32)

On a basis of these Nabokov's opinions, the world of *The Metamorphosis* and *Invitation to a Beheading* is a fantasy and at the same time a reality. In a real world it is impossible that man transforms to an insect or man is sentenced to death for a reason of opacity. "On the one hand, it is likely that none of its readers will have experienced a transformation into an insect. On the other hand, everything transmitted by an artist of genius – Proust, Tolstoy, Kafka, or himself, to employ the examples he offers – is by definition a "fantasy."" (Durantyae 322) But we can also read that *The Metamorphosis* actually depicts a patriarchal violence in the outset of European industrialization and *Invitation to a Beheading* is a condemnation against Soviet dictatorship. The Kafka's insect and Nabokov's prison can be a literary symbol of absurd reality.

To sum up, as a genuine literary work, these two stories reflect reality in their own way. According to Nabokov's understanding, we can say that *The Metamorphosis* is a Kafka's reality and *Invitation to a Beheading* is a Nabokov's reality.

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The Issue of Food and Desire in Chekhov's Writings

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I. Introduction

There are only a few things that attract our attention as much as food in popular culture. Food is consumed under a desire which has been exaggerated more than the basic needs of eating and drinking.

It is one of the inevitable elements in literature as it delivers personality, mood, and human status. In understanding people who have been brought up in different cultures or environments, food and food culture are important. Also, preferred foods or how they are eaten show one's sexual tastes. Feuerbach suggested, "Humans are defined through what they eat ."[1)]

That is, being human is defined by the food we eat. When food is mentioned in Chekhov's literary works, one pays more attention to the food used in literature and feels closer to the smell of the food.

Of course, there are lots of writers who mention food in different aspects, not only in literary works. Tolstoy is famous for strict adherence to vegetarianism .[2)] Writers often use food to twist those they hate. Samuel Johnson criticized the Scottish for eating like a horse. African-Americans mockingly call caucasions crackers. It may be because caucasions preferred crackers made by Nabisco[3)]. Caucasions insisted without proof that African-Americans liked watermelons, mockingly comparing them to the seeds of watermelons. They were compared to the black seeds of watermelons that people usually spit out. Food itself represents the people who eat, and if one does not eat the same thing as the rest of us do, or eat what we eat, this is interpreted as being an enemy. To examine the words which correspond to enemies in different cultural zones, they often indicate those who have different states.[4)]

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1) Ludwig Feuerbach: Das Geheimnis des Opfers. In: Gesammelte Werke(22vols) Vol. 11 Akademie Verlag Berlin 1969, p.26. recited: Jeon, Gyong-Hwa, "Happy Emma, Happy Pig, And Men, Desires and Death Shown in Emmas Gluck(2006)", No. 52, *German Language and Literature,* 2011.6, p.170.

2) Ronald Leblanc, *Food and Sexuality: Dostoevsky and Tolstoy*, Greenb, 2015, p.57.

3) An American confectionary which is famous for Oreo cookies and Litz crackers

4) Stewart Lee Allen, *At Devil's Garden,* Translated by Jeong, Mi-Na, Thinking Tree, pp.112-113

In Goncharov's *Oblomov*, residents in Oblomovka distribute common food, which is not an insignificant thing. It is a literary device to deliver a community consciousness which unites peopl e.[5] Food in Goncharov's novel is provided as a comfort in the ideal childhood of the hero and as a symbol of warmth. It indicates the perfect relationship between mothers and babies. The connection that was felt before they were weaned from the breast in the Oral Stage, an initial period of infancy. So, Oblomov was strongly attracted by the raised and compact breast of Agafia Pshenitsina, who became a representative mother and nanny.[6]

Eating behavior is more than simply satisfying basic biological needs. Food intake is an important behavior which is culturally framed and socially decided. As eating is a human activity that includes social, psychological, and physiological levels eating in literature can be changed into a narrative symbol which has diverse symbolic functions in a wider cultural context as well as in daily living and literary works.

II. Food in Russian Literature

Food has its own social properties. Society is a meeting and food exists in it. This study speculates on the relationship between the socialization of individuals and food, and society itself and food.

Socialization is a process which internalizes social values and culture. That is, socialization includes two supplementary processes, that is, transmission of social and cultural heritage, and formation of personality. Human socialization is derived from eating behaviors. [7] That is, when a baby begins suckling first, socialization begins. The experience of eating food during infancy is the basis of life. Diverse situations relating to food in childhood are remembered forever. This is because food provided to people is selected and processed according to ecological conditions and the history of our society. Society is formed by exchanges between people and the symbol of familiar relationships is food itself. Sharing food indicates entry into a closer stage beyond the formal level.

Theories on food in Europe focus on personal pleasure in appetite rather than Oriental cooking art [8]which governs self and the world in a harmonious way, but they focus on power which governs pleasure. The brutal outrage of sexual desire and physical pleasures are related to the needs of cooking. Or, what food becomes dominant as it is tangled with interests of power? Also, focus

5) М.В. Отрадин, “Сон Обломова как художественное целое“ *Русская литература*, No.1(1992), p.7.
6) Givens, ”Wombs, Tombs, and Mother Love“, p.100.
7) Park, Jae-Hwan, *Everyday and Food*, Everydayness·Everyday Living Research Association, Hanwool, 2009, pp.15-35, 37-59,123-144
8) Shin, Beom-Soon, “Primitive Love and Poetics of Restaurants – Towards Meal of Wildness”, *Korea Modern Literary Study*, vol. 12, Korea Modern Literature Association, 2002, pp.30-32.

is given to what food people look for to reveal identity and the desires of self with such power.

Hillman has a distinctive viewpoint as he reinterpreted Freud's theories on sexual desire into theories on appetite[9]: As the oral cavity is considered as a sexual organ that demonstrates a close correlation between sexual desire and appetite. Enjoying food is related to satisfying desires for tastes needed by the mouth.

Sydney Mintz focused on the political aspects and symbolic meanings of food. According to him, consuming food is identifies our identity and is a form of communication. Mintz said, "There are many cases where food is mobilized for happiness or freedom, and people understand it easily." This means that there are many cases where food is used for symbolic meaning rather than for physiological satisfaction. He suggested that the feeling that one is special, as a sort of false consciousness, and feeling of freedom and self-esteem are related to the consumption of food.[10] He also dealt with the power which takes place in food.

At any rate, Hillman and Mintz's points of view are somewhat different even though they considered instinct a brutal nature. Hillman saw foods as symbols of sexual desire which correspond to the id rather than the ego while Mintz saw it as ideologic symbols of ego relating to appetite. The problem is that food is a symbolic view of sexual desire or appetite ideology of the ego.[11] It seems that ideologic symbolism of the ego is generated from a crossing where the ego meets society and political power.

According to a study by Ronald Le Blanc, Dostoevsky's style' carnivore describes eating and sexual intercourse as psychological violence and attack. Governing the act is dramatically contrary to Tolstoy's sensuality which is interpreted as sexual impulse for orgasm, pleasure and addiction.[12] Dostoevsky's characters have strong personalities and brutal sensual impulses, and are governed by desires which can not be satisfied externally. Eating and adultery in Dostoevsky's novels indicate acts of violence and brutality rather than those of pleasure. Sensual desire is a realization of insatiable desire for power, that is, a desire to devour others.

III. The Relationship between Food and Desire in Chekhov's Novels

Food is a subject of desire for the heroes of Chekhov's novels. Chekhov's heroes eat very well and very much. Food sometimes leads to an eating behavior, that is uncommon or informal. Such acts are often derived from the desire of resolving hunger or being differentiated from others.

Olga Dmitrievna, a heroin of *Супруга(wife)* is gluttonous. Olga eats and drinks a lot even though

9) James Hilman, Charles Boer, *Freud was a cook*, Golden Branch, 2001.
10) Sydney Mintz, *Taste of Food and Taste of Freedom*, Jiho, 1992, p.54.
11) Shin, Beom-Soon, Ibid., p.34.
12) Ronald Leblanc, *Food and Sexuality*, p.77.

she is as light as air.[13] She has a boyfriend in France who is younger than her, but she enjoys joining in outdoor parties every night to have fun with other men. Ariadne, a heroin of *Ариадна*, knows the way to thoroughly use men as a means to escape poverty, destitution and solitude. So, she wanted to seriously love Shamokhin, and pretended to enthusiastically love him through chemistry. However, when Shamokhin's wealth was exhausted, she naturally moved her love to Duke Makutev, another financial supporter. Chekhov even presented a detailed menu of what and how much she eats to explain her big appetite.

> "We ate enormously. In the morning, coffee with milk, white bread with butter were served. Then, for breakfast served at 1 p.m., meat, fish, omelet whose name is unknown, cheese, fruits and wine were served. For lunch served at 6 p.m. eight dishes were served. We drank beer and wine for a few hours with a few long intervals. At 9 p.m. we drank tea. Before noon, Ariadne said she is hungry, and we ordered ham and half-cooked eggs."[14]

> "Ariadne slept until two or three in the morning everyday. She ate breakfast with coffee on the bed. For lunch, she had soup, king prawn, fish, meat, asparagus, and wild birds, and before going to bed, she ate roasted beef as a night snack. Then, she woke up in the middle of night and ate apples and oranges."[15]

Notwithstanding, Olga and Ariadne are surprisingly slim. Ariadne never grows fat and is surprisingly sly and cunning. (Она была дьявольски хитра и остроумна). Just as a sparrow chirps or a cockroach moves its feeler, she always uses tricks instinctively. The spaces where she eats food along with a number of food lists symbolizes her infinite desire. In addition, the fact that they never grow fat can be recognized as a symbolic sign of infinite desire. Thus, food in Chekhov's novels has value as an instrument and exchange, and exists as part of a medium which brings change to life.

IV. Chekhov's Ways of Expressing Food

Food in the kitchen always attracts Chekhov's attention. When Chekhov was a middle school student, he went fishing and enjoyed eating fried fish on the coast of Taganrog Bay.[16]

That the author repetitively expressed food in his novels can be evidence that it gives more

13) Супруга, *А.П. Чехов: Собрание сочинений в двенадцати томах*, том 8, с.10.
14) Ариадна, том 8, с.71.
15) Ариадна, том 8, с.74.
16) Ирина Варламова, "In the 155th Chekhov anniversary ceremony held at Taganrog Bay, I tasted food written in the writer's novels", https://godliteratury.ru/events/solite-ogurey-v-tykvakh 2016.5.22

active meaning instead of modern human desire. In [*Иванов*], a drama, the characters mentioned food in great detail.

> "Rebezev: A herring is most common as a side dish.
>
> Shavelsky: No, no, cucumber is the best. Scholars kept thinking from when this world was created. That nothing was better than pickled cucumber...(omitted)...
>
> Rebezev: It is good to drink Vodka with caviar as a side dish. The problem is how to eat it . We have to be smart... Mix 250 grams of salted caviar, two pieces of green onions, and olive oil and add some lemon . ..It's amazing! Excited with even the smell.
>
> Borkin: Following vodka, fried skewered food is good as a side dish. However, we have to know how to fry skewed meat very well. wash the meat, sprinkle on some bread crumbs and fry it enough to be crispy in the mouth...crispy-crispy-crispy..."[17)]

Chekhov intended to symbolically show the close relationship between the heroes through the stories where they remember and recollect food they ate in the past. When they share food, their relationship becomes closer. As seen, the food Chekhov described is not specially exotic. His novels describe food in detail and show a close or unnatural feeling the heroes experience.

Also, the food he describes connects the past to the future. It works in recovering past memories rather than it simply existing as material. Descriptive words such as "miss", "think", "was tasty", "was happy when I thought of it" confirm the literary functions of these materials more definitely. In particular, it is considered that from a semantic perspective, descriptive words govern the behaviors of the subject and forcefully give meaning to them. The descriptive words cited clearly show the mental orientation of characters beyond just descriptions of what the characters feel.

However, the most important thing is why intelligentsias of Chekhov gave special meanings to the food they ate. To this question, Chekhov answered like this: "When people are full, they feel happy. When eyelids are closed and the whole body becomes languid, they feel happy even when they read a magazine dealing with sensitive political issues."

V. Conclusions

Food has a higher value in addition to getting rid of hunger. It is culture itself, living and ideology. For Chekhov, memories of taste that he shared with his family in childhood are stored in his memories. The taste of food he ate as a child reminds him of the feelings he had when he shared it with his family. At this time, the memories he is reminded of are reflected by the taste of food he is experiencing in the present . To him, it can be summarized as follows: "taste –

17) Иванов, том 9, с.54-55.

remember – write". Of course, each stage is not only sequential, but sometimes simultaneous.

Food in Chekhov's novels were the subject of desire. So, food has instrumental and exchangeable values. It repeats extinction and creation through eternal regression. It seems that life styles including food in his texts are placed in the middle between the subject and object.

Motivation for Non-projective Constructions in Czech

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1. Introduction

Recently non-projective structures have been widely studied across different languages. These structures in contrast to projective ones contain a node with a discontinuous constituent on the level of phrase structure. These structures are well known to pose problems for the transformational theory which are applied to structures generated by phrase-structure rules.

The constituency in non-projective structures is viewed differently in Dependency Grammar in that the finite verb is the root of all sentence structure, they cannot and do not acknowledge the initial binary subject-predicate division of the clause associated with phrase structure grammars.

Non-projective constructions are common in natural languages, particularly frequent in morphologically rich languages with relatively free word-order like Czech. This paper investigates the issues of non-projective constructions in Czech. It illustrates several types of these constructions in Czech and discusses the factors and specific features causing deviations from projectivity such as motivation for these constructions. Movement of contrastive Topic to the initial position can be supposed that the flexible word order in Czech can be a decisive factor to require a non-projective left-moved node to be contrastive: it generally moves to the initial surface word-order position in the clause.

2. Projectivity and its Basic Theoretical Conceptions

2.1 Projective vs. Non-projective

Projectivity as a formal description of language has been discussed in linguistics since the establishment of modern generative grammar. It is a formal aspect of sentences in which constituents related by syntactic dependency form one syntagm and occur in the adjacent position in the surface structure word order.

(1) a. Nepodařilo se mu otevřit soubor.
not-succeeded Refl him_{Dat} to-open $file_{Acc}$
'He failed to open the file.'
b. He attends Czech class every day.

Both Czech and English sentence in the example (1) illustrate completely projective structures of the sentence; two constituents within VP domains, {*otevřit, soubor*} in (1a) and {*attend, Czech class*} in (1b) respectively appear in the adjacent position and they form the immediate syntactic domain; the complements *soubor* and *Czech class* immediately depend on their governing heads, *otevřit* and *attend* respectively.[1] All clauses interrupting any syntactic dependency in the surface structure by another element that does not immediately depend on either of them violate the projectivity, and they are called non-projective.

(2) a. Soubor se mu nepodařilo otevřit.
$file_{Acc}$ Refl him_{Dat} not-succeeded to-open
'He failed to open the file.'
b. Which class do you attend?

The examples in (2) instance non-projective counterpart of the previous projective constructions in (1). (2a) represents one of the most frequent types of Czech non-projective constructions motivated by Topic-Focus articulation; the immediate syntactic VP domain {*soubor, otevřit*} is split by the insertion of the finite verb *nepodařilo*.

The interrogative sentence (2b) is one of the typical non-projective constructions in English in which wh-items undergo obligatory wh-fronting to [Spec, CP] position. Therefore this discontinuity of the immediate syntactic constituents is triggered by the syntactic movement, i.e. it is motivated structurally not pragmatically; the immediate syntactic VP domain {*which class, attend*} is split by the insertion of the finite auxiliary verb *do* and the subject of sentence *you*.

2.2 Basic Aspects of theoretical description of Non-projective constructions

In regard to the property of projectivity, two basic theoretical conceptions are generally applied in the formal description of syntax, i.e. phrase structure grammar and dependency grammar. Phrase structure grammar is based on the syntax of immediate constituents within phrase structure; a sentence is not just a string of words in linear sequence, but is made up of 'layers' of immediate constituents; each lower-level constituent being part of a higher-level constituent. (Lyons 1995: 211). The essential criterion for determining which word forms or segments form a constituent is immediacy, i.e. closeness

[1] Oliva (2001: 163) operates in his analysis of discontinuity with the terms *syntactic domain* and *immediate syntactic domain of a governing element*. The syntactic domain includes all elements that depend directly or indirectly on the governing node (including the governing node); the immediate domain includes the governing node and all elements that immediately depend on it.

(affinity) of the parts.

Since the immediate constituents in phrase structure occur usually in contact positions and their ordering is fixed, the aspect of syntactic structure of sentence has been well applied to the language with fixed word order but not to free word order language. Since English has primarily grammaticalized word order in which the grammatical function of a word or phrase is determined by its position in the sentence" (cited in Novák 1997:464).[2]In English, the nominative and accusative are not morphologically distinct, hence the distinction of subject from object is determined by their relative positions to the verb of the sentence; the syntactic function of subject and object in a declarative sentence can be indirectly defined in positional terms as a noun phrase on the left and right of the predicative verb, respectively. This is one of the problematic issues when analyzing non-projectivity from the perspective of immediate constituents and phrase grammar.

The second prevailing approach to projectivity of the sentence is Dependency grammar. Unlike the dominant view of Phrase structure grammar that words are grouped together to form larger units or phrase structures of various kinds, dependency grammar assumes that words are grouped together by a relation of dependence.

Dependency syntax is based on the concept of valency, and therefore on the assumption that a verb is the major constituent of a sentence which selects its valency, i.e. obligatory complements in order to create a minimal complete structure and grammatical sentence (Danes - Grepl - Hlavsa 1987: 18).

The phrase grammar assigns syntactic roles to continuous constituents on the basis of surface word order position, i.e. it is unable to record syntactic relations between members of a non-projective constructions such as topic-focus articulation, wh-fronting etc. causing problems in the phrase structure of surface word order. Dependency grammar, on the contrary, is able to represent all dependencies between individual clause constituents and simultaneously preserve the surface structure word order.

3. Main motivation for non-projective conditions

Assuming that the dominant factors causing discontinuity can vary among languages, according to typological features of each language, I provide two main motivation for non-projective conditions: word order rule and topic-focus articulation.

As we looked at the previous examples in (2), most types of discontinuity in English are motivated by factors of grammatical nature while Czech discontinuity is largely connected with the Topic-focus information structure.

(3) a The bank robber is arrested by the policemen.
b. What did farther think that John will give to Mary?
c. The student we met yesterday speaks Czech.

All examples in (3) are the typical non-projective constructions in English. The passive construction in (3a) is generated by NP-movement to the initial position in the surface word order; the passive

[2] See Mathesius' comparative study of Czech and English word order (1947:349-350)

constructions are treated as having a D-structure in which the NP *the bank robber* occurs after the active transitive verb *arrest* and then moves into the subject-position of the surface structure. NP is generated inside VP domain {arrest, the bank robber}, where *the bank robber is* the complement of the head *arrest*.

The interrogative (3b) is the example of wh-fronting resulting from long-distance movement; the wh-item *what* is moved to the initial position of the matrix clause, leaving co-indexed trace in its base position. It is extracted from VP domain {give, what} to [Spec, CP].

The embedded relative clause (3c) is one of the most typical examples of non-projective constructions in English; the subject student is moved to the initial subject position of the sentence and separated by the embedded relative clause from which it is extracted.

These non-projective constructions in English given above bear no evidence of markedness, and they represent structural discontinuity. This kind of discontinuity is resulted by syntactically motivated movement, therefore it is not contrastively contextually bound. (Kristýna Čermáková 2008: 69)

3.1 Non-projective constructions motivated by word order rule

There are non-projective constructions which are characterized by several specific features of Czech word order rules, though Czech discontinuity is largely connected with the Topic-focus information structure.

Let us illustrate the typical conditions of these types of non-projective constructions.

A. Discontinuity caused by Question Particle *-li*

(4) Máme-li peníze, chceme si ho koupit.
have:1PL-if money want:1PL Refl it:ACC buy
'If we have money we want to buy it at once.'

The Czech clitic, *-li* 'if' serves to introduce the indirect question clause and in modern Czech it is attached by a hyphen only to the indicative form of the initial verb. The clitic *-li* is prosodically incomplete, and syntactically it actually encliticizes to one and only one initial word but not to the phrasal constituent. If the verb is followed by a dependent element, then -li is in a gap and non-projectivity follows or several of them at once. The clitic *-l*i is usually found in the examples antiquated but still acceptable.

B. Discontinuity caused by clitic climbing

The clitic climbing is the phenomenon, whereby a clitic moves from the lower phrase where it is generated to the second clitic position of a higher phrase. The representative instance in Czech is clitic climbing from an infinitival complement clause.

Type 1: Modal Verb + Inf

(5) a. Karel *by se mu* měl omluvit za jeho nezdvořilost.
Charles:NOM AUX.3SG RFL him:DAT had to apologize for his disrespect:ACC

'Charles should apologize to him for his disrespect.'

b. *Karel by měl omluvit se mu za jeho nezdvořilost.

c. *Karel by měl se mu omluvit za jeho nezdvořilost.

Clitic climbing the Type 1 is restricted to obligatory climbing out of the infinitival complement of modal verbs. As given in (5a), the clitic position of *by* is associated with its verbal head *mít* 'to have to' whereas the placement of *se* and *mu* is triggered by movement from the lower base-generated position, that is, from the argument position of the verb *omluvit* in the infinitival clause. Both (5b) in which the clitics do not undergo obligatory climbing and remain in situ, and (5c) in which the clitics climb to the initial position of the infinitival clause rather than to the sentential second position, are ungrammatical in Czech.

Type 2: Non-modal Verb + Inf

(6) a. Karel se rozhodl představit ti ho.
Charles RFL decided introduce:INF you:DAT him:ACC
'Charles decided to introduce him to you.'
b. Karel se ti_i ho_j rozhodl představit t_i t_j.

The constructions in Type 2 allow optional clitic climbing in Czech. As the example in (6a) shows, clitic clusters can remain in situ as arguments of the head verb, *představit* or climb to the higher second position as in (6b) where it should be ordered according to restricted template of the clitic cluster, RFL-DAT-ACC. The following example (7) points out that a clitic separated from its cluster does not undergo climbing individually.

(7) *Karel se ti_i rozhodl představit t_i ho.

Interestingly, there is a restriction on clitic co-occurrence in the instances of optional clitic climbing.

(8) a. Karel se rozhodl představit se mu.
Charles RFL decided introduce:INF RFL him:DAT
'Charles decided to introduce himself to him.'
b. Karel se $Ø_i$ mu rozhodl představit t_i.
c. *Karel se se mu rozhodl představit.

In (8b), where the lower reflexive clitic is phonetically identical to the higher one and climbs to the sentential second position, the merger of two reflexive clitics into one form is obligatory. (8c), where this merging is not realized, are ungrammatical. Note that clitic climbing leads to ungrammaticality in the following examples where the higher reflexive clitic differs from the lower reflexive clitic in form.

C. Discontinuity caused by wh-movement

The initial position in the discontinuous domain is occupied by a interrogative pronoun. The following

examples are concerned with short movement through fronting of multiple wh-items.

(9) a. Kdo_i $komu_j$ co_k [$_{VP}$ t_i dal t_j t_k]? (Palek 1999)
who:NOM whom:DAT what:ACC gave
'Who gave what to whom?'
b. Kdo_i [$_{VP}$ t_i dal komu co]?
c. Kdo_i $komu_j$ [$_{VP}$ t_i dal t_j co]?

Comparing its English gloss 'Who gave what to whom?', in which the language does not undergo multiple movement and only one wh-item can be fronted while the others should be in-situ, the multiple wh-items in (9a) are fronted in the left peripheral position, leaving coindexed traces. Czech also allows wh-items in situ as given in (9b) and (9c).

Now, consider the examples of wh-fronting resulting from long movement with the corresponding glosses in English.

(10) Kdo_i myslíš, [$_{CP}$ že [$_{IP}$ t_i přijde na večeři]]?
who:NOM think:2SG that come:FUT to dinner:ACC
'Who do you think will come to dinner?'

The subject wh-item in (10) is extracted from lower clauses beyond the overt complementizer.

The long-distance wh-movement also involves multiple wh-fronting in Czech and involves discontinuity.

(11) a. Kdo_i $komu_j$ co_k myslíš, [$_{CP}$ že t_i dal t_j t_k]? (Palek 1999)
who whom what think:2SG that gave
'Who do you think gave what to whom?'
b. Kdo_i myslíš, [$_{CP}$ že t_i komu co dal]?
c. Kdo_i co_j myslíš, [$_{C}$P že t_i t_j komu dal]?

In (11a), the multiple wh-items are moved to the initial position of the matrix clause, leaving coindexed traces in their base positions. Sentences (11b) and (11c) indicate that one or more than one wh-item can be extracted to a higher clause and the other items can remain in situ. However, at least one wh-item should be fronted to the [Spec, CP] position, otherwise the result is ungrammatical.

3.2 Non-projective constructions motivated by Topic-Focus articulation3

Let us now illustrate the two types of non-projective constructions motivated by Topic-Focus articulation. The examples mostly taken from the Prague Dependency Treebank.

[3] The analysis of non-projectivity is connected to the analysis of word order and topic-focus articulation (TFA). We understand TFA (also Functional Sentence Perspective) as a segmentation of a sentence into topic (theme) and focus (rheme). (Sgall et al. 1969:67).

A. Non-projective constructions with attributes

There are two subtypes of discontinuity between a nominal node and its attribute. First, the attribute moves to the left then it causes discontinuity.

(12) a. Studené mám pivo nejradši.
cold I have beer the most
'As for beer, I like it best cold.'
b. O dietě jsem napsal knihu.
about diet be:AUX.1st wrote book
'As for diet, I have written a book about it.'
(Hajičová 2004:16, Prague Dependency Treebank)[4]

The attribute *studené* of the noun *pivo* in (12a) and the attribute *o dietě* of the noun *knihu*, respectively are non-projectively moved to the left initial position in the sentence.

Secondly, the governing head moves to the left then it causes discontinuity.

(13) a. Sportovec je Pavel dobrý.
sportsman is Paul good:MAS
'As for sport, Paul is good at it.'
b. Těch stromů porazili třicet.
those trees:GEN they felled thirty:ACC
'As for the trees, they felled thirty of them.' (Hajičová 2004:16)

Sportovec je Pavel dobrý in (13a) and *Pavel je dobrý sportovec* are realized differently in their DP; in the former case *Sportovec* is contrastively bound, on the other hand in the latter one it is contextually non-bound.

B. Non-projective constructions with infinitives

There are two types of discontinuity between an infinitive and its complement.

(14) a. Karla jsme zamýšleli poslat do Ameriky.
Charles:ACC be:AUX.1stPL intended to send to America
'As for Charles, we intended to send him to America.'
b. Pozvat jsem se rozhodl jen rodinu.
to invite be:AUX.1stSG Refl. decided only family:ACC
'Speaking of invitation, I have decided to invite only the family members.'
(Hajičová 2004:16)

[4] The Prague Dependency Treebank (PDT) contains a large amount of Czech corpus texts with complex and interlinked morphological, syntactic and complex semantic annotation; PDT is based on the long-standing Prague linguistic tradition, adapted for the current Computational Linguistics research needs.

(14a) is the example in which the complement of the infinitive is non-projectively moved to the left, on the other hand (14b) the infinitive itself is moved to the left.

Non-projective constructions motivated by Topic-Focus articulation has quite strong tendency to occur in the initial position in the surface word order, no matter how deeply it is embedded in the DP of the sentence.

4. Conclusion

The objective of the study is to investigate the basic issues of non-projective constructions in Czech. We discuss the notion and property of projectivity, based on the basic aspects of theoretical description of syntax, i.e. phrase structure grammar and dependency grammar.

Assuming that the dominant factors causing discontinuity can vary among languages, according to typological features of each language, I provide two main motivation for non-projective conditions: word order rule and topic-focus articulation.

Even though Czech non-projectivity is largely connected with the Topic-focus information structure, there are non-projective constructions motivated by Czech word order rules. The paper provides three types of discontinuity in this respect: discontinuity caused by Question Particle -li, discontinuity caused by clitic climbing and discontinuity caused by wh-movement.

Two decisive factors causing non-projective constructions in Czech, such as clitic climbing in Czech from an infinitival complement clause and short and fronting of multiple wh-items through long distant movement are discussed in detail.

Finally, I illustrate the two types of non-projective constructions motivated by Topic-Focus articulation through the examples are mostly taken from the Prague Dependency Treebank.: (1) non-projective constructions by movement of attributes and movement of governing head to the left initial position of sentence, (2) discontinuity between an infinitive and its complement.

One can see that Czech non-projective constructions motivated by Topic-Focus articulation has quite strong tendency to move to the left initial position in the surface word order.

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III-3 Social Sciences 1 (in English)

‘V4+1’: Opportunities for Strengthening the Cooperation

Chair: Bongchul Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ The Present Situation and Strategy of Development of the Tourist Industry in Croatia

Chul-Min Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ A Comparative Study of Romania and North Korea under the Communist Dictatorship

Jeong O Park (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ What’s Different about Corporate Governance in Korea and Eurasia?

Jae-Seung Baek (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

The Present Situation and Strategy of Development of the Tourist Industry in Croatia

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1. Introduction

Croatia is a Mediterranean country with approximately 930km of shoreline along the Adriatic Sea. This country with its ancient remains, situated in a primitive natural environment, make it an obvious tourist attraction. By 1980, Croatia already had an inflow of foreign currency because of its tourist industry, Croatia was considered the third base best travel destination of Europe behind Austria and Switzerland. Also, it was among the main tourists countries in Southern Europe, right behind Italy and Spain; Croatia had the third largest income from tourism and number of tourists visiting the country.[1)]

Geographically, Croatia was centered in the heart of the major ancient transportation routes that connected Western Europe, Central Europe and the Balkans, and for a long time Croatia had been an active center of trade and commerce. Therefore, because of it's geographical location, it is a place that had been blessed with an influx of foreign tourists. Although, in 1989 the collapse of the socialist system in Eastern Europe, the consequent election of a multiparty in 1990, the division of the SFRY(Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), and a long Civil War(1991-1995) led to a rapid decline of tourist, and this brought about the destruction of the tourism industry in Croatia. Along with this, in 1999 the outbreak of war in neighboring Serbia with Kosovo caused further destruction and made it difficult to revitalize the tourism industry.

However, from the year 2000 Croatia has begun to become a great travel destination again, and revitalization is taking place. The raw natural beauty that Croatia is blessed with is an especially great resource for tourism, with 1,244 islands stretching from the north to the south in the beautiful Adriatic Sea.[2)] From the time of the ancient cities of Greece and Rome they have been importing and embracing an array of cultures, which has led to a country dotted with the vestiges of diverse

1) Lee, Seung-Woo, *A Study on Development Trends of Croatian Tourism: in terms of World Tourism Trends,* (Seoul: Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2003).

2) Ministry of Tourism of Croatia, "General Data on the Republic of Croatia" http://www.mint.hr/UserDocsImages/150701_Tourism014.pdf

ancient civilizations. Along with this, traditional festivals and a cuisine rich with fresh seafood provide a combination for Croatia to become a country with a strong tourism industry.

In this study, my purpose is to introduce to you the distinct features of how Croatia will successfully become a new tourist destination in the 21st century. A study on the development of Croatian Tourism with a practical approach can not only be the foundation but also increase the expected effect in introducing the characteristics and policies of Tourism Industry in other Eastern European countries where interests is growing.

2. The current situation of Croatia's Tourism Industry.

The World Tourism Organization defines tourism more generally, in terms which go "beyond the common perception of tourism as being limited to holiday activity only," as people "travelling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business, and other purposes."[3] The main tourist attractions are natural wonders, history, cultural heritage, and festivals. When you consider this, the tourist industry can be much more environmentally friendly than the manufacturing industry. Also, another attractive aspect of bringing foreign tourist is that they bring in foreign currency and foreign cultures that will be a positive influence on the country by broadening the country's cultural understanding, which will contribute to a positive image for the country. Thus, countries around the world can nurture the progress of Croatian industry through tourism.

With the coming of the 21st century, it has become easier in the global economy to have rapid growth and attract an ever increasing amount of tourists be cause of competition from multiple airlines driving down the price off lights and access to the Internet, and its vast wealth of information, simplifying how one makes and markets travel arrangements.

According to the data of the WTTC(World Tourism Travel Council) in 2008, the tourists industry made up approximately 8.4% (approximately 238,277,000 people) in 2018 it is expected to reach 9.2%. Also, in 2008 tourism made up 9.9% (U.S.$ 5,890bn) and in 2018 it is expected to be 10.5% (U.S.$ 10,855bn). Along with this, in 2008 the tourism industry was responsible for 11% (U.S.$ 2,103bn) of world exports and it is expected to be 10.3%(US$ 4,714bn) in 2018. Based on this, we should see a 4% growth of the world tourism industry every year for the next 10 years. Europe has the most developed tourist industry with the largest number of tourists in the world. The World Tourism Organization reports the following ten destinations as the most visited in terms of the number of international travellers in 2014 (if you include Turkey and Russia in Europe, 7 of the 10 are from Europe): 1st place France with 83.7 million visitors, 2nd place the

3) UN World Tourism Organization (1995), "UNWTO technical manual: Collection of Tourism Expenditure Statistics" p. 10.

U.S.A. with 74.8 million visitors, 3rd place Spain with 65.0 million visitors, 4th place China with 55.6 million visitors, 5th place Italy with 48.6 million, 6th place Turkey with 48.6 million, 7th place Germany with 33.0 million visitors, 8th place England with 32.6 million visitors, 9th place Russia with 29.8 million visitors, and Mexico with 29.1 million visitors. Europe does very well as a location that attracts tourism.[4)]

Actually, judging by the statistics from 2008 tourism accounts for 10.1%(U.S. $1,876.6 bn) of the EU's GDP and accounts for 10.8% of employment, creating a large job market. Also, when the world tourism market is divided into 13 areas, Europe comes out to be the number one market.[5)]

This research shows that when you're looking at high growth markets in Europe for the 21st century Croatia's tourism industry draws your attention. In 1990 Croatia's independence process and ethnic conflicts were troubling for Croatia's image, but in the 21st century it appears that Croatia will experience yearly growth. According to the data from Croatia's Ministry of the Sea, Transport and Infrastructure(Ministarstvo mora, prometai infrastukture) along with Croatia's Ministry of Tourism(Ministarstvo turizma) in 2002 approximately 8,320,000 tourists visited Croatia, in 2003 approximately 8,877,000 tourists visited, 2004 approximately 9,412,000 tourists visited, in 2005 approximately 9,995,000 tourists visited, and finally in 2006 over 10,000,000 tourists visited with approximately 10,384 people visiting, in 2007 approximately 11,162 tourists visited Croatia.

Following the financial crisis in 2009 the number of tourists were reduced everywhere in the Euro zone. However, because of it's beautiful natural environment, ancient structures, and abundance of tourist attractions, Croatia was able to rebound quickly. In 2010 approximately 10,604,000 tourists visited, in 2011 approximately 11,455,000 tourists visited, in 2012 approximately 11,835,000 people visited, in 2013 approximately 12,433,000 tourists visited, in 2014 approximately 13,128,000 tourists visited, continuing the trend of the rapid growth of the number of tourist visiting the country each year.[6)]

<Chart 1: Croatian Tourism Conditions>[7)]

	Number of Tourists (in 000)							
	2002	2004	2006	2007	2010	2012	2013	2014
Domestics	1,375	1,500	1,726	1,855	1,493	1,466	1,485	1,505
Foreigners	6,944	7,911	8,658	9,306	9,111	10,369	10,948	11,623
Total	8,320	9,412	10,384	11,162	10,604	11,835	12,433	13,128

4) In 2014, there were 1.133 billion international tourist arrivals worldwide, with a growth of 4.3% as compared to 1.087 billion in 2013. UN World Tourism Organization (2015), "UNWTO Tourism Highlights 2015 Edition", (25 June 2015), http://www.e-unwto.org/doi/pdf/10.18111/9789284416899 (Retrieved 3 June 2016).

5) World Travel & Tourism Council, http://www.wttc.org (Retrieved 16 June 2016).

6) Ministry of the Sea, Transport and Infrastructure/ Ministry of Tourism, "Tourism in Figures", http://www.mint.hr/default.aspx?id=363 (Retrieved 14 June 2016).

7) Ibid.

From the 21st century on, the 2009 numbers are excluded because of the financial crisis in the Euro zone, you can already see a 5-10% growth in the tourist industry every year. Also, *Lonely Planet* mentioned Croatia as part of there reporting on the most popular tourist destinations in the world. *Lonely Planet* included Croatia because it is blessed with a great location and beautiful scenery, along with culture, history, cuisine, and traditional festivals that are all harmoniously combined to give it the strong foundation for a great travel destination.[8)]

In our country's case a considerable number of foreign tourists are from China, Japan, and other Asian countries. Croatia has faces a similar challenge, with 80% of its foreign tourists coming from countries in Europe. In 2007 the majority of Croatia's foreign tourists came from Germany, with Germans making up 16.7% of all visiting tourists(approximately 1,554,000 people). In 2014 Croatia maintained those past numbers with approximately 1,989,000 visiting Germans. Next in line (in 2007) was Italy with approximately 1,249,000 Italians visiting (making up 13.4% of visiting tourists), but after the Euro zone crisis all Southern European countries experienced economic difficulties, and based on the statistics from 2014 that number was reduced to about 1,061,000 Italian visitors. One peculiarity is the small European country of Slovenia is the third largest visitor of Croatia. In 2007 Slovenians made up 10.9% of all visiting tourists (approximately 1,015,000 people), and in 2014 they continued their interest in Croatia with about 1,101,000 Slovenians visiting. Even taking into account its geographical proximity to Croatia, it needs to be pointed out that with a population about 2 million people in 2014, approximately one million of them visited Croatia.[9)] To be specific, a very large amount of foreign tourists are revisiting Croatia and we can analyze the high growth potential of Croatia's tourist industry.

<Chart 2: Until 2007, Tourists by Nationality>[10)]

	Number of Foreign Tourists						
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
1	1,299,729	1,481,659	1,551,844	1,580,844	1,572,090	1,544,801	1,554,794
2	1,059,810	1,099,427	1,205,532	1,231,901	1,252,684	1,235,413	1,249,343
3	686,844	690,366	708,506	740,960	742,498	790,083	839,717
4	74,719	134,708	220,636	392,911	591,098	505,139	473,808
5	106,960	132,160	152,519	208,359	255,500	266,777	267,159
6	46,026	60,607	82,883	103,686	113,909	129,737	134,312
7	742,485	697,902	699,992	663,794	615,535	593,276	669,132
8	279,825	318,015	356,139	403,443	453,395	402,782	381,202
9	391,809	358,065	237,968	240,654	241,868	275,845	322,890

8) Lonely Planet, http://www.lonelyplanet.com (Retrieved 8 June 2016).
9) Ministry of the Sea, Transport and Infrastructure/ Ministry of Tourism, "Tourism in Figures", op. cit.
10) Ibid.

10	202,905	191,176	198,957	176,294	184,891	217,988	280,586
11	876,987	869,900	918,462	884,462	878,882	913,072	1,015,379
12	172,490	173,214	177,661	163,104	170,581	188,774	222,135
13	52,446	58,529	65,430	97,564	115,280	154,065	181,381
14	10,323	15,602	20,258	28,138	40,825	57,550	70,489
15	12,565	15,340	16,040	22,932	32,748	64,751	86,404
16							13,792

(# 1-Germany, 2-Italia, 3-Austria, 4-France, 5-U.K., 6-Swiss, 7-Czech, 8-Hungary, 9-Poland, 10-Slovakia, 11-Slovenia, 12-Bosnia, 13-America, 14-Australia, 15-Japan, 16-Korea)

<Chart 3: Number of tourists, by nationality, since the global economic crisis of 2008>[11)]

	Number of Foreign Tourists (in 000)						
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Germany	1,545	1,579	1,525	1,661	1,852	1,932	1,989
Italia	1,167	1,200	1,018	1,150	1,050	1,107	1,061
Austria	813	881	810	892	945	968	1,019
France	439	406	388	394	418	449	441
Netherland	297	307	285	286	335		
Russia				182	196		
U.K.						389	429
Czech	622	607	605	638	647	652	661
Hungary	370	323	297			326	366
Poland	417	454	454	497	544	636	630
Slovakia	299	306	310	335	337	337	355
Slovenia	1,042	1,012	1,016	1,099	1,053	1,067	1,102
the rest	2,399	2,254	2,398	2,788	2,988	3,175	3,570

The reason why there are relatively a lot of European tourists is Croatia's geographical proximity to other European countries as well as the advantages in cost and how easy it is to collect information for tourism.

Especially those countries that need long-term accommodations like the U.S.A., Australia, Russia, France, and etc. will only have their numbers raised by some effort from Croatia. One point also worth our attention, is that recent numbers show the number of Korean tourists is growing exponentially. Also, the average length a tourists stays in Croatia, 4.9 days, is much higher than other Eastern European Countries.[12)]

11) Ibid.

These are the numbers after Korea was introduced to beautiful and clean Croatia with its historical artifacts and tourist attractions: in 2007 over 10,000 Koreans visited, in 2013 approximately 70,500 visited, in 2014 approximately 240,000 visited, and in 2015 over 300,000 Koreans visited.

Croatia has now become the largest tourist destination among Eastern European countries for Koreans. Croatia has done a lot to make plans and try to heal from the wounds caused by its civil war, especially in the year 2000, and has been successful doing so. The IBRD(International Bank of Reconstruction and Development) and the IMF(International Monetary Fund) has given a lot of support and loans to help improve Croatia's ageing facilities and infrastructure, which has helped in the effort to revitalize its tourist industry.

The Croatian governments efforts and greater foreign investment have been, and are being, used to expand tourist facilities, strengthen service industry education, to make it easier for foreign tourists to enter the country through improved flights, roads, and ports, and to improve overall infrastructure. Also, Croatia's government is working with tourism companies to restructure certain processes and to bring in international hotels and to allow them to invest in Croatia's hotel industry.

In addition, Croatia, in an effort to protect the natural beauty of the Adriatic coastline, has enacted the 'Adriatic Costal Protection Law'. While at the same time, in an effort to extend the traditional tourists season along the Adriatic Coast, currently from June to September, has added newer tourists attractions (focusing on leisure sports, spas, and themed tours). Along with Croatia's long coastline, an effort has been made to create a sustainable infrastructure that supports the 1,244 beautiful islands along the coast and opens them up to tourism.

Compared to many countries, Croatia has had very positive results due to the effects of its tourist industry. Actually, based on the numbers from 2014, tourism was 15% of total GDP (accounting for approximately 74 billion euros); 28% of Croatia's employed are working with or in the tourism industry.[13] Therefore, Croatia's tourism industry is a vital aspect of its economy, and can be considered strategic for Croatia's success.

Next, we will look at the current state of Croatia's tourism industry and look at four key features of that industry, and development strategies for each feature.

12) tportal. hr, "Turistički prihod porast će prvi put nakon 2008." http://www.tportal.hr/biznis/gospodarstvo/148403/Turisticki-prihod-porast-ce-prvi-put-nakon-2008.html (Retrieved 8 June 2016).

13) World Bank, "Croatia", http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/croatia/overview (Retrieved 6 June 2016).; But, annual average unemployment rate in 2014 was 17.3% and Croatia has the third highest unemployment rate in the European Union, after Greece (26.5%), and Spain (24.%). Eurostat, "Unemployment rate by sex and age - annual average", http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do (Retrieved 9 June 2016).

3. Characteristics and Content of Croatia's Tourism Industry

3.1 Environmentally Friendly Elements

Despite the disregard for the natural environment that is experienced during a civil war, Croatia's has been well preserved and protected. One element of the tourist industry is that Croatia's government has to be careful to protect its environment while it uses its natural resources as tourist attractions. Thankfully, national strategies have been devised, and are being pursued, to protect and conserve this pristine environment. Also, Croatia's tourism industry understands that to have any longevity they must preserve the environment that is fueling the industry by growing in an environmentally friendly way.

As a result the inland region around Plitvice Lakes and the area along the Adriatic Sea are being carefully preserved and protected for and by the tourist industry, and is an exemplary case of an "environmentally friendly tourism industry." This tourism industry is a wonderful example of how humans and nature can exist together in the tourism industry and the economic benefits from that coexistence.

To this end, since 1989 the Croatian government has conducted salinity probes and assessed the sea level along the 800 of its beaches along the Adriatic Sea. In particular, during the major tourist season (from May to October) the government has taken the initiative to carefully monitor and manage the areas using its labs. They are doing their evaluations by processes and standards set by the EU, and have set even stricter standards than the WHO(World Health Organization) and UNEP(United Nations Environmental Program Organization).[14)]

3.2 Natural and Geographical Elements

Croatia is a relatively small country with a population of 428 million as of 2015. Croatia's capital is Zagreb. It is a country with a territory that covers 88,703 square kilometers, 65% of it consisting of 56,594 square kilometers of land and 35% of it consisting of 31,479 square kilometers of coast and water. It has 6,278 kilometers of coastline, with 1,880 kilometers of it on the mainland coast and 4,398 kilometers of it consisting of island coastlines.[15)]

In other words, without even mentioning Croatia's inland, it has an enough amount of costal geographical features to even further develop its tourism industry. Also, Croatia, being a Central European country, is located at a major crossroads that links Asia and Southern Europe and allows for tourist from many locations to easily visit it. Since ancient times, Croatia's long Adriatic

14) The other Europe, balkan, http://san.hufs.ac.kr/~balkan (Retrieved 11 June 2016).

15) Ministry of Tourism, "General Data on the Republic of Croatia" http://www.mint.hr/UserDocsImages/150701_Tourism014.pdf (Retrieved 8 June 2016).

coastline allowed it to develop into an important trade area for the Mediterranean.

Croatia has a long rugged mountain range stretching from the north to the south that allows for it to have distinct climates between its inland and coastal areas. Resulting from this, Croatia has a variety of flora and an expanse of virgin forests. These elements help to make environmentally friendly travel into a theme of the industry and its products.

3.3 Ancient Cultures and Folk Heritage

In Croatia, especially along the Adriatic costal areas, an array of ancient cultures and their influences can be seen. There are several, still well preserved, Roman structures that exist from when the Roman's dominated the area. Visitors to Croatia interested in touring parts of the ancient world find these structures quite rewarding, and they are another strong draw for the Croatian tourism industry.

Croatia has a variety of culturally rich architecture that is well preserved and able to be viewed closely that is surrounded with backdrops of rugged mountains and beautiful coastlines. The cities receive less attention due to the pull of the gorgeous coastal areas. As a result, places like the Istra Peninsula, with the city of Pula and its Roman amphitheater, and the region of Dalmatia, and its city Split with Diocletian's Palace, erected by the Roman emperor in the 4th century, in its center, are wonderful places to see ancient roman architecture.

In addition, 9^{th} to 11^{th} century, well preserved and beautifully constructed, Christian architecture can be seen. Especially since the expansion of influence by the 15^{th} century Republic of Venice that brought many catholic churches, city halls, clock towers, and a variety of structures to the cities and coastline, Medieval Gothic architecture can also be easily observed. Also, in it's time, the Italian Renaissance brought a lot of influence to Croatia's sports, architecture, and engravings, so there are many treasures from the Italian Renaissance to be discovered in Croatia.

3.4 Traditional Festival and Cooking

Croatia's traditional festivals and cultural heritage have long been an important draw for their tourism industry. Croatia's traditional festivals and traditional cuisine are closely linked with the local catholic rituals. Croatia's culinary traditions are also extremely diverse. Its inland and coastal areas have varying traditions of cuisine, with Slavic, Turkish, Hungarian, and Italian culinary traditions uniquely represented in its various regions. Croatia is also well known for its varied selection of wines, with approximately 700 different types of wine all uniquely representing the regions that they come from.

4. Conclusion

Croatia's tourism has risen and has room to grow because of its natural wonders, unique cultural heritage, and varied and outstanding ancient architecture. As Alvin Toffler, a scholar of the 21st century has mentioned, the information-communication industry and the environmental tourism industry will be strategic industries of the future.

Accordingly, each country in the world, including our own, is putting a lot of effort into their tourism industry. When you look at it, given the importance of tourism in the 21st century, Eastern Europe is on her way up, and this study shows that Croatia, through it's local character and status as a tourist destination, is a representative of the possibilities.

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ROMANIA and North KOREA A Comparative Study on the Communist Dictatorship*

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I. Introduction

Kim Jong-il who was born in February 1942 died of a heart attack at the age of 69 on December 17, 2011. His sudden death raised tensions in the Korean peninsula and rippled big effects in the international society as well. Before he died, North Korea experts had used to mention his sudden death as the most likely cause that can lead to sudden changes in North Korea. The period when the possibility of sudden change in North Korea was most actively discussed was in mid-1990s and also in mid-2000s. At that time there were some issues about Kim Jong-il's health problems and the succession of his power.

The background of which North Korea experts first discussed actively in mid-90s about the possibility of North Korea's sudden change was the serious financial difficulties and Kim Il-sung's death. Then, North Korea had serious economic difficulties because the Soviet Union had stopped supporting North Korea and moreover, natural disasters had continuously occurred in North Korea. So about 2-3 million North Koreans died of starvation as a result of the collapse of the distribution system and several hundred thousand people also escaped from North Korea.

The defect of Hwang Jang-yop[2] to South Korea in Jan. 1997 was thought to suggest that there were some serious problems even in the domestic structure of political power in the process of power transference in North Korea. However, unlike the speculation of many experts, emergency situation was not raised in North Korea. Considering that in those days most socialist countries with Soviet Union as the leader collapsed, the survival of North Korea was quite an exceptional case.[3] Nowadays, North Korea, armed with nuclear weapons and missiles, remains still stable even

1) This paper is the revised version of the proceedings for the presentation in the International Conference "*Korea's Challenges Ahead: The Korean Peninsula Issues in the World*" organized by Korea Foundation, Central European University, University of Bucharest (04, september, 2015).

2) Hwang, Jang-yop (February 17, 1923 – October 10, 2010), a former North Korean Workers' Party secretary defected to South Korea in 1997, best known for being, to date, the highest-ranking North Korean defector. He created North Korea's ruling philosophy of 'Juche idea', or national self-reliance. In 1972, Hwang became Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, a position which he would hold for 11 years.

after a quarter century since Eastern Europe's dismantling of socialism. As North Korea had gradually become stable, the discussion related to the sudden changes of North Korean political system was soon weakened. Especially when Kim, Jong-il died on December 17th 2011, South Korean and international societies mentioned neither North Korea's sudden change nor the unification of Korea, but started to analyze the structure of Kim Jong-un's power and his political line.[4)]

After the end of the Second World War, the foreign policy strategy planned by Soviet leaders was an agreement based on equal political rights between the big powers. It was kind of securing the balance of power, which was usual in the European diplomacy in the 19th century. As the Soviet Union made the atomic bomb in 1949, the threat of the nuclear war brought about the "balance of terror". Regarding this situation, the French philosopher Raymond Aron underlined that "Neither the war is likely to be, but nor the peace seems to be."[5)]

North Korea like the Soviet Union wants to get maintain the balance of terror by possessing nuclear weapons. Its current economic size is a little bit smaller than that of the Gwang-ju city (population: 1.42 million) in South Korea. Also, according to recent statistics, South Korea's economic volume is about 43 times bigger than that of North Korea.[6)] The expansion of military budget accompanied with the growth of economy in South Korea can be a big pressure to North Korea. The pressure might be increased with The United States during the Clinton Administration tried to discuss an attack on North Korea with Kim Young-sam government of South Korea. Therefore, North Korean leaders believe that holding nuclear weapons would be the best way to maintain the clan dictatorship.

When only the military power of the two Koreas is compared, North Korea is superior to South Korea in terms of the number of weapons; however, most of the weapons and fighters are outdated. In other words, North Korea is better than South Korea in respect of quantity, but not in respect of quality. The annual military expenses of South Korea are 4-5 times higher than those of North Korea as shown in <table-1> below.

3) Jon, Gyong-ju (2012) pp. 4-5.
4) Jang, Dal-jung (2013) pp. 4, 53.
5) Delouche, Frédéric, translated by Yun, Song-jun (1992) p. 389.
6) Newspaper *Moneytoday* (June 27, 2014): North Korea's nominal GNI in 2013 was 30,900,000,000$. It is 43 times less than that of South Korea (1,320,000,000,000$). And even North Korea's per-capita GNI(1,259$) is 21 times less than that of South Korea (26,205$). So the gap between the two Koreas has widened compared to last year. On the other hand, the gap between the two countries' foreign trade volumes was reduced. North Korea's Foreign trade volume, which is 7,340,000,000$, is 147 times less than that that of South Korea, 'the world's eighth-largest trading nation.' Last year, the trade volume of the Republic of Korea was 1,075,200,000,000$ (export: 546,400,000,000$, import: 515,600,000,000$).

<table-1> North and South Korea military comparison: (2011 Defense White Paper)

	South KOREA	North KOREA
Total	655,000 people	1,190,000 people
army	522,000 people	1,020,000 people
navy	68,000 people	60,000 people
air force	65,000 people	110,000 people
*armaments expenditures	27.6 billion - 38.4 billion US$ (2.7% of GDP)	5.76 billion - maxim 9.84 billion US$ (16.9-23.1% of GDP)

* Newspaper Chosun (March 23, 2014)

Many countries including South Korea and U.S.A. are not sure if North Korea was successful in its three times of nuclear test, and about how many nuclear weapons they have. The explosive power noticed to China just before the first test was about 4 KT, however the U.S. experts calculated it to be under 1 KT after analyzing the seismic wave. Considering that the explosive power of plutonium bomb dropped at Nagasaki, Japan was 21 KT, and that the explosive power in the tests of the early stage in the nuclear power nations were 10-60 KT, North Korean nuclear test could be thought as a partial success. It was estimated at 2-6 KT in the second test done in May 2009 and more powerful in the third test in February 2013. According to the experts, the quantity possessed by North Korea is estimated able to make more than 6 nuclear explosive devices, and in the future, their number will increase even more with enriching uranium. But many experts consider that even though the nuclear bombs of inferior quality exist in North Korea, it is still difficult for those to be used in actual practice.[7)]

During the past 10 years of reign of two former Korean presidents Kim Dae-jung(1998-2003) and No Mu-hyeon(2003-2008), the money flowing into North Korea from South Korea was about ten billion dollars including cash and goods. In other words, one-billion dollars were sent every year. However, the halting of aid to North Korea during the LEE Myung-bak administration (2008-2013) has put the North Korean policy of ‘balance of terror’ not working. Supposing that one-billion dollars were cut from North Korea’s annual budget, which is equivalent to the annual amount of imported food to the country, it would cause severe damage to North Korea suffering from economic crisis. This is why North Korea has staged continuously military threatening and provocation, such as its torpedoing the Cheon-an warship, shelling Yeon-pyeong Island and missile test lunching, from the administration of President Lee Myung-bak down to the present.

North Korea and Romania share many similarities but also differences in their dictatorships. First of all, we can observe the difference in their ‘external circumstances’ and ‘differences between Eastern and Western values: represented by ‘collectivism and individualism.’ In addition, religious oppression in North Korea has been much more severe than that in Romania in late ’80s, and in

7) Jang, Dal-jung (2013) p. 220.

North Korea the idolization of its leader has been successfully carried out through the exhaustive indoctrination. In contrast, freedom of religion was tolerably allowed in Romania. So that most Romanians used to go to church covertly during the communist era. And the idolization of Nicolae Ceauşescu was not also successful as in North Korea because it was unfit for the European values: individualism. Eventually, North Koreans who have Asian sentiments and values seem to be somewhat different from Romanians who have an inclination toward individualism. Anyhow, North Korean's acceptive attitude of the idolization and the clan dictatorship seems to be different from that of Romanian. It is perhaps derived somewhat from the horror by the terror politics to exterminate three generations of family.

In fact, Romania was a rich country in Europe before and after the First World War. It was richer than Greece even until the communism was introduced in this country in 1947. So Romanian people were reminiscent of the 'good life in the past' and compared it to the 'hardscrabble life' of the present in the late '80s; consequently, they found the reason in Ceauşescu's dictatorship. In contrast, North Korean people are just living resignedly because they have never experienced rich life.

In this article, I would like to compare Romanian and North Korean dictatorships by looking at the 1980s Romanian situation and the current situation in North Korea aiming to predict how the North Korean system will change in the future.

II. The Comparison of Romanian and North Korean Communist Dictatorships

2.1. External circumstances

First of all, the external circumstances in Romania at the end of the '80s and those of today's North Korea are completely different. Gorbachev, who tried to solve Russian internal problems in 1985, decided to set up the Perestroika (reform) and Glasnost (openness). Soon after, the Berlin Wall collapsed and most Eastern European countries were changing from communism to democracy as a trend of those times. Even though Romania's transition to democracy was relatively late realized due to Ceauşescu's authoritarianism, the wind of democracy blown in Eastern Europe finally destroyed even Ceauşescu's dictatorship which seemed like an impenetrable fortress. But now, North Korea, far from the wind of democracy having blown in Eastern Europe, is under the direct protection support of China, another communist state.[8)]

I attribute the success of the Romanian revolution to three factors, each one of which is equally

8) *The Korea Times* in the U. S. A. (Jan. 06, 2010)

important: 1) Influence of Eastern European countries in the late ’80s (external circumstances), 2) Romanian People’s Revolution from below, 3) Role of the Romanian army (restraint of firing).

Without the democratic movements in East Europe in the late ’80s, Ceauşescu’s regime would have been maintained continuously. In this respect, the external circumstances were one of the very important factors. For North Korea, the most important external circumstance is China’s attitude. If North Korea was not supported further by China, its dictatorship would be difficult to be maintained. However, looking into the relationship between China and North Korea, we hardly expect that China’s attitude will change in the near future; in other words, China did not want the collapse of North Korean dictatorship.

Moreover, according to diplomatic sources on January 16, 2011, many former senior North Korean army officers are protected by the Chinese authorities. In case of an emergency in North Korea by the collapse of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un’s regime, China is likely to put up these officers in front to establish a pro-China regime, preventing the unification of the two Koreas.[9)]

Meanwhile, China has continuously supplied food and oil to North Korea. The exact figure is not known, but North Korea experts estimate that about 100 thousand tons of food and 500 thousand tons of oil including 20 million dollars worth of goods were sent to North Korea every year in the grant-type aid.[10)]

In addition, China is currently North Korea’s largest trading partner. In 2013, North Korea’s trade volume with China was about 6.54 billion dollars (export: 2.91 billion dollars, import: 3.63 billion dollars) which account for 89.1% of North Korea’s total trade.[11)] Therefore, it is assumed that, owing to China’s supports, North Korea could have had some durability for the maintenance of its regime even in the midst of long-standing international sanctions.

2.2. Economic Situations

There are 26 countries around the world where national income per capita is less than 500 dollars (not even immediately after undergoing a war), and the average economic growth rate is less than 4.5% in 1990-2000, namely low-income countries in stagnant growth. Among them, 20 countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the rest is Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Mongol et c.[12)] The current situation of North Korea is similar to that of these countries.

It would be hard to believe if a casino existed in a country’s embassy. But in the mid-90’s, a part of the building of the Embassy of North Korea in Romania was leased to a casino company. It has been used as a gambling place. North Korea is occasionally considered an anti-state

9) Newspaper *Donga* (Feb. 17, 2011)
10) Newspaper *Donga* (June 25, 2012); An, Mun-sok (2012) p. 186.
11) Newspaper *Chosun* (May 22, 2014)
12) Nicolas van de Walle, *Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries* (Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2005), pp. 7-11; Kim, Yon-chol et al. (2009) p. 286.

organization similar to Mafia rather than a nation, because the North Korean government is earning foreign currency through the counterfeiting of U.S. dollars and drug trafficking in secret as well.

The man who counterfeited the currency of other country at the level of a nation was Hitler first, and then Kim Jong-il. Hitler counterfeited 100 million English pounds during the Second World War. In addition to counterfeiting currencies, Kim Jong-il manufactured and sold drugs in secret, adopting project of 'white balloonflower roots' as an official national project in 1992. At that time, he conferred the title of 'the hero of white balloonflower roots' on the person who sold more than one million dollars worth of drugs. In June 2003, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that North Korea is the third place in opium production next to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and Afghanistan, and also the sixth place in heroin production in the world.[13)]

In August 1955 in North Korea, there was a debate on which industry should have priority. In this debate, the communists mainly from the Soviet Union and China stood for the consumption industry insisting that 'The rice is socialism' while the communists servile to Kim Il-song stood for heavy industry insisting that 'The machine is the king.' Finally, the heavy industry was given priority by Kim Il-song and it became a prototype of North Korean self-sustaining economy thereafter.[14)] In 1956, North Korea launched a campaign so-called 'Chulli-ma Movement' to accelerate the achievement of the self-sustaining economy. The term 'Cholli-ma', originating from the Chinese mythological flying horse, can be translated into 'thousand li horse,' referring to its ability to travel 1,000 li (400 kilometers) in a single day. Thus, this campaign was to aim for the national economy to recover from the ruins caused by the Korean war and to advance to independence and self-sufficiency in a such speed of Cholli-ma. This movement was the foundation of North Korea's economic growth in the 1960s and furthermore, it was specified in the Constitution adopted in 1972: "Cholli-ma Movement is the total policy line for constructing socialism."(Article 13)

North Korea's economy is based on the 'independent national economic construction', 'heavy industry priority policy' and 'military and economy parallel advancing policy.' The raised dependence on its own resources based upon the principle of self-reliance has made North Korea's economy closed more and isolated gradually from the international community. Such isolation has worked as a big obstacle to the economic growth of North Korea.

Pushing the policy of military built up economic development dates back to 1962. Since then, North Korea's military has been strengthened each year. Moreover, Kim Jong-il proclaimed in the New Year's address of 2003 that "I will first concentrate our capacity on the defense industry." So the heavy industry priority policy switched to the defense industry priority policy. In his point of view, the development of defense industry was the best method for maintaining his regime.[15)]

13) Hong, Jin-pyo et al. (2005) p. 96.
14) Jang, Dal-jung (2013) p. 171.

Nowadays, in North Korea there are many farmers markets so-called ‘Jang-madang’ all over the country where people freely buy and sell products. The selling items were formerly restricted, but currently almost everything from agricultural products to industrial ones can be sold. The most popular item is cigarette because it is not only profitable but also proper for bribe.[16)]

‘Jang-madang’ can be literally translated as ‘market ground.’ So merchants would gather to sell their goods in an open field, Jang-madang. Even though this market originally began as an agricultural market, it became a vital means of survival to most people with the collapse of the nation’s distribution system following the Great Famine in the late 1990’s

Surely, this market has become an extremely important place in North Korean people’s living. So many North Korea experts consider Jang-madang to be a potential place where the uprising starts in the future. Now it is estimated that there are about 40 Jang-madangs in Pyong-yang city and 300-350 ones all over the North Korea.[17)]

North Korea tried to remove Jang-madang once. But now it is conniving at the spread of it to pass through the economic crisis which resulted from the currency reform of November 2009.[18)]

When the currency reform failed in November 2009, the disappointment and distrust of the North Korean people in the regime reached to a very serious level. The currency reform was to revaluate the currency at the ratio of one to one hundred. So North Korean money one thousand won became ten won in a day. This reform was intended to control the people who had accumulated capital.[19)] However, it led to an unexpected sever rise in prices and caused the country to fall into chaos.

Nowadays, the monthly income of a family of four is about 250 dollars. But the prices also rose so much as the wage. The price of 1 kg of rice was 8 jon before, but now it is 44 won (0.4 dollars), an increase of about 550 times. Sometimes, 1 kg of rice has been occasionally traded for more than 5,000 won according to the seasonal causes, foreign exchange rate and supply and demand.

Formerly, in accordance with the socialist policy, housing rent and essential services such as gas, water, electricity etc. were provided almost free but now they must be paid for. So ‘free’ is gradually disappearing.[20)]

2.2.1. Food Crisis

80% of North Korean territory (12.3 million hectares) is covered with mountains, and so, the arable land is only 15% (2 million hectares), which is only 0.1 hectare per person. The main crops are such as rice, corn, beans, potatoes etc. and among them rice and corn occupy more than 80%

15) Hong, Sung-won (2011) p. 201.
16) Kim, Sang-su (2005) p. 137.
17) Yu, Sok-ryol (2009) p. 198.
18) Jon, Gyong-ju (2012) p. 34.
19) *Ibid.,* p. 35.
20) Jong, Yong-chul (2004) p. 55; Jang, Dal-jung (2013) pp. 251-252.

of the total production.

North Korea's food crisis was extremely severe for nearly four years from 1995 to 1998. During this period, though variable with the investigation agencies, minimum of 2 million and maximum of more than 3 million North Korean people died of starvation and disease caused by food shortages.[21)]

Hwang Jang-yop, a former North Korean Workers' Party secretary, said that half a million North Koreans died in 1995 including 5 thousand Communist party members, and about 1 million people would die of starvation in 1996; moreover, if there would not be an assistance from the outside, more than 2 million people would die in 1997.[22)]

In Dec. 1996, in the speech at the 50th anniversary ceremony of Kim Il-song University, Kim Jong-il said that "We currently do not provide the food properly even in the army, and if the U.S. imperialists know that we don't have military provisions, they will attack us right away."[23)] The reason that millions of North Koreans died of starvation can be attributed to the following: 70% from wrong policies of the Kim, Jong-il's regime; 20% from long-lasting structural problems of the socialist system; and just 10% from natural disasters. In other words, the core reasons behind the death of North Koreans from starvation, are 'the absolute Su-ryong dictatorship'[24)]which put the maintenance of Kim Jong-il's personal regime before North Korean people, 'military first policy' that is consuming a quarter of the GDP for military expenses and totalitarian economic system which constricts structurally personal autonomy.[25)]

2.2.2. Energy Crisis

Before the 1990s, North Korea had imported more than 80% of the crude oil from the Soviet Union at very low prices compared to the international prices. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, crude oil imports have significantly been reduced because North Korea had to pay hard currency according to the international market price. Since the 1990s to until recently, most of oil imports of North Korea have relied on China, but China has also demanded hard currency from 1992. Therefore, annual crude oil imports of North Korea, which were 2.52 million tons in 1990, are currently just half a million ton. To make matters worse, China blocked for a while in 2011 the oil supply pipe line between China (Dandong city) and North Korea (Sinuiju city) in 2011, which was considered as a 'lifeline' of North Korea.[26)]

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21) Hong, Jin-pyo et al. (2005) p. 18.
22) Hwang, Jang-yop (2006) p. 21.
23) Monthly Newspaper *Uolgan Chosun (*April 1997) pp. 308-311; Jong, Song-jang (2007) p. 29.
24) Starting from 1967 when 'monolithic ideology system' was brought up, the leadership of Kim, Il-sung was symbolized as a 'Su-ryong' namely 'a chief leader.' Before 1967, Kim, Il-sung was called 'Su-ryong' but its meaning was merely chief leader. However from 1967, Kim Il-sung was described as a 'Su-ryong' which is over 'chief leader.' In those days, Kim, Il-sung who was idolized as 'a holy being', ranked alongside communism leaders such as Marx and Lenin, world errorless leaders.[Kim, Yon-chol et als. (2009) p. 78]
25) Hong, Jin-pyo et al. (2005) p. 25.
26) Hong, Sung-won (2011)) p. 232.

North Korea has good conditions for hydropower because most of the North Korean territory is mountainous and there are many branches of rivers and streams. Even though North Korea has as many as 200 places suitable for building dam, its chronic shortage of electric power has been going on for over 10 years. North Korea's manufacturing operation ratio did not exceed 20-30% in 2006, due to electric power shortage. While the industry could get less than 30% of power requirements, the electric power supply for civil life was also extremely deficient as seen in the satellite photograph.[27)]

North Korea's household energy consumption of 2011 was 1,711,000 TOE, which was reduced by 58.2% compared to the consumption (4,099,000 TOE) of 1985. It is only 7.9% of South Korea's household energy consumption in 2011 (21,621,000 TOE). Actually, it is known that North Koreans are using electricity only for about 1.9-3.7 hours a day for lighting; this means that the electrical supply is granted only for a little while in the early evening.[28)]



This picture is a night view of the Korean Peninsula taken from a space station in 30 Jan. 2014. North Korea which is suffering from an electric power shortage is dark except Pyongyang city. NASA described that "East Sea and West Sea look like a single sea".

2.3. Differences between Eastern and Western values: Collectivism and Individualism

27) An, Chan-il et al. (2006) p. 79.
28) *Chosunbiz* (June 26, 2014)

Religious oppression in North Korea was much more severe than in Romania in the late ’80s, and the idolization of the leader also has been successfully carried out through the exhaustive indoctrination. In contrast, freedom of religion was tolerably allowed in Romania. So many Romanian people used to go to church with connivance during the communist era. And Ceauşescu’s idolization policy also did not succeed as much as in North Korea because it was not fit with the European values of individualism.[29] Romanian people who belong to the Latin races like music and dance, and they are also liberal in thinking and behaving. So, the rigid cult of personality was not fit for Romanian people.

In the Romanian history, the personality cult was tried about 3 times in the past. Two occasions for Carol II and General Ion Antonescu were carried out in the passive way but the other one for the leader of Iron Guard was more actively progressed next to Ceauşescu’s case. The Romanian Iron Guard which was one of three typical far-rights in Europe tougher with German Nazism and Italian Fascism attempted idolization in the 30’s, but it finally ended in a failure.[30] Anyway, the idolization for Kim Jong-il was more successful than Ceauşescu’s one.

It is requisite to get aware of ‘Juche ideology’ in order to understand North Korea’s political system. Juche, which is usually translated as ‘self-reliance’, is sometimes referred to as Kimilsong-ism and the national ideology of North Korea. From the 1950s to the 1970s, Kim Il-song and the party theorists including Hwang Jang-yop elaborated the Juche ideology into a set of principles to serve for the decision of policy and its justification. Juche, in fact, goes beyond the mere idea of self-dependence. It is the ‘independence in politics, self-reliance in the economy and self-defense in the military’ as Kim Il-song defined it.

The first reference to Juche as a North Korean ideology was in a speech given by Kim Il-song on December 28, 1955. In the beginning, the substance of Juche was such that demanded to get rid of toadyism and dogmatism admiring and following blindly the big power, and to apply the Marxism-Leninism to Chosun (North Korea) realistically and inventively. In other words, it was an ideology which stressed the autonomous policy suitable to the actual condition of North Korea, being free from the influence of closely related Soviet Union and China. With the lapse of time, Juche evolved, borrowing from Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism and Confucianism whatever Kim Il-song and Kim Jong-il wanted, as well as their own ideas, and in 1972, replaced Marxism-Leninism in the North Korean constitution as the country’s official ideology. Up to this time, North Korea had accentuated such a slogan as “Kim Il-song, Kim Jong-il are ‘great’, ‘talented’, ‘genius’, ‘God’, ‘God’s mentor’ etc. as a part of idolization policy. Nobody could object to it, otherwise, being considered as a traitor, the person would have lost his/her life.[31]

29) *The Korea Times* in the U. S. A. (Dec. 06, 2010)
30) Georgescu, Vlad (1995) 207-224.
31) Hwang, Jang-yop (2006) p. 16.

In addition to the Juche ideology, we need to see the collectivism of North Koreans for the understanding of North Korea's political system.

According to the 'Philosophy Dictionary' published by the Institute of Philosophy of North Korea's Academy of Social Sciences, "collectivism is the communistic ideology and morality to regard the interests of the society and the group as valuable and devote all to struggle for the realization of the interests."[32] In the same way, the organization dominates the individual of North Korean people. So it can be said that North Koreans live a life in the organization from birth to death. North Korean's organizational life begins at the age of 4. Most North Korean children go to the daycare center at the age of 4 where they learn collective rules from 8 am to 4:30 pm; at the same time, brainwashing is commenced for them to grow up to Juche-type (independent) human being which the state requires.[33] They are also educated to trust Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il more than their own parents and also to cherish the bund loyalty to their commander in chief.[34] In 1959, compulsory education was extended to junior high school and, according to the 2006 Census, the illiteracy rate was almost zero in North Korea. This suggests that North Korea has given weight to education as well as brainwash even in the economic difficulties.

As the slogan "one for all, all for one" suggest, North Korean people are living a life in the rigid collective order and discipline. Owing to such collectivism, the basic rights of individuals are liable to be outraged because in North Korea because "the concept of human rights is to punish those who reject the way of life determined by the group."[35] Therefore, the collective life is very important factor to understand the North Korean regime.

In this regard, North Korean people who have Asian sentiments and values seem to be somewhat different from Romanian people who are characterized by individualism. Besides, the reign of terror in North Korea that can exterminate three generations of a family is awesome to North Koreans. Eventually North Korean people's attitude has been a little different from that of Romanians'.

2.4. Freedom of religion

Even under the Ceausescu's dictatorship in Romania, freedom of religion had been admitted by usage much more than in North Korea. In fact, most Romanian people went to church in a stealthy way during that time. When I took a taxi at Bucharest, immediately after the Romanian revolution in 1989, I saw the taxi driver praying to God whenever he passed by a church. Surely in the reign of Ceauşescu, the religion would result in a blemish on the qualification of a communist, so it was known that the communist who was near at promotion avoided going to church.

32) Kim, Jin-man (2011) p. 401.
33) Jang, Dal-jung (2013) pp. 233, 237.
34) Byon, Yong-gwan (2000) p. 16.
35) Kim, Sok-hyang (2003) pp. 249-251.

In contrast, North Korea ranked worst among 50 Christian-persecuted countries in the world for 9 successive years by 2011 on the World Watch List.[36] Idol worship is allowed only for "dear leader" Kim Jong-il and his father Kim Il-song. In North Korea, religious activities are labeled as an act of insurrection against North Korean socialist principles. Christians are routinely beaten, tortured, imprisoned for life, mutilated, murdered and/or used in the testing of biological or chemical weapons. Punishment for being a Christian can also include imprisonment or death of one's mother, father, sisters, brothers, children and grandchildren. The communist Police stops at nothing to search out and punish Christians, including pretending to be Christians to infiltrate underground prayer meetings. The information that they obtain is then used to identify and arrest Christians, who are taken to prison camps where they face slave labor and starvation as well as the inhuman treatment mentioned above.[37]

Baek Jung-hyon has mentioned in his book *Is there any church in North Korea?* that there are 2 churches and 520 chapels. Ostensively, there are 2 churches such as Bongsu and Chilgol in Pyeng-yang. However, it has nothing to do with the religious freedom. Among North Korean defectors, few people had religious activities in North Korea and most North Koreans do not even know that two churches exist for the sake of formality.

Today, in North Korea, there is a Chosun Religionist Association (founded in 1989) which is composed of organizations representing every religion such as Chosun Buddhist Federation, Chosun Christian Federation, Chosun Catholic Church and The Central Advisory Council of Chosun Cheondoism Society. In case of Buddhism, there are about 60 temples, 300 monks and 10,000 believers: for Christianity, 20 pastors, 130 missionary and 12,000 believers; and for Catholicism, there are 3,000 believers in Jangchung Cathedral where neither priest nor nun exists.[38] It is estimated that there are currently about 35,000 religionists in North Korea. By the way, it is noticeable that these kinds of religious organizations were founded together with the necessary facilities mostly in the late 80s. Actually, they were established while the 13th World Youth Student Festival was being prepared in 1989. In other words, these religious facilities were built for propaganda effect to foreigners before the visit of South Korean religionists such as pastor Mun Ik-hwan and priest Mun Gyu-hyon etc. to the North. Even though freedom of religion is stipulated in the North Korean Constitution, most North Koreans are living without knowing religious facilities and even the word 'religion'.[39] North Koreans defectors are now saying that numerous North Korean people who have been exhausted with the hardships of life are recently falling into divination instead of religion instead of religion.[40]

36) Newspaper *New Daily* (Jan. 06, 2011)
37) "Persecution of Christians in North Korea" in http://www.opendoorsusa.org (2011. 06. 05)
38) Korea Unification Education Research Committee (2008) p. 128.
39) Hong, Jin-pyo et al. (2005) pp. 78-81.
40) Kim, Sang-su (2005) p. 51.

2.5. Social Resistance Movements led by Dissidents and Dissident Groups

While there have rarely been the social resistances in North Korea, such moments existed occasionally in 1970s thru 1980s in Romania though not so hard as in the other Eastern European countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

Dumitru Ţepeneag, Paul Goma and Marin Preda are well-known dissident writers in Romania. Thousands of miners were on strike in 1977 and approximately 2,000 laborers who were working in several cities including Bucharest tried to organize a free trade union for the first time in 1979. These are good examples of social resistance movements in Romania. Also, social resistance movements were developed in 1978-1979 by the religious figures of the Orthodox Church and the Protestantism.

The most interesting feature of the Romanian resistance movements conducted by the opposition forces in '80s was that some politicians who were disbanded after the introduction of communism in 1947 were trying to organize political parties again. But at the time, Romanian workers, intellectuals and religious figures did not organize an unified front unit. Therefore, their social movements were conducted separately from each other. So, the *Securitate* (Romanian secret police) did not have any difficulty to suppress the resistance movements, for the movements in the 1980s did not develop into a revolution but remained as simple, social defiant movements.[41)]

In contrast, such kind of social resistance movements never existed in North Korea. In fact, as shown in the process of democratization in Eastern European countries, the dissidents and the dissident groups played an important part for the will and power of public to be gathered in the countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia etc. However, Romania had no such a leading dissident or dissident group Lech Walesa of Poland or the Civic Forum of Czechoslovakia, so the democratization was delayed than in other East European countries and finally achieved through the bloodshed revolution.

North Korea has been classified as "the worst nation oppressing human rights" for 39 consecutive years.[42)] It is estimated that approximately 1.5 million people died of hunger and violence in North Korea's political prisoner camps for the last 50 years. Even at present, it is estimated that approximately two hundred thousand political prisoners placed under confinement in prison camps. North Korea is such a drastic club-law organization that does not accept any kind of resistance. The excessively severe punishment such as the confinement in prison camp or public execution is inflicted on the people in discontent with the regime.[43)]

In 2010, many experts excluded the possibilities of sudden changes by a mass struggle in North Korea for the reason that the potential seemed quite slim for the masses to be organized on a large

41) Georgescu, Vlad (1995) pp. 320-321.
42) Hong, Sung-won (2011) p. 315.
43) Hong, Jin-pyo et al. (2005) p. 166.

scale enough to cause a revolt. They also pointed out that it would take a long time before a sense of comparison with and yearning for the outside world became popular in such a nation severed from the outside world, and that the so-called 'diffusion effect' consequently could not help being restrained. Meanwhile, the lack of experience in and awareness of liberal democracy among the residents in North Korea is pointed out as an obstacle to a revolt.[44)]

By all means, it is believed that there is less possibility for the North Korean communist regime to collapse in the Polish or the Czech style which was led by dissidents, since social resistance in North Korea is much lower than in Romania.

2.6. The role of the Romanian Military Authorities

The crucial factor behind the success of the Romanian Revolution was the role of the Romanian military authorities. The outbreak of the Romanian Revolution was on December 16, 1989 at Timişoara, a city in western Romania, and it lasted 9 days till December 25 when Ceauşescu was executed. The revolution could be a complete success, for the Romanian military authorities did not against it. If Romanian military authorities had suppressed the revolutionary forces aggressively on the Ceauşescu's command, numerous people would have been injured or died and the revolution would have hardly succeeded.

The mass demonstration which arose on December 16, 1989 in Timişoara spread to Bucharest in just a few days. Ceauşescu, who was visiting Iran at that time, come back in a hurry, and on December 21, he began to make a speech to show off his own undiminished political power at the square of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee Building. But it became chaos soon thereafter. So he had to give up his speech. However, the students of Bucharest University and the citizens who attended the rally did not go home and began to yell the overthrow of Ceauşescu's dictatorship. As time passed, the number of demonstrators increased out of measure and control.

The next morning, Vasile Milea, the Minister of Defense was found dead in a mysterious death. A rumor was going around that he had been shot because of his refusal of the command of Ceauşescu. After the revolution, the Fact Finding Committee concluded in 2005 that he had committed suicide shooting his chest with a pistol in Communist Party Central Committee building. Anyhow, it triggered the Romanian military authorities to drift apart from Ceauşescu. After that incident, Victor Stânculescu was appointed to the Minister of Defense, but he did not want to be involved with Ceauşescu regime on the wane. He showed loyalty to Ceauşescu ostensibly but did not actively suppress the protests.

Meanwhile, numerous people were killed from the gunfight that continued in Bucharest. The foreign press estimated that the number of the dead would reach approximately 60,000. But in

44) Jon, Gyong-ju (2012) p. 31.


2005, the State Secretariat for Revolutionaries' Problems announced that 1,104 people (221 soldiers) were died and 3,321others (663 soldiers) wounded.

As the situation became serious, the new Minister of Defense stopped firing on demonstrators and ordered soldiers to return to their home units. At this time, the atmosphere of the revolution reached its peak. The revolutionary forces organized 'National Salvation Front' and then occupied Romanian national television and radio stations. Under these circumstances, some soldiers had received unreasonably worse treatment that *Securitate* and had felt discontented did not return to the camp and began to join the revolutionary forces. After a while, even some high-ranking officers also joined the revolutionary forces. Thus, the situation developed in favor of the revolutionary forces and the Ceauşescu regime came to an end.

Watching the collapses of socialist countries in the 1990's, the leadership of North Korea became skeptical of the sustainability of their regime and began to worry about "the unification through absorption" by South Korea. Especially, North Korean leaders, observing the collapse of the regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu in Romania in December 1989, put emphasis on the security of regime and the full control of military forces having great influence on its destiny.[45] Kim Jong-il submitted his graduation thesis "Military's position and role in building socialism" when he graduated from Kim Il-sung University.[46] He paid much attention to the army and strengthened 'military first policy' to maintain the system, afterwards. Military first policy, the term which appeared in the North Korean newspaper, 'Rodong Sinmun (Labour newspaper)' on December 27, 1997, means the policy that gives precedence to the army of other sectors.[47] However, there is a distinct difference between setting important on the army and putting the army at the center of politics. In other words, the political structure of a socialist country is called 'party-state system' in general, which means that the role of the party takes priority over that of other political structures (the government or the army). It is stated in article 11 of North Korean constitution that "Democratic People's Republic of Korea controls all the activities under the lead of the Korean Workers' Party." It is also stated in article 46 that "North Korean People's Army controls all the political activities under the lead of the party." But there is an essential difference between the political structure of North Korea and that of other socialist countries. That is the "Su-ryong system."[48] In the process of building unique ideology system from 1967, North Korea built so-called 'Leader's sole leading system' in which the leader holds a dominant position over the party, politics and the army. This is a 'leader-centric party-state system' that is essentially different from the party-state systems of other socialist

45) Jang, Dal-jung (2013) p. 188.
46) Kim, Jin-man (2011) p. 316.
47) An, Mun-sok (2012) pp. 133.
48) Starting from 1967 when 'monolithic ideology system' was brought up, the leadership of Kim, Il-sung was symbolized as a 'Su-ryong' namely a leader. Before 1967, Kim, Il-sung was called 'Su-ryong' but its meaning was merely chief leader. However from 1967, Kim Il-sung was described as a 'Su-ryong' which is over 'chief leader.' In those days, leader was idolized as 'a holy being.' Kim Il-sung, as a leader, ranked along of communism leaders such as Marx and Lenin, world errorless leaders.

countries.[49] It was stated in 'Rodong Simnum' on October 8th, 1995, that "As we cannot think of the human world without the sun, so we cannot think of the revolution world without leader." This enables us to get a glimpse of how Kim Jong-il has been idolized and absolutized.



<table-2> Power Structure of the Kim, Jong-il Era

Hwang, Jang-yop speculated as the following in September 2009, relating to the power structure of North Korea after Kim Jong-il's death: "There is less possibility for the military to seize power because the military of North Korea has been supervised thoroughly by Kim, Jong-il. There is a high possibility that the party may control the North Korean regime after Kim Jong-il's death, not the military." Generally a socialist country forms two groups in the army - military command group and political group. There are general political bureau (GPB) and general staff department (GSD) in North Korean People's Army. General political bureau (GPB) practically controls the army of the Korean Workers' Party. Meanwhile, general staff department (GSD) is the top enforcement agency in the military which takes the supreme command of the military forces under the lead of the party. Accordingly, the head of GPB is superior to the head of GSD in North Korea these days.[50] As predicted by Hwang Jang-yop, there is less possibility of a military coup independently led by the military of North Korea in the future.[51] But if the sudden change simultaneously happened from below and above just like in Romania, it would show the great destructive power. That is the reason why we cannot exclude the possibility of the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime. Were there a sudden change in North Korea in the future, I believe it would be closely related to the military authorities of North Korea.

49) Jang, Dal-jung (2013) pp. 58-62.
50) Jang, Dal-jung (2013) p. 61.
51) Jong, Song-jang (2007) p. 10.

2.7. Romanian who experienced an affluent society in the past and North Korean who did not

Before and after World War I, Romania belonged among rich countries in Europe. Until the communism was introduced in the late 1940s, Romania was a much richer country than Greece. So Romanian people got reminiscent of the 'good life in the past' and compared it with the 'hardscrabble life' of the present in the late '80s. And they could easily attribute such variation to the communistic system or Ceauşescu's dictatorship. In contrast, North Korean people are just living resignedly because they have never experienced rich life.[52] In the 1960s, Romania was trying to promote national development focusing mainly on the heavy industry as in the economic system of Stalinism, against Khrushchev's policy that attempted to turn Romania backward into an agricultural country. By the way, in the era of Ceauşescu, the Romanian Communist Party selected three major industries (steel industry, machine industry and heavy chemical industry) and fostered the growth of them to excess. The light industry was completely ignored and the three major industries were chosen by the Romanian communists without any market research; in other words, they made an arbitrary decision. Disregard of the principle of market economy brought the Romanian economic policies naturally into a failure. Finally, Romanian economy came to ruin in the late '80s.[53] Nicolae Ceauşescu enforced a hunger export to redeem the foreign loan of more than 13 billion U.S. dollars. Consequently the discontent of the Romanian people was swelling. All the agricultural products of good quality were exported, and people suffered from lack of food and could barely keep on living with their minimum daily rations supplied by the state. Due to the lack of electricity, TV broadcast time was only for 2 hours a day. Because the three major industries in Romania consumed too much energy, Romania suffered from serious energy shortage throughout the '80s. In the winter, Romanian people could not help shivering with cold in an apartment without heating. In these circumstances, the discontent of the Romanian people reached its peak in the late '80s. However, many Romanians said after the revolution that they had not felt inconvenience heavily in living till the early '80s. This means that the repeated failure of the economic policy in the mid and late '80s served a momentum for the revolution. In other words, the primary cause of the revolution in Romania was the failure of the economic policy.

The distress of North Korea in the early 1990s commenced with the shock derived from international relations. The relationship with the former Soviet Union became deteriorated and all the foreign transactions including China were demanded to be settled in hard money. This restrained foreign trade of North Korea which was already troubled with the foreign currency shortage. Such situation brought to a crisis first the energy sector which was much dependent on import and then gradually all other sectors. The manufacturing operation ratio dropped rapidly and the agricultural output tumbled down as the chemical fertilizer production fell into abeyance. A

52) *The Korea Times* in the U. S. A. (Dec. 23, 2010)
53) *The Korea Times* in the U. S. A. (Dec. 23, 2010)

serious deficiency of daily necessaries and food followed raw materials shortage linked with energy crisis and the attended overall production fall off. Distribution system, the backbone of the socialist system did not work normally. Workers had lived on the distribution were faced with nonviable situation unless they left the factory and became self-reliant. In the process of people's trying to become self-reliant, 'jang-madang(market place)' has formed of itself.[54]

IV. The Prospect of North Korean Regime's Change in the Future

We often represent the diplomacy of North Korea by the figurative expression of 'cliff edge diplomacy' or 'roller-coaster diplomacy.' It means that the diplomacy of North Korea is irregular and unpredictable. President Obama said - "There previously have been patterns where, you know, they bang the spoon on the table and then suddenly they get food aid, or they get other concessions. Then they come back to the table and negotiate a little bit, and then if they get bored they start - provocative actions again. We've broken that pattern."[55]

Through it is hard to forecast the change of North Korean regime as of now, we can suppose following three scenarios:

1) Kim Jong-un regime continuance
2) 'Romanian-style' collapse
3) 'Chinese-style' open-door system.

Since Kim Jong-un's regime launched on December 17, 2011 after Kim Jong-il's death, internally, the economic situation has been getting worse and eternally, the interest of U.S.A., China, Russia and Japan in relation to the Korean Peninsula has become intricate, the potential of scenario 2) or 3) seems growing with the lapse of time. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility of sudden change from below caused by the popular uprising in North Korea. Even if oppression and control are still severe in North Korea, the range beyond control of North Korea's regime is expanding and the spreading corruption of officials is gnawing at the control. Residents are communing together, being politicized and acquiring capitalism in 'the market place'. Through the foreign products smuggled via border area, the people who get a glimpse of outer world including South Korea are increasing. Though being under tight surveillance many residents can communicate among themselves thanks to the prevalent use of cell phones.[56] We should take into account the rapid collapse of the regime in the Romanian-style national people's revolution or military coup as

54) Jang, Dal-jung (2013) p. 161.
55) www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/north-korean-rocket-launch/story/china-recalculating-policy-towards-north-korea-obama-
56) Jon, Gyong-ju (2012) p. 38.

well. The current unstable economic conditions, as mentioned above, provide a sufficient ground for Romanian-style national people's revolution. However, North Koreans are fearful of the reign of terror, one of the most important factors that impede a popular uprising.

In an interview with me on February 17, 2014, Claudiu Iordache, the director of 'Institute for Romanian Revolution of December 1989' emphasized that "Romania is located in Europe, not in Asia", giving more weight to the difference than the factors in common between the communist regime of Romania and North Korea. It has something in common with the for-mentioned 'difference in values between East and West.' Professor Ion Calafeteanu of the same institution personally mentioned that "Because a revolution is accompanied with the considerable sacrifice in general, if a military coup occurs instead of a revolution by people, the regime will be overthrown in a short period of time and the cost of the people will be small."

German authorities on unification sector forecasted that - "It takes at least one generation to complete unification. The reunification of North and South Korea, with a greater difference, will be a bigger challenge than that of East and West Germany." In July, 2010, Ulrich Blum, the head of Halle Institute for Economic Research, said that - "The situation between the South and the North Korea these days differs greatly from that of Germany at that time. The population size and GDP per capita of East Germany was respectively about 20% of those of West Germany. Nowadays, however, population size and GDP per capita of North Korea against South Korea are 40% and 5%, respectively." And he anticipated that if North Korea, so-called 'the Stone Age Communism', collapses abruptly, it will be an enormous financial burden to South Korea. It means that the annual amount of financial aid that South Korea should provide to North Korea in the process of reunification will be 250 billion dollars, which is 280 trillion Korean won. An interesting point is that while 250 billion dollars is 5% of GDP of Germany, it is 25% of GDP of South Korea.[57] According to the estimated data of the reunification of North and South Korea by The Presidential Council for Future and Vision in 2010, 322 billion dollars is required for gradual reunification and 1.14 trillion dollars for radical reunification. The Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) estimated that 40 billion dollars is needed annually to raise the living standards of North Koreans to the level of South Korea's minimum cost of living.[58] Although differing slightly with the research institutes, allotment per capita in the case of radical reunification will be about 50 thousand dollars, which would be a disaster. Perhaps, for this reason, in the latest poll on 'perception of Koreans toward reunification', 63.5% of the respondents preferred 'gradual reunification.'[59] A look at the recent situation in North Korea reveals new aspects that we could not imagine before, in this worldwide society. The number of cell phones surpassed 1.7 million. Furthermore, it is easy to see people wearing clothes printed in English and people using digital

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Yonhapnews (June 23, 2010 / March 23, 2014)

Choi, Yun-sik (2010) p. 282.

Newspaper *Moneytoday* (April 8, 2014)

cameras, MP3 players, computers and even tablet PCs in the center of Pyeng-yang. Nowadays, the number of people watching South Korean TV channels keeps growing and South Korean DVDs of movie and drama are flowing into North Korea through the border area. It is expected that among the 3 scenarios mentioned above, North Korea is most likely to choose the Chinese style open-door policy, and this would be the most ideal one. Even though it is hard to predict the course of North Korean regime change precisely, considering that a rapid collapse of North Korea puts enormous amount of financial burden on South Korea, the best scenario of reunification of the two Koreas would be for North to accept an open-door policy and undergo an economic development for gradual reunification. In other words, the open-door system would adapt the consciousness and behavior of North Korean befittingly for reunification and then reunification would naturally follow.

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What's different about corporate governance in Korea and Eurasia?

Jae-Seung Baek*

Abstract

Numerous studies have examined the relationship between firm performance and governance measures adopted by firms and find that generally there is a significant relationship between good governance and firm value. In this paper, I examine the features of corporate governance variables in Korea and Eurasia such as Thailand, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the Czech Republic.

As a results, I find some facts about corporate governance in European firms including Eurasian companies. Firms have defensive systems for a control stability of the country business groups and no restrictions related to holding company and pyramid investment with general cross-shareholding. However, since the late 1990s, Eurasian firms are getting better on the principles for the corporate governance structure and the strengthening of shareholder rights. We can find recent ownership decentralization of the new company and the weakening of the business group links.

Also, I show the time varying effect of corporate structure on firm value in emerging market. For example, during Boom period (recession period), firms recover (suffer) from external shocks and have much brighter (darker) prospect of investment opportunities; firms with poor governance experience a bigger (smaller) rebound in their share values. This paper suggests that the role of corporate governance affects firm value and has been changed following economic situation.

To the extent that corporate governance affects in expected return on investment, this study supports the view of a link between corporate governance and firm value in Korea and Eurasia.

JEL classification: *G21; G32; G34*

Key words: Corporate governance; Firm value; Korea; Eurasia; Emerging Market

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1. Introduction

In this paper, I show the effect of corporate governance structure on firm value and corporate governance matters to firm value and performance in Korea and Eurasia. Numerous researches explain the importance of corporate structure in the development of financial markets in emerging markets. For example, using a sample of firms from East Asian countries, Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), Baek, Kang, and Park (2004), Baek, Kang, and Lee (2006), Bae, Baek, Kang, and Liu (2012) show that higher cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder are associated with higher market valuation, but higher voting rights (control rights) correspond to lower market valuation (Figure 1). If owner-managers of the firms use equity ownership by affiliated firms to strengthen their control rights with little regard to the wealth of other shareholders, we would expect equity ownership by affiliated firms to have a negative impact on firm value.

However, there are few studies about time varying effect of corporate structure on firm value during economically good, bad and normal state by stock market or economic index. The role of the corporate structure cannot be fixed as economic situation has been changed. Our study focuses on this hypothesis that corporate structure differently affects firm value according to the macro economic situation such as normal, boom and recession. [1]

Using 25 emerging stock markets around the world, Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) find that governance variables, such as investor protection indices and the quality of law enforcement, explain more of the variation in exchange rates and stock market performance during the Asian crisis. In a similar vein, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) show that firms in countries with better shareholder protection have higher Tobin's q than those where such protection is weaker.

Even though the studies listed above have used cross-country analysis to demonstrate the first-order importance of corporate governance characteristics in determining firm value, few researchers investigate individual countries in depth. Four notable exceptions are Wiwattanakantang (2001), Mitton (2002), Baek, Kang, and Park (2004), Baek, Bae, Kang, and Liu (2012). They use firm-level data from East Asian countries to show that several firm-specific measures of corporate governance had a significant effect on performance before and during the Asian crisis. They argue that corporate governance becomes more critical in explaining cross-firm differences in performance before and after financial crisis.

Based on a unique database of Thai firms, Wiwattanakantang (2001) shows that the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher performance in Thailand. She does not find the evidence that controlling shareholders expropriate corporate assets. This study also reveals that family controlled firms display significantly higher performance. Foreign controlled firms as well as more than one controlling shareholder also have higher performance, relative to firms with no controlling shareholder.

Mitton (2002) uses firm-level data from five East Asian countries to show that several firm-specific

[1] Recent studies explain ownership structure by largest controlling shareholder ownership into cash flow rights and voting rights. Cash flow rights means direct ownership by controlling shareholders, while voting rights includes direct and indirect ownership by controlling shareholders through pyramidal structure such as business groups. Business groups are generally known that those organizations have pyramidal ownership structure (Baek et al., 2012, etc.).

measures of corporate governance had a significant effect on performance during the Asian crisis. He argues that corporate governance becomes more critical in explaining cross-firm differences in performance during a financial crisis for two reasons. First, as also argued in Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000), expropriation of minority shareholders could increase since the incentive for controlling shareholders to do so tends to go up as the expected return on investment falls. Second, the relationship-based financial system in East Asia worked well during the Boom period since outside investors did not have full information on whether or not their funds were being deployed appropriately, and the crisis triggered greater investor awareness of weaknesses in corporate governance in the region and led to them pull out (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Consistent with these arguments, Mitton (2002) finds that firms with higher disclosure quality, greater transparency, higher outside ownership concentration, and corporate focus experienced better stock price performance during the crisis. Lemmon and Lins (2001) also show that during the crisis, firms in which controlling owner-managers owned more of the control rights, but fewer cash flow rights, suffered more loss of share values.

Baek, Kang, and Park (2004), Baek, Baek, Kang, and Liu (2012) also show that firms with higher ownership concentration by unaffiliated foreign investors experienced a smaller reduction in their share value. Firms that had higher disclosure quality and alternative sources of external financing also suffered less. In contrast, chaebol firms with concentrated ownership by controlling family shareholders experienced a larger drop in the value of their equity. Firms in which the controlling shareholders' voting rights exceeded cash flow rights and those who borrowed more from the main banks also had lower returns. These results suggest that change in firm value is a function of firm-level differences in corporate governance measures.

2. Corporate governance and firm value in Korea

Focusing on Korean firms allows us to examine corporate governance measures at a level of detail that would be hard to aggregate across countries. Korean data have a number of other characteristics that make them particularly suited to our investigation. First of all, many Korean firms belong to business groups known as *chaebols*. Although a great deal of theoretical and empirical research is devoted to understanding the role of business groups in a range of countries, it is not entirely clear whether such entities always perform a valuable function for their shareholders. [2]

Chaebol firms operate in many different industries, are bound together by a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, and maintain substantial business ties with other firms in their group. They are also characterized by an extensive arrangement of pyramidal or multi-layered shareholding agreements and the existence of cross-debt guarantees among member firms. If risk sharing among chaebol firms and the operation of an internal capital market within chaebols allows its members to survive the external shock, the structure of diversified business groups can have a positive effect on the value of their members.

[2] In this view, Thai firms also have an ideal setting. Wiwattanaknatang (1999, 2001) explains that there exist two types of firms in Thailand: one is characterized by concentrated ownership, and the other is less concentrated ownership. In addition, in about 75% of the firms, the controlling shareholders are involved in the firms' management as officers and directors. Furthermore, there are large numbers of firms that are totally controlled by a single family.

On the positive side of chaebol, Khanna and Palepu (2000) compare the profitability of Indian firms belonging to industrial groups to that of independent Indian firms, and find that diversified business groups do add value. Another important finding is that of Shin and Park (1999) who shows that because of their internal capital markets, Korean firms belonging to the top 30 business groups are subject to fewer financing constraints than other Korean firms. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) also examine the sensitivity of Japanese firms' investment expenditures to liquidity and find that it is lower for firms within bank-oriented keiretsu.

On the negative side of chaebol, however, Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) show that controlling shareholders in European business groups have strong incentives to siphon resources out of member firms to increase their individual wealth. Furthermore, according to Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002), although minority shareholders of firms within the top 30 Korean chaebols (hereafter referred to as the *chaebol*) typically lose out from their acquisitions, the controlling shareholders gain from the same deals. Using a sample of 18,600 Indian firms during the period 1989 to 1999, Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) also find that that the ultimate owners of the Indian pyramids have strong incentives to divert resources from firms low down in the pyramid towards ones high up in the pyramid.[3]

From my perspective, one notable feature of the chaebol is that ownership is heavily concentrated, inasmuch as one individual has almost complete control over all firms within the group. Such a structure gives the owner-managers involved strong incentives to diversify their wealth and human capital and to expand their chaebol into several different industries. Despite the significant contribution chaebols have made to the rapid growth of the Korean economy during the last 40 years, critics claim that much of their business expansion has resulted from excessive borrowing and that owner-managers have expropriated other investors by investing the firm's resources to maximize their own or the group's welfare. At the end of 2015, the top 30 chaebols accounted for 11.97% of total GNP, 47.79% of total corporate assets, and 46.54% of total corporate revenues.

Previous study on Thai firms also show concentrated ownership by persons with the same family name, their close relatives, as well as companies that are owned and controlled by the same ultimate owner. So this feature of ownership structure is similar to those of Thai firms (Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang, 2006). It will be interesting to see whether or not the tendency towards concentration of ownership in chaebol firms has an adverse (positive) effect on firm value during bad state (Boom period).

Another important characteristic of ownership structure in Korea is that in many firm's institutional investors hold a large proportion of "Voting Rights." Such investors are sometimes affiliated with firms and serve as trading partners, meaning that their stake in the firms is similar to the holding of debt. Although large shareholders who are not affiliated (e.g., foreign investors) have strong financial incentives to monitor manager (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), affiliated investors might have different

[3] There is an interesting study on Thai big business owners. Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2007) report that politically connected big business firms are able to seize more market share because big owners in top office use their policy-decision powers to implement regulations and public policies favorable to their firms. They also show that such policies hinder not only domestic competitors but foreign investor. Also, by collecting wedding announcements for the offspring of big business owners in Thailand, Bunkanwanicha et al. (2008) shows that family networks provide reputation capital and reliable information, thus reducing frictions faced by entrepreneurs.

monitoring incentives.

Finally, Korean firms have traditionally placed greater reliance on bank financing than companies elsewhere. Although the importance of bank financing in Korea has recently decreased due to financial deregulation and capital market liberalization, Korean firms still rely strongly on bank financing and maintain close financial ties with their main banks (Kang, 1998). A bank-centered corporate governance system is often viewed as having advantages over the capital-market-centered system (Aoki, 1990; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991; Kaplan, 1994; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). In a bank-centered system, a firm obtains most of its external financing from the main banks, which not only provides both short- and long-term financing but plays the role of a manager of a loan consortium in obtaining financing for its client firms. The main bank also sometimes provides advice to management and intervenes when the firm's profitability is poor. These arguments suggest that the strength of a firm's ties to a main bank will have a positive effect on firm value.

However, bank relations are unlikely to be valuable in circumstances when the banking sector is itself experiencing severe external shocks. If banks are forced to curtail lending because of their own difficulties and firms have no alternative sources of funding, firms have to cut back on investment even when they could invest profitably. An unexpected deterioration in bank durability, therefore, inevitably imposes costs on client firms. According to these arguments, firm value is more likely to fall when a firm has a close relationship with its main bank. Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993), Gibson (1995), Kang and Stulz (2000), and Bae, Kang, and Lim (2002) show that when a bank suffers from a decreased ability to lend to a borrower, the client firm is adversely affected.

Korean banks are widely owned by many shareholders, in general. Unlike Korean bank, Thai banks were owned or controlled by family-based business groups, most of which were founded by overseas Chinese with the purpose of channeling funding to their own businesses. Crown Property Bureau founded other several banks. Consequently, local Thai banks appeared to extend loans based on personal ties and collateral rather than on the basis of future cash flow (Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang, 2006).

Finally, Baek (2015) shows that that the role of corporate governance has been changed following macroeconomic situation such as stock market index or economic index in Korea. For example, during boom period (recession period), firms recover (suffer) from external shocks and have much brighter (darker) prospect of investment opportunities; firms with poor governance experience a bigger (smaller) rebound in their share values. We find that poorly governed firms — firms that have high disparity between voting and cash flow rights, have low equity ownership by controlling shareholders and their family members, have low block ownership, and are highly diversified — suffer more during the crisis period and rebound more during economically Boom period. Finally, normal periods show swinging effects of good and bad situation which are mixed up result of the two opposite periods.

3. Corporate governance in Eurasia

Lee and Lee (2014) analyzes status of governance and ownership structure through literature review

for papers on the governance and ownership Structure of the six European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands) and evaluate changes of Europe's corporate governance and ownership structure, especially as a result of the global financial market liberalization since 2000s. In order to compares and analyzes the change and status of corporate governance structure in Europe's developed countries, this study examines following subjects:

1) Historical background the formation of the country's corporate governance structure of the institutional background which is important for ownership structure.

2) Formation for the current regulatory environment of the legal system, mainly the principles of shareholding structure and the corporate governance structure principles as examining the legal regulatory information on changes in the corporate governance structure principles and the pyramid investment structure and a cross-shareholding structure.

3) Recent changes in the country's corporate governance and ownership structure and historical changes in the process or what were the agents led these changes.

4) Gathering up the case of the business group in each country forming a pyramid investment structure, a cross-shareholding structure or a circulating investment structure.

5) evaluation of the country's characteristics and the status of change of the corporate governance and ownership structure briefly.

As a result, this study derives seven stylized facts through a comparative analysis for the changes, status and institutional background of corporate governance and ownership structure of the major developed countries in Europe and Eurasia as follows.

Stylized Facts 1)

The development of defensive systems for a control stability of the country business groups

Stylized Facts 2)

No ownership restrictions related to holding company and pyramid investment

Stylized Facts 3)

No ownership restrictions for general cross-shareholding

Stylized Facts 4)

Since the late 1990s, the principles for the corporate governance structure and the strengthening of shareholder rights

Stylized Facts 5)

Recent ownership decentralization of the new company and the weakening of the business group links

Stylized Facts 6)

The continuation of the traditional business groups

Stylized Facts 7)

The diversity of pyramid investment structure and cross-shareholding structure of business groups, etc. These traditional governance and ownership system of a business group does not appear to be significant changes in spite of the liberalization of the global financial markets and the consequent

pressure of shares expansion of the international institutional investors. Due to some of the newly listed companies and IPO of multinational corporations, ownership was decentralized in the European stock markets and the companies of high foreign ownership emerged, but traditionally, business groups that make up the European economy does not appear to be affected by existing pyramid investment schemes and the stable governance and ownership structure through a multi-voting system. Because all countries had the reigns of the country's major Business groups stable and did not allow mergers and acquisitions by foreign and industry ruling.

As Lee and Lee (2014) surveys, pyramids are common in Asian countries as well as European and Eurasian countries. Usually less than 51% of shares are needed for effective control, so the shareholders of the topmost holding company may be able to maintain control with smaller equity investment as shown in Figure 2. Figure 1 shows how the Wallenberg family controls ABB. ABB is controlled by Incentive Co., which holds 24% of ABB shares but controls about 33% of the shareholder votes. Incentive Co. in turn controlled by investor, an investment holding company, and by the Wallenberg family directly. The family also holds about 41% of Investor's votes. At each stage, the family's voting right is at least 32.8%, which is sufficient to control the next layer of the pyramid.

Family control or controlling ownership by family members are common in Europe and also in Asia. Except Japan, a high proportion of public firms were family controlled in Asia. Therefore, wealthy families control large fractions of many Asian firms. For example, in Hong Kong, the 10 largest family groups control 32% of the assets of all listed firms. In Thailand, the top 10 families control 46% of assets and 58% of assets in Indonesia. In Korea, the 10 largest conglomerates owned by family members control roughly half of the corporate economy. These chaebols are also strong exporters with a variety of businesses: names like Samsung and Hyundai are recognized worldwide like in Latin America. Widely diversified groups are also common in India. The largest, Tata Group, spans eighty companies in various industries such as steel, electric power, communications. All of these companies are public, but control rests with the group and ultimately with the Tata family.

However, in Germany block ownerships are usually held by other holding companies instead of families and this corporate ownership in Germany is typical of continental Europe such as France. We can find the example from the ownership in 1990 of Daimer-Benz, one of the largest German companies. The ownership of Daimer-Benz shares is concentrated in large blocks and the several layers of owners. Frank and Mayer (2001) investigates the ownership of 171 large companies in 1990, finds 47 with blocks of shares held by other companies and 35 with blocks owned by families. This would be impossible in the U.S., where federal law prohibits equity investment by banks in nonfinancial corporations. Germany's universal banking system allows such investment as in Japan.

Another characteristic of the German firms is a system of board of directors. Large European firms (firms with more than 2,000 employees) have two boards of directors unlike Asian firms: the supervisory board and management board. Half of the supervisory board's members are elected by employees including staff as well as labor unions. The other half represents stockholders and includes bank executives. The management board answers to a supervisory board, which represents all employees and investors. But in the U.S. and U.K., the law puts shareholders' interests first. Managers and board of directors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders.

Meanwhile, in France, firms can elect a single board of directors which is common (as observed in the U.S., U.K., Japan, and Korea) consists mostly of outside directors who are shareholders and representatives from financial institutions with which the firm has relationships.

The United Kingdom, Belgium, Italian corporate structures also tend to hold shares indirectly, through equity-linked insurance and pensions. Direct investment in shares is much less common than in the United States.

Regarding Russian corporate governance, Lee, Yoon, and Roh (2008) describe the state of corporate governance of Russia and discuss its dynamics and prospects. This study reviews the main mechanisms of corporate governance in the country and relate them to firm's ownership structure, financial market development and government influence. They suggest Russian firms to accept good corporate governance structure in order to enter advanced corporate system from emerging market structure.

Hyun (2003) also examines two types of reforms of state-owned enterprises in transitional economies: the gradual type of reforms in China and the radical type of reforms in Russia.[4] She adopts the corporate governance theory of New Institutional Economies to the study on ownership reforms of the state-owned enterprises, with a special focus on manager and labor governance. This paper has following contents about the reforms in China and Russia as transitional economies. State-owned enterprises in China maintained social entities under powerful party leadership. In the beginning they were gradually reformed following domestic institutional frameworks. In the later stages, however, they were reformed more fundamentally with the property rights of the joint stock companies transferred to stockholders. Meanwhile the states are still remained to be the most dominant owners. As the states could not supervise managers effectively, there occurred the principle-agency problems on the part of managers. As managers came to dominate the firms, their corporate governance structures changed to managers controlled ones. Laborers were excluded from management decision making processes as laborers had a small portion of the stocks due to a rule that laborers were prohibited to have stocks of firms that they worked for. This paper also surveys Russian governance system. Russia followed radical steps in privatizing state-owned enterprises. Most firms were transformed into private firms. In the beginning, laborers became majority stockholders. But laborers were prohibited to use the right of stockholders collectively by authority administration. Consequently, laborers could not recognize the meaning of the right of stockholders and showed no interest in it. As time went by, the proportion of the stocks owned by laborers decreased while that by managers increased. In the event, privatized firms became to be of managers controlled corporate governance structure.

In sum, there are stylized findings about corporate governance in European firms including Eurasian companies. Firms have defensive systems for a control stability of the country business groups and no restrictions related to holding company and pyramid investment with general cross-shareholding. However, since the late 1990s, Eurasian firms are getting better on the principles for the corporate

[4] For example, there were only 70 firms with shareholder rights and shareholder rights have not been focused by managers of the firms in Russia in 2000. After 2000, in privatized enterprises, role of managers and non-financial shareholders was expanded as new trend of ownership structure. But the role of employees was diminished while managers are getting important in the ownership structure and control. And one of the characteristic trends is the strengthening of control of state-assets in Russian economy. The privatization policy of Putin`s government focuses on the effectiveness of privatization and the control of state-owned assets. This is related to good economic situation of Russia and expansion of stock market. The protection of shareholder rights in enterprises is recognized as an important problem in Russia (Cho, 2007).

governance structure and the strengthening of shareholder rights. We can observe recent ownership decentralization of the new company and the weakening of the business group links in Eurasian firms such as Skoda Auto, Agrofert Holding, Ceska Sportielna, Kooperativa, RWE Supply & Trading CZ, Metrostav, petrochemical group Unipetrol in the Czech Republic.[5,6]

4. Conclusion

In this paper, I show the effect of corporate governance on firm value in Korea and the features of corporate governance in Eurasia. My results suggest that the role of corporate governance is a significant factor for firms in Korea and has been changed following macro economic situation such as stock market index or economic index. For example, during boom period (recession period), firms recover (suffer) from external shocks and have much brighter (darker) prospect of investment opportunities; firms with poor governance experience a bigger (smaller) rebound in their share values. I find that poorly governed firms — firms that have high disparity between voting and cash flow rights, have low equity ownership by controlling shareholders and their family members, have low block ownership — suffer more during the crisis period and rebound more during economically boom period.

I also find some facts about corporate governance in European firms including Eurasian companies. Firms have defensive systems for a control stability of the country business groups and no restrictions related to holding company and pyramid investment with general cross-shareholding. However, Eurasian firms are getting better on the principles for the corporate governance structure such as transparency, protection and the strengthening of shareholder rights to accomplish advanced market system. We can observe recent ownership decentralization of the new company and the weakening of the business group links in Eurasian firms.

[5] It is widely known that financial industry in the Czech Republic has been successful in Eurasian firms. This means that financial firms have good governance structures to raise funds from investors.

[6] For example, Skoda Auto aim is to manage the company in a reliable, qualified, and transparent manner, which is focused on the long-term success of the company and protection of the interests of the interested groups. Corporate Governance is system which manages and controls the company. It defines the distribution of rights and duties between the interested parties of the company, as the shareholders, executive management, statutory bodies, employees, and customers. (*http://www.skoda-auto.com/en/company/compliance*)

Table 1. Mean and median holding period return (HPR)

during good and bad states in Korea

The sample contains nonfinancial firms listed on the *Korea Stock Exchange.* Cash flow rights of controlling shareholders are the sum of direct equity ownership and the product of the ownership stakes obtained indirectly along the chain of a pyramid structure for controlling shareholders. Voting rights of controlling shareholders are the sum of direct equity ownership and the minimum of the level of ownership in the pyramid structure. Equity ownership by controlling shareholders is the sum of equity ownerships by owner-managers and their family members. ***, **, and * denote significance of the parameter estimates at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.

Panel A: HPR by disparity variable				
	Disparity between cash flow rights and control rights (voting right / cash flow right)		Test of difference: *p*-value	
	Low	High	*t*-test	Wilcoxon *Z*-test
Bad state	-0.682 (-0.739)	-0.735 (-0.797)	0.03**	0.01**
Good state	1.236 (0.507)	1.587 (0.964)	0.00***	0.00***

Panel B: HPR by equity ownership by controlling shareholders				
	Equity ownership by controlling shareholders		Test of difference: *p*-value	
	Low	High	*t*-test	Wilcoxon *Z*-test
Bad state	-0.729 (-0.786)	-0.664 (-0.730)	0.00***	0.00***
Good state	1.764 (0.834)	0.898 (0.396)	0.00***	0.00***

Panel C: HPR by sum of block ownership by all shareholders				
	Sum of block ownership by all shareholders		Test of difference: *p*-value	
	Low	High	*t*-test	Wilcoxon *Z*-test
Bad state	-0.745 (-0.786)	-0.646 (-0.731)	0.00***	0.00***
Good state	1.701 (0.678)	0.948 (0.529)	0.00***	0.02**

Panel D: HPR by largest managerial block ownership				
	Largest managerial block ownership		Test of difference: *p*-value	
	Low	High	*t*-test	Wilcoxon *Z*-test

Bad state	-0.732 (-0.779)	-0.661 (-0.725)	0.00***	0.00***
Good state	1.857 (0.867)	0.782 (0.396)	0.00***	0.00***

Source) Baek, J.S., Bae, K.-H., Kang, J.-K., Lui, W., 2012. Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence. *Journal of Financial Economics* 105, 412-435.

Table 2. Family control in Asia

"Control" means ownership of shares with at least 20% of voting rights.

	Number of Firms	Control		
		Family	State	Widely held
Hong Kong	330	66.7%	1.4%	7.0%
Indonesia	178	71.5	8.2	5.1
Japan	1,240	9.7	0.8	79.8
Korea	345	48.4	1.6	43.2
Malaysia	238	67.2	13.4	10.2
Philippines	120	44.6	2.1	19.2
Singapore	221	55.4	23.5	5.4
Taiwan	141	48.2	2.8	26.2
Thailand	167	61.6	8.0	6.6

Source) Brealey, R.A., Myers, S.C., Allen, F., 2008. Principles of Corporate Finance, 9th edition. McGraw-Hill.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L., 2002. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. *Journal of Financial Economics* 58, 81-112.

Figure 1. Ownership and corporate control






Figure 2. Pyramid controls in European company: ABB, one of Sweden's largest companies




Source) Brealey, R.A., Myers, S.C., Allen, F., 2008. Principles of Corporate Finance, 9th edition. McGraw-Hill.

Figure 3. Pyramid controls in Belgium: Colruyt Group



Source) Lee, W.S., Lee, B.K., 2014. Becht et al. 2000.

Figure 4. Pyramid controls in Italian company: Benetton Group



Source) Lee, W.S., Lee, B.K., 2014. Melis, A., Gaia, S., 2011.

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III-4 Linguistics & Literature 2 (in Russian)

‘V4+1’: Opportunities for Strengthening the Cooperation

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≫ Именование человека в русском и корейском языках: лингвистические и культурные контрасты

Karine Deponian (University of Suwon) &
Raisa Kulkova (Sang-Myung University)

≫ Slavic Alphabet (“azbuka”) between East and West

Vanja Stanišić (University of Belgrad)

≫ Экзистенциальное мировоззрение в советском неофициальном искусстве

Hoon Suk Lee (Lomonosov Moscow State University)

≫ Русские сравнительные союзы как отражение картины мира и русской ментальности

Natalia Okatova (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

Именование человека в русском и корейском языках: лингвистические и культурные контрасты

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Annotation

Vocabulary learning is an important part in foreign language. Commonly, there are several techniques concerning the teaching vocabulary. In this article, we are talking about learning vocabulary in Russian by Korean students (and in Korean by Russian students) at the beginning level. We focused on the teaching words with abstract meaning and in terms of the group of words with the meaning "naming" we show that teaching vocabulary even at the beginning level must be systematic, must take into account the student's native language and stimulate their speech activity in foreign language. For example, the Russian word "имя (name)" we must not only translate in Korean, but also we must explain in details the difference between the meanings of the Russian word "имя" and it's equivalents in Korean. This will allow students to perceive the language vocabulary, starting with the first of its presentation and create the necessary conditions for speech activity in the classroom.

Key words: Russian as a foreign language, Korean as a foreign language, teaching vocabulary, beginning level, group of words with the meaning "naming".

Формирование у учащихся прочных знаний нужной лексики как основы для коммуникации – одна из ключевых целей обучения русскому языку как иностранному (далее – РКИ). Результативный процесс накопления этих знаний во многом зависит от формы и характера презентации учебного материала, особенно в условиях иноязычной среды. В данной статье на примере темы «Имя человека» мы покажем, что обучение лексике даже на начальном этапе должно строиться с учётом родного языка учащихся и стимулировать их речевую деятельность на изучаемом языке.

В разных языках системы именования, или антропонимические системы (далее – АМ), имеют свои особенности, что позволяет говорить об их неоднородности. Различия систем именования у разных народов связаны как с исторически конкретными социальными условиями страны, так и с особенностями строя самого языка. Один из крупнейших ономастов В.А. Никонов отмечал, что, например, «трёхчлен *Александр Сергеевич Пушкин* родственнее… польскому, чешскому, болгарскому двучленам *Адам Мицкевич*, *Карел Чапек*, *Иван Вазов* (отличие только в отсутствии

отчества)», в то время как говорить о его родственности с «древнеримским трёхчленом *Публий Овидий Назон*» не приходится [7, с. 6]. То же касается и современных европейских АМ: если обозначить русскую систему именования как ИОФ, польскую, чешскую и болгарскую как ИФ, то, например, исландская система будет выглядеть как «И+О» (т.е. имя и отчество), немецкая и французская – соответственно «И+$И_1$+Ф» и «И+$И_1$+$И_2$+Ф» (в этих системах принято указывать второе и третье личное имя) [там же, с. 7] и т.п. И даже китайскую и корейскую АМ, состоящие из фамилии и имени, т.е. «Ф+И», нельзя признать похожими по принципам внутреннего устройства ни на русскую, ни на польскую, ни на чешскую, ни на болгарскую системы.

Неповторимость и своеобразие языка зависит не столько от наличия или отсутствия в нём тех или иных слов, сколько от закономерностей их употребления [5, с. 6]. Как известно, объём значения слов, которые в разных языках выражают одно и то же существующее в сознании носителей разных языков понятие (например, *мебель*, *друг*, *имя* и др.), часто не совпадают. Это происходит потому, что «понятие есть психологическая категория мышления и как таковое оно имеет всеобщий, «неязыковой», «вненациональный» характер. Значение – категория лингвистическая, и поэтому её содержание имеет национальное выражение… Значение выражает какое-либо понятие лишь частично, поэтому одно и то же понятие может быть выражено в разных языках разными словами, а слова, обозначающие одно и то же понятие, в разных языках не совпадают по объёму значений» [11, с. 121]. Исходя из этого, в обучении лексике ИЯ семантизация вводимых слов путём соотнесения изучаемого слова с определённым словом родного языка допустима лишь в отношении слов, смысл которых легко выявляется указанием на их денотат (русское слово *яблоко* можно перевести корейским словом *саква*, *книга* – словом *чек* и т.п.). Но если слово имеет абстрактное значение, его семантизация становится более сложной задачей, так как надо дать учащимся представление «о его месте и функциях в том мире, где данный язык используется в качестве реального средства общения» [10, с. 18]. Такое представление невозможно дать только с помощью перевода слов каким-то одним словом иностранного языка: в этом случае в сознании учащихся складывается ложное представление об объёме значения иностранного слова, происходит уподобление значения одного понятия изучаемого языка значению этого же понятия в родном языке [8, с. 79]. Приведём пример, который мы обнаружили в ходе своей практической работы. Так, в корейской аудитории введение слова «друг» путём его перевода на корейский язык словом *чингу* сформирует у учащихся весьма ложное представление о том, что *друг* и *чингу* – это одно и то же. Значит наши слушатели будут думать, что *друзья* (как это принято в корейском социуме, в корейской культуре) – это находящиеся в психологически близких отношениях люди **одного возраста**, а точнее – **одного года рождения**. А в этом случае в понятие *друзья* не будут входить старшие и младшие по возрасту друг и подруга: в Корее их называют, используя термины родства, а именно: *старший (младший) брат* или *старшая (младшая) сестра*.

Таким образом, семантизация вводимых слов с абстрактным значением путём соотнесения изучаемого слова с каким-то единственным словом родного языка будет приводить к интерференционным ошибкам [подробно см.: 4, с. 13]. Чтобы их избежать, необходим учёт родного языка учащихся: многомерное сопоставление лексических единиц в изучаемом и родном языках даёт возможность предупредить потенциальные ошибки, которые обусловлены влиянием

родного языка, предвидеть степень лёгкости/трудности восприятия учащимися вводимой лексики, т.е. строить учебный процесс наиболее оптимальным образом для конкретного контингента учащихся.

Такой подход к семантизации лексики применим как для лексико-семантических группы [8], так и для тематических групп слов (обозначение цвета, название учебных заведений, разновидности мебели и др.), изучение которых приходится на начальный этап обучения. В статье мы обратимся к группе слов со значением «компоненты паспортного именования человека» (в дальнейшем – группа слов со значением «именование»).

В научной литературе под ***именованием*** понимаются «имя, отчество, фамилия, прозвище и некоторые другие слова, выделяющие лицо, сообщающие ему определённую характеристику» [1, с. 5]. Исходя из данного определения, рассмотрим в составе этой группы слова, которые выступают в качестве основных компонентов русской АМ – имя, отчество и фамилия.

Начнём с первого компонента – с имени.

В русском языке слово «имя» может употребляться как в узком, так и в широком значении. В узком значении под «именем» понимается «личное название человека, даваемое ему при рождении… *Его и. – Иван… Дать ребёнку и. Пётр… Полное и.* (официальная форма имени). *Моё полно и. – Надежда, а можно просто Надя*» [3, с. 390-391]. В широком значении «имя» употребляется для передачи всей АМ, а именно как «личное название человека с его отчеством, а также его фамилия. *И. лучшего футболиста года. Имя его было Акакий Акакиевич* (Гоголь)» [там же, с. 391]. Примером употребления слова «имя» в широком значении могут служить и устойчивые выражения типа *громкое имя*, *человек с именем* [9] и т.д.

В корейском языке понятие «имя» передаётся не одной, а двумя лексемами: ***ирым*** (относится к исконно корейскому пласту лексики) и ***мён*** (относится к ханмунной лексике) [1]. Различаются они по стилистическому признаку: *ирым*, как правило, употребляется в разговорной речи (성은 김이고 이름은 선우다 Моя фамилия – Ким, моё имя – Сону), в то время как *мён* участвует в образовании других слов ханмунного происхождения, например: *понмён* (настоящее, истинное, первоначальное имя), *тхэмён* (прозвище ребёнка в утробе матери), *амён* (детское имя), *пёльмён* (прозвище) и др.

Ирым и *мён* могут выступать как равнозначные синонимы, при этом одна из этих лексем используется для раскрытия смысла второго, например: 명은 개인의 이름이다 *Мён* – это личное имя (*ирым*) [17, с. 567]. Приведём пример, подтверждающий тот факт, что лексемы *ирым* и *мён* являются синонимами: в исследовании «Ча и хо корейцев» авторы Кан Хончун и Син Ёнхо, рассказывая о том, как в среде корейских феодалов старшие собеседники обращались к младшим,

[1] Как отмечает южно-корейский исследователь Тен Енс Сун, исконно корейские слова составляют древнейший лексический пласт, и как правило обозначают «жизненно первичные объекты и понятия», а ханмунная лексика является «продуктом многовекового взаимодействия корейского и китайского языков» и составляет «основу научно-технической и специальной терминологии». Различное отношение к корейским и ханмунным лексическим единицам в корейском языке «утвердилось со времён средневековья, когда ханмун функционировал в качестве письменного языка, корейский же язык использовался только как разговорный, то есть наблюдалось по сути дела жанрово-стилистическое двуязычие. Остаточные явления этого двуязычия сохранились до наших дней. Ханмунные слова, как правило, ассоциируются с письменным языком (тогда как корейские – с устной речью), вежливым и возвышенным стилем (корейские – с нейтральным стилем), мужской речью (корейские – с женской речью) [12, с. 9-11].

в одном предложении используют слово *ирым* (함부로 이름을 부르지 않았다 бесцеремонно не произносили имя), а в следующем – *мён* (사람은 名[2]으로 부르지 않는다고 하였다 не называли человека по имени) [13, с. 9-10].

Следует отметить, что в корейской культуре, которая развивалась под сильным влиянием конфуцианства, придаётся большое значение смыслу имени: «Имя (*ирым*) (передаётся иероглифом) *мён*, который состоит из элементов «вечер» (это иероглиф) *сок* и «отверстие» (это иероглиф) *ку*. Вечером темно и ничего не видно… Родители дают детям имя с добрым предзнаменованием и хорошим значением, желая, чтобы дети жили в соответствии со своим именем»[3] [16]. Другими словами, в корейском языке значение имени следует понимать как жизненный ориентир, который может помочь человеку выбраться из темноты невежества, преодолеть себя и воспитать в себе личность. Так, в одном конфуцианском сочинении мы читаем: «Посмотри на своё имя, подумай о его смысле, и не веди себя распущенно, не проводи время праздно, размышляй о сделанном сегодня и о том, что будешь делать завтра, совершай добрые поступки и сегодня, и завтра, будь всегда осторожен, не отдыхай даже тогда, когда можно отдохнуть, прилагай усилия, тогда ты сможешь стать выдающимся воспитанным человеком со сформированным характером, иначе ты останешься маленьким (незначительным) человеком. Поэтому почитай значение своего имени и старайся всё это делать» [цитируется по: 13, с. 9].

Таким образом, придавая большое, почти сакральное, значение имени, его смыслу, бережно относясь к нему, корейцы предпочитали не произносить вслух *понмён*[4] (настоящее, истинное имя), причём ни своё, ни другого человека, дабы не осквернить его. *Понмён* всегда скрывалось от посторонних. Настоящее имя человека могли произносить лишь король, наставник (учитель) и отец. Если имя феодала произносилось вслух, то это означало, что его признавали преступником, совершившим тяжкое преступление [там же]. По этой причине *понмён* заменялось другими именами, которые отражали возраст, род занятий, черты характера и пр. Поэтому в корейском языке кроме слов *ирым* и *мён* существует ещё целый набор слов, которые употребляются в значении «имя». Дело в том, что в корейской культуре вплоть до начала XX века личное имя давалось человеку не пожизненно, а менялось с возрастом и после смерти (как отмечает В.А. Никонов, такое же явление имеет место у китайцев и некоторых народов Африки [7, с. 7]), что, естественно, находит отражение и в языке: *амён* (детское имя) или *чхомён* (первое имя); *кванмён* (официальное имя, которое даётся юноше при достижении совершеннолетия); *ча* (имя, под которым молодой мужчина, как правило после женитьбы, становится известен в кругу своих родственников и близких друзей); *хо* (псевдоним людей, которые занимались государственной, научной, литературной или какой-либо другой творческой деятельностью); *сихо* (посмертное имя (псевдоним), которое давалось после смерти заслуженным деятелям) [6, с. 175].

Как и слово «имя» в русском языке, лексемы *ирым* и *мён* могут употребляться в широком значении для обозначения всей АМ, т.е. фамилии и имени. При этом *ирым* встречается в устойчивых словосочетаниях типа *ирым нан чакка* (известный писатель), в составе отдельных

[2] Иероглиф名 в корейском языке читается как *мён* (имя).
[3] Вероятно, имя следует понимать как ориентир в жизни, такой же как ориентир, который может помочь человеку выбраться из темноты.
[4] Равнозначными синонимами *понмён* являются слова *сильмён* и *вонмён*.

слов: *ирымпхё* «табличка с именем, бейджик» и т.п., в то время как *мён* используется в составе слов преимущественно ханмунного слоя лексики: *мёндан* (список имён и фамилий), *чакмёнсо* (заведение по составлению имён), *мёнхам*[5] (визитная карточка) и др. [18]. В значении «фамилия и имя» *ирым* употребляется в разговорной речи в нейтральном стиле в составе речевого клише *«моё имя – ФИ»*, например: 제이름은 김민호입니다 (Моё имя – Ким Минхо). Однако в разговорной речи в вежливом и возвышенном стиле используется слово *сонхам* «Ваши фамилия и имя»: 성함이 어떻게 되십니까? (Как Ваши фамилия имя?) и др. Синонимом *ирым* в широком значении выступает слово *сонмён* (*сон* «фамилия», *мён* «имя»), например: **이름표** 성명을 적어서 가슴에 다는 표 *Табличка с именем (ирымпхён) – это табличка, на которой написаны фамилия и имя (сонмён) и которая вешается на одежду (досл.: на грудь)* [14, 1481]. Кроме этого, лексема *сонмён* широко употребляется в письменной речи в разного рода документах (подобно ФИО в документах на русском языке).

Соотношение объёма значений слов, выражающих понятие «имя» в русском и корейском языках, можно представить в виде таблицы (см. Таблицу 1).

Таблица 1.

Языки	**Узкое значение**	**Широкое значение**
Рус. язык	имя	имя (имя и фамилия; имя и отчество; имя, отчество и фамилия)
Кор. язык	*ирым* *мён* - - - - - - - - - - - - *амён (чхомён),* *кванмён, ча, хо, сихо*	*ирым* (устн., нейтр.) *сонхам* (устн., вежл.) *сонмён* (пис., нейтр., офиц.) *мён* (в составе слов ханмунного пласта)

Как показывает таблица, русскому слову «имя» в узком смысле в зависимости от контекста может соответствовать не одно, а целый ряд слов корейского языка – *ирым*, *мён*, *амён*, *кванмён* и др. Слову «имя» в широком значении в русском языке соответствуют четыре слова корейского языка (*ирым*, *сонхам*, *сонмён*, *мён*), употребление которых варьируется в зависимости от стилевой окраски и типа речи – устной или письменной.

После знакомства с данной таблицей преподаватель, не владеющий корейским языком, сможет очень определённо представить себе, насколько наивно было бы давать русскому слову «имя» перевод на корейский язык в виде одной единственной лексемы, что, к сожалению, практикуется авторами учебников для корейцев.

Следующий компонент русской АМ – это отчество, т.е. именование по личному имени отца [3, с. 766]. Отсутствие в антропонимии корейцев отчеств приводит к тому, что в корейском языке нет исконного слова с таким значением. Слово «отчество» на корейский язык передаётся словом ханмунного происхождения – *пучин*, которое включает два слога: *пу* «отец» и *чин* «звать,

[5] В словах *мёндан* и *мёнхам* первый слог «мён» – это сокращённый вариант слова *сонмён* [16].

называть». Отметим, что слог *чин* используется в основном в составе слов со значением «прозвище», например: *мёнчин*, *пёльчин*, *ичин* и др.

Отсутствие в корейском языке слова «отчество» и самого феномена приводит к скрытой интерференции: учащиеся, не понимая его значения, стараются заменять в своей речи на русском языке обращение по имени-отчеству формами родного языка – т.е. названиями профессии, должности, титула и т.п., например: по отношению к преподавателю употребляют обращение «преподаватель» или «профессор», по отношению к директору – «директор» и т.п.

Следующий компонент русской и корейской АМ – фамилия. В русском языке *фамилия* – это именование, обозначающее всех членов семьи и переходящее на следующие поколения [7, с. 264]. Принимая в целом данное определение, отметим, что из этого правила есть исключения. Например, хотя в России и принято, чтобы женщина после замужества меняла свою девичью фамилию на фамилию мужа, однако это не является обязательным. Дети тоже могут носить не фамилию отца, а фамилию матери или другого родственника (например, девичью фамилию бабушки и др.). Известны также случаи, когда мужчины берут фамилию жены.

В корейском языке *сон* (фамилия) – это именование, которое указывает только на кровное родство (членов семьи) и наследуется от отца к детям[6] [17, с. 922]. В корейской культуре женщина, в отличии от России, после замужества не берёт фамилию мужа, а остаётся на своей фамилии (т.е. на фамилии отца).

Отметим ещё одно фундаментальное отличие. Современные корейские фамилии, в прошлом представлявшие собой родовые имена [2, с. 29], тесно связаны с ***понкван*** или ***пон*** ("топонимическое" имя), под которыми понимается название места, откуда конкретный род ведёт своё происхождение [6, с. 179], например, *род Ким из Кёнджу*. Фамилия и топонимическое имя позволяют не только проследить историю того или иного рода, но и отделить родственников от тех, кто родственниками не является. Это определяется так: люди, носящие одинаковые фамилии и имеющие одинаковые *пон*, являются фактическими родственниками, хотя в реальной жизни они могут и не знать друг друга. Люди же, носящие одинаковые фамилии, но имеющие разные *пон*, родственниками не являются [15, с. 80]. Это, в свою очередь, ещё в недавнем прошлом позволяло регулировать семейно-брачные отношения: заключение брака между родственниками либо было запрещено, либо не рекомендовалось.

Сопоставим значения лексем, передающих понятие «фамилия», в русском и корейском языках (см. Таблицу 2).

Таблица 2.

Фамилия	**Сон**
именование, которое носят все члены семьи (возможны исключения)	именование, которое носят отец и дети - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - *понкван* ("топонимическое" имя)

[6] Как известно, в корейской культуре женщина после замужества остаётся на своей фамилии.

Таким образом, анализ слов со значением «именование» в русском и корейском языках позволяет говорить о том, что однословный перевод на корейский язык входящих в эту группу лексем (имя – это *ирым*, отчество – это *пучин*, фамилия – это *сон*) не может дать адекватного и точного представления об их значении. Поэтому становится необходимым эксплицитное и детальное сравнение объёмов их значения, в котором отражены результаты сопоставительного изучения этой лексики. Наиболее понятной формой введения этого материала в учебниках (учебниках по РКИ для корейцев и учебниках по корейскому языку для русских) являются таблицы. С помощью таблиц за минимальное количество времени достигается большая наглядность в представлении материала, что увеличивает вероятность точного понимания учащимися разницы в объёме значения этих слов, а значит – их места в языковой системе и особенностей их употребления в речи.

Практика показывает, что предлагаемый нами подход к представлению лексики со значением именования даёт следующий эффект:

- при изучении лексемы «имя» в сознании корейских учащихся предотвращается недодифференциация значения слов, когда со словом «имя» в русском языке ошибочно ассоциируется несколько слов в родном, а в сознании русскоязычных учащихся предотвращается сверхдифференциация значения слов, когда несколько слов со значением именования корейского языка ошибочно ассоциируются с одним многозначным словом родного языка «имя», что нельзя признать соответствующим лингвистическим и культурным реалиям;
- при изучении лексемы «фамилия» у корейских и русскоязычных учащихся не происходит непосредственного переноса (калькирования) в изучаемый язык лексического значения этого слова;
- в сознании корейских учащихся не ожидается появления «белых пятен» в понимании феномена русского отчества, а у русскоязычных учащихся – в понимании того, что такое "топонимическое" имя.

Компактная, лингвистически выверенная форма представления материала позволяет учащимся увидеть логические связи в данном фрагменте учебного материала, что существенно экономит время на его усвоение и в дальнейшем даст им возможность безошибочно использовать изученные лексемы в собственных высказываниях на изучаемом языке.

Несомненна также польза такого рода таблиц для занятий по речевой практике. Представленная в лексических единицах лингвострановедческая информация может стимулировать начало интересной беседы, так как информация таблицы рождает ряд специфических вопросов (подчёркнуто): Как ваше имя? Что оно означает? В детстве у вас было детское имя *амён*? У вас есть *ча*? Если бы вы выбирали себе *хо*, то какое имя вы себе выбрали? и др.

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Славянский алфавит («азбука») между востоком и западом

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йся литературе по старославянскому языку уже было замечено, что «диграфия и билингвизм почти ‘генетически’ вложены в славянскую письменую культуру».[1] Особо значимым внешним выражением различных культурных ориентаций и политичких влияний, которым подвергались славяне, является их хорошо известная полиграфичность.[2] Такая культурная физиономия славянства имеет свои глубокие корни, она была предопределена центральным положением славян в евразийском культурноисторическом и этнолингвистическом контекстах.[3] Особое место в этом занимает двуазбучность в рамках одной письменности, с которой славяне в старославянскую эпоху появляются на исторической сцене и которая вплоть до нашых дней является внешним отличием той части балканских славян, которых игрой исторической судьбы характеризует подобная культурная распятость между Западом и Востоком, империальным и своим, причастностью к чужим культурным ценностям с одной стороны, и самобытностью с другой, о чем шла речь еще в тематически уникальном старославянском памятнике – “О письменах” Черноризца Храбра.

Как известно, в течение всего средневековья в церковнославянской литературе речь шла только об одном славянском письме как оригинальном произведении славянского первоучителя Константина Кирилла Солунского, хотя в славянской письменности с самых ранних времен употреблялись две, по форме совершенно различные азбуки, *кириллица* – открытый дериват греческого письма и загадочная *глаголица*, которая, видимо, сначала называлась именно *кириллицей*.[4] Уже двести лет в славистике обсуждаются вопросы происхождения, старины и взаимоотношений данных азбук и вопреки отдельным все еще открытим вопросам, сегодня общепринятым является мнение о том, что причины существования двух славянских писем

[1] К. Станчев 2000: 88.

[2] Этому феномену посвящены, например, вводные глявы в пособии «Введение в славянскую филологию» Лешека Мошиньского (Moszyński 1984) и коллективная монография The Slavonic languages (1993) в редакции Бернарда Комри и Гревилля Корбета.

[3] На это указал уже Н. С. Трубецкой: еще в те времена, когда предки славян были лишь частью индоевропейской массы, общаясь на диалекте индоевропейского праязыка, центральное положение этих племен содействовало возникновению тенденций к установлению связей между некоторыми из них с Востоком, другими же с Западом, третьими – с Югом. Позднее эти тенденции четко проявились в связи с разделением самого славянства, вследствие чего каждое из славянских ответвлений унаследовало одну из упомянутых тенденций (Трубецкой 1995: 131-132).

[4] Как известно (Hamm 1974: 11; Хабургаев: 29), название *глаголица* имеет более позднее происхождение и, судя по всему, ему присуща внутренняя связь с хорошо сохранившейся глаголической традицией в Хорватии. В древних памятниках говорится лишь о единственном *славянском* письме.

главным образом хронологического порядка. Структура глаголицы показывает несомненную связь с греческим письмом, что само по себе делает второстепенным вопрос о происхождении ее знаков. С другой стороны, ее графическая оригинальность и строгий внутрений принцип, который связывает целые группы знаков с соответствующими вереницами фонем, что можно отнести к гениальному филологическому дарованию ее создателя,[5] находятся в связи с тем фактом, что это новое письмо было создано для первого славянского государства с отчетливо выраженным стремлением к славянской этно-политической эмансипации.

После разгрома моравской миссии оригинальное славянское письмо переживает на Балканах стратегическое изменение своей формы – оно становится выражением нового типа государственности, во всем подражающего Византии. Непосредственным последствием этого оказалось приспособление греческого письма к славянскому языку с помощью прибавления особых знаков, взятих у глаголицы или сделанных по ее примеру.[6] Это привело к диграфии – одновременному параллельному существованию двух различных письменных систем для одного и того же языка, которое не могло просуществовать длительный период, так что оригинальное славянское письмо очень рано, уже до конца XI в., было вытеснено славянизированным греческим письмом у всех тех славян которые принадлежали к византийскому культурному кругу. Несмотря на то, что большинство вопросов, касающихся первенства, старины и диалектных основ славянских азбук уже разъяснены, сам факт их существования имеет огромное значение для понимания дальнейшей судьбы письменности у славян.

Это второе, византинированное славянское письмо сохранило в своем названии воспоминание о Кирилле и Мефодии, но при этом почти совсем лишенное непосредственной связи с графическим планом их работы. С другой стороны, оригинальное славянское письмо осталось в живом употреблении у славянского католического населения западной части Балкан только в функции домашнего народного письма, а это значит без возможности противостоять распространению государственных графических систем которые вытесняли его и с запада и с востока.

Как можно видеть, славянское письмо среди южных славян пережило диаметрально различные изменения как на плане выражения, так и на плане содержания. На востоке получила перевес внешняя идентификация с Византией, а на западе его сохранение как домашнего народного письма было возможно до тех пор, пока латинское письмо не вошло в сферу его употребления. В обоих случаях, при этом, получила преобладание идентификация с мощными культурными центрами вне славянского мира. Совсем наоборот от графической мотивировки оригинального славянского письма, которое графически выделяло славян и от «римских» и от «греческих письмен».

Древное славянское письмо прошло, таким образом, через фазу диграфии, через конкуренцию культурных характеристик и оппозицию между различными культурными ориентациями южных славян. В контексте сказанного, загадка славянского оригинального письма решалась в виде вопроса: какую культурную роль выполняло это письмо, т.е. чем была мотивирована его особая

[5] Велчева 1980: 158; Пешикан 1994: 112; Станишић 1994: 267.
[6] И. Добрев, «Кирилица», *Кирило-методиевска енциклопедия,* II: 312.

графическая форма? Несмотря на то, что вопрос мотивации и культурной роли оригинального письма не кажется слишком сложным, он до сих пор получил настолько различных ответов, что оправдано можно поставить вопрос критериев на основании которых определяется предназначение этого письма.

По своей двухсторонней природе, письмо как культурный феномен представляет собой "центральное поле взаимодействия внешних и внутренних факторов в развитии языка".[7] Оно одновременно зависит и от внутрилингвистической основы данного языка, для которого употребляется, и от культурной истории этого языка. По этой своей двухстороней природе письмо, подобно языку, оказывается семиотической системой, на которую может быть применено известное лингвистическое разделение на план выражения и план содержания (signans – signatum). Это разделение способствовало лучше понять место и роль культурноисторического контекста в развитии отдельных типов письма.[8] То что, к примеру, является общим для трех особых дериватов семитской письменности – греческого, индийского и ефиопского, это факт, что с одной стороны, все они одинаково отклоняются от семитского источника в пользу своих языковых основ, т.е. своего плана содержания, и что, при этом, все они и во времени и пространстве в приблизительно равной степени отдалены от семитского мира. Как и в случае возникновения самой семитской письменности, которая находилась достаточно далеко и от Египта и от Месопотамии чтобы ее самостоятельность могла отразиться и на этот графический сегмент культуры, и эти три письменности представляют собой оригинальные произведения которые селективно использовали только семитскую графическую модель – ее план выражения, что позволило им проявить независимость по отношению к первоисточнику.[9]

Этому разделению на поверхностную и глубинную структуры письма грузинский специалист Тамаз Гамкрелидзе прибавил и другое важное лингвистичкое разделение на парадигматику и синтагматику, которое в самом широ́ком смысле дало возможность различения системы и структуры и убедительно показало близкую связь между наукой о языке и наукой о письме, основанной на прочной, структурной связи между языком и письмом. Этот подход Гамкрелидзе успешно демонстрировал на примере отношения графической формы и языковой основы средневековых дериватов греческого алфавита, что со своей стороны предоставило возможность лучшего понимания культурноисторического измерения славянской двуазбучности.

Взаимное отношение двух основных факторов каждой письменной системы – ее фонологической основы и культурно-исторического контекста, в котором она возникла – хорошо обозревается на примере языковой основы и графической формы отдельных европейских писем. Суще́ственная связь между структурной самостоятельностью письма и этно-политической эмансипацией общества хорошо видна на примере латинского алфавита, наиболее оригинального из всех италийских алфавитов и наиболее свободного по отношению к их этрусско-греческому образцу, а также и на примере германских рун, которые, со своей стороны, подобным образом использовали письменности латинско-италийского круга лишь в качестве отправной основы. В соответствии с упомянутым критерием средневековые дериваты греческого письма могут быть

[7] Журавлев 1982: 83.
[8] Упор. Станишић 2004(а): 267.
[9] Упор. Станишић 2004(б): 267.

разделены на два типа: коптскую и готскую модель. Как показал Т. Гамкрелидзе, первая была использована в грузинском, а вторая в армянском письме. Грузинское придерживание греческого парадигматического ряда свидетельствует о прочных культурных связях с Византией, о том, что это писмо, как и в коптском случае, возникло спонтанным приспособлением греческого письма. В отличие от этого, нарушение подлинной структуры греческого письма в готском и армянском случае совпадает с фактом, что это были оригинальные произведения выдающихся деятелей (Ульфила и Месроп Маштоц), которые в этих алфавитах выразили идею культурно-политической самостоятельности их народов по отношению к Византии.

В отличие от эфиопских христиан, которые, в соответствии со своим периферийным положением по отношению к средневековой христианской экумене, пишут слоговым письмом семитского происхождения, все остальные народы, принявшие христианство непосредственно от греков, создали оригинальные национальные алфавитные письменности: коптскую, готскую, армянскую, грузинскую и славянскую. В некоторых из этих письменностей греческая основа очевидна уже в плане выражения – в коптском и готском письмах и в славянской кириллице. О происхождении остальных, графически оригинальных писем – кавказких алфавитов и славянской глаголицы, выдвинуто множество различных теорий. Однако, лишь с введением парадигматического и синтагматического планов в данное рассмотрение Гамкрелидзе наглядно показал их греческое происхождение, отражающееся именно в точном сохранении греческой парадигматики во всех этих письменностях. Несмотря на отдельные различия, все восточнохристианские письменности в числовых стоимостях своих знаков сохраняют в основе византийский десятеричный числовой порядок, состоящийся из трех энеад (единицы, десятицы, сотни).

Готская модель – сохранение греческого числового порядка путем замены лишных греческих знаков своими особыми, это то что в различной степени находится и во всех остальных письменностях греческого круга (кроме копткого письма, в котором древнеегипатские знаки были прибавлены после греческого алфавитного списка, чтобы не нарушать оригинальную греческую парадигматику). Ту же модель можно видеть и в славянском письме. В то время как создатель готского письма при замене отдельных греческих знаков необходимые готские звуки пополнял главным образом из списка знаков германских рун, создатель славянского письма, по всему судя, в славянской части своих знаков опирался на семитские письменности, а возможно и на тзв. «русские писмена» загадочных крымских христиан, которые скорее всего можно отождествить именно с готами – древнейшими христианами в той части Европы.[10]

Готская структурная модель в рамках греческой парадигматики письма, открытая графическая связь определенного числа глаголических знаков с некоторыми ближневосточными письменностями, с которыми Константин Философ мог встретиться и во время своей хазарской мисии (семитское происхождение очевидно для  /ша/, а очень возможно и для всей остальной серии африкат и фрикативов, в первую очередь  /чрьвь/,  /живѣте/,  /хѣръ/, 

[10] Крымские готы были с времен Вульфилы древнейшими христианами в той части Европы, а православная «готская епархия» в Крыму сохраняла воспоминание о готах вплоть до конца XVIII века (упор. Станишић 2008: 405-406).

/ци/, включая также негреческое ѹ /боукы/)[11], а также загадочное христианское евангелие и псалтырь написанные упомянутыми «русскими письменами», которые согласно VIII главе Константинова жития создатель славянского письма обрел в Херсоне во время своей хазарской мисии – все это может говорить в пользу хазарских источников славянского письма.

Вопреки сказаному, палеославистика по этому вопросу опирается только на косвенные данные и оперирует только рабочими гипотезами, которые менялись в зависимости от более широких теоретических подходов. В упомянутых хазарских источниках славянского письма можно распознать две старые гиппотезы высказаные еще в XIX в. – готскую и кавкаскую, которые возобновил Гамкрелидзе, а каждую из них дальше развивали Юрий Степанов (1991) и Николаос Трунте (Trunte 1997). Однако, в палеославистике, более точно в славянской палеографии, с середины XX в. наступил кореный поворот точки зрения. Как выражение своеобразного насыщения исследованиями только внешних связей славянского письма, во второй половине XX ст. преобладал поиск внутренней логики и структурной мотивировки знаков глаголицы. Сегодня эти два подхода часто воспринимаются как альтернативные и противоставленые друг друг.[12] А в самом деле, надо согласиться со словами Славомира Самбуняка о том, что хотя логично предположить что на создателя славянского письма влияли и культура которой он принадлежал и письменности которые изучил, его произведение в первую очеред имеет творческий характер и несомненную авторскую печать.[13] Более подробный анализ графической структуры глаголицы раскрыл некоторые ее уникальные и противоречивые особенности. Знаки древнейшей глаголицы[14] пишутся в свободном порядке между верхней и нижней буквеными линиями, а их также оригинальные графические элементы вращаются вокруг серединной оси знака описивая круг по его буквеном поле,[15] в чем некоторые авторы попытались раскрыть христианское символическое послание: орнаментальное символическое письмо созданное из сочетаний христианских эзотерических символов. Однако, сужение точки зрения только к воображениям о возможной внутреней структуре письма и к поискам гипотетической структурной модели нужно ведут к вдавливанию всех знаков в прокрустовскую модель “протоглаголицы”, включая и те знаки которые гораздо старше славянской письменности, как это случай со знаком ѡ. Или же приходиться игнорировать факт, что напр. глаголическое ⰽ /како/ своей несиметричной и разрезаной формой[16] нарушает графическое единство славянского письма, но при этом имеет явные сходства в ближневосточных и кавкаских письменностях от самаритянского и еврейского ק /koph/, до армянского Կ կ /ken/ и грузинского ჳ /kan/ (Илчев 1985: 506).

Разногласия по этому поводу хорошо иллюстрирует проблематика первобытного значения первой буквы славянской азбуки. Почти общепринятым является мнение о том, что крестообразная первая буква глаголицы (ⰰ ⰱ ⰲ) может иметь христианскую символику, как

[11] Гамкрелидзе 1989: 255; Карпенко: 21-22. Глаголические знаки которые здесь приводятся взяты из Киевских листков, Мариинского и Зографского евангелиев.
[12] Ср. об этом в следущих работах: Sambunjak 1998; Карпенко 1999; Иванова 2004; Добрев 2005.
[13] Упор. Sambunjak: 33.
[14] В которую помещаются четыре памятника с более древными особенностями: Киевские листки, Синайская псалтырь, Охридские и Прашские отрывки, ср. Станишић 2004(а): 389.
[15] Илчев 1985: 494-500; Станишић 2005: 342-343; Žagar 2007: 267; Čunčić 2008: 270-276.
[16] Пример знака взят из Синайского требника.

возможная символическая инвокация Христа, «Бога Слова», «альфы и омеги», и чтобы в этом смысле она могла быть в узкой связи и с еврейским и самаритянским крестообразным «алефом»,[17] а может быть и еще более широкой теологической символикой креста, которая не только христианская и которую Константин Философ мог застать среди Хазаров.[18] Однако, предположение Юрия Степанова о том, что и его славянское имя /азъ/ может являться каким то дохристианским божественным алефом было встречено отрицательными откликами среди специалистов которые настаивают на сакральном, христианском характере славянской азбуки.[19] Вместо традиционного толкования имен первых трех букв славянской азбуки азъ боукъі вѣди (вѣдѣ) как старославянской синтагмы «я букву (буквы) ведаю», Степанов в этом видел готско-руническое наследие – дохристианскую руническую формулу в начале готского алфавита *Aza berkna geuua* < рун. *ansuz *berkanan *gebō «Аз[а] (епитет германского бога Одина) бересту ввел (разведал)». Вопреки всем откытим вопросам, все же очевидно что речь идет о тождественной формуле, единственной синтагме азбучного низа которая имеет какой то смысль предложения и которая поэтому в славянское письмо и вошла как одно целое, вопреки нарушению парадигматической структуры прототипа которое она вызвала.[20]

Почему глаголица Киевских листков и им подобных памятников тзв. древнейшей глаголицы по отношению к европейским письмненным традициям того времени была письмом “более примитивной страничной структуры”? [21] Возможно ли, все таки, что в этом виновата своеобразная висящая регулировка письма[22] – его привязанность к верхней линии ряда, которая характерна для семитской письменности и ее восточных ответвлениях? Культурноисторическая роль и предназначение славянского письма могли бы подтверждать такое предположение. Это хазарские источники славянского письма созданного для первого славянского государства, христианского наследника аварского каганата, в котором могло осуществиться хазарское соединение востока и запада и которое, потом, определило и будущую “хазарскую” судьбу славянского письма.

Примечание: резюме, ключевые слова и библиография будут добавлены потом...

[17] Илчев: 504; Успенский 2005.
[18] Степанов: 34-36; Москов 1987.
[19] Карпенко: 54-55; Иванова 2004: 81-82.
[20] Начальный семитский парадигматический низ [α, β, γ, δ] сохранен во всех дериватах греческого письма, включая и латинское письмо с этрурским оглушением «гаммы» [a, b, c, d]. От этого отклоняется только славянский в котором из зо разширения этого низа (а, б, в, г, д) разрушены и парадигматическая и числовая стоимость греческого прототипа. Поэтому убедительно выглядит обяснение этого отклонения предложенное Юрием Степановым (31-33), что это может быть скрещивание греческой и готской парадигматики, т.е. что названия первых трех букв славянского письма представляют собой готское наследие (ср. Станишић 2008).
[21] Žagar 2007: 280.
[22] Еще Тхорви Екхардт (Ekhardt 1955: 76) обратила внимание на факт, что в глаголице фактически отсуствует европское двухлинейное устройство письма, и что ее знаки “висят как белье на веревке“; об этом более подробно Čunčić 2004: 485, ср. также Илчев 1985: 501.

Экзистенциальное мировоззрение в советском неофициальном искусстве

Hoon Suk, Lee*

Abstract

This paper explores the elements of the existential worldview in the artworks of Soviet unofficial artists. Existentialism after WWII is deeply connected with the appearance of the new art trends, not only in the Western world, but also in East Asia and in the Soviet bloc. Such worldwide influence of existentialism is associated with a similar ontological experience of individuals from different countries in the war, pre-war, and post-war period. Therefore, the study of existentialism and its correlation to art is important for understanding of the value of art of the postwar period as the universal human value of the contemporary world. Artistic intellectuals in Soviet Union, who experienced tragic war and witnessed massive loss of not only human life, but also trust in modernist perspective of development, demanded to make new language of art, which is able to express the new reality of post-war era. The expression of loneliness, suffering, fear, anxiety and desire for freedom through the artwork of many Soviet unofficial artists, such as Vadim Sidur, Evgeni Kropivnitski, Lev Korpivnitsky and Vladimir Yakovlev demonstrate the possibility of interpretation in common principle in the terms of existential worldview.

Key words: Existentialism, 20th-century art, unofficial art in USSR, Soviet nonconformist art, Vadim Sidur, Evgeni Kropivnitski, Lev Korpivnitski, Vladimir Yakovlev

В Европе после Второй мировой войны вместе с распространением экзистенциализма появились новые течения искусства, отличающиеся от прежних времени: новый роман или т. н. антироман в литературе, театр абсурда в драматургии и ар-информель в изобразительном искусстве являются такими новыми течениями. Представители этих новых течений, например, не только писатели как Ф. Кафка, Ж.-П. Сартр, А. Камю, С. Беккет, или художники как Ж. Дюбюффе, Ж. Фотрие, А. Джакометти, Вольс, а еще теоретики искусства как М. Тапье оказывали огромное влияние на творчество не только в европейских странах, но еще в странах Азии и других частей света. В итоге мировое искусство второй половины XX в. стало неотделимым от европейского экзистенциализма. В данной работе мы рассмотрим отношение между

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экзистенциализмом и изобразительным искусством после Второй мировой войны в Европе и формирования советского неофициального искусства, в котором часто наблюдаются темы как забота, страх, свобода, одиночество, страдание и смерть, считающиеся важным в экзистенциализме.

В Советском Союзе экзистенциализм в основном воспринимался как мрачное пессимистическое и нигилистическое философское учение, отражающее кризисное состояние западного капиталистического общества. В разных советских публикациях 1950-60-х гг. экзистенциальное понятие о субъективности человеческого существования критиковалось как враждебное марксистско-ленинскому учению. В статье в Малой советской энциклопедии экзистенциализму дано следующее определение: «Экзистенциализм — субъективно-идеалистическое направление буржуазной философии. <…> Э. отрицает объективный характер бытия <…> и считает реальным лишь существование человека <…> его переживания — страх, одиночество, забота и пр. Индивидуализм и пессимизм — отличительные черты социологии и этики Э. Экзистенциализм <…> враждебен диалектическому материализму»[1]. Не только в статье Малой советской энциклопедии, но и в разных советских научных публикациях экзистенциализм часто представляется как «реакционное», «нигилистическое» и «антикоммунистическое» философское учение[2].

Из-за негативного отношения советских публикаций к экзистенциализму можно предположить, что в СССР отсутствовал интерес к данному течению. Однако, стоит не забыть, что советская жизнь середины 50-х гг. т. е. после смерти Сталина уже была разделена на две части – официальную и неофициальную. Мы полагаем, что однообразная критика экзистенциализма со стороны советских официальных источников наоборот свидетельствует о довольно большом влиянии экзистенциализма на образ жизни и мышления советского интеллигентного сообщества на неофициальном уровне. Если бы это было не так, то не существовало бы и столь бурной односторонный идеологической критики. К тому же, обстоятельства жизни советского общества начала и середины XX в. в большой степени совпадали с основным условием для возникновения раннего экзистенциализма в Германии: деперсонализацией и отчуждением индивида, произошедшим в результате бюрократизации и стандартизации всех отраслей общественной и личной жизни. А. Камю писал: «Русская концентрационная система и впрямь осуществила переход от правления лицами к управлению вещами, спутав при этом личность с вещью»[3].

Кроме того, некоторые произведения представителей французского экзистенциализма, например, Сартра и Камю, были переведены и представлены в Советском Союзе уже в 50-60-х гг.[4] Письмо саратовского художника М. Аржанова, руководителя реставрационной мастерской

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[1] Цит по: Малая советская энциклопедия. третье издание. Т.10. М., Советская энциклопедия. 1960. С. 736

[2] См.: *Ойзерман Т. И.* Реакционная сущность немецкого экзистенциализма // Современный субъективный идеализм. М., 1957. С. 424-473; *Фогелер Я. Г.* Философия западногерманского экзистенциализма на службе антикоммунизма // Против империалистической идеологии антикоммунизма. М., 1965. С. 199-212; *Мысливченко А. Г.* Критика экзистенциалистского понимания свободы // Вопросы философии. № 10. 1963. С.91-101; *Нарский И. С.* Понятия «нигилизма» и «ничто» в экзистенциализме М. Хайдеггера и антикоммунизм // Философские науки. № 3. 1964. С. 67-75

[3] *Камю А.*, Человек Бунтующий // Иностранная литература, 1990. № 6. С. 221.

[4] *Bollaert C.* Советская судьба французских экзистенциалистов: анализ восприятия переводов произведений Жан-Поля Сартра и Альбера Камю. Магистерская диссертация. Universiteit Gent, 2014. С. 36, 48.

Радищевского музея доказывает, что в москве, по крейней мере среди творческих интеллигентов экзистенциализм был хорошо знаком. Он с удивлением пишит о семье Кропивницких, т. е. о Лианозовской группе: «... они живут, как, вероятно, жили все подлинные художники, - духом... одеваются как крестьяне, и быт весь, как у самых бедных, и только комната, в которой книги и великолепные тонкие вещи на стенах, говорят о том, что это люди высокой культуры, когда слышишь вдруг, как старушка, ничем внешне не отличающаяся от моей матери (портнихи для бедных), тихо беседует с сыном об экзистенциализме (деревня и Сартр), то хочется остаться у них и никуда болльше не ндти...»[5]. Тем более, главные труды Кьеркегора и Ницше, считающихся предшественниками экзистенциализма были переведены и широко читаемы уже в конце XIX в. в России. К тому же, искусствовед Г. Маневич говорит, что с конца 1950-х гг. в самиздатах читатели смогли найти не только переведенные на русском языке произведения Ф. Кафки, А. Камю, Ф. Ницше, Т. Манна, Г. Бёлля, М. Пруста, Л. Селина, К. Гамсуна, Э. Хемингуэя и Н. Бердяева, а еще Ф. Достоевского, Вл. Соловьева, А. Платонова, М. Зощенко, В. Розанова, А. Ремизова[6]. Этот список авторов, чьи творчества, считающиеся исследователям тесно связанным с экзистенциализмом добавляет вероятность на наш домысл о распространении экзистенциального мировоззрения у советской творческой интеллигенции, или, по крайней мере, о существовании общественного настроения, подобного экзистенциализму и оказавшего влияния на формирование неофициального искусства СССР второй половины XX в.

Холодная геометрическая абстракция, которая доминировала сферу изобразительного искусства Европы накануне Второй мировой войны оказалась неподходящей для выражения кризисного состояния послевоенного времени. Экзистенциальное мировоззрение представителей художественной интеллигенции Европы, испытавших трагедию войны и свидетельствовавших массовую потерью не только человеческих жизней, но и веры в модернистскую перспективу развития человечества, выражалось в новом стиле искусства, могущего всецело отразить реальность послевоенной эпохи. Например, человеческие фигуры в скульптурах А. Джакометти (илл.1) и Ж. Ришье (илл. 2) характеризирующиеся деформированностью и искаженностью, эффективно усиливают экспрессивность человеческого существования и его страх и мучение в неприязненном ему пространстве. «Заложники» в живописи Ж. Фотрие (илл. 3) выражаются как-будто раздавленные невыносимым насилием. Сгущенный материал, напоминающий растоптанную грязь усиливает такое впечатление. Все эти выражения являлись новыми и неожиданными в то время в европейском изобразительном искусстве.

[5] Цит. по: *Богадельщикова М. А.* «... Все-таки живопись у меня настоящая, а она редкая, когда-нибудь людям будет нужно и то, что делал я, грешный..»: Документальное повествование о художнике Михаиле Николаевиче Аржанове (1924-1981) [Электронный ресурс] // Волга-XXI век. 2007. № 7-8. Режим доступа: http://magazines.russ.ru/volga21/2007/7/bo.html

[6] *Алпатова И. Г.*, *Талочкин Л. П.* «Другое искусство». Москва. 1956—1976. Т. 1. М.: Художественная галерея «Московская коллекция», СП «Интербук», 1991. С. 15.

Илл. 1. Джакометти А. Лес. 1950



Илл. 2. Ришье Ж. Человек-шторм. 1947-8



Илл. 3. Фотрие Ж. Голова заложника № 14. 1944



Запрос изобретения нового художественного языка среди художников наблюдался еще в Советском Союзе. Официально одобренный «большой стиль» социалистического реализма, искажающего и идеализирующего кризисной реальности послевоенного времени считались молодым художникам несоответствующими с мироощущением советской послевоенной эпохи. В связи с творческим противостоянием в СССР скульптор Э. Неизвестный говорит: «Разногласия с соцреализмом возникли в институте в первую очередь у фронтовиков. Многие из этих молодых людей были даже коммунистами, но их переживания, их жизненный опыт не соответствовали гладкописи соцреализма. Мы не теоретически, а экзистенциально выпадали из общепринятого, нам требовались иные средства выразительности»[7].

Скульптор В. Сидур был одним из таких фронтовиков-коммунистов, понимаюших, что он «должен говорить на языке своего времени»[8]. В студенческое время он искренне верил в коммунистическую идею и правоту курса Сталина и активно занимал начальственные должности в студенческом профсоюзе и комсомоле[9]. Как многие художники того времени, Сидур проводил

[7] *Алпатова И., Талочкин Л., Тамручи Н.* Другое искусство. Москва. 1956-1988. М.: Галарт, 2005. С. 22

[8] *Сидур М. В.* Вадим Сидур: Очерк творчества на фоне событий жизни. М.; Московский государственный музей Вадима Сидура. 2004. С. 16


[9] Там же С. 19

свой творческий эксперимент лишь неофициально, в личное время, а официально занимался скульптурой в стиле социалистического реализма. Его дипломная работа 1953 г. «Мир» (илл. 4) в Высшем художественно-промышленном училище (бывш. Строгановское) хорошо показывает черты, полностью совпадающие по характеристикам с типичными произведениями советского неоклассицизма, т. е., соцреализма. Многие его работы 50-х гг. не сохранились до настоящего времени, но сохранившиеся его произведения, такие, как «Текстильная промышленность» (1954), позволяют нам угадать дух его официальных скульптур. С 1961 г. он больше не занимается монументальной скульптуры в соцреалистическом стиле. Тематика и стль произведений Сидура 60-х гг. сильно отличаются от его официальных работ 50-х гг. В его скульптурных произведениях как «Раненый» (1963) (илл. 5) и «Инвалид с палкой» (1962) (илл. 6) наблюдается мучение и чувство отчуждения. В «Инвалиде» из цикла «Обожженные» (1965) (илл. 7) Сидур уделяет больше внимания страданию человека.

Илл. 4. Сидур В. Мир. 1953



Илл. 5. Сидур В. Раненый. 1963



Илл. 6. Сидур В. Инвалид с палкой.



Илл. 7. Сидур В. Инвалид (из цикла



Почему произошла такое резкое изменение в его творчестве? Мы можем угадать ответ на этот вопрос в событии, произосшедшего в жизни скульптора. С 1954 г. вместе с В. Лемпортом и Н. Силисом, учившимися в одном вузе, они составили творческий коллектив, называемый ЛеСС. Тем не менее их совместная деятельность прекратилась после того, как у Сидура в 1961 г. случился инфаркт. Скульптор в одном интервью объяснял, что распад коллектива состоялся не только из-за творческого разногласия между членами, но еще по другой причине: «Моя болезнь и временная нетрудоспособность, ... привели к возникновению у двух других «колхозников» чувства, что они «перерабатывают» и «кормят» меня. Произошло неизбежное бурное выяснение отношений, за которым последовал полный разрыв. Этот разрыв и развал коллектива был для меня большим ударом, т. к. содружество являлось именно моим детищем, и его крах был одновременно крахом моих утопических идей о том, что именно коллектив способен защитить своих членов от многих несчастий и случайностей (таких, например, как моя болезнь) и создать наилучшие условия для творчества. После разрыва я остался, как говорится в романах, «совершенно без средств к существованию», инвалидом второй группы, но в то же время абсолютно свободным располагать собой, одержимы идеей выполнить все свои замыслы,

получивший возможность не вступать по поводу их осуществления ни в какие обсуждения, не имея больше ни советчиков, ни критиков»[10].

Мы привели довольно большую цитату, но она является важной вехой для развития нашего исследования, т. к., анализируя это высказывание, мы можем догадаться о том, как Сидур обрел экзистенциальное мировоззрение. В первой части этого высказывания показывается разочарование скульптора в его прошлом убеждении о развитии творческой общины по коммунистическому пути и его отчаяние от осознания реальности жизни. В подобном случае, как следствие, естественны чувство отчуждения и одиночество, которые являются основными факторами для экзистенциалистского познания мира. Кроме того, как мы уже сказали выше, Сидур был убежденным коммунистом и искренне верил в правоту сталинизма. Однако в 1956 г., после того, как на XX съезде КПСС Н. С. Хрущев выступил с докладом, осудившим культ личности Сталина, прежние его убеждения, возможно, разочаровали его как неправильные и тупиковые. В связи с этим, его сын М. В. Сидур говорит, что, несмотря на разочарование в «учении Ленина-Сталина», скульптор на всю жизнь сохранил некую внутреннюю, глубинную веру в коммунистическую идею, прекрасно понимая при этом ее практическую неосуществимость [11]. Такое осознание парадоксальности несовпадения между идеалом и реальностью тоже является важным условием для приобретения экзистенциального мировоззрения.

Тем более, повторяющийся опыт смерти (серьезное ранение на фронте и инфаркт) напоминал Сидуру о том, что страдание и смерть всегда находятся рядом с жизнью человека. Беспокойство о временности, или конечности, своей жизни стимулировало творческое изменение скульптора. После инфаркта он должен был выбирать дальнейший путь — не измениться и продолжить свою карьеру, работая по «ложному» соцреалистическому принципу, или быть честным с самим собой и начать свободно заниматься «настоящим» искусством, но остаться без заказов и средств к существованию. Как мы уже знаем, он выбрал последний путь. Мы полагаем, что такой выбор Сидура является абсолютно экзистенциальным, т. к. скульптор выбрал свободу, в которой он может самостоятельно решать, кем быть, понимая, что он должен сам нести ответственность за свой выбор. Согласно Ж.-П. Сартру, человек отличается от всех природных существ способностью выбирать самого себя, быть самим собой и нести ответственность перед собой за свой выбор[12].

Для советских художников отказ от соцреалистического канона обозначал почти социальное самоубийство. В самом деле, после того, как Сидур решил пойти по экзистенциальному пути, он до конца своей жизни оказался почти забытым и не смог выставляться на своей Родине. Нетрудно угадать, что такой нелегкий процесс выбора своей судьбы открыл скульптору новую дорогу для преодоления ограничений и приобретения настоящей экзистенции в качестве самостоятельного художника, не склоняющего ни к какому авторитету и ни к какому образу художественного мира.

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[10] Там же. С. 24
[11] Там же. С. 22
[12] *Гайденко П.* Экзистенциализм // Философская энциклопедия. Гл. ред. Ф. В. Константинов. М.: Советская Энциклопедия, 1970. С. 540.

В. Сидур провел отшельническую жизнь. Ограничивая связь с другими художниками он одиноко продолжался свой экзистенциальный путь. Тем не менее, некоторые неофициальные художники образовали общительную группировку. Художник-поэт Евгений Кропивницкий был центральной фигурой в группе художников, т. н. «Лианозовская группа». Название группы естественно сформилось, потому что они собирались в квартире, точнее в бараке находящейся в Лианозово, хотя это название не давали сами художники, а сотрудники следственого органа: в 1963 г. Кропивницкого упрекали за формализм и организацию Лианозовской группы и отчислили его из Союза Художников. В эту группу включились сам Евгений Кропивницикий, его жена Ольга Потапова, сын – Лев Кропивницкий, дочь – Валентина Кропивницкая, зять – Оскар Рабин, и их друзья. Лев Кропивницкий считает, что «Лианозовская группа» как оформленного движения, имевщего общие художественные принципы, не было, а были поэты и художники, которые находились в родственных и дружеских отношениях[13]. Единственная общая черта творческих направлений членов группы – несогласие с официальным течением советского соцреалистического искусства.

Среди произведений Е. Кропивницкого есть пейзажи на тему «оголенность». Его живопись «Труба» (Илл. 8) включается в этот цикл. Лев Кропивницкий интерпретирует эту тему как в ней художник передает свои предвидения будущего земи, связанные эсхатологических настроений: требога за судьбу людей, потерявших психику, этику и эмоцию, составляющую человеческий «Я»[14]. Подобное кризисное настроение наблюдается в его поэме «Автоматы» (1957).

Явился автомат:
Довольно!
Теперь властитель он земной.
И содрогнется мир невольно:
Автоматически слепой
Раздастся жуткий взрыв...
И сгинут
Миллионы.
Автоматов вой
Застынет в небе.
В небо кинут
Они потоки смерти.
Прах!
Так вот он жребий!
Кем он вынут:
Кромешный ужас
Смертный страх?!

Илл. 8. Кропивницкий Е. Труба. 1958



[13] *Акимова Л.* Живопись льва кропивницкого // Лев Кропивницкий Жизнь и творчество. М.: РА «СОРЕК», 1995. С. 24.
[14] *Алпатова И. Г.*, *Талочкин Л. П.,* «Другое искусство»: Москва 1956—1976. Т.1. С.31.

Еще в другой стихотворении Е. Кропивницкого «Селедка» наблюдается тема пьянство как сознательное уклонение от страданий и экзистенциального ужаса и абсурда жизни[15]:

Засолили жирную селедку –
Это разумеет всяк, кто пьян.
Хорошо, что выдумали водку...
Господи, нелеп сей балаган!

Ели бред все, если жизнь вся тайна,
Если смерть подстерегает нас;
Если мы до глупости случайны –
Кроме водки, что еще у нас?

<...>

Е. Кропивницкий неоднократно писал стихи о смерти. Причина смерти героев в его стихотворениях разнообразная: смерть от пьянство, убийство, самоубийство, несчастный случай естественная смерть и т. д. Их смерть – безрадостная кульминация их пустой барачной жизни и там никакой героичность[16]. Смерть в стихотворении Е. Кропивницкого есть неизвежная реальность, не укращаемая пафосным тоном как в других советских стихотворении о «героической смерти». В следующей стихотворение автор приучает себя и читателя к самой простой, но самой трудно воспринимаемой мысли о собственной смертности[17].

Будь готов к великому страданью,
Ждет тебя великая беда.
Не помогут горькие рыданья,
Не вернуть былого никогда.

Сникла жизнь – благие упованья.
Так от века водится всегда.
Мимолетны грезы и желанья.
Не уйти от муки никогда.

Очередьидет весьма поспешно...
Вот хоронит грешный тех же грешных,
А посмотришь – новые растут.

[15] *Бурков О. А.* Поэзия Евгения Кропивницкого: примитивизм и классическая традиция : диссертация ... кандидата филологических наук: 10.01.01 [Место защиты: Новосиб. гос. ун-т]. Новосибирск, 2012. С. 103.
[16] Там же. С. 127.
[17] Там же. С. 130.

На земле сей некие маячат
И под джазы пагубные скачут,
Но глядишь – и им пришел капут.

Стихотворение Е. Кропивницкого по теме смерти считается как имеющее важное рецептивное свойство. Исследователь творчества Е. Кропивницкого О. Бурков пишет: «претензия, недоумение и разочарование, испытываемые автором по отношению к Бытию (вселенной, Богу), возникают и у читателя по отношению к тексту: такая реакция неизбежно возникает в силу антиинтеллектуализма этих стихов. Здесь практически нет размышлений о смерти – на протяжении всего текста или нескольких строф поэт артикулирует лишь глубинный («элементарный», «примитивный») страх смерти, блокирующий или отрицающий рефлексивные услилия на эту тему; смерть в этом случае можно только ждать или констатировать. Страх смерти часто вербализуется в обращении к читателям, собственникам или к самому себе»[18]. Смерть и страдание всегда рядом с жизнью человека как другая сторона медали. М. Хайдеггер считал, что смерть, точнее ужас (Angst), возникший у человека после осознания своей смертности и ограниченности своей жизни может служить причиной пересечения из неподлинного существования в подлинное существование. По его мнению когда человек по серьезному чувствует свою смерть, которая случиться не «когда-то», но прямо каждый минут, он может пересмотреть свою жизнь и бросать пристрастие к ценности мира как «Das Man» и найти свою настоящую жизненную ценность, к которой он по настоящему желает стремиться. Поэтому смерть по Хайдеггеру, приводящая человека в подлинное существование есть сугубо индивидуальное понятие «я умираю», отличающееся от общественного и повседневного понятия «люди умирают». В стихотворении Е. Кропивницкого по теме смерти хорошо показывает тот факт: «люди умирают и ты тоже».

Как Э. Неизвестный и В. Сидур, сын Евгения Кропивницкого, художник Лев Кропивницкий тоже участвовал на Второй мировой войне и находился на грани жизни и смерти – на фронте он получил серьзное ранение и инвалидность. Опыт на фронте оказался не последным ужасом его жизни: он был репрессирован по ложному обвинению в попытке убийства Сталина вместе с другими студентами. Он сидел в концлагере с 1946 г. и смог вернуться в Москву после реабилитации в 1956 г. Кропивницкий написал в 1964 г. что: пройдя «смерть страдание, обнажение человеческих отношенийй ... я убедился, что абстрактная живопись даёт возможность максимально приблизиться к реальность... Акт живописи стал для меня актом познания. Внутреннее содержание сделалось главным»[19]. По словам художника, он смог приобрести такое понятие еще в 1955-1956 гг., среди «песков Казахстана», во время ссылки: «Я ощутил современность, как совокупность драматических свершений, психологических напряженностей, интеллектуальных перенасыщений; понял, что нашему времени больше всего свойственны страх, неуверенность, контраст впечатлений, новизна ощущений, нервозность»[20]. В этих его словах мы

[18] Там же. С. 130.
[19] *Алпатова И. Г.*, *Талочкин Л. П.,* «Другое искусство»: Москва 1956-1976. Т.1. С. 33.
[20] Там же. С. 33.


можем наблюдать его экзистенциальное мировоззрение и его замысл проекцировать свое мироощущение на абстрактную живопись, которая казалась ему самым современным стилем.

Полагается, что художника привел к абстрактному экспрессионизму его поиск нового пластического языка, способного выразить сложный мир переживаний, гнет мрачных времен послевоенного времени и сталинизма[21]. Разрушительная война, политический террор Сталина против народа СССР прямо коснули жизнь художника. Как в случае Э. Неизвестного и В. Сидура, не трудно угадать, что опыт переживания в «пограничной ситуации» заставил его искать новый язык выражения.

Илл. 9. Кропивницкий Л. Лунный свет. Отраженые. 1959



Илл. 10. Кропивницкий Л. Абстрактная композиция. Взрыв. 1959



В абстрактных живописях Л. Кропивницкого «Лунный свет. Отражение.» (илл. 9) и «Абстрактная композиция. Взрыв» (илл. 10) чувствуется острота движения и эмоциальный взрыв от крупных сильных мазков кисти. Напряжение в цветной композиции и в пересечении горизонтальной и вертикальной стурктуры взрывается разбрызгиванием краски. Взрыгивание как элемент случайности и неуправляемости в творческом процессе. Художник говорит о важности случайности в своем творчестве: «фактор случайности (не только в абстратных картинах) чрезвычайно важен. Его и избежать-то нелегко, самый рационально продуманный мазок всегда несет хоть и небольшую долю случайности. Выплескивание, разбрызкивание, эмоциональное нанесение кистью или мастихином движения красочных масс – великолепное использование элементов случайности. Это божественное действо, где воля художника предельно ограничена,

[21] Акимова Л. Живопись льва кропивницкого // Лев Кропивницкий Жизнь и творчество. М.: РА «СОРЕК». 1995. С. 27

но царствует подсознание. При умышленном изгнании фактора случайности работы становятся сухми, мертвыми, бездушными»[22].

Творчество Л. Кропивницкого оценивается тем, что в нем художник стремится осознать смысл человеческой экзистенции и ее связи со Вселенной, представить земное существование в единстве с космическим пространством, постичь суть иррационального мира и перевести его на пластический язык[23]. Л. Кропивницкий в одном интервью, которое он дал в 1991 г., сказал, что он по духу считает близки себе немецких эспрессионистов, как Э. Нольде и О. Дикса и др., в чьих работах чувствуется боль, страх за людей, тем не менее круг свого проблем в искусстве отличается от них: иррациональное осмысление космоса, непроявленные скрытые трансцендентные силы, действия, свершения[24]. Он также в одном сочинении, которое было написано в 1988 г., выражает свое мнение об инструментах художника – Экспрессия, парадоксальность и абсурдность.: «...Острота, движение, экспрессия, эмоциональный взрыв, может быть, неотвратимое ожидание – когда же сработает детонатор. ... необходимое: парадоксальности структуры природы имманентна парадоксальность результатов творчества. ... Скудная логика убогой текучей повседневности – все ничтожное в искусстве – от нее. Великая Абсурдность бесконечного "молчащего мира" – все настоящее в искусстве – от НЕЕ»[25]. Эти его слова нам позволяют угадать, что его творчество тесно связан с экзистенциальными проблемами человеческого бытия. Особенно стоит обратить внимание на его слова об абсурде – он показывает, что его понятите абсурда пришло от А. Камю, французского экзистенциалиста, определявщего абсурд как столкновения человеческого разума и безрассудочного молчания мира. Художник пишет: «Абсурдность руководит всей нашей жизнью <...> Но, я думаю, что поскольку искусство занимается не зависящими от житейской суеты проблемами, абсурдность для человека творческого – наилучший и закономерный художественный прием. Воспринимая современность как эпоху распада, когда уродливо трансформируются общепринятиые понятия и представления, художник разыгрывает свой живописный карнавал, создает целую плеяду образов-типов, монстров, олицетворящих нелепое время рубежа тысячелетий, в этот хоровод включается люди и животные»[26]. Серия быков Л. Кропивницкого передают такое требожное ощущение и трагизм, связанные с неблагоприятным обстоятельством в советской реальности. Светлые и мудрые морды быков выделываются от темного фона («Два быка», «Белый бык» илл. 11-12). Тем не менее, их существование слишком сильно отличается от мрачного обстоятельства вокруг их. В связи с этим их существование постоянно тряхивается. Их светлое и нестабильное существование постепенно растворяется в темный фон и в конце концов, их угрожает потерь собственного и умудренного взгляда на жизнь («Розовый бык», илл.13).

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[22] Там же. С. 28
[23] Там же. С. 38
[24] Кропивницкий Л. Е. Ответы на вопросы об искусстве // Лев Кропивницкий Жизнь и творчество. М.: РА «СОРЕК». 1995. С. 150-151
[25] Кропивницкий Л. Е. Современное искусство // Лев Кропивницкий Жизнь и творчество. М.,: РА «СОРЕК». 1995. С. 19
[26] *Акимова Л.* Живопись льва кропивницкого. С. 42

Илл. 11. Кропивницкий Л. Два быка. 1966



Илл. 12. Кропивницкий Л. Белый бык. 1964



Илл. 13. Кропивницкий Л. Розовый бык. 1965



Художник Владимир Яковлев провел жизнь в ужасающем состоянии – отсутствие образования и инвалидность: из-за жизненного обстоятельства, связанного с войной ему удалось окончить только четыре класса школы и пришлось работать курьером в издательстве «Искусство». У него было слабое зрение и в последние 30 лет свой жизни он был почти слеп – у него был лишь пять процентов зрения. Он жил в коммуналке, испытывал депрессию и шизофренией, ходил в психиатрическую больницу. Тем не менее, он в течение десять лет с начала своего творческого

пути смог нарисовать почти 3500 работ. Для чешского искусствоведа Индржиха Халупецкого, прибывший в Москву в 1967 г. и познакомивший с кругом советских неофициальных художников, этот факт считался как метафора того, что человеку дана бесконечная трансцендентная свобода, жаждущая проявить себя в ограничивающем ее мире. Халупецкий увлекся немецким экзистенциализмом и давал особое значение искусству как пойск свободы[27]. Он считал, что произведения В. Яковлева привлекают людей не тем, что они передавали зрительное впечатление, а стоящее над ним наиболее общее чувство как «существование-в-мире» (по терминологию Хайдеггера), граничащее с трансцендентным, которое он выражал в визуальной форме «цветового события» [28]. Из-за болезненного зрения В. Яковлев смог воспринимать мир не четко, но это не служилось недостаток его творчества. По словам Халупецкого В. Яковлев писал картину «не потому, что видит, а для того, чтобы видеть; чтобы видеть больше видимого»[29]. Картины Яковлевя не являются оптическими феноменами, а записью его стремелния для того, чтобы узнать свое местонахождения в мире и достичь свободу за пределами его слепоты и жизненной страдания[30]. Живопись В. Яковлева «Летящая рыба» (илл. 13) возможно считать метафорой его желания преодолеть ограничение и приобрести свободу – рыба словно летит над водой. Благодаря не четкого контура, горизонт сплавляется с телом рыбы и становится ее крылями. Пеперь рыбы выглядет как планер. Плавно летя по воздуху, свободная рыба в восторге улыбается. Халупецкий пишет о творчестве В. Яковлева: «Мир враждебен и давит на нас, и мы не знаем, как распорядиться своей изначально данной нам бесконечной свободой. Причина этого не в мире, а в нас. Это мы – полуслепые и несовершенные, и если мы останемся в этом полуживотном чувственном состоянии, мир будет для нас капканом. Но если мы будем учиться видеть и делать видимым, если мы выйдем на тот уровень, где мир сам становится свободой, мы обретем его как свою единственную, прекрасную и истинную родину. Работы Яковлева – это путеводитель души, указывающий путь ее освобождения, достигаемого здесь, в этом мире, в согласии с ним, а не в конфликте»[31]

[27] *Кантор-Казовская Л.* Второй русский авангард и западное художественное сообщество:1950-е – 60-е годы. [электронный ресурс] // Зеркало. 2011. № 37. Режим доступа: http://magazines.russ.ru/zerkalo/2011/37/8ka.html
[28] Там же.
[29] Владимир Яковлев. Анатолий Зверев. Игорь Ворошилов. Живопись, графика: Каталог выставки. М., 1990. С. 2
[30] Там же. С. 2
[31] Цит. по.: *Лёля Кантор-Казовская* Второй русский авангард и западное художественное сообщество:1950-е – 60-е годы. [электрнный ресурс]

Илл. 13. Яковлев В. Летящая рыба. 1970



Кроме творчества вышеуказанных художников, творчество многих представителей советского неофициального искусства возможно интерпретироваться в рамках влияния экзистенциалистского мировоззрения и его выражения. Интересно и одновременно печально что в нашем XXI веке жизненное обстоятельство складывается похоже на трагическое обстоятельство начала и середины прошлого столетия: постоянная угроза внезапной потери жизни от распространенного по всему миру террористического акта, возвращение националистической и авторитарной идеологии, ограничивающей своболюбие в демократических стран и отчуждения человека от результата собственного труда в капиталистическом устройстве общества и т. д. Переживание за собственную жизнь и судьбу будущее человечества продолжается как по прежнему и в нынешнее время. Поэтому исследование по экзистенциальному мировоззрению в художественной культуре в прошлом и нышенем времени актуально.

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Русские сравнительные союзы как отражение картины мира и русской ментальности

Окатова Н.Т., HUFS

Аннотация

Национальный способ выражения и восприятия мира, общества и человека в формах и категориях родного языка, способность истолковывать явления и соответственно этому действовать в определенной обстановке есть ментальность, она уникальна для каждого народа. На этом основании в современной науке язык определяется как один из ведущих признаков этноса.

Язык, будучи аккумулятором всех происходящих изменений, хранит их и передает другим поколениям. По мнению Е.В.Падучевой, нельзя на естественном языке описать «мир как он есть»: язык изначально задает своим носителям определенную картину мира, причем каждый данный язык – свою»[1]

На примере сравнительных союзов мы демонстрируем, как происходит декодирование текста его получателем, какие общие знания имеются у говорящего и у слушающего, позволяющие им понимать друг друга. При этом мы обращаемся к компонентному анализу сравнительных союзов и логическому анализу высказываний с ними, что позволяет вычленить ту специфическую, часто национально специфическую информацию, которую расшифровывает получатель текста.

Ключевые слова: картина мира, сравнительный союз, декодирование текста

Abstract

A national way of expression and of perception of the world, society and the person in forms and categories of the native language, ability to interpret the phenomena and according to it to work in a certain situation there is a mentality, it is unique for each people. On this basis in modern science language is defined as one of the leading signs of ethnos.

Language is the accumulator of all happening changes, stores them and transfers to other

[1] Падучева Е.В. Семантические исследования (Семантика времени и вида в русском языке; Семантика нарратива). – М. Языки русской культуры, 1996. – 5-6

generations. According to E.V.Paduchevoy, it is impossible to describe "the world as world is " in a natural language: language initially sets a certain picture of the world, and each language – the his own"**.**

On the example of the comparative conjunctions we show how recipient is decoding the text, what general knowledge is available at speaking and at listening, allowing them to understand each other. At the same time we address the component analysis of the comparative conjunctions and the logical analysis of statements with them. Analysis is showing specific, often national specific information which is deciphered by the recipient of the text

Key words: picture of the world, comparative conjunction , decoding of the text

Языковая картина мира – определенный способ восприятия и устройства мира, совокупность представлений о мире, заключенная в языке. Национальный способ выражения и восприятия мира, общества и человека в формах и категориях родного языка, способность истолковывать явления и соответственно этому действовать в определенной обстановке есть ментальность, она уникальна для каждого народа. Это целостная картина мира в его ценностных ориентирах, которая проявляется в чувстве, разуме и воле членов общества на основе общности языка и воспитания; форма сознания, мышления, которая формируется на протяжении всей истории существования народа. Она в большей степени ориентирована на духовную составляющую, понятие скорее этическое, чем логическое. Национальный язык - главное средство выражения ментальности. Будучи аккумулятором всех происходящих изменений, он хранит и передает их другим поколениям.

Говорящие на русском языке кодируют передаваемую информацию разными способами[2]. Один из них - сравнительные союзы, являющиеся образным средством такого кодирования.

В группе сравнительных союзов отчетливо выделяются союзы с чисто сравнительным значением (*как*) и модально-сравнительные союзы (*будто, словно, все равно что*).

Считается, что союз *как* служит для выражения типичного сравнения. В языке есть высказывания с *как* типа *день как день, дорога как дорога,* служащие для выражения привычности, обычности, типичности, нормативности существующего положения вещей.

Примечательно, что синоним союза *как,* а именно союз *будто* не способен таким же образом маркировать типичность ситуации, невозможны такие же сочетания с модально-сравнительным союзом: **день будто день, *дорога будто дорога.*

Или трудно представить *будто* в выражениях, указывающих на обычность, соответствие ситуации принятому ходу событий: **будто всегда, *будто обычно, *будто бывает, *будто водится, *будто полагается, *будто должно быть* при нормативности их употребления с союзом *как*: *как всегда, как обычно, как бывает, как водится, как полагается, как должно быть.*

[2] Окатова Н.Т. Из прошлого в будущее: новый взгляд на природу функционирования слов в русском языке/ Социокультурные и филологические аспекты в образовательном и научном контексте. - Япония, Киото, Изд-во «Tanaka Print». 2014

Невозможны подобные сочетания с модально-сравнительным союзом *все равно что*: **день все равно что день, *дорога все равно что дорога. Х*отя сам союз считается модально-сравнительным, его употребление в таких же высказываниях, как при союзе *будто,* весьма условно. Значит, язык отсеивает даже явные синонимы или приспосабливает их для несколько иной роли в составе предложения.

На наш взгляд, все три союза – сравнительный союз *как*, выражающий идею чистого сравнения, модально-сравнительный *будто*, выражающий идею метафорического сравнения, модально-сравнительный союз *все равно что* со значением приравнивания национально-специфичны.

В качестве доказательства предлагается компонентный и логический анализ модально-сравнительных союзов и организуемых ими конструкций. Но нашему мнению, не только строгий концептуальный анализ дает возможность говорить о национальной картине мира. Данные для нее дают и другие виды анализа лексических единиц.

1. Компонентный анализ модально-сравнительного союза [3] . Компонентный анализ семантической структуры модально-сравнительного союза, типа *словно, будто, как будто, точно* [4] , позволяет выделить следующие компоненты смысла: “отрицание”, семантические элементы “можно сказать” (модусный элемент) и “мера соответствия информации знаниям или представлениям субъекта”, иначе – указание на несоответствие норме в качественном или количественном отношении.

Модусный компонент

Модусный компонент семантической структуры союза выделяется нами в духе семантических примитивов А.Вежбицкой[5]. Вслед за ней мы выделяем модусный компонент “можно сказать”. Факт наличия этого компонента в семантических структурах со значением сравнения и метафоры можно подтвердить реальными языковыми фактами: *Можно сказать, что с вином огонь влился в душу, так лицо покрылось румянцем, так глаза горели*.

На наш взгляд, более адекватно передает семную структуру союза слово “впечатление”. Приведем примеры: *Грефе помолчал, наблюдая, какое впечатление произведет на Глотова его предложение, характер задания, но тот не проронил ни слова, будто давно готов был именно к такому повороту событий (В.Макеев*). Само слово выводит на образное видение ситуации. Это же значение соответствует словам *казаться, показаться,* обозначающим гедонистическую,

[3] Окатова Н.Т. Некоторые вопросы словарного описания союзов в русском языке /Some issues of the dictionary description of conjunctions in Russian / Asta Rossica Turnaviensis II. Zbornik studii Kafedry rusisticy Filozofickey fakulty sv. Cyrila a Metoda v Trnave. – Brno: Tribun EU, 2016

[4] В дальнейшем мы приводим примеры преимущественно с союзом *будто*, ярким представителем модально-сравнительных союзов.

[5] Вежбицкая А. подтверждает, что «постулирование этого элемента отвечает всей традиции, рассматривавшей обе фигуры речи как тропы, то есть своеобразные языковые игры, а также новейшим учениям, прямо говорящим об их метаязыковом характере». Вежбицкая А. Сравнение – градация – метафора// Теория метафоры: Сборн. / М.: Прогресс, 1990. - С. 146

непосредственную оценку вида “X ощущает, что[6]…”

Отрицание

Наше утверждение о наличии семы ”отрицание” в структуре высказывания с союзом *будто* близко интуитивным предположениям исследователей, занимавшихся сравнением[7]. Наличие отрицания в семантической структуре высказываний с *будто* вытекает из функции этого союза – выступать в таких фразах показателем неистинности именования. Высказывание *Платье на Агриппине было легкое сейчас и чулки такого цвета, будто их не было совсем (В.Чивилихин*) содержит имплицитную информацию *на ней были чулки* в досоюзном компоненте; та же самая информация заключена в послесоюзном компоненте введением отрицания – отрицается существование крайнего, полярного события *их на ней не было*. Наличие семы отрицания подтверждается примерами с ее экспликацией: *Суставы с трудом гнутся. Антонина Ивановна все же их сгибает. Онисимов не покряхтывает, не морщится, будто ему вовсе не больно. Нет, это не железный, совсем не железный организм. Но человек, несомненно, железный (А.Бек).* Функцию, аналогичную частице *не*, может выполнять заместительный предлог *вместо*: *Саня Литвинцев сморщил нос на манер печеного яблока, будто на охоте вместо матерого сильного селезня всадил заряд дроби в деревянное чучело (В.Поволяев).*

Отрицание, как непременный компонент семантической структуры союза *будто* вводится чаще всего наличием явного отрицания: *не, нет, не…а, а не*[8]. *Будто* «переворачивает», на наш взгляд, замену правильных представлений на неправильные. Функцию отрицания мы видим в том, чтобы прежде всего ввести реально существующую ситуацию.

Мера соответствия информации знаниям или представлениям субъекта

Понятие нормы, соответствия или несоответствия норме имеет в языке достаточно широкое распространение и входит в значение не только полнозначных лексем[9], но и в значение лексем служебных, грамматических, в частности, входит в значение сочинительных союзов – разделительных (*а то и, а может быть и*), а также многих соединительных (*и..и…, ни…ни, как…так и, но, а, да, же, только, и то, а то*) и используется в сочинительных союзах по-

[6] Зализняк Анна А. О понятии факт в лингвистической семантике // Логический анализ языка: Противоречивость и аномальность текста /Ин-т языкознания. – М.: Наука, -1990. – С.: 25

[7] Черемисина М.И. Сравнительные конструкции русского языка. – Новосибирск: Наука, Сибирское отд., 1976; Вежбицкая Указ. соч.; Дэвидсон Д. Что означают метафоры // Теория метафоры: Сборн. / М.: Прогресс, 1990. – С. 173 – 194

[8] В.З Санников прагматику заместительных союзов видит в том, что «говорящий, зная правду, заменяет ошибочные представления, которые есть или могут быть у слушающего, другими, правильными представлениями» См Санников В.З Русские сочинительные конструкции : Семантика. Прагматика. Синтаксис . – М.: Наука, 1989. – С. 96.

[9] Например, качественных прилагательных и наречий См. Апресян Ю.Д.Лексическая семантика: Синонимические средства языка. – М.: Наука, 1974. – С. 295, глагольных лексем типа *портить, нарушать, ломать* См Балли Ш. Общая лингвистика и вопросы французского языка. – М.: 1955. – С. 239; лексем *выдающийся, необыкновенный, уникальный* См. Арутюнова Н.Д.Типы языковых значений: Оценка. Событие. Факт. – М. Наука, 1988. – С.99.

разному[10].

То есть, в языке существует общепринятое и закрепленное представление о нормальном ходе событий, соответствующее некоторым общим принципам, отражающим мироощущение человека: нормально то, что обычно, характерно для какой-либо ситуации. Нам близко также представление о норме как о «таком положении вещей, которое должно представляться (или представляется) большинству говорящих как наиболее вероятное в данной конкретной ситуации»[11] (выделено нами – Н.О.). *По всему полю, докуда хватал взгляд, зашевелились, замахали красными рукавами высокие костры, словно ослепительные китайские драконы [Н. Гумилев]*. В досоюзной части некоторое свойство выступает как специфичное, нехарактерное, можно сказать, ненормальное для данной ситуации. Можно говорить не столько о норме, так как норма связана с представлениями, характеризующими достаточно большую общность людей, для которых что-либо приемлемо или неприемлемо, сколько о мере соответствия информации реальным знаниям воспринимающего субъекта или его общим представлениям о мире.

Выделяемый нами компонент ‘указание на меру соответствия информации знаниям представлениям воспринимающего субъекта” можно подтвердить фактами, где данный семантический компонент содержится в эксплицитном виде: *А Любка смотрела на Генку насмешливо, несерьезно как-то, будто никогда не было между ними откровения*, *серьезного разговора (В.Поволяев)* (в норме *насмешливость* вряд ли соотносима с *серьезным* разговором).

Ненормативное явление «озадачивает»; «в субъекте это отличительные черты, в предикате – неповседневные состояния и действия»[12]. В наших случаях они эксплицируются лексемами *удивляться, удивительный, странный, особенный, редкий*, например: *Неожиданный вопрос наполнил Скачкова удивительным волнением, будто наконец исправилась огромная ошибка и он попал не в холодную чужую больничную палату, а в родной дом (А.Голубев*). В ответной реплике или в компоненте с союзом *будто* воображаемая причина устанавливается, и это снимает удивление. Объяснить причину часто означает свести ненормативное явление к норме или открыть нечто неизвестное (новую норму). Компонент с союзом *будто* призван, таким образом, через воображаемую причину привести к типичному, обычному, привычному, т.е. нормативному.

Установка говорящего - указать на несоответствие обычному, привычному ходу событий или общим представлениям о мире. Естественно, что отклонение от привычного хода вещей, событий оценивается как нечто плохое. Именно поэтому высказывания с *будто* часто выражают не положительные, а отрицательные эмоции. Как правило, это пейоративные метафоры – знак осуждения, неодобрения. Исходной точкой для их развития служит то, что человек, видя людей или события, сознательно наблюдает отклонения от их нормативного поведения, замечает отклонения от их обычного протекания, порядка, с целью их оценки, как правило, негативной. В то же время у субъекта есть представление о нормальном для данной ситуации развитии событий: *Странно было Мамаю, привыкшему к дробному гулу конских копыт, слышать приглушенный, будто рассыпанный по степному пространству шелест кожаных башмаков и перекатный чужой говор (Молодая гвардия, 10, 1980).*

[10] Санников В.З., Указ соч. – С. 239
[11] Апресян Ю.Д. Указ. соч. – С. 74
[12] Арутюнова Н.Д. Язык и мир человека. – М.: Языки русской культуры, 1999. – XV. – С. 84

Сказанное позволяет нам прибегнуть к утверждению Н.Д.Арутюновой о том, что «восприятие мира <…> прежде всего фиксирует аномальные явления»[13]. «Когда спрашивают «Случилось что-нибудь?», <…> имеют в виду что-то выходящее за пределы заведенного порядка, и если этот порядок ничем не был нарушен, то говорят, что ничего не случилось, хотя жизнь не ведает пустоты» [14].

Для высказываний с союзом *будто* нами предлагается следующая семантическая запись: "можно сказать, что это могло бы быть не обычное/нормальное…, а…" ; ИЛИ "впечатление, что это не обычное/нормальное…, а… ".

Проиллюстрируем это на примере разных структур.

Сложное предложение: *И рожа должна при этом сохранять спесивое выражение, будто перед тобой не человек, а так, чучело (В.Кожевников*) = *И рожа должна при этом сохранять спесивое выражение* – **"**можно сказать, что это могло быть не обычное *выражение человека, а" спесивое выражение чучела*.

Моносубъектная структура (с одним подлежащим и двумя сказуемыми): *Я смотрю ему в глаза сколь угодно долго, и он первый отводит свои, будто виноват в чем-то передо мной (Новый мир, 10, 90*) = *Я смотрю ему в глаза сколь угодно долго, и он первый отводит свои* - "можно сказать, что это могло быть не обычное, нормальное *поведение, а" виноватое*.

Структура с параллельными членами (существительными): *Парни казались огромными от дыма и марева. Но работали так, будто настоящие великаны (Ю.Ефименко*). Не вызывает сомнений, что имя в придаточной части становится при преобразовании предикатом: *Парни казались огромными от дыма и марева. Но работали так*, - "можно сказать, что это могли быть не обычные, нормальные *парни, а " настоящие великаны*.

Двучленная структура: *Для ребят, как для кур, любая щель между жердями и кольями – будто дверца (В.Смирнов). = Для ребят, как для кур, любая щель между жердями и кольями –-* "можно сказать, что это не обычная, нормальная *щель, а " настоящая дверца.*

Вторичная Союзная связь (в которой при опущении союза связь сохраняется, поэтому наслаивающуюся на нее союзную связь называют вторичной - РГ): *Вот* уже *и плача не слышно, и воя нет, сплошной железный гром катится по селу, будто от Прохорова молотка по наковальне (В.Смирнов*) = *Вот* уже *и плача не слышно, и воя нет, сплошной железный гром катится по селу,* "можно сказать, что это не обычный *гром , а " грохот от Прохорова молотка по наковальне.*

Союз, таким образом, описывает несоответствие объекта реальному положению вещей, привычному ходу событий, ожидаемому в данной ситуации развитию действий. Отрицание также указывает на то, что признак предмета или действия такой степени интенсивности воспринимается говорящим впервые, необычен для него. Предложенная интерпретация, поддерживаемая словом *это*[15], предполагает, что истинное намерение говорящего – указать на «особость», специфичность ситуации, предмета, их отличие от других объектов, ситуаций, их

[13] Арутюнова Н.Д. Указ. соч., 80
[14] Арутюнова Н.Д. Указ. соч., 83
[15] Булыгина И.В., Шмелев А.Д. Аномалии в тексте: проблемы интерпретации // Логический анализ языка: противоречивость и аномальность текста. – М.: 1990. – С.101

уникальность.

Итак, можно говорить о правильности семантической записи для модально-сравнительных союзов: “можно сказать, что это могло бы быть не обычное/нормальное…, а…”; “впечатление, что это не обычное/нормальное…, а…”. В этой записи семантической структуры союза *будто,* помимо компонента *“*мера соответствия информации знаниям или представлениям субъекта*”,* отражены также “модусный компонент” и “отрицание”.

Опишем, как происходит понимание сравнительной конструкции с модально-сравнительным союзом «*А будто С»*[16] адресатом речи. Понимание высказывания предполагает сложную, хотя и не осознаваемую носителями языка почти мгновенную процедуру декодирования. Этот процесс заканчивается формированием некоторого невербального представления, «картинки» в сознании получателя текста в соответствии с воспринятым и понятым сообщением. Эту процедуру декодирования[17] можно представить следующим образом[18]:

Слыша высказывание *А будто С*, адресат речи понимает, что действие (шире – явление), описанное в А, протекает как-то особенно, специфично. Чтобы выяснить, какая особенность, специфичность имелась в виду говорящим, адресат должен понять, какие общие свойства у ситуации А и ситуации С послужили основанием для сравнения. Для этого адресат должен знать (из своего личного опыта или культурного знания, общего для всех носителей языка), как происходят вещи, описанные компонентом С, и, следовательно, характерный для них набор признаков (свойств). Данные свойства адресат как бы примеряет к ситуации А, которая, в свою очередь, ограничивает («метафора отбирает, выделяет и организует одни, вполне определенные характеристики главного субъекта и устраняет другие»[19] этот набор характерных свойств до одного или нескольких, применимых к ней, они и будут являться основанием сравнения. Затем имеющаяся у этого свойства в ситуации С качественная и /или количественная характеристика должна быть спроецирована на такое же свойство ситуации А.

2. Логический анализ высказываний с модально-сравнительным союзом. Сравнение, выражаемое союзом *будто*, как ужу было сказано, называют метафорическим[20]. Объяснить простую субъектно-предикатную метафору, по Дж.Серлю, значит объяснить, как говорящий и слушающий переходят от буквального значения предложения «S есть P» к метафорическому высказыванию «S есть R». Мы совершенно убеждены в том, что «истинные метафорические утверждения вовсе не обязательно служат для утверждения сходства»[21]. Этот отправной

[16] А и С – досоюзная и послесоюзная ситуации

[17] «При анализе сложной информации …в распоряжении говорящих имеются различные виды стратегий понимания, функция которых заключается в в быстром выдвижении гипотез относительно наиболее вероятных структур настоящей и последующей стадий коммуникации. Эти стратегии опираются на индикаторы и ключевые признаки текста» (Т.А.ван Дейк Язык. Познание. Коммуникация. – М.: Прогресс, 1989: 39)

[18] По мнению Д.Дэвидсона, цель получателя «тривиального сравнения» - найти некоторую общую черту при несомненном общем сходстве, цель же получателя метафорического сравнения – найти сходство, то есть разгадать загадку и выяснить, в чем оно (Указ соч: 68).

[19] Блэк М. Метафора // Теория метафоры: Сборн. / М.: Прогресс, 1990. - С. 167

[20] Черемисина М.И. Указ. соч.

[21] Серль Дж. Р. Метафора // Теория метафоры: Сборн. / М.: Прогресс, 1990. - С. 317

пункт заставил нас обратиться к логике метафор и сравнений.

Наиболее разработан логический подход к сравнениям, пожалуй, у Дж.Миллера [22] и Дж.Серля[23]. Следуя Дж.Миллеру, структура метафоры «S есть P», где S и P – именные группы, имеет такой вид:

(E F) (E G) (SIM (F (S) G (P))). Так, предложение *Человек – это волк*, по Дж.Миллеру, толкуется следующим образом:

“Существует некое свойство F и некое свойство G такие, что S (человек) в отношении F похож на P (волка) в отношении G”.

Теорию Дж.Миллера Дж.Серль называет наиболее «изощренной версией» сходства. Он считает, что немногие метафоры на самом деле отражают такую структуру, а фраза *Человек – это волк* скорее значит, что человек похож на волка в определенных отношениях R. Поэтому, уточняя формулу Дж.Миллера, он предлагает переписать ее, указав основание сравнения H:

(E F) (E G) (E H) (SIM И (F (человек) G (волк))). Ее смысл:

“Человек обладает набором свойств F, волки обладают другим набором свойств G, и человек в отношениях F похож на волков в отношениях G”, причем основанием сходства является H.

Но и эту, уже измененную формулу он критикует, считая, что ее недостатки в том, что здесь осталось много предикатных переменных, так что эта формула ставит перед говорящим и слушающим «нерешаемую вычислительную задачу»: что это за G, F, H? К тому же в высказывании *Человек – это волк* не утверждается существование разных наборов свойств для человека и для волка, а утверждается именно существование у них общего набора свойств. Поэтому Дж.Серль приходит к своей интерпретации высказывания с позиции слушающего: “Когда вы слышите S есть P, то, чтобы выяснить возможные значения R, вы ищете вероятные черты сходства R и P, а чтобы найти эти черты сходства, вы ищете характерные известные и при этом дистинктивные признаки вещей[24] P”.

Во фразе *Сэм – свинья* этот шаг состоит в следующем: обратившись к своим знаниям о внешнем мире, можно найти такие признаки свиней, как жирные, грязные, мерзкие, имеющие определенную форму, щетину. Но, поскольку значений много, следует ограничить их круг применением стратегии: «Вернись к терму S и посмотри, какие из кандидатов в значение R являются вероятными или хотя бы возможными свойствами S». Слушающий должен использовать свои знания (как носителя языка и культуры) о вещах S и о вещах P, чтобы узнать, какие из возможных значений R могут претендовать на роль в метафорической предикации.

Таким образом, суть его теории в том, что, произнося P, мы имеем в виду смысл “R” и применяем ряд стратегий для его выявления. И хотя это объяснение выглядит более привлекательным, чем объяснение Дж.Миллера, оно не устраивает нас по той причине, что, для того чтобы добраться до смысла высказывания, следует сделать несколько шагов. А так как процедура декодирования происходит почти мгновенно, значит, должен быть иной механизм

[22] Миллер Джордж А. Образы и модели, уподобления и метафоры // Теория метафоры: Сборн. / М.: Прогресс, 1990. - С. 236 - 281

[23] Серль Дж. Р. Указ. соч. С. 307 – 341

[24] Серль Дж. Р. Указ.соч. С. 330

расшифровки. Наше объяснение в какой-то мере смыкается с толкованием Дж.Серля. Но, помимо квантора существования (Е), мы вводим квантор генеричности и считаем, что именно с его помощью удастся раскрыть смысл метафорических высказываний не прибегая к сходству, тем более что цель говорящего не указать на сходство, а прояснить, высветить некое особое свойство S, не соответствующее данной ситуации, а скорее характерное для другой ситуации. По И.М.Богуславскому, фактор генеричности сближается с фактором общности, хотя и не совпадает с ним. Его можно приближенно истолковать как "все типичные" и прочитывается он так: "для всех типичных Х верно[25]". Квантор вводит переменные Р.

Считая наше сравнение метафорическим, мы, в отличие от Дж.Серля, учитываем в интерпретации релят – показатель отношения. Наша запись выглядит следующим образом:

Е R (S) cause T (R (P)) и имеет смысл " существует некое свойство R в отношении S, такое, что cause : [для всех {типичных (квантор генеричности)} Р верно (квантор общности)] R в отношении Р".

Тем самым мы признаем, во-первых, существование некоего общего свойства у S и Р; во-вторых, его типичности скорее для Р и в меньшей степени для S, то есть несоответствие его присущности S; в-третьих, типичность заставляет смотреть на Р как на то, что в настоящий момент не происходит, находится в голове говорящего, в его представлениях о мире.

Покажем действенность этой формулы для разных типов союзных высказываний. В случае Сложное предложение, когда одна ситуация может объясняться через другую:

Уроки тянулись с таким занудством, будто в них не 45 минут, а 44 часа (Б.Васильев)

"Существует некое свойство (*занудство*) в отношении ситуации (*уроки в 45 минут тянулись*), такое, что каузирует: для всех типичных ситуаций, в которых (*уроки в 44 часа*), верно: (*занудство*) в отношении (*в уроке 44 часа*)".

Пример Сложного предложения, где, по мнению М.И.Черемисиной, одну ситуацию (это ситуации звучания) нельзя объяснить через другую:

Не сдержали ослабшие крючки 36-метровой плети, лопнули с таким стеклянным звуком, будто ножку у старого хрустального бокала обломили (В.Поволяев).

*"*Существует некое свойство *(тонкий стеклянный звук)* в отношении ситуации *(лопнули ослабшие крючки),* такое, что каузирует: для всех типичных ситуаций *(обломить ножку у хрустального бокала)* верно*: (тонкий стеклянный звук)* в отношении *(ножку у хрустального бокала обломить)".*

Структура с параллельными членами: *По мере того, как приближался Василий, неотвратимый, будто судьба, Витя отступал маленькими шажками (Ю.Коротков).*

*"*Существует некое свойство *(неотвратимый)* в отношении лица *(Василий),* такое, что каузирует: для всех типичных ситуаций *(судьба)* верно*: (неотвратимость)* в отношении *(судьба)".*

Вторичная союзная связь: *Генка снова захватил воздух сухим ртом, будто пьяный, засипел (В.Поволяев).*

[25] Богуславский И.М. К вопросу об универсальной системе // Русский язык в научном освещении. – 2002. - № 1 (3), - С. 61.

*"*Существует некое свойство *(засипеть, сиплый голос)* в отношении лица *(Генка),* такое, что каузирует: для всех типичных ситуаций *(пьяных)* верно*: (сиплый голос, сипеть)* в отношении *(пьяных)".*

Как видим, для всех высказываний, где функционирует модально-сравнительный союз, в том числе для одной из разновидностей Сложного предложения, описывающей звучание, которой до сих пор в лингвистике не нашли объяснения, наше толкование подходит идеально.

Союз *все равно что* как показатель национальной склонности к интенсификации. Дифференцирующий союз *все равно что* считают синонимичным рассмотренным модально-сравнительным союзам. Но, в отличие от них, он выражает собственно сравнительные отношения, при этом конкретизатор акцентирует тождество сравниваемого[26]. Близость его значения предшествующим модально-сравнительным союзам проявляется в сложном предложении, сравнительном обороте (в трехчленной конструкции): *И он, всё равно что ребёнок, распалялся в гневе, выкрикивая неизвестно кому: "Ну куда с такими руками ехать? (Олег Павлов).* Факты употребления *все равно что* в сложных предложениях единичны: Когда тебя предали – *все равно что* руки сломали**:** простить можно, но вот обнять уже не получается **(**Л.Толстой http://persons-aforism.ru/aforizm/13587). Из этого можно заключить, что союз предназначен не для описания особенностей проявления некоторой ситуации, как модально сравнительные союзы *будто, словно*. Характерные контексты употребления союза – двучленные конструкции: *Вечер пятницы — это всё равно что утро понедельника (Андрей Волос «Новый Мир», 2001). И ещё: я был уже популярным артистом, а популярный артист — всё равно что счёт в банке. (Тамара Клейман. Левон Оганезов. 2002.05.16); Первый год жизни маленького человечка с точки зрения взрослого — всё равно что кинохроника, снятая в быстром режиме. (Алсу Разакова, 2002.11.11).*

Особенность союза, состоит в том, что в определенных структурах, (а именно между двумя инфинитивами, где он преимущественно функционирует), его значение несколько отличается от значения других модально-сравнительных союзов. В таком употреблении наиболее ярко раскрывается значение полемичности союза. Приведем примеры. В заголовках: *Борьба с коррупционерами - все равно что стрелять из пушки по воробьям (http://rian.com.ua/politics/20151102/376242150.html); Менять отношение сотрудников к работе – все равно что инструктировать через замочную скважину семилетнего ребенка (https://roem.ru/30-09-2015/208658/zamok-i-deti/).*

Часто говорящий, приравнивая описываемую ситуацию к парадоксальной, бессмысленной, воздействует на слушателя, навязывая ему свою позицию[27]: *— Ну ты ведь понимаешь, что эти твои лекции — все равно что трехлетнему ребенку вместо сказок читать акафист, тот же эффект. [Александр Иличевский. Перс (2009)]; В том-то все и дело: нервная система человека не способна уже выдерживать нагрузки прогресса, все равно что по линии конки пустить*

[26] Русская грамматика / Гл. ред. Н.Ю.Шведова. – М.: Наука 1980. – Т. II. – С. 606

[27] Окатова Н.Т. Союз как обнаружение коммуникативных намерений говорящего // Материалы X Международной научной конференции по актуальным проблемам теории языка и коммуникации. 1 июля 2016 года. Военный университет. Факультет иностранных языков. Статьи и доклады участников конференции. (ред. Н.В.Иванов). – М.: Книга и бизнес, 2016.

скоростной поезд. [Александр Иличевский. Перс (2009)].

Говорящий приравнивает эту нежелательную ситуацию к крайне негативной, неблагоприятной, часто бессмысленной, парадоксальной, абсурдной. В этом проявляются склонность русского характера к интенсификации, доведению ситуации до полной бессмысленности. Говорящий приводит как доказательство своей правоты очевидную бессмысленность, доводя ситуацию до предела, до абсурда.: *Я понимал, что урезонивать её — всё равно что уговаривать самум или землетрясение. [Андрей Волос. Недвижимость (2000) // «Новый Мир», 2001];*

Полное безразличие (в выражении с *все равно* (*что воля, что неволя – все равно*), таким образом, сменяется прямой противоположностью - нетерпимостью к мнению собеседника (*все равно что* между инфинитивами).

Обладая, таким образом, сравнительной семантикой, союзы по-разному ее преподносят. Говорящий предлагает для объяснения некоторой ситуации другую, типичную, понятную любому человеку (*как*); Или, описывает специфичность, необычность, некоторой ситуации, предлагая видеть в ней черты другой ситуации, существующей в сознании говорящего и понятной слушающему как носителю русского языка (*будто, словно*); Или, характеризуя ситуацию и выражая негативное к ней отношение, сравнивает ее с абсурдной, бессмысленной, воздействуя таким образом на мысли и чувства слушающего. Сравнительные союзы, таким образом, маркируя ситуацию, представляют картину мира, общую для носителей языка, обладающих, благодаря категориям родного языка, способностью истолковывать явления окружающего мира.

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IV-1 Session 2
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≫ The International Laws on the Cooperation of the Korea-Vesegrad Group: For further Relationship

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The International Laws on the Cooperation of the Korea-Vesegrád Group: For further Relationship

Bongchul Kim*

I. Introduction

The Visegrád Group shows the efforts of four Central European countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – to join forces in the struggle for common goals within the all-European integration.[1] Korea became one of the main trading partners to the Eastern European Group outside the European region. For example, Korea is one of the biggest investors in the Czech economy since 1993 and a significant source of income through tourism. Based on the economic partnership, the cultural and promotional activities, majority of them on a commercial basis, are increasing. Now, Korea and the Visegrád Group are developing new fields for their cooperation.

Korea has built the FTA relations with various partners so far with countries such as Chile, EFTA, EU, ASEAN, India, Peru, Colombia, the US, Australia, Vietnam, and even China. The government of Korea expected that FTAs could work as the vehicle in promoting qualitative economic growth and leap into more advanced economy. It also intended to utilise FTAs for the systemic reforms in several areas including its' domestic laws. In fact, Korea has improved many rules and regulations in accordance to the international standards after adopting the FTA policy.[2]

Many activities for the (economic) cooperation which were held by Korea and the Visegrád Group were mainly based on their bilateral agreements. However, the Korea-EU FTA has changed the paradigm of their cooperation. It is because the FTA provides many types of preferential rules for the trade and economic cooperation between the parties. Special commitments by partners have been made to abolish and avoid trade barriers in many sectors.

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the laws on the cooperation of Korea and the Visegrád Group. It will start from the analysis of the three basic agreements between Korea and EU, then moves to the Korea- Group Countries bilateral agreements. The legal analysis will be directly related to the suggestion of new possible meanings of the agreements. The laws can be significant new engines to

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[1] According to the Visegrád Declaration, the Visegrád Group was established as an alliance of initially three, and later four states to further their European integration as well as upgrading their cooperation in such fields as economy, military and energy.

[2] Bongchul, Kim, *Understanding Free Trade Agreement,* Korea Corporate Legal Affairs Association, 2007, pp.155-156.

boost better cooperation between the partners.

II. The Relationship between Korea and the Visegrad Group

1. The Establishment and Development of the Relationship

Korea established its first diplomatic relations with Hungary in 1989. It was the first communist country that Korea recognized as a possible international partner in the Eastern European area. This event encouraged other Eastern European countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia to forge diplomatic relations with Seoul despite protests from Moscow and Pyongyang. When Czechoslovakia was split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, both countries established separate embassies in Korea. More recently, the trade volume between Korea and the Visegrád countries reached $13.7 billion in 2013.

The economy of the four member countries is growing fast compared with the other EU member states. The annual average of economy growth for the group is around 3.5 percent in recent years, while for the 28 EU members, it has remained below 2 percent. This figure makes Korean companies more and more interested in investing there. More than 330 Korean companies, including Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motor, operate there, with their investment exceeding $4.9 billion in 2013. In Slovakia, which has a population of 5.5 million; Korean manufacturers employ about 27,000 workers.

Korean politicians, as well as investors, know that the potential of cooperation with the Visegrád area has yet to be fully achieved. Korea since the very beginning of the Group existence recognized it as an important partner for future cooperation in many different areas. It is also important that recently the Group members are making significant steps to strengthen actual cooperation outside the economic area.[3]

Korea's Cooperation with the Visegrád Group may also be essential in terms of leading North Korea to take a path toward reform and democracy. The Korean government might gain not only valuable information and assessment from embassies of Poland and the Czech Republic based in Pyongyang, but also insight knowledge about regime transition. Furthermore, the members' experience in regime transformation at the end of the Cold War could also be considered by North Korea as a possible reference model if it chose to take a step toward change.

2. The recent economic environment of Korea and the Visegrád Group

Korea, which has been developed mostly based on international trades, now records a steady growth in both its domestic and international society. Korea recently reached the aged society and is rapidly aging with an extremely low birth rate. In addition, high unemployment presents challenges for coming

[3] In July 2014 in the Slovakian capital of Bratislava, Korea's Foreign Minister held the first meeting with his counterparts from the four-member states. One month before the summit assistant minister-level officials from the five countries gathered in Seoul for their first round of consultative talks.

generations. After the global financial crisis in 2008, the export increase rate has dropped to 4 percent and is currently all the way down to 2 percent.

According to the economic analysis, Korea faces quite a few challenges and opportunities in the international economic stage.[4] Firstly, Korea is positioned between rising China and the US. Korea confronts an international balancing, since growing economic relations with China is no more treated as minor compared to the political relationship with the US. Second, as the economic recovery of European nations is not showing much progress and the debt risk of China is growing, many Korean investors are focusing on the economic movement of the US. Following the economists' statements, the interest rate of the US is on its way to increase no later than 3rd quarter of 2015. Therefore the Korean monetary flow is expected to head outward in the domestic market.

As the Visegrad Group countries are under pressure of EU to harmonize their financial systems towards the European standard, the economies of the members highly depend on international circumstances. Along with the EU, Russia also had limited economic activities in the member countries which resulted in the European economy being in bad condition in such a short period.

However, it is anticipated that those including the economy of the group would soon recover. For example, the growth rate of Czech Republic in the 3rd quarter of 2014 has reached 2.4 percent, which is 2.3 percent higher than the expectation. The consumer confidence index has increased by 1.7 percent which represents the consumers' satisfaction. Among the businesses, Czech Republic is now focusing on tourism since Prague is in the spotlight. The recent number of foreign guests in Prague is above 10 times of the resident population, which would lead the Czech Republic economy rise.[5]

3. The Korea-Czech Republic: an Example of the Bilateral Relationship of the Partners

Two governments established the installation agreement of the bilateral trade office, which was signed in 1989.[6] Their bilateral economic relationship has developed in many ways. For example, the Czech Republic was the 5th largest European car producing country in 2009. The Korean car brand, Hyundai, built its first production factory in Nošovice in the north-east of the Czech Republic and started its serial production in November 2008, recording a production capacity of more than 200,000 cars a year. The largest Korean motor company has invested more than one thousand million Euros in the Czech factory. Furthermore, Korean Air acquired shares of 44 percent in the Czech Airlines in 2013 in an attempt to make Prague Airport as the European distribution hub.

Since 2000, the quantity of bilateral economic trade has continuously increased recording $1330 million in 2007. The exporting products Korea is mainly dealing with are mostly related to automobiles, while the Czech Republic exports parts for automobiles and electron microscopes. Influenced by the Global economic crisis in 2008 to 2009, the trading quantity has decreased. However, as the FTA held

[4] Korea Statistic of trade [http://stat.kita.net/stat/kts/sum/SumImpExpTotalList.screen], 2016. 6. 18.

[5] On the other hand, as Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency(KOTRA) has selected 'Well-Being', 'Wise consumption', and 'Smart automation' as the Consumption Trend of Europe in 2015, Czech Republic seems to concentrate on these sources, too. [The 2015 world market KOTRA sees, Weekly Trade, 2015. 1. 11].

[6] The KOTRA trade building was established in Prague in 1990 under the agreement.

between EU and Korea came into effect since 2011, the exportation quantity of products made in Korea toward the Czech Republic has increased by 45.3 percent. This economic growth seems depressing as the economic depression lasts longer than expected in the Euro Zone.

According to the National Statistical Office of the Czech Republic, the trade volume with Korea has grown that Korea has ranked the 4th among non-European countries following China, Russia and the US in order. The trade volume of 2006 was more than $800 million, which shows a 10 times larger amount than the one of 1993. In this sense of huge increase in trade, economic relations between two countries is closely bound together that Korean companies' investing amount toward the Czech Republic reached up to $14.50 million (June 2013).[7] Even though both Korea and the Czech Republic have confronted the global economic crisis which affected the trade volume deeply in such a short period, currently both countries are on their way to recover its' drops.[8]

III. Legal Frames for the relationship between Korea and the Visegrád Group

1. The Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement for the Economic Cooperation

The economic relation between Korea and the EU is based on their bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA).[9] Korea and the EU have been expanding cooperation in many areas. For this purpose, the Korea-EU FTA became the fundamental legal tool to provide more favourable environments regarding the Korea-EU economic relation.[10] This FTA is the first major EU trade agreement concluded after the introduction of the new strategy Global Europe, and the economic cooperation between the two partners based on the FTA has been improved in many ways.[11]

The Korea-EU FTA document consists of 15 Chapters, several annexes and appendixes, three protocols and four understandings.[12] Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 set forth the objectives with some definitions and the elimination of the barriers to trade in goods. Chapter 3 provides the use of trade remedies such as safeguards. Then, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 intended to reduce obstacles as technical trade barriers and the negative effects of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 aim to enhance cooperation in customs and trade facilitation matters and the liberalisation of

[7] Similarly, the fact that importing quantity of Korea toward the Czech Republic has continuously increased large every time is an interesting factor we can notice. The imported parts of automobile reached $539 million (55.6 percent), computer up to $72 million (7.4 percent), and flat panel display recorded $46 million (4.7 percent) in 2012.

[8] KOTRA, [www.kotra.or.kr], 2016. 5. 20.

[9] Negotiations on the FTA were launched in May 2007 in Seoul. After eight formal rounds of talks, the FTA was initialled by both sides on 15 October 2009. On 6 October 2010 the Agreement was officially signed during the EU-Korea Summit in Brussels. The Agreement has been provisionally applied since 1 July 2011.

[10] The FTA is the most ambitious trade agreement ever negotiated by the EU and it is also the EU's first trade deal with an Asian country.

[11] Edita Šedová and David Müller, "European Union-Korea Free Trade Agreement", Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law Vol. 3, Czech Society on International Law, 2012, p. 274.

[12] European Union, *The EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in practice*, 2011, p. 3.

trade in services or non-service sectors including telecommunications and transport.

Chapter 8 is the regulation of the freely convertible currency sector with the safeguards in the area and Chapter 9 contains a provision to enhance access to government procurement. Chapter 10 and Chapter 11 include strong disciplines in important area as the intellectual property rights and the competition regulations. Chapter 12 provides strong transparency commitments in order to an efficient and predictable regulatory environment for economic operators, especially small ones doing business in their territories. Chapter 13 provides the regulations for the promotion of sustainable development in order to strengthen their trade relations and cooperation. It contains firm commitments to multilateral labour and environmental standards by both parties. Then, Chapter 14 has provisions on the dispute settlement. Chapter 15 is about Institutional, General and Final provisions.

Three protocols, Protocol on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Custom Matter, Protocol on Cultural Cooperation and Protocol on Croatian Accession are included in the FTA to support the main document. Although the FTA rules are mainly for the common economic benefits of the partners, this international law sometimes provides indirect economy related regulations. For example, the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation is to implement the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions in accordance with the UNESCO Convention.[13]

2. The Korea-EU Framework Agreement

Diplomatic relations between Korea and the EU date back to July 24, 1963, when the Asian country agreed to establish ties with the European Community (EC), the predecessor to the EU. Since then, they have strengthened the political partnership based on several agreements. For example, the Korea-EU Framework Agreement (FA) was signed in 1996. Now, the amendment of the FA in 2010 proclaimed a strategic partnership between the two.[14]

The new version of the FA was signed in May 2010 and entered into force on June 1, 2014. Although the FTA can be used for even non-economic issues for the Parties,[15] the enhanced 2010 EU-Korea FA provides the basis for strengthened cooperation and dialogue in various areas. It addresses a wide range of international concerns including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, cooperation in the fight against terrorism, climate change, energy security and development assistance.[16]

The FA consists of 10 Titles (chapters) with 53 articles and a technical sub-rule. Title I provides the basis and scopes of the cooperation with Article 1 and 2. Title II is about the dialogue and cooperation on the political issues such as ‘Countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (Article 4) and ‘The most serious crimes of concern to the international community’ (Article 6). Title III is on the

[13] Even if the FTA is more focused on the economic interests of the parties, these protocols may have possibilities to be connected with other non-economic areas. The partners can develop the legal infrastructure for other (non-economic) purposes.

[14] The FA for Trade and Cooperation opened doors in 2001 for more meaningful exchanges. This FA was also basis for the establishment of the FTA relationship later.

[15] Bongchul Kim, “Legal response to the Korea-EU FTA: Is it possible to use the law for other purposes?”, Journal of European Union Studies Vol. 37, Institute of EU Studies at HUFS, August 2014, pp. 162-185.

[16] The agreement will also promote cooperation in sectors vital to economic growth, such as science and technology, innovation, education and environment.

cooperation in regional and international organisations. The Parties promise each other to cooperate and exchange views in regional and international fora and organizations.[17]

Title IV provides many articles on the economic and development cooperation. The topics of the articles in this title are Trade and investment (Article 9), Economic policy dialogue (Article 10), Business cooperation (Article 11), Taxation (Article 12), Customs (Article 13), Competition policy (Article 14), Information society (Article 15), Science and technology (Article 16), Energy (Article 17), Transport (Article 18), Maritime transport policy (Article 19) and Consumer Policy (Article 20). They are one of the important parts in this agreement and also directly related to the philosophy of the Korea-EU FTA.[18]

Title V is on the sustainable development issue. The articles in this title are Health (Article 21), Employment and social affairs (Article 22), Environment and natural resources (Article 23), Climate change (Article 24), Agriculture, rural development and forestry (Article 25), Marine and fisheries (Article 26) and Development assistance (Article 27).[19] Furthermore, the mainstream of this title is harmonized with the concept of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the UN in 2015. Title VI provides regulations to the areas of education and culture.[20]

Title VII is the agreement on the cooperation in the area of justice, freedom and security. Based on the concept of 'Rule of law' (Article 30), the parties agree to cooperate in many issues such as Legal cooperation (Article 31), Personal data protection (Article 32), Migration (Article 33), Combating illicit drugs (Article 34), Combating organised crime and corruption (Article 35), Combating money laundering and terrorism financing (Article 36), Combating cyber crime (Article 37) and Law enforcement cooperation (Article 38). Then, the agreement expands its regulation boundary to the fields of Tourism, Civil Society, Public administration and even Statistics area in Title VIII. Title IX and Title X include the articles on the institutional framework and final provisions.

3. The Korea-EU Agreement Establishing a Framework for the Participation of Korea in EU Crisis Management Operations

The Agreement establishing a framework for the participation of Korea in EU crisis management operations, also called as 'Framework Participation Agreement aimed at facilitating Korea's future participation in EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations' was signed at Seoul on May 23, 2014. The crisis management operations agreement specifies third party invitation to participate in an EU crisis management operation. It also sets the status of Korean personnel who will be dispatched to command elements in case the CSDP operation is implemented.

The agreement consists of just 4 sections with 16 articles. Section I has 4 articles on 'Decisions relating to participation', 'Framework', 'Status of personnel and forces of the Republic of Korea' and

[17] Such as the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the WTO, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

[18] Some provisions even regulate the economic or trade issues that are not directly ruled by the Korea-EU FTA.

[19] The Parties try to follow the international trends regarding this issue providing some international rules such as the Paris Declaration of 2005 on Aid Effectiveness.

[20] Article 28 to 29. This title can be deeply related to the protocol on cultural cooperation in the Korea-EU FTA.

'Classified information' as general provisions. They provide the mainstream or the general procedures of the co-works in this field. According to the provisions in this section, the Parties will exchange their information and decision on the invitation and the contribution, and even the costs or budgets of the works.

Section II and III are the rules on two types (civilian and military) of the EU crisis management operations. Section II is about the participation in the EU civilian crisis management operations. Article 5 provides the regulations on the 'Personnel seconded to an EU civilian crisis management operation' issue and Article 6 lays the regulations on the issue of the 'Chain of command.' Article 7 and Article 8 are the provisions on the 'Financial aspects' and the 'Contribution to operational budget.' Section III[21] is for the rule of the participation in the EU military crisis management operations, and the main structure of the articles is very similar to the previous section.[22] The Korean government shall appoint a National Contingent Point of Contact (NPC)[23] and a Senior Military Representative (SMR)[24] to represent its national contingent in the operations.

Then, Section IV is the package of the final provisions. Here, Article 13 is for the 'Arrangements to implement the Agreement' and Article 14 is on the issue of 'Non-compliance.' Article 15 is on the 'Dispute settlement' and Article 16 provides the regulation of the 'Entry into force, Duration, and Termination.'

Although the FA already provides some rules on common policy or dialogue on the security issues,[25] Korea and the EU have a more direct legal basis on the co-actions in the field of crisis management, including peace-keeping operations or humanitarian operations by this agreement. Therefore, the Parties can make common policies based on the FA rules and do co-activities in the third countries and international society by the crisis management operations agreement.

4. Bilateral Agreements between Korea and a member of the group

Before the establishment of the series of the Korea-EU agreements, many cooperating activities between Korea and the Visegrád Group were basically based on the bilateral agreements between Korea and one member of the Group. These bilateral agreements could provide various positions of a member country of the Group. For example, various types of bilateral agreements were signed between Korea and the Czech Republic since 1990 as below;[26]

<The Bilateral Agreements between Korea and the Czech Republic>

- *Agreement between the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Government*

[21] Article 9 to 12.
[22] According to the provisions of these sections, the EU control the Personnel seconded by Korea to an EU crisis management operation.
[23] It is for the EU civilian crisis management operations.
[24] It is for the EU military crisis management operations.
[25] They can be especially based on the Title II and III of the FA.
[26] Bongchul Kim, "The Legal Tools for the Economic Cooperation between Korea and the Czech Republic" in Jaewan Moon and Michal Tomasek (eds.), *Law Crossing Eurasia: From Korea to the Czech Republic*, rw&r Science & New Media, Passau-Berlin-Prague, 2015, pp.194-195.

of the Republic of Korea on aviation service (1990)

- Agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Government of the Republic of Korea (1990)

- Agreement between the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Government of the Republic of Korea for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments (1992)

- Convention between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Republic of Korea for the avoidance of double taxation ant the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income (1992)

- Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Republic of Korea on waiver of visas (1994)

- Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Republic of Korea on cultural cooperation (1994)

- Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the cooperation in science and technology (1995)

- Agreement between the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear energy (2001)

- Arrangement between the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Korea on Cooperation in the Field of Youth for 2003-2005 (2003)

- Arrangement between the Ministry of Informatics of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Information and Communication of the Republic of Korea on Cooperation in the Field of Information and Communication Technologies (2004)

- Arrangement between the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea on Economic Cooperation (2009)

- Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Republic of Korea concerning a Working Holiday Program (2011)

Although several Korea-EU agreements such as the FTA and FA may regulate many issues between Korea and the Visegrád Group countries, the bilateral agreements by Korea and a member country of the Group such as the Czech Republic are still useful. It is because they provide details of the regulation for the benefits of the partners based on the different background of each Group member.[27] Therefore, many dimensions of their cooperation of the partners may rely on the bilateral laws.

VI. The Legal Function of the Agreements for new issues

1. International Security or Peace Keeping Law for the Korean Peninsula

Peace maintenance is a very serious question in the Korean Peninsula and even in the Northeast Asian area. Therefore, international laws will be useful tools in working out the solution to this complicated and sensitive issue. The three Korea-EU agreements can make a synergy effect for the peacekeeping or

[27] The bilateral laws can cover some areas which the FTA or FA cannot regulate.

security issues in the area. The Visegrád Group can and must be definitely engaged to the peacekeeping works.

First, some parts of the Korea-EU FA may provide legal solutions for the issue. According to the FA Title II, the Parties will have dialogue and cooperation on the political issues such as the 'Countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' and 'Small Arms and Light Weapons.' These activities are to promote peaceful solutions in international or regional conflicts and the strengthening of the UN and other international organizations. Furthermore, the provisions on the 'The most serious crimes of concern to the international community' and 'Cooperation in combating terrorism' can also be useful to establish the common policy on the peacekeeping issue in the area.

Second, the EU crisis management operations agreement is a more direct international law for the issue. The EU CSDP operations can be practiced in the third country and it can cover somewhere of the Northeast Asia by the decision of the EU and/or the international society. The Korean government may have a certain cooperation role with the EU in this case. Therefore, the agreement has some practical meanings for the solution to the peacekeeping problems in the Korean Peninsula. Of course, it must be harmonized with the common policies of the international society as the agreement confirmed.

Lastly, FTAs can be also used for the solutions on this issue. Korea is driving their FTAs to promote the constructive engagement with North Korea by extending trade preferences to the products from the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in North Korea.[28] Almost every Korean FTA has special treatment rules to recognize the products from the Complex in North Korea as (South) Korean local products.[29] Article 12 of the Protocol Concerning the Definition of Originating Products and Methods of Administrative Co-operation in the Korea-EU FTA provided the possibility for the special treatment of KIC. Then, Annex IV of the protocol provides languages about the details on the concept of the Committee on Outward Processing Zones (OPZs).[30] According to provision, the Committee will discuss the criteria for OPZs like the KIC and the special treatment of the Zone under the FTA order.

The special treatment provisions of the Korean FTAs clearly have political reasons. The Korean government thought that the FTAs could be useful for the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the special treatment rules to the KIC products in the FTAs can be read as the legal infrastructure for the economic and the political cooperation of two Koreas which are supported by the Korean FTA partners including the EU.

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[28] Although there have been several political influences, the two Koreas consented to guarantee business environments in the KIC that meet international standards, and work towards improving the competitiveness of its products in the global market. [Myungchul Cho and others, *Strategies for Promoting Exports of Companies in Gaeseong Industrial Complex,* Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2005, pp. 16-27].

[29] There is no such provision in the first Korean FTA, the Korea-Chile FTA. From the second Korean FTA, the Korea-Singapore FTA provided special treatments of certain goods made at the KIC. The Korea-EFTA FTA, the Korea-ASEAN FTA and the Korea-India CEPA provide similar standards for the treatment of the KIC products as the Korean product. The Korea FTAs with ASEAN, Peru and Colombia gave breaks to 100 products. Then, the Korea-China FTA expands the possibility of the special treatment to 310 products in the KIC.

[30] The Korea-US FTA also provides a possibility of the treatment by establishing the 'Committee on Outward Processing Zones on the Korean Peninsula.' It was a concession of both parties because Korea considered the KIC as an important issue while the US worried about security problems from North Korea. [Mark E. Manyin and others, "Imports from North Korea: Existing Rules, Implications of the KORUS FTA, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex", *CRS Report for Congress, The US Congressional Research Service 7-5700*, 2011, p. 15]. It is because the Korea-EU FTA was concluded after the conclusion of the Korea-US FTA and the EU requested a similar level of concession compared with the Korea-US FTA.

Furthermore, Korea and the Visegrád Group members can jointly do more sensitive political works in North Korea. Then, the works will based on the special status of the member countries (historically and practically from western European countries) to North Korea. This is related to the point that one of the main purposes of the Group is in the security field. For this purpose, Korea and the Group may think about that they can develop the bilateral laws on the works.

2. The Laws for new fields such as Human Rights and Development

The three Korea-EU agreements can also be used for the new sensitive issues such as human rights and development assistance. The bilateral FA provides the direct rules for the issues. As mentioned above, the articles in Title V of the FA are on the sustainable development issue such as Health, Employment and social affairs, Environment and natural resources, Climate change, Agriculture, rural development and forestry, Marine and fisheries and Development assistance. With the accordance of the international rules such as the Paris Declaration of 2005 on Aid Effectiveness and the SDGs by the UN, the Parties will make more detailed cooperation policies and projects under the FA rules. Of course, other provisions in the FA or some provisions of the EU crisis management operations agreement can be also used indirect ways for the purpose.

The FTA rules are sometimes related to the human rights issues or even development issues. For example, many FTAs have owned labour related rules in their provisions and the working conditions at the KIC have been a subject of debate.[31] Chapter 13 of the Korea-EU FTA provides the regulations for the promotion of sustainable development to strengthen their trade relations and cooperation. It contains firm commitments to multilateral labour and environmental standards by both parties. If the Korean FTAs have better labour regulations in the KIC, they will be more helpful to extract some solutions for the labour environment or the human rights issues in North Korea. The workers' rights criteria in the Korea-US FTA instructs the Committee to consider in determining whether to recommend free trade accord extension to North Korean OPZs are not sufficient to ensure respect for labour rights in those zones.[32]

To globalize the KIC with strengthening inter-Korean trade, developing human rights condition of North Korean workers is essential and improvement in FTA level should be considered. Here, the European standard for the working conditions and human rights issues will provide certain direction for the improvement of the level in the KIC. Even if the level is too high for the North Korean government to reach at the moment, the works with the consideration of the human right issues may make right progress. EU and Korea can do for the human rights issues in there based on the FTA relation. The cooperation will provide a gate for the North Korea to open.

Recently, the development or assistance issue is one of emerging topics in East Asia. Japan has a long

[31] Although the KIC Labour Law stipulates that (South) Korean companies shall pay wages to North Korean workers directly in cash, the companies remit worker salaries to the North Korean government on its demand.

[32] The criteria are vague, weak, and fall far short of the new workers' right requirements in the main text of the FTA. As a result, they will allow the parties to permit the violation of the OPZ workers' basic rights under the agreement. [The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement Annex 22-B: A Missed Opportunity on Workers' Rights in North Korea, Human Rights Watch, August 2007.].

history on the issue and Korea recently changed the status from an aid recipient to a donor.[33] China is driving its policies focusing on the development issue. Accordingly, the international society expects that the three countries can lead the international society in this field. However, their experiences as a donor are relatively short and the awareness on the development projects are still needed to be improved in this area.[34] The EU has established the 'European styles' in the administrative, the judicial and even human rights and development fields, from many agreements and laws for the cooperation such as the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. Therefore, the experiences of the EU in this field may provide a positive influence to the Korean (even sometimes to Japan and China) development works.

The concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the official assistance that advanced country provides give, loan, technical aid, and others to developing country or international organization as a part of the development field. In a legal sense, ODA is an official policy or action to assist developing worlds based on domestic and foreign legal systems. The Visegrád Group has its own special experience on the ODA issues. Therefore, they can make good advices to the Korean ODA works and even the partners can develop joint projects to third countries. Of course, North Korea is also included in the group of target if some legal problems are solved.[35]

V. Final Remarks

Many economic cooperation works by Korea and the Visegrád Group were mainly based on their bilateral agreements since the late 1980s and the early 1990s. However, the Korea-EU FTA in the late 2000s started to establish a new paradigm for their cooperation. The FTA is very useful and significant as a legal tool for the economy and trade with member countries. Therefore, many new legal issues will be related to FTA. Researchers must find out or develop the issues to cover the needs for the cooperation with the partners.

Here, the other Korea-EU agreements can be used for the same goal and they can even expand the fields of cooperation. For example, the Korea-EU FTA may provide some opportunities to push for openness of North Korea. The increased trade through the FTAs and globalization policy on the KIC may produce greater openness with the positive possibilities in North Korea. The new version of the Framework Agreement may provide the legal basis for strengthened and direct cooperation in the North Korean issues. The bilateral Agreement establishing a framework for the participation of Korea in EU crisis management operations may also expand the partner's cooperation in the field of the security and defence regarding North Korea.

However, there are still many problems to solve in order to reach these goals. The two Korean

[33] KOICA, *Understanding International Development Cooperation*, 2008, pp. 394-395.

[34] Taejoo Lee, "Korea Joins the Big League with a Donor-centric Approach" in Alex Wilks (eds), *Aid and Development Effectiveness: Towards Human Rights, Social Justice and Democracy,* Reality of Aid 2010 report (The Reality of Aid Management Committee), IBON Books, Philippines, 2010, p. 234.

[35] For example, according to the Korean Constitutional Law, North Korea is not official country in Korean Peninsula. In this reason, North Korea cannot be a partner of (South) Korea's ODA projects. However, (South) Korea has done various types aid works to North Korea under the name of the 'Inter-Korean cooperation'.

governments should create opportunities to discuss their issues. The (South) Korean government also has some responsibility to improve the KIC globalizing policy. The combination of the economic cooperation with the Group members such as the Czech Republic under the Korea-EU FTA and the globalization policy of the KIC may create a synergy effect for the solutions to the problems. Regarding this point, the Group countries have special position as the middlemen between two Koreas.

Through the cooperation works with Korea, the Visegrád Group may provide many lessons from their economic and legal experience in adjusting to the capitalism in 1990s for the North Korean issue. The help from the Eastern EU member countries, the Inter-Korea work may have alternative solution. Based on this cooperation, the bilateral relation between two countries can be also developed to another step. For this purpose, we can use the international laws between Korea and the countries as the 'legal infrastructures'.

The Inter-Korean cooperation and the KIC project both could be considered in this effort as combination with the ODA approach. If the main part of this support is to upgrade the level of labour, environment and others, furthermore to harmonise global standards in North Korea, it would create another synergy under the possible joint ODA works of the Korea-the Visegrád to North Korea. Then, this cooperation will also be based on the laws between them.

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Quo vadis, V4? Problems and Prospects for the Visegrad Group*

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On 15th February, 1991 Lech Wałęsa, the President of the Republic of Poland, Václav Havel, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and József Antall, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary held a meeting in Visegrád, Hungary. At the meeting the representatives of the three Central-East European states signed a document called the "*Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration*" that brought the Visegrad Group to life. The title of the document says the basic aim of the cooperation of the three countries: to help each other to shed the burden of the Eastern bloc existence in the preceding fifty years, and to proceed towards a full integration into Europe. The Group started out as V3 but since the disintegration of Czechoslovakia in 1993 the Group has been comprised of four countries with both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic opting to join the regional integration. From then on the integration has been referred to as the Visegrad Four or V4, Visegrad countries or Visegrad Group.

The location of the meeting is symbolic in more than one way: the acropolis overlooking the scenic Danube Bend located in the former royal seat, Visegrád had been the venue of another important meeting in 1335 attended by John of Luxembourg, King of Bohemia, Charles I of Anjou (Charles Robert), King of Hungary, and Casimir III, King of Poland. The meeting was intended to facilitate peace among the three Central European kingdoms and secure an alliance between Poland and Hungary against the Habsburgs. The allusion to the historic meeting bears a clear message: mutual cooperation and friendship among the three Central European states is crucial for their respective development and for their ability to defend themselves from foreign threat. The location is also symbolic in that the meeting of the representatives of Hungary and two Slavic nations took place on Hungarian soil while the name of the venue, *Vyšehrad* is of Slavic origin, meaning "upper castle" or "upper settlement".

According to the original declaration "the formation of the Visegrad Group was motivated by four factors of decisive relevance:

1. the desire to eliminate the remnants of the communist bloc in Central Europe;
2. the desire to overcome historic animosities between Central European countries;
3. the belief that through joint efforts it will be easier to achieve the set goals, i.e. to successfully accomplish social transformation and join in the European integration process; and
4. the proximity of ideas of the then ruling political elites."[1]

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[1] http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about/history

The document emphasizes the similarity of the situation the three nations found themselves after the developments in the late 1980s in the East European region, and the fact that the tasks ahead of them were also similar: the need for setting new political, economic and cultural foundations on an altered Central European stage.

February, 1991 … a little more than a year after the Velvet Revolution broke out in Czechoslovakia getting Václav Havel into the presidential seat, and only about 8 months after the first democratic parliamentary elections were held in the country. February, 1991 … ten years after the strikes organized by Solidarity crippled communist Poland, and only a year after the Polish communist party was finally dissolved. Another signatory, Lech Wałęsa, former Solidarity leader had been elected Polish president only a couple of months earlier. February, 1991 … the Hungarian government opened the country's western borders, the iconic "iron curtain" separating the two world systems to refugees from East Germany a little more than a year prior to the meeting, the last Soviet troops left Hungarian soil in June, 1990, while the Hungarian signatory, József Antall took the helm as Prime Minister in the new multi-party National Assembly around the same time, eight months before the meeting. This is basically the „altered Central European stage" the Declaration referred to. Of course, the historic events that took place in the three countries played out against the backdrop of the total collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the gradual disintegration and finally the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the termination of economic cooperation within the Bloc, i.e. Comecon – in short, in the context of the end of communist totalitarianism in Eastern Europe.

In this new situation former Eastern Bloc countries had basically the same objectives. As the 1991 Declaration puts it, the Visegrád countries had to aim at the „full restitution of state independence, democracy and freedom, elimination of all existing social, economic and spiritual aspects of the totalitarian system, construction of a parliamentary democracy, a modern state of law, respect for human rights and freedoms, creation of a modern free market economy, full involvement in the European political and economic system, as well as the system of security and legislation."[2] Some of these objectives (like the establishment of a parliamentary democracy or the rule of law) had to do with domestic politics thus being the concern of individual governments in the three countries, but others, especially the integration into the existing European political and economic system had more to do with foreign policy, and it was basically in this field that the Visegrád Group focused on in the initial period of the cooperation (between 1991 and 1993). Practically speaking the main objectives were: integration into NATO and the European Union. It seemed that the coordination of efforts towards attaining their common objectives would increase their chances of attaining the goals. Visegrád countries wanted to make it clear from the very beginning that the V4 was not created as an alternative to the all-European integration. Quite the contrary: the Visegrád Group was meant to cooperate with other regional or all-European bodies as well as individual countries, with special attention to neighbouring nations, in order to contribute to European security, economic and cultural cooperation, while also aiming at strengthening stability in their own backyard, the Central European region. It is important to note, however, that while the V4 was committed to maintain close cooperation with many European entities, the member states acknowledged an underlying common identity that is the outcome of „mutual spiritual,

[2] http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412

cultural and economic influences exerted over a long period of time, resulting from the fact of proximity".[3] The four countries thus form a natural historical region and the V4 is simply the contemporary embodiment of this fundamental shared identity. In light of some recent developments in the V4 countries, it is important to point out that the original, 1991 Declaration contained repeated references to the national identity of the member states. It was the expressed desire of the Visegrád Group to join European cooperation, however, they found that universal human values could be and should be reconciled with national tradition: „In unified Europe, to which the three countries wish to actively contribute, it is possible to maintain culture and national character while fully realizing the universal system of human values. ... Drawing on universal human values as the most important element of the European heritage and own national identities should serve as the basis for developing a society of people cooperating with each other in a harmonious way, tolerant to each other, to individual families, local, regional and national communities, free of hatred, nationalism, xenophobia, and local strife."[4]

This year we celebrate the 25th anniversary of launching the Visegrád Group. A quarter of a century is a long time in the existence of a multilateral cooperation even if the V4 barely existed from 1993 to 1998 when the cooperation was revived at a tri-lateral summit in Budapest. The three Prime Ministers who signed the document in 1998 endorsed the recovery of the Visegrád cooperation in the political field as well as in the economy, culture, education, science and the exchange of information. They also declared their commitment to traditional European democratic values, civil rights and the market economy. Despite the lapse in the functionality of the V4 for five years, the cooperation has had a long history. It is impossible to give a full overview of this history in the present paper, therefore I will concentrate on the initial steps taken by the Group and then I will take a look at the present of the V4 initiative with an outlook to the possible future. My analysis will focus on the relation of the V4 initiative and the European Union. In view of recent developments in the EU and the V4 countries (e.g. alternative visions about the future of the EU, the migration crisis) this relation seems to be of decisive importance and will, without doubt, influence the future of the Visegrád cooperation.

As I have indicated before, the first period in the existence of the Visegrád Group was very intense. The European situation immediately after the collapse of the old world order was rather chaotic, no one knew how the new, emerging Europe will look like. The leaders of the Central European post-communist countries understood that the „entry into the democratic world would be a long and bumpy road"[5], and that the first task they had to face was the dismantling of the old structures: first of all the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and together with that the departure of Soviet troops. The dissolution of the Pact was a necessity but there were fears in the West that it will create a power vacuum and will eventually destabilize not only the region but all Europe. They were also wary of extending European cooperation to the countries in transition. The Visegrád countries made it clear that they were not creating a new bloc in spite of the fact that some Western politicians envisioned a Central European cooperation as a substitute for structural integration into Western Europe. There was a basic agreement among Visegrád member states that an all-European security system should replace the former pacts,

[3] http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412
[4] http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412
[5] Dienstbier, Jiří: Visegrad - The First Phase in: *Visegrad Group--A Central European Constellation* (ed. by Andrzej Jagodziński), International Visegrad Fund (Bratislava 2006)

and that NATO, the only legitimate and functional security institution, should be in the center of the new system. Since the expansion of the North Atlantic security cooperation was out of the question at that time, this was the only way to ensure the security of both Europe and the Central European region. In an effort to fill in the void after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and in the wake of the ensuing economic hardships in the former „empire", in October, 1991 the Group decided to participate in Western aid to the Soviet Union. At a conference in the U. S. in January, 1992, Jiří Dienstbier, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia said (speaking for the Visegrad Group) that humanitarian assistance was only the first step. He emphasized that funds provided by the West could fulfill several functions at the same time: "They can stabilize the post-Soviet countries and, at the same time, stabilize democracy in Central Europe. In other words, they can guarantee the progress of democracy, stability, and renewal throughout the entire post-communist world."[6] Extending democracy eastward became the V4 foreign policy in the early 1990s and this approach was warmly welcomed by the European Community. It was probably the first political success for the Group. The structure in which aid would be provided to the Soviet Union was worked out by Group, too. It consisted in sending goods from Central Europe to the Soviet Union financed by Western institutions. The participating countries also provided transportation, marketing and distribution of goods through their networks that were familiar with the Soviet market. They also appealed to the European Community for help in restructuring their own economies especially in light of the collapse of the Soviet export market. Dienstbier also calls the joint diplomatic efforts of the Visegrád countries as the first demonstration that the V3 could cooperate well in the European integration: „... the fact that three - and, after the division of Czechoslovakia, four - Central European countries were able, at the outset, to demonstrate an aptitude for multi-tiered cooperation was one of the factors that led to their being among the first post-communist states to join the process of European integration."[7]

The V4 cooperation was pretty much dormant for a couple of years, until 1998. The Group never ceased to exist, only the intensity of the cooperation decreased and became more focused on economic issues. At that time, customs barriers were being lifted and the Visegrad Fund was being created.[8] In that same period there was one more important issue that required joint attention from the V4: the American idea of the Partnership for Peace. In its original shape it was to have replaced the membership of the V4 countries in NATO. It was in the Wałęsa-led V4 talks with U. S. President Bill Clinton in Prague that the original plan was reshaped in a way that Partnership for Peace became a path to membership in NATO. When that hurdle was removed and three member states joined NATO with only Slovakia left out of the first expansion round, the V4 made serious efforts to support the NATO candidacy of Slovakia. Although the four nations took joint diplomatic steps in the face of strategic challenges, they had their own differences among themselves in minor issues.

The next step in the European integration for Central European countries was of course the accession process to the EU. In general the four countries proceeded together, although there were some arguments, mainly about the pace of the process: some countries would claim that „each nation's state of readiness for accession negotiations should be judged on its own merits, and that the tortoises should not delay the

[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid
[8] Ananicz, Andrzej: From the Anti-Communist Underground to NATO and the EU in: *Visegrad Group--A Central European Constellation* (ed. by Andrzej Jagodziński), International Visegrad Fund (Bratislava 2006)

hares".[9]

2004 was a milestone in the history of the V4: the entry of the member countries to the European Union meant that the foreign policy priorities defined at the beginning of the cooperation were fulfilled, the V4 countries became a part of the European integration. In the 2004 Declaration of the V4, the Prime Ministers were happy to announce that "the Visegrad Group countries regard their accession to the European Union and NATO as a significant step towards the reunification of Europe and as a historic milestone on the path of their democratic transformation, integration efforts and mutual cooperation. The integration of the Visegrad Group countries into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures opens up new opportunities and poses new challenges for their further cooperation on the issues of common interest."[10] The Declaration also contained references to new goals set by the member states: "The cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries will continue to focus on regional activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region. In this context, their cooperation will be based on concrete projects and will maintain its flexible and open character."[11] The key concept in the new objectives was regional cooperation based on concrete projects as opposed to the relatively vague political objective of accession to the EU in the first phase, and the promotion of a Central European identity. Very soon it became obvious that the Visegrád countries found themselves in a totally new situation yet again: they had to redefine themselves and the V4 in general within the context of the EU. The question was whether the Visegrad cooperation was still viable after the entry of these countries to the EU, or whether it had become irrelevant against the backdrop of the wider European integration. In gaining entrance to the EU, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia gained an opportunity to directly form and influence the policy of the entire Union. The original V4 policy of „extending democracy eastward" and the unique knowledge of these countries of the transition process, together with their traditional social, historical, economic and cultural ties to Eastern Europe and the West Balkans, made the V4 an ideal candidate for promoting and facilitating both the EU's neighborhood policy (with the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia) and the Stabilization and Association Process in the West Balkans. The V4 was a natural to participate in the formation of neighborhood policy and pro-integration strategy towards Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

In an informative article in 2011 Tomáš Strážay gave a summary of the post-accession achievements of the Visegrád Group.[12] Under „General Achievements" he mentions

1. The exclusion of bilateral tensions from the V4 agenda
2. The increasing impact of V4 presidencies
3. The development of the International Visegrad Fund trademark

In spite of the fact that the V4 form a historically, culturally (more or less) homogenous entity, interrelations among the member states were historically hampered by animosity. Ethnic minorities had been a very sensitive issue for a long time. Since Polish-Hungarian relations have always been unaffected by this issue, bilateral relations thrived, on the other hand Slovak-Hungarian relations had

[9] Ananicz, Andrzej: From the Anti-Communist Underground to NATO and the EU in: *Visegrad Group--A Central European Constellation* (ed. by Andrzej Jagodziński), International Visegrad Fund (Bratislava 2006)
[10] http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412-1
[11] Ibid
[12] Strážay, Tomáš. Visegrad—Arrival, Survival, Revival In *Two Decades of Visegrad Cooperation—Selected V4 Bibliography*. Bratislava : International Visegrad Fund, 2011. pp. 14–38.

been hit hard by the minority problem. However, as a result of the intensive, multi-level cooperation of the member states in many different areas, the „cooperation ceased to be significantly affected by bilateral problems between the individual Visegrad countries."[13]

The presidency-system was a later addition to the V4 cooperation: the idea to hold the presidency of the group on a rotating basis with a mandate for one year was adopted by the V4 Prime Ministers' Summit in Bratislava in 1999. The Visegrád cooperation was originally based solely on the principle of periodical meetings of its representatives at various levels (from the high-level meetings of prime ministers and heads of states to expert consultations). Official summits of V4 prime ministers take place on an annual basis. In Bratislava the parties agreed that between the summits one of the V4 countries holds presidency, part of which is the responsibility of drafting a one-year plan of action. "The institution of the presidency offers an individual country the opportunity to propose and carry out its own initiatives. Intensification of Visegrad cooperation therefore requires not only careful handling by the presidency, but also that the presidency be active in seizing the initiative. The presidency has therefore become an important coordinating and policy-shaping instrument."[14] It is also important that the V4 managed to keep the continuity in priorities, regardless of which country held the presidency.

The International Visegrad Fund (IVF) serves basically two purposes: the funds help strengthen the internal cohesion at the level of civil society, but it also plays an important role in developing contacts with countries outside the group. Due to the increasing budget the IVF has recently been more and more successful in attaining the relevant V4 objectives.

Strážay also mentions „Particular Successes" in his article:

1. The inclusion of the V4 countries in the Schengen system in 2007
2. The development of territorial priorities
3. Energy security

The prompt Schengen accession was mainly due to an exemplary coordination of policies of the member states.

The openness the V4 countries have demonstrated towards their Eastern neighbors and West Balkan countries since their accession to the EU manifested itself in the support for the intensification of relations between the EU and the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (Eastern Partnership), Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia (West Balkans). As I have said earlier, one of the major assets of the V4 countries is the expertise they accumulated to assist the above mentioned countries in the process of implementing necessary political and economic reforms.

All four Visegrád countries depend on foreign energy resources which is a vulnerability especially at times of crises such as the gas crisis in 2009. However, the V4 countries successfully coordinated their positions in the energy sector thus reducing their vulnerabilty by their common stance.

If we fast forward to today, it seems that the „General Achievements" mentioned by Strážay are holding up despite the V4 scepticism that resurfaces from time to time. If we have a quick look at the general achievements, it becomes clear that the greatest challenges to the Visegrád cooperation do not come from that direction. There have been ups and downs in the interrelations of the member states, that

[13] Ibid
[14] Ibid

is true. The relations with Russia for example seem to divide V4 states: after Vladimir Putin's warm welcome in Budapest by Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán in February, 2015 amid tensions between Europe and Moscow over the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Hungarian-Polish relations went sour because Warsaw was alarmed (together with most of the EU) by Orbán's drift into the Kremlin's orbit. Yet, bilateral tensions seem to be an unlikely source of any serious or permanent rift within the V4 cooperation. While it is true that some presidencies proved more sluggish than others, the rotating presidency system seems to work just fine. The International Visegrad Fund still serves as a donor for strengthening cohesion at the local level while also providing funds for projects outside of the V4 cooperation in the form of grant programs, individual scholarships, fellowships and artist residencies. Grant support is normally given to original projects in the areas of culture, science and research, youth exchanges, crossborder cooperation and tourism promotion. In 2014 the fund's annual budget stood at €8 million coming from equal contributions of V4 governments. The fund also utilizes contributions from other governments/governmental organizations from the following countries: Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.[15] The budget is growing and the funding seems to work smoothly in IVF.

The „Particular Successes" section does not look too bright on the other hand: the Schengen system, territorial priorities and energy security are all issues that spell trouble for the Visegrád cooperation today. Before having a closer look at the problems that have loomed over the V4 the past few years, let us see what changes have taken place in the leadership of the member states.

In 2010 a supposedly conservative coalition took over the helm in Hungary on an expressly nationalistic, populist ticket. After coming to power, Prime Minister Orbán limited the constitutional court's powers, packed it with cronies and introduced a new constitution. Orbán's party, Fidesz changed the electoral system, helping it win again in 2014. A new media regulator was set up, headed by a Fidesz stalwart. Public television channels were stuffed with pro-Fidesz journalists, while foreign media were taxed more heavily than domestic ones. All these actions were labelled "illiberal" by Orbán in a speech he delivered in 2014 in Tusványos in which he announced the end of liberalism and the advent of its modern day alternative. He said, democracy is not necessarily liberal. He also mentioned that „new stars" are up and coming on the world stage like Singapore, India, Turkey and Russia.

In November, 2015 the nationalist conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) won the elections in Poland. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the party leader, had been known as an admirer of the Orbán-model for years and apparently Poland is following Orbán's footsteps. PiS has sacked the heads of the security and intelligence services, weakened the constitutional tribunal, passed a new media law that lets it install loyalists to head the public radio and TV channels. Both countries have come under intense fire from the EU, and the European Commission has conducted numerous investigations whether the actions taken by the two V4 countries violate their EU commitment to the rule of law.

Similar political changes occurred recently in Slovakia and the Czech Republic: a nationalist conservative authoritarianism seems to replace the not yet solidified democratic institutions. In December Robert Fico, Slovak Prime Minister launched a legal challenge to the EU's migration policy and other V4 countries also followed suit. After far-right Jobbik in Hungary had gained considerable

[15] http://visegradfund.org/about/

strength, another far-right party in Slovakia won 14 seats in the parliamentary elections in 2016. Sylvie Kauffmann, in an article published in *The New York Times* in March, 2016 on the Visegrád countries notes: „The way these leaders [i.e. new governments in Budapest, Warsaw, Prague and Bratislava] practice democracy, bending the rule of law as far as they can within an elected government, is equally unsettling to the older democracies of Western Europe."[16] In the same article Jacques Rupnik, Czech-born French political scientist is quoted as saying: „We are witnessing a democratic regression and identity-related tensions on migration, and both phenomena are strengthening each other."[17] There is no wonder that Western Europeans „see a new East-West divide emerging, threatening to fracture the European Union itself."[18] Of course, Eurosceptic, populist movements do not mushroom only in Central European countries, but it would be foolish to deny that the perception of the once welcome and respected Visegrád countries has somewhat changed recently in the Western part of the Union. It is undeniable that a growing number of European officials and politicians are getting impatient with the Visegrad Group. In an article entitled "Big, bad Visegrad" published in *The Economist*, Milan Nic of the Central European Policy Institute is quoted as saying: "Nowadays … Visegrad is like a bad word."[19]

The reason for the change in the perception of the V4 countries and the growing impatience towards them is the result of the way these countries have been dealing with some of the most important challenges the European Union is facing. While the V4 countries were fairly successful in the early phase of their cooperation in fields such as the 1. Schengen system, 2. territorial priorities and 3. energy security, their responses to challenges in the same fields in the 2010s are significantly different from most EU member states's responses.

One of the biggest challenges to the Schengen system has been the ongoing migration crisis. While most EU members have been open to discussion aimed at solving the crisis by accepting large numbers of refugees, the V4 countries have been adamant that they would not take any refugees. Their argument is that sovereign nations have the right to decide who they want to live with, and V4 leaders claim that the ethnic, religious and cultural homogeneity of their societies is so precious to their citizens that they would not give it up, no matter what. It is somewhat ironic that it is the migration crisis that seems to revitalize and activate V4 cooperation while unifying the member states under the flag of an anti-migrant sentiment. As we have seen, it is not against the political intentions of the illiberal leaders of the V4 states to antagonize the EU. In fact they like to position themselves as nationalist saviors opposing EU bureaucrats. Thus the newfound unity within the V4 is a welcome development for populist politicians. "Probably the only good thing in the whole migration crisis is that the V4 [Visegrad group] has found a common voice and strategy," says Márton Gyöngyösi of Jobbik [in Hungary].[20] The problem is that the migration crisis, however far-reaching the implications might be, is a marginal issue for the V4 to find a common voice.[21] Let me repeat: while the V4's Schengen-related policy was remarkably successful (as a result if which the V4 was included in the area) at an earlier period of the Central European

[16] Sylvie Kauffmann: Europe's Illiberal Democracies in: *The New York Times*, March 9, 2016
[17] Ibid
[18] Ibid
[19] Big, Bad Visegrad in: *The Economist*, January 30, 2016
[20] Big, Bad Visegrad in: *The Economist*, January 30, 2016
[21] It must be noted that in spite of the apparent accordance there are rifts within the V4 concerning the migration crisis.

cooperation, the handling of the migration crisis, which is in the final analysis, also a Schengen-related issue, turned the EU and the V4 against each other. Whether this confrontation will effect the Union's cohesion, remains to be seen.

Another success story, the cooperation of the V4 with the EU in setting territorial priorities and offering their expertise in projects like the Eastern Partnership and the West Balkans integration has recently turned into another stumbling block (at least partially) in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. To cut a long story short, as a result of the intervention in the Ukraine, Vladimir Putin's Russia became isolated in Europe. The V4 do not seem to be united on this issue, especially because Poland's perspective is (understandably) fundamentally different from the Hungarian point of view. Yet, Viktor Orbán's close ties with Russia are often perceived as a joint political agenda of the V4. Putin's meeting with Orbán in early 2015, Putin's first bilateral visit to the European Union since June, 2014, was widely interpreted as a criticism of the EU's common foreign policy, and the opinion prevails that Hungary will take part in further negotiations and eventually be submissive to Russia. Some analysts went as far as saying that Orbán's move was an act of betrayal, Hungary became the Trojan horse of Putin in the EU, and Hungary is promoting Russian interests in the Union. Foreign Minister Szijjártó was quick to point out that Hungary did not intend to disrupt European unity, and the cooperation with Russia on several projects (mainly energy-related issues) is purely practical in nature. After the visit, in a meeting with Western diplomats Szijjártó reiterated that Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán informed Putin that Hungary can only accept peaceful ways in which to solve the conflict in Ukraine. The Foreign Minister's explanations seemed to fall on deaf ears: Western fears that an EU member (and by implication the V4) is getting uncomfortably close to Putin's Russia are strong as ever.

The controversy around the V4-Russia relations brings us to one more weakness in V4 policy that once used to be a success story, i.e. energy security. Before 2010 the V4 were fairly effective in coordinating their positions on energy security, however, the past few years have shown that member states have parted ways even if temporarily. There is a fundamental agreement that all V4 countries depend on foreign sources for energy. However, Hungary looks at Russia as a crucial player in solving the energy problems of the country, while Poland for example urges the V4 countries to develop a united market in order to shed the dependency on Russia. The agreement between Hungary and Russia on the Paks 2 nuclear upgrade project also draws a lot of criticism from the EU, and no one actually knows where the ongoing EU investigations into the project will eventually lead.

Apparently there is a genuine change in the V4 countries' attitude towards the EU. Risking a certain degree of generalization and simplification, I would say that the original formula to describe the coexistence of the EU and the V4 was: the EU+V4. That changed to the current formula: the EU vs. V4, somewhere along the way. As I said before, Orbán and other V4 leaders repeatedly position themselves as the no-nonsense counterparts of ignorant Brussels bureaucrats who detached themselves from reality. That kind of stance inevitably leads to disputes and recrimination.

Another metaphor to describe the recent change in the policy of the V4 could be the following. In the early period domestic policy was defined by foreign policy objectives thus creating a centrifugal momentum in decision making: democratization, the introduction of the free market economy etc. all aimed at the fundamental goal of integrating into the EU and the transatlantic cooperation, and the V4 brand was used to coordinate the efforts of the individual countries. The centrifugal momentum seems to

be gradually giving way to a centripetal one under the populist, illiberal governments of the V4 countries: the V4 brand is now used to address the domestic constituency in an effort to energize them in a quasi confrontation with the EU. The basis of the metaphor is the spinning wheel … where exactly the spin will catapult the Visegrad Group … is impossible to see at the moment …

Visegrad Countries in Transition: Implications to Korean Unification*

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Introduction

The purposes of this study are to review Visegrad countries' transition process, and to find implications of their experiences to the Korean unification with the focus on the restoration of the 'justice in the past'. 'Justice in the past' refers to transitional justice (TJ) in this paper, indicating "a set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human right abuses," including the measures of "criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms."[1] The issue of TJ has become a focus of transition studies particularly after the 'third wave' of democratization. Literature agrees that 'justice' is believed to constitute a cornerstone for social trust and democracy, and thus a crucial part of a stable transition. However, empirical studies have pointed in common that 'justice' in this context is socially constructed perception of 'fairness,' becoming very political process, and that there occurred a dilemma of TJ that claims socio-political stability.

Growing interests in TJ in 1990s coincided with the transition in post-Soviet countries. Post-communist transitions showed various paths in their transition, particularly in their reforms of political and economic systems. Vast literature of transitions has vested on state/national identity building. However, less attention has drawn to rebuilding of social trust and justice in the post-communist transitions. Justice in this context means more than a criminal justice; justice constitutes a criteria for what is and should be acceptable or unacceptable in a society, and thus a common understanding of how a society should be reconstructed.

In terms of economic development Visegrad countries' transitions appear to be successful. For instance, Human Development Index of Czech Republic increased from 0.762 in 1990 to 0.861 in 2011. National Income has increased in Visegrad countries, ranging from 2-3 thousand dollars in 1992 to 18,970 dollars in Czech Republic, 17,810 dollars in Slovak Republic, 13,260 dollars in Hungary, and 13,240 dollars in Poland in 2013 (World Bank data). Despite the economic success, TJ appeared to be a thorny and challenging task to newly established governments with limited socio-economic resources, and threatened socio-political stability even after the transitional period.

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[1] **The International Center for Transitional Justice, "What is Transitional Justice?"** https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice.

TJ issues shown in Visegrad countries' experiences will emerge in a unified Korea. Why TJ matters in the process of transition? Why have TJ issues been so challenging and often become a source of political struggles that hampers socio-political stability? How do the Visegrad countries deal with TJ issues and what's the implications of Visegrad countries' experiences to the Korean unification? Too brief though, in this paper, I would like to draw attention to the merits of comparative studies of TJ experiences in Visegrad countries and Korea, and the importance of building a proper TJ process in the unification of Koreas.

Transition Justice in Dilemma

TJ has attracted greater attention of both policymakers and scholars. TJ is prevailing not only in the process of transition from authoritarian regime to democracy, but also in the process of readdressing the 'legacies of human right abuses', particularly committed by state actors. The Transitional Justice Database Project (TJDP), for instance, covered over 1,000 mechanisms that were used in the period between 1970 and 2007 in about 130 countries including many OECD countries.

Why is TJ so prevailing? TJ takes time and not necessarily activated just after the human right abuses in question or in the process of the transition. There could be a delay and lags between the occurrence and activation of TJ. TJ does not simply attend to the rights of the victims of human right abuses. It is dealing with the society as a whole; investigating abuses to discover the truth in the past, stopping human right abuses at present, and investing efforts to prevent human right abuses from reoccurring in the future. In particular, literature insists that let 'the past' just 'go away' would not enhance social integrity as the past will keep raises the question of rule of law, that we believe to be a basis of democracy, and social trust, a basis of social consolidation. In this context, O'Donnell and Schimitter emphasized "transitional actors must satisfy not only vital interests but also vital ideals" and asserted that "the worse of bad solution would be to try to ignore the issues of the past violations" (O'Donnell & Schmitter 48-49, in Arthur 2009, 347).

Despite the importance of the TJ in the process of transition and restructuring the society, various mechanisms were employed at different time schedules. TJ procedures include trials for perpetrators, compensation and reparation schemes for victims, truth revelations such as lustration, and reconciliation measures such as granting amnesty.

However, TJ processes have often involved in dilemma arisen from the process itself and a perception gap of justice. Dilemma in the TJ process arises particularly in punishing the perpetrators and revealing the truth. Based on regulatory focus theory in social psychology, Nalepa argued dilemma of *false acquittals* and *false convictions*. If stronger the intention to avoid an error, i.e. prevention-oriented motivation, the higher the threshold to accept potentially relevant information. As a result false acquittals of perpetrators increase, which in turn decrease feeling of fairness of the TJ process. On the other hand, lower the threshold of accepting information, i.e. promotion-oriented motivation, will increase the false convictions, and as a result, may lower the feeling of fairness again (Nalepa 2012). The matter is past proofs were often massively destroyed and victims' memories blurred, increasing the possibility of false

acquittals and convictions.

Another issue of TJ involves the question of when and which mechanism will be employed in what degrees. Comparative research of TJs confirms that there is no particular time for TJ; it depends on cases. Literature, however, showed two different paths of TJ: demand- and supply-oriented TJs (Backer 2003). Supply-side literature focuses on the role of political elites, for instance, elite bargaining, in shaping the TJ mechanism, while demand-side underlines citizens' demands of TJ mechanism. Elites bargaining is more likely occur when a coalition government, embracing old and new elites, is established in the period of transition, in which proofs that are unfavorable to old elites are apt to be destroyed and a higher threshold to accept information as relevant is prone to be introduced in the TJ process.

Discourses of motivations and actors of TJ enable us to categorize TJ mechanism. Considering the actors, two types, i.e. top-down and bottom-up models, are identified. Based on the principles of approaches to TJ, TJ mechanism is grouped into two, i.e. TJ with high and low thresholds. The latter category contains some unclear points; low threshold does not necessarily indicates the intention or motivation originally designed. A threshold to accept potential information has often been faced judicial and political challenges and adjusted, and thus the result or a final form is considered in this paper though the criteria needs to be refined and generalized taking world-wide TJ experiences into account.

Table 1. A Typology of Transitional Justice

		Main Actors	
		supply	demand
Principles of Approach	low threshold	(Poland)	(Czech)
	high threshold	(Hungary)	(Slovak Republic?)

Elites-dominant types are prone to rely on reparation or compensation of victims' suffers and losses, and truth revelations. Bargaining between the old and new elites in the time of transition appeared to avoid punishment-oriented TJ mechanisms and tends to focus on amnesty, truth revelation and redesigning of institutions. TJs by political elites are prone to employ consociational approaches as in Northern Ireland and hampers the perception of fairness that remains to be addressed after transition period. However, trials against perpetrators may be tried with high or low threshold, but often fail to produce 'positive' outcome.

By contrast, replacement of old by new elites and citizens' domination over the TJ with low threshold recoded more cases of trials against perpetrators than elites-dominant TJ cases. As in Romania, punishment of the perpetrators turned out to be a prime concerns. Strong oppression under the authoritarian regime in the past may facilitate subversive regime change, and thus bargaining between old and new elites may be unnecessary. Fresh memory of victims and limited time to destroy the past increase the opportunity of trials against the past human right abuses.

Table 2. Transitional Justice in Romania (1970-2007)

Mech. Type	Start Date	End Date	Target	Target Description
Amnesty	1994-03-25	1994-03-25	State Agents	Members of the Politburo
Amnesty	1990-01-05	1990-01-05	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
Amnesty	1977-07-07	1977-07-07	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
Trial	1999-07-16	1999-07-16	State Agents	former Defense Min. & a high ranking general
Trial	1990-06-21	1990-06-21	State Agents	The Former President's Brother
Trial	1990-11-21	1990-11-21	State Agents	The Former President's Son
Trial	1989-12-25	1989-12-25	State Agents	military trial of Ceaucescus; executed
Trial	1990-03-03	1990-03-03	State Agents	21 police officers were tried and convicted
Trial	1991-05-01	1991-05-01	State Agents	Several high-ranking members of the government and military are convicted for their roles in suppressing in the riots that ended the authoritarian regime in 1989.
Trial	1993-07-01	1993-07-01	State Agents	A court convicts two former Interior Ministers for ordering the murder of three people who had hijacked a bus in 1981.

Sources: Transitional Justice Database Project (TJDP, 1970-2007), in http://tjdbproject.com/index.php.

Discourse of historical institutionalism suggests at least three directions of developments: path-dependent direction, new directions advocated by new elites, and a realistic compromising path between the two. TJ is targeted against those who should be integrated into the same society, efforts to bring justice to the past accompanied by growing demands of reconciliation. Focusing the prevention of the same mistakes at present and in the future could be an easy compromise, though it does not necessarily mean to close the TJ for the past human right abuses. Rule of law, a principle of democracy, in this case, may limit the TJ with a higher threshold.

Transition Justice in Visegrad Countries

Poland

According to the literature, sever atrocities and fresh memories demand greater TJ (Nalepa 2012, 491). However, differences are found in the assessment of oppression in the past. For instance, some argues that atrocities were greater in order of Hungary, Czech, and Poland (Elster 2004), while others listed in order of Czech, Poland, Hungary (Offe 1997). Whatever the assessment, successful legislations of TJ mechanisms constitute the key determinant; this means socio-economic policies and political support in the elections turned out to be a key factor in the TJ process.

In Poland, political elites during the communist rule had been replaced by former opposition or post-communist elites whose ratio reached up to 77.8 percent of elites in 1993 (Nedelsky 2004, 101). Solidarity that converted into Polish United Worker's Party won the 'first free election' in 1989, but replaced by oppositions in 1991, recording only 5.1 percent of public support. Solidarity came back to power after the election of 1997. President Lech Wałęsa was also replaced by Aleksander Kwaśniewski in 1995, and wait to come back as president till September 2001.

Polish TJs started with restoration of the rights of those opposition activities in February 1991. The first lustration law was adopted in 1992, but declared unconstitutional. The second lustration law passed the parliament in 1996 and came into effect in 1997, but few results were recorded. Another TJ mechanism was worthy of noting; law on Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN). It was established in 1999 with the purpose of maintaining archives and investigating Nazi and communist criminal cases. IPN investigated more than 9 thousand cases and brought 391 to criminal court (Kim & Park 2014, 143). IPN law was changed in December 2006 and came into effective in March 2007. The law would have some 700,000 people (about 1.8-2 percent of the total population) to submit declaration on whether they were in collaboration with the secret policy during the communist period, which recognized as unconstitutional in May 2007, making lustration process unclear.[2]

Table 3. Transitional Justice Practice in Poland (1970-2007)

Mech. Type	Start Date	End Date	Target	Target Description
Amnesty	1989-12-30	1989-12-30	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
Amnesty	1989-06-06	1989-06-06	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
Amnesty	1989-05-29	1989-05-29	Non-State Agents	Political Crimes
Amnesty	1983-07-22	1983-07-22	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
Amnesty	1984-07-22	1984-07-22	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
Amnesty	1986-07-17	1986-07-17	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
Trial	2000-07-01	Present	State Agents	The Institute for National Remembrance has brought charges and tried several former communist leaders, including former president General Wojciech Jaruzelski and former Interior Minister General Czeslaw Kiszczak
Trial	2007-05-31	2007-05-31	State Agents	Former Police Officers

TJ Mechanisms at Domestic Levels

Source: Transitional Justice Database Project (1970-2007) in http://tjdbproject.com/index.php

[2] Secret files created during the communist period was illegally collected and thus one may ask destruction of 'illegal' files (Safjan 2007, 13).

Hungary

Hungarian experiences also confirmed that the composition of political blocs in the parliament affect the TJ process. Post-communist transition shaped with the changes of elites; new political elites with no affiliation with communist party in 1988 comprised of 70.2 percent of elites (Nedelsky 2004, 104). However, communist party re-legitimized itself and survived to win the election in 1994 forming coalition government.

TJ procedures in Hungary composed of two mechanisms; reparation/compensation and lustration. The Compensation for Unlawful Deprivation of Life or Liberty Law was adopted in 1992, but declared unconstitutional in 1996. The first lustration law passed the parliament in 1994, requiring public officials of 10,000-12,000 positions were to submit declarations of not being involved in the secret police, the fascist Arrow Cross during the World War II era, and the squads that took part in the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 (Nedelsky 2004, 104). However, the law was limited only to cover 500-1,000 posts in 1996, although the range was extended by ex-opposition government to 7,000-8,000 posts (Nedelsky 2004, 104).

Table 4. Transitional Justice Practice in Hungary (1970-2007)

Mech. Type	Start Date	End Date	Target	Target Description
Amnesty	1992-02-19	1992-02-19	Non-State Agents	Political Crimes During Communist Rule
Trial	1999-10-12	1999-10-12	State Agents	Three Former Border Guards
Trial	1995-01-31	1995-01-31	State Agents	Two Former Communist Military men
Reparations	1992-05-08	1996-06-25	State Agents	The Compensation for Unlawful Deprivation of Life or Liberty Law, guarantees payment of financial reparations to those who were deprived of life or liberty by the Communist regime from 1939-89. It was declared unconstitutional in 1996.

TJ Mechanisms at Domestic Levels

Source: Transitional Justice Database Project (1970-2007) in http://tjdbproject.com/index.php

Czech Republic

The earliest and the most sever TJ was implemented in the Czech Republic among the Visegrad countries:

> The Czech Republic embarked on the earliest and the most severe program. Anyone who

> maintained a public position was required to petition the Ministry of Interior for a lustration certificate—even if the position was as minor as that of a post office manager. Failing to document one's innocence with a lustration certificate let to automatic disqualification. In Poland, by contrast, the target of lustration could keep her office even if she collaborated, so long as she disclosed all facts relevant to her collaboration. Poland's procedure was not only milder than the Czech Republic's, but it was not implemented until the late 1990s, many years after transition. The lustration law in Hungary was delayed (as in Poland) and initially reached only six hundred national government officials. Similarly to Poland, proven collaborators in Hungary were not banned from holding office, but the compromising facts about their past were disclosed to their electorate (Nalepa 2012, 505).

According to Kraus, the Czechoslovak transition fits much better in the category of replacement. He argues that, "because it resisted reforms on the Hungarian or Polish model to the bitter end, the communist leadership pin Prague was in an exceptionally weak position to stem the tide of protest that swept all the East European capitals" (Kraus 1995, 544, in Nedelsky 2004, 72).

Lustration law of 1991, applicable to those who were "members and agents of the State Security, owners of 'conspiracy apartment' used by ŠtB, knowing ŠtB collaborators, members of the People's Militia, students at the KGB schools for more than three months, Communist Party officials, Political officers in the Corps of National Security, members of committees that conducted purges in 1948 or after 21 August 1968." Those listed were forbidden for five years of taking official positions such as federal/republican levels of government positions, judicial posts, rank above colonel in the army, management positions in state-owned enterprises, top academic positions, and so on (Nedelsky 2004, 70). The law was to be expired in 1996, but extended.

During the period between 1991 and 2001, Interior Ministry of the Czech Republic reviewed more than 402,270 lustration applications, and 3.2 per cent of applications during the period between 1991 and 2000 failed the process. In 2001, 2.5 per cent of applications failed to get lustration certificates (Nedelsky 2004, p. 76).

Table 5. Transitional Justice Practice in Czech Republic and Slovakia

Location	Mech. Type	Start Date	End Date	Target	Target Description
Czecho-slovakia	Amnesty	1989-12-08	1989-12-08	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	Amnesty	1993-02-01	1993-02-01	Non-State Agents	100 political prisoners
	Trial	1992-10-30	1992-10-30	State Agents	Former Officials for Putting Down a Student Protest
	Trial	1990-10-22	1990-10-22	State Agents	Former Officials for Putting Down a Student Protest
	Trial	1990-03-14	1990-03-14	State Agents	Former Officials for Putting Down a Student Protest

	Reparations	1990-10-02	Present	State Agents	Law on Mitigation of Some Property Injustices restores ownership of shops and small businesses confiscated from 1955-1962.
	Reparations	1991-05-21	Present	State Agents	Law on Regulation of Property in Land and Other Agricultural Property returns nationalized property to former owners or their heirs.
Czech Republic	Trial	2007-11-01	2007-11-01	State Agents	A Former Communist Prosecutor
	Trial	2003-06-09	2003-06-09	State Agents	A Former Communist Leader
Slovak Republic	Amnesty	1998-03-04	1998-03-04	State Agents	Officials linked with sabotaging the NATO referendum
	Trial	2001-12-05	2001-12-05	State Agents	A military court convicts Alojz Lorenc, former head of the Czechoslovak secret police, for jailing dissidents without legal grounds during the 1980s.

TJ Mechanisms at Domestic Levels

Source: Transitional Justice Database Project (1970-2007) in http://tjdbproject.com/index.php

Experiences of Transition Justice in Korea

TJ in Korea involves the transition from authoritarian to democratic regime. Kim Yong-Sam administration (1993.2-1998.2) put to an end of military rule in Korea. His success in the presidential election in 1993 was based on the merger of three parties including Kim Yong-Sam's Unified Democratic Party and Ruling Democratic Justice Party. TJ process was initiated under President Kim Dae-Jung (1998.2-2003.2).

In January 2000, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK) was established, which concluded its activities in December 2010, although its website is still open to public for reviews of its activities. The Commission was to deal with the legacies of Japanese colonialism, massacres during the Korean War, human right abuses during authoritarian rules (TRCK 2009, 4-8). The Commission comprised of nine commission members with four investigation departments that are responsible for investigations of deaths related to the National Police Agency, Defense Ministry, Entities other than Police and Defense Ministry, and Special investigation on the request of Commission Chairs.

Truth Commission for National Police Agency (NPA), established in November 2004, comprised of 156 members including 5 from NPA. During 2 terms of operation, 8 specific cases and 3 broad issues were investigated. Three broad issues include suspicions of illegal intervention in elections, illegal

inspection on civilians, and reinvestigation of selected closed court cases of 'espionage' incidents, and Commission's final report in two volumes was published in November 2007. Truth Commission for Defense Ministry, established in May 2005 consisted of 13 members of Commission including five from the Ministry of Defense, operated between June 2005 and December 2007, investigating 8 cases. Truth Commission for National Security Service (NSS), established in November 2004 with 15 members including 5 from NSS, dealing with 7 cases that questions raised by bereaved families and NGOs. The Commission published *Dialogue with the Past and Reflection* for *the Future* in three volumes as final reports of its activities. During its operation, the TRCK reopened 73 closed cases; among them 42 cases were brought to the court for reinvestigation and 18 cases sentenced 'not guilty'. For the other human right abuse cases, the TRCK also recommended official apology of the Government and reparation.[3] The TRCK also investigated "85 mysterious deaths suspected to have occurred under the iron-fisted rule of the military dictatorships," in which 19 deaths were directly or indirectly involved with Government authorities.[4]

Table 6. Transitional Justice Conducted in Korea (1970-2007)

Mech. Type	Start Date	End Date	Target	Target Description
Amnesty	1999-08-14	1999-08-14	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1999-08-31	1999-08-31	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1999-08-12	1999-08-12	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1999-02-25	1999-02-25	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners, Trade Union Activists, and Those Involved in the 1980 Coup
	1998-03-13	1998-03-13	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1997-12-22	1997-12-22	Non-State Agents	Former Presidents
	1995-08-11	1995-08-11	Non-State Agents	Political Crimes
	1993-05-05	1993-05-05	Non-State Agents	Political Crimes
	1988-02-26	1988-02-26	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1987-07-09	1987-07-09	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1985-05-27	1985-05-27	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1983-12-24	1983-12-24	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1983-08-15	1983-08-15	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1981-05-11	1981-05-11	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1981-03-02	1981-03-02	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
	1977-07-06	1977-07-06	Non-State Agents	Political Prisoners
Trial	1996-03-11	1996-08-26	State Agents	Former Presidents and Aides
	1970-12-20	1970-12-20	Non-State Agents	Those Involved in the Assassination of President Park

[3] http://www.jinsil.go.kr/Information_Notice/counsel.20100322/index.asp
[4] http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/Former/index.html

Truth Commission	2000-10-17	2004-08-15	State Agents	Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths to examine crimes from 1961-1990
	2000-08-28	2012-05-03	State Agents	National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Event to examine crimes committed from 1947-1954
Reparations	1990-08-06	1998-12-31	State Agents	The National Assembly enacts the Act for Compensation to the Victims of the Gwangju Democracy Movement to provide compensation for victims of the former authoritarian regime. Compensation is paid through 1998.

TJ Mechanisms at Domestic Levels

Source: Transitional Justice Database Project (1970-2007) in http://tjdbproject.com/index.php

Discussion

A brief review of TJ in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Korea suggests two things: strong impact of elite bargaining and framing in the process of TJ.

First, elite composition in the transition period has strong influence over the TJ process. Transition does not necessarily aiming at democratic system. However, in any case, the balance of power between old and new elites affects the decision on TJ mechanisms and a way of implementing them. In democratic transition, ‘rule of law’ constitutes a basis of society, and thus elite presentation in the parliament has greater influence on TJ legislation, deciding the methods and ranges of TJ. Coalition government may employ limited TJ mechanism; for instance, Northern Ireland accept consociational principles and underlined the reconciliation and truth revelation, leaving punitive measures aside. In this case, reconciliation may be pursued through equality measures between conflicting social groups, which frustrated victims of both sides, and may hamper the feeling of fairness. By contrast elites with disconnected with the past and public supports may introduce a broader TJs as in the Czech Republic.

Second, TJ under the principle of ‘rule of law’ faced obstacles when old documents were destroyed and huge gaps of memories between victims and perpetrators were commonly found, placing challenges to newly established government with limited resources. Furthermore, TJ process itself may easily fall into a dilemma of false convictions and false acquittals in its implementation. TJ process affected the perception of fairness. TJ process may directly affect relatively small proportion of population. For the rest of the population, their perceptions and assessments of the TJ process are easily linked with the position of political parties or blocs of their supports.

TJ experiences in Visegrad countries, though Slovak case excluded, suggest a couple of implications to the TJ in the possible transition to unified Korea. First, discourse of Korean unification appears to

focus on international settings, social integration, and economic burdens. However, greater attention to build a consensus of social values and basic idea of TJ should be drawn for stable transition. Strong support for 'democratic' values of a society will reduce the perception gap of justice not only in the past, but also in the future.

Secondly, perception gap of TJ are to be bridged, not only with the preservation of relevant documents, but also with the understanding of TJ and its dilemmas. Visegrad experiences of TJ showed that preserving archives and documents were a challenging task. In this context, framing of TJ is as important as preservation of proofs and documents that support TJ process.

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IV-2 Linguistics & Literature 3 (in English)

Middle Power Diplomacy & Visegrad Group

Chair: Ivana Bozděchová (Charles University in Prague, Czech)

≫ Internationalization and Terminologization: Driving Forces of the Dynamics of Contemporary Czech Vocabulary

Ivana Bozděchová (Charles University in Prague, Czech)

≫ Happiness in the Era of Globalization and Consumerism: On the Example of *Second Life*

Olena Shchegel (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ Signs and Kundera's Drama Nonsense (Ptákovina)

Sunbee Yu (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ Epic Singers in Eurasian Turkic Countries

Eunkyung Oh (Dongduk Women's University)

Internationalization and terminologization: driving forces of the dynamics of contemporary Czech vocabulary

Ivana Bozděchová, Prague

1. Introduction

The dynamics of any era and its life is reflected in the dynamics of interpersonal communication and its means, linguistic and non-linguistic. The aim of this paper is to comment that fact briefly in the case of contemporary Czech language; illustrating examples represent words and naming units (including neologisms) coming from different spheres – everyday speech, mass-media as well as special communication.

2. Dynamics of vocabulary and its tendencies

As in their works linguists of the Prague Linguistic Circle (PLC) pointed out significantly, the dynamics of the language system belongs to the general tendencies of development in each language and at each stage of its development. In the early days, the Prague school‘s distinction opposed the dynamics and diachrony vs synchrony and statics, but later it turned out that it is not possible to keep a precise border, and the linguists began to talk about the projection of diachrony into synchrony and the projection of synchrony into the diachrony and they started to use the terms the dynamics and the diachrony and the statics and synchrony with a semantic differentiation. – The dichotomy of the diachrony and synchrony was known and commented already by the founder of modern structuralism Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913). The member of the PLC, Josef Vachek (1909–1996) defined synchronous dynamics (in his work on the dynamics of the phonological system)[1] as a constant movement, a constant voltage in the system of a language, manifested in the existence of peripheral components and phenomena in the system. Synchronous dynamics as a fact of objective linguistic reality is the result of the on-going developmental processes and the action of trends, often contradictory; it manifests itself in the norm by variant means and the tension between them. Those means are linked with units of the national language and its functional styles.

When assessing the dynamics of the vocabulary we follow its development and changes in a relatively

[1] J. Vachek: *Dynamika fonologického systému současné spisovné češtiny*, Praha 1968.

short period of time, we confront it with the vocabulary of a previous time stage, and we analyze the driving forces which determine the movement and trends in the various types of naming. In the development of the current vocabulary of the Czech language there are three most prominently manifested tendencies there: tendency to democratization, intellectualization and internationalization of the expression, i.e. the development of colloquial and slang expressions and their penetration into the literary language, increasing share of technical (specialized) vocabulary and foreign elements (internacionalism). The intellectualization of language is strengthen by the processes of terminologization and internationalization, and by the related development of an abstract vocabulary. Although these tendencies (the tendency to democratization, intellectualization and internationalization) as a rule operate at the same time, since the 1990‘s we can record a certain deflection of journalisms from the use of the intelectualized words and, conversely, wider use of means of democratization (e.g. *board* = snowboard, skateboard), still more terms penetrate into journalism and into the everyday communication.

3. Extralingual changes and neologisms

As with other European, and especially Slavic languages, also with Czech this stage of a new development vocabulary is being defined and conditioned namely by the socio-political and subsequently socio-economic, cultural and educational changes since the beginning of the 1990‘s. The most important factors of changes in the vocabulary, therefore, include factors extralingual – communication needs to name new facts, the transformation of the social status or preferences of areas of social reality, the external influences of globalization and international integration. When examining the dynamics of the vocabulary we assess the nature of the nomination and the process of nominalization: vocabulary development is manifested by the increase of competing types of naming (including multi-word expressions) and by neologization processes. Considering the current communication, it can be seen that one of typical elements in the current time is hybridization, i.e. the use and involvement of foreign language elements.

Looking at the latest vocabulary indicates much from our current life – new words (neologisms) describe people, their relationships, interests, cultural, social, economic and production development, inventions, etc. The main areas where neologisms are used include in particular:

1. business and trade: *leasing, shopping center, good will joint venture, tendr, eurodotace, diskontní ceny*
2. banking and accounting: *money market účet, homebanking, internetbanking, direct banking, on-line provoz, hotovostní výběr cash advance, stop list, topkredit, expreskonto, webkonto*
3. communication and communication tools (mobile, telecommunication): *mobilní operátor, Go kredit, twist sada, platební terminál, elektronická platební karta*
4. *electrotechnique (IT, computers):* operační systém, scroll dálkový ovladač, overhead projektor,

digitální paging

5. social sphere and wellfare: *charitativní organizace, charitcentrum, azylové domy, centra pro drogově závislé, centra pro ohroženou mládež, alternativní péče, bezbariérové dílny*

6. environment, ecology: *globální oteplování, oázapark, terénní pracovník, terénní práce*

7. journalism: *kontrasummit, nonstop on-line zpravodajství, peoplemetr, megaúspěch, minijob*

8. advertising: *storyboard, teleshopping, top kvalita, bodystyling, (reklamní) spot, MEGA CENA*

9. sport: *snowboardista, skeet, skreč, outdoorové aktivity, skipas, tie break, play off*

10. tourism: *all-inclusive, last minute*

11. gastronomy, cooking: *biojogurt, muffin tmavý s čoko kousky, ochucené mělněné maso, bagetérie, špagetérie*

12. culture and entertainment: *telenovela, kinohit, multiaréna, ikona, VIP, stand-up*

13. everyday communication: *dát si týdenní time, náš hotline, babysiting, level, mikrovlnit*

Neologisms often give names to new phenomena such as:

1. products: *nazouváky, ekotaška, biopolštář, fytokrém, nanopočítač, termohrnek, videobrýle, MP3, iPad*

2. services, institutions: *bankopojišťovna*, *gastrozařízení, školka pro seniory, intimbar, etnočajovna*

3. tools, equipment, instruments, means (technical, traffic): jednorázové holítko, videoučebnice, cyklopočítač, čtečka, třípásmový multimediální telefon, city-taxi, hotelbus

4. features of life-style, activities, sport: *mikrovětrání, apartmán, semivegetarián, balneoterapie, biosolárium, biopantofle, megafilm, e-kniha, fitklub, wellness, spinning, autofotbal, autonavigace, geochaching*

5. professions, hobbies etc.: *drobnochovatel, mobilní telefonista, hypnoterapeut, jazzofil, scientolog, roztleskávačka, topkař* (TOP 09)

6. special branches, domains of social life: *astromedicína, fytomedicína, kosmetologie, nanomedicína*

4. Internationalization and intellectualization of vocabulary

The need to communicate successfully and unambiguously in all fields of human activity is one of the typical features of our information age. Easpecially for international cooperation it is an undeniable advantage if its vocabulary has an international character. In view of the internationalization of the economy, business, science, education, culture, arts and sport such communication is only made possible by shared words and uniformly defined terms that are used in all languages – internationalisms (borrowings of worldwide spread, whose sources or mediators are prestigious and communication languages). As for Czech, internationalisms (of Graeco-Latin origin) were traditionally adopted by way of German, though today this process takes place chiefly via English. With advancing globalization, the use of English as a lingua franca has become common practice at specialized international negotiations. Its predominant position since the second half of the 20th century is perceived as natural and (new) terms of English origin more and more frequently become the source of internationalisms. In connection with

the recognition of English as a means of international (and intercultural) communication a narrower subject of English for Specific Purposes (ESP) is emerging in linguistics within the framework of Language for Specific Purposes (LSP) research.

4.1 Internationalisms

Internationalisms (and in a narrower sense Europeanisms as a linguistic, not a geographical, term) are defined (with a distinction between specialized internationalisms and those in the common vocabulary) by Fried (1956, p. 214): "International words and word-forming morphemes are lexical elements (loans) in the system of more than two European languages belonging to different language families, two of which are necessarily world languages. Such words (a) have a different degree of outward graphic and phonetic similarity, (b) their inter-lingual semantic agreement and the degree of semantic difference are indirectly dependent on the degree to which they have adapted themselves to all partial plans of the system of the language in question." One of the important differences between the two types of internationalisms, according to the author, is the fact that internationalisms in the common language are mostly unmotivated (referential), while in the specialized language they are motivated (categorizing) – the fact is that every scientific discipline aims at a logically ordered nomenclature and terminological schema (this is helped chiefly by the use of Graeco-Latin neologisms, the use of international prefixes and suffixes, paradigmatic formation and collocation).

According to Fried the main difference between internationalisms and other foreign words is that internationalisms have a nationwide character, whereas foreign words often only have regional significance or else are part of the vocabulary of certain specialists. He sees a further difference in the fact that neologisms and new formations are most common among internationalisms in specialized language, while in common speech the internationalisms are usually established and only rarely become the basis of neologisms. In specialized texts use is made of so-called quotation words, many of which have, at the same time, the character of internationalisms.

4.2 Anglicisms

The above mentined internationalization processes are nowadays characterized by the established usage of the English words (*showroom, sitcom*), multiverbization and formation of analytical denomination structures (*fitness center, hands-free kit*), hybrid compound words, including occasionalisms (*ekoaktivista, m-phone, in-line*) and (semi)qualks (*trash – koš, web page – webová stránka, hotline – horká linka, elektrobicykl – elektrokolo*). Internationalization can be currently considered as a general, universal tendency, the process to a greater or lesser extent common or similar in all modern languages. It has some common features in them: 1. internationalization affects mostly professional communication spheres (terminology), 2. individual languages are not the only passive recipients of the internationalization.

Majority of new internationalisms are of English origion. The influence of English on Czech began to

become stronger in the 19th century, when England was a model of industrial development for the whole of Europe. Roughly until the Second World War it continued under British predominance. Later on however, American English began to predominate. In the Czech environment English (unlike German, Slovak, Polish or the Roma languages) is not ethnically justified. English is becoming the second most-used language of the younger generation, for whom the borrowing of words (especially of fashionable expressions) is a way of giving their speech a modern, colourful character. English is the language which attracts, for instance, the managers and employees of big international firms. Alongside actual communication with foreigners, the Czechs now have more frequent contact with foreign languages or translated texts than before 1989, especially in the specialized domain, where there is a growing demand for specialized texts to be written directly in English. Under its influence and mainly as interference from English, this leads to a parallel use of English words and collocations with Czech words and collocations (e.g. *odseparovat pool progenitorových buněk; limitací je life expectancy méně než 1 rok, čeká je fitting šatů, dress code je předepsaný).* These texts are labelled „hybrid" by Koblížek (1995, p. 216); Kocourek (2002, p. 199) records a fluid transition between adopted terms and haphazardly quoted foreign expressions that occur accidentally in texts, but are not considered units of the native vocabulary.

The increasing use of English for specialized international purposes is at present common to many national languages, where, however, it may cause terminological problems. On the other hand, as Jernudd has shown (1994, p. 82), while English is becoming proportionately more dominant in scientific literature, there continues to be a large and relatively stable body of scientific literature written in languages other than English; this is not likely to diminish in importance. In 1983, the database MATHFILE was examined by language over a seven-year period to obtain data on the proportional share of English and other languages used in scientific communication. While English-language articles increased each year as a proportion of the total, using 1972 as the base-line year, articles written in Russian, German and Japanese were relatively stable in absolute terms. Similarly, when the theoretical sections of psychology journals were examined in four countries in 1985, the percentage of citations in English were as follows: Russian journals – 10%, American journals – 89,1% and 94,2%, German journals – 38% in the German Democratic Republic and 69,4% in the Federal Republic of Germany. „Studies of databases are selective and often biased in favour of English-language publications. Thus the extent of the non-English language literature is undoubtedly underestimated." (Jernudd, 1994 ibid.)

4.3 Specialized terms

As already mentioned, internationalization affects first of all the specialized vocabulary (individual terminological systems), in which it is a source of dynamic movement; it inspires word-formation and also semantic processes, whereby the principal source of borrowing new lexical terms in Czech is English.[2] In contemporary Czech communication anglicisms prove chiefly economical in expression,

[2] Mravinacová (2004) points out that the neo-semanticization of international character concerns words of supra-national character: the most numerous of them are clearly words of Greek or Latin origin and words formed from Latin and Greek roots that are an historically integral part of the vocabularies of the languages of

though this does not always mean that they are properly functional and adequate to a given context. Their stylistic validity is also an important issue, i.e. mainly the boundary between slang words used by professionals in their every-day work conversation and a neutral terminology used officially both in speech and in written texts (compare *cété, cétéčko* vs *CT = computer tomography*, *puzzle* vs *polytrauma*, *rumin*, *rumun* vs *rooming in* = accomodating a mother in the neonatal department in the same ward as her newly born child, etc.).

The lexical layer of specialized (technical) terms is remarkably extensive and rich (experts estimate that the total number of specialized terms in developed modern languages stands at about three millions, see Kraus, 1995)[3] and is continually developing and growing (of a 10% quantitative increment of the vocabulary almost a quarter is accounted for by specialized terms – see Jedlička, 1965). Machová (1995, p. 152) remarks on the situation that "movement in the specialized vocabulary is much faster than in the general vocabulary". Its dynamics is therefore an important aspect of evaluation and description of terminology.

Specialized terms are characterized by exactitude of meaning and unambiguity; semantic anomalies do not avoid them, which means that many of them have idiomatic character (figurative character and metaphor in the broad sense of the word). R. Kocourek (2001) distinguished terminological metaphors (as a sub-type of established metaphors – set metaphors) from free metaphors by their limitation of meaning through definition, contextual independence and nomination of common concepts (rather than unique ones). Figurative nominations also prove that specialized language uses the same methods of word formation as the common language.

Many terms also have the validity of inter-disciplinary terms or neutral words; let us have a few examples of primarily medical names: *anamnesis* (in Plato's gnoseology), *deviation* (geography, sociology), *latent* (physics, photography), *diagnosis* (biology), *frontal* (military, architecture), *immunity* (law), *virus* (biology, computer technology), *compression* (physics, communication technology), *operation* (mathematics), *aspiration* (phonetics, agriculture), *circulation* (biology, mathematics, meteorology), *collapse* (engineering), *defect* (nuclear physics, pedagogy), *deformation* (physics, engineering), *acute* (social), *infection* (biology, conversationally), *crisis* (literature), *pill* (metaphorically), etc.

Some processes taking place in terminology can be described as determinologization or reterminologization, especially in the media. See e.g. *childish disease, the shock of deregulation of rentals, the rejuvenation shock of European democracy, green lungs, the Christmas holiday syndrom, the Princess Diana syndrom*. Compare also some further collocations with the lexeme *disease*[4] from

the European-American area (so-called Europeanisms).

[3] For the medical terminology, with which we mainly deal in this lecture, we may, by way of illustration, refer to the statement by Doležel (1999) that a Czech doctor actively uses some 8,000 terms on average.

[4] *Slovník spisovného jazyka českého* (p. 316) lists the following meanings for the lexeme *disease*: 1. disturbance of health, illness, 2. a bad characteristic, a fault, a shortcoming, a bad habit, a weakness, 3. passionate engagement, passion, 4. arch. coll. *baker's disease* (feeding on rolls or croissants scalded with milk).

the Czech National Corpus (SYN2000); about social phenomena (*eradicate the diseases of society, a sick society, the sickness of power, the sickness of the government, the sickness of the century, alcoholism is called Disease No. 1*), in politics (*succumb to the infectious disease of nationalism, the new Czech state must overcome the diseases of adolescence and immaturity, regard Communism as a "disease of a time of transition"*), in culture and art (*the childish disease of self-censorship, the "grey disease of puritanism", the disease of education, a silent disease*), in economics (*a medicine for the advancing sickness of the banks*), in the health field (*The power and sickness of medicine* – title of a book; *AIDS used to be called the disease of homosexuals, drug addicts and the gutter, the disease of perverts, gays and druggies*), etc.

5. Conclusion

The process of internationalization of modern languages results in variations and contributes to the enrichment and greater differentiation of their expressive means. As we have tried to illustrate, especially in certain types of contemporary Czech communication (such as media, journalism, advertising, sometimes even the common expression) strikingly high amount of internacionalisms (mostly anglicisms) appears. Czech, like most other languages in the world today, employs especially anglicisms and, to a varying degree, comes to terms with them. This confirms their universal character. Therefore, even if we don't have to be concerned about the preservation of the Czech language, its Czech and multifunctional form should not be indifferent to linguists, teachers and all users and it should be discussed and taken care of in the context and sense of the constant and real everyday language culture.

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Happiness in the Era of Globalization and Consumerism - On the example of *Second Life* -

Olena Shchegel*

"I have never looked upon ease and happiness as ends in themselves -- this critical basis I call the ideal of a pigsty. The ideals that have lighted my way, and time after time have given me new courage to face life cheerfully, have been Kindness, Beauty, and Truth. Without the sense of kinship with men of like mind, without the occupation with the objective world, the eternally unattainable in the field of art and scientific endeavors, life would have seemed empty to me. The trite objects of human efforts -- possessions, outward success, luxury -- have always seemed to me contemptible."

— Albert Einstein, The World As I See It

Humanity has always wondered about what happiness is. But even as we advance into the new millennium, the pursuit of happiness continues to be tiring and seemingly unending for many in societies around the world. There are countless books on how to become happy easily found in bookstores everywhere and many go on to become bestsellers[1], according to the World Happiness Report and NEF which is responsible for the Happy Planet Index. Nevertheless, modern humans do not seem to be less prone to depression, anxiety, or discontent, than their predecessors, nor are they happier. A major reason for our unhappiness is the fact that we live in a consuming society.

Before the advent of consumption-based society, people used to consume only as much as was needed to sustain their existence, while overconsumption was considered harmful not only for the individual but also for the society as a whole. Today however, the situation is quite the opposite whereby most of members of society seem to be indulging in overconsumption and those who attempt to refrain are considered exceptions to the rule. For many people in today's modern society, purchases are made in order to obtain a feeling of gratification, which is misinterpret as happiness.

Maryna Hrymych's *Second Life* explores the question of what it is that makes a person happy and whether it is possible to become happy in a consumption-based society.

Consumerism first arose in the 19th century but gained ground after the WWII, accompanying the intensification of globalization. In a consumer-based society, the actions of the members are influenced by the principles of the market economy and one's real worth is proved not through a person's

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[1] A search on Amazon.com shows more than 90,000 results for the word 'happiness' while a corresponding search on Google.com provides more than 220 million results.

productivity but through his consuming capacity. If the core of production culture is creating something for others, consumer culture is focused on the practice of consumption that is egocentric.

In order to understand the correlation between consumerism and happiness, it is crucial to first define what happiness is. Although the meaning of happiness varies among individuals, there are philosophical definitions that can be said to be representative for each era. Aristotle was the first known Western thinker to attempt to define and explain happiness in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. For him, "the function of man is to live a certain kind of life, and this activity implies a rational principle, and the function of a good man is the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed it is performed in accord with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, then happiness turns out to be an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue". Aristotle's happiness is not a pleasurable sensation but an ultimate evaluation of a person's life.

By the 1700s, utilitarianism became a major philosophical train of thought that replaced Aristotle's approach to happiness with the idea of minimizing suffering and maximizing pleasure. After Jeremy Bentham and other English philosophers elaborated on this view, the 18th century became the turning point of our understanding of happiness – it was no longer the evaluation of one's life but a feeling, an emotion, something that makes us smile and brings pleasure. Utilitarians argued that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" was the ultimate good for society and supported free trade as they recognized personal freedom as a necessary means for achieving happiness and thus, creating the first theoretical foundation for globalization.

The eighteenth century signalized the beginning of the era of the pursuit of happiness with highlights being Jean Jacues Rousseau's *Theories of social contract* and the United States' *The Declaration of Independence*. The former argued that the most important function of the government and social rules is to make all citizens happy. The latter stated that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness". Such perspectives of the Enlightenment have continued to influence our perception of happiness to this day. Before the Enlightenment, people often sought the meaning of life in beauty, honor, or virtue. Today, finding happiness is generally the goal of one's life. McMahon argues that the reason humanity has become obsessed with the pursuit of happiness is due to a decline in religious beliefs and economic prosperity. He claims that a person can only worry about how happy he or she is only when all other needs are satisfied. Therefore, happiness is referred to as a kind of luxury.

The pursuit of happiness has become a Hedonic treadmill of consumer-based society - when a person's economic expectations and desires rise in accordance with an increase in income but the feelings of gratification or happiness do not follow. In other words, despite living more prosperously now than in any other period of human history, happiness (or contentment) is not lasting for today's populace who try to obtain it through the buying of more goods but soon find themselves on a never-ending Hedonic treadmill. Artem – the protagonist of Maryna Hrymych's novel *Second Life* – is a typical product of consumer-based society. Born in Ukraine and raised in a poor family, he later gets a chance to study in the U.S. but his life is far from glamorous – he lives in a dirty room in Chinatown and works odd jobs to pay for his lodgings and food. The goal of his life is to pull out of poverty in any way possible.

The person who helps Artem get a room in Chinatown is Li, a Vietnamese girl whom he met at the

university library when they were both freshmen. After helping Li with her assignment, the two start living together until it is time for Artem to go to London for his master's degree. Despite living together for four years, Artem's relationship with Li has nothing to do with love. Not once does he refer to her as his girlfriend as he sees her as nothing more than a 'commodity'. Li cooks, washes and irons his clothes, cleans his room while not asking any questions, and thus is a comfortable 'utility' that helps him concentrate on his work and studies. She also helps him feel less lonely in a foreign country, and gives him a feeling of warm affection which he accepts but never reciprocates. He never considers Li's feelings until he dies and finds himself in a 'second life', finally acknowledging her as a human being and not a mere object needed for the moment.

With the role of money becoming increasingly important, relations between people in society have steadily become more fragmented. In a society ruled by money, relations between people last only as long as there is a deal to seal. Then, when the deal is no longer profitable to either of the parties, the relationship is broken, which makes it hard for people to find genuinely deep affection. Artem is a person not capable of real affection which is evident from his relationship with both poor Vietnamese student Li and wealthy English aristocrat Elizabeth.

By the time he enters graduate school at Oxford, Artem has already become more affluent than most of his peers by virtue of his talent in trading stocks. Despite being no longer poor, he is still not happy as begins to crave social status and recognition in society. For accomplish this, he joins the astronomical society which he has no sincere interest in but where the cream of English society are members, with whom he tries to befriend. At the same time, he becomes friends with Elizabeth – a student from one of his classes – but is not attracted to, even referring to her as 'Ugly Betty'. That changes after Elizabeth invites him for a Christmas dinner at her home. Artem discovers that Elizabeth's father is a lord and she is an heiress to an enormous fortune and a title. In his eyes, she is not longer and Ugly Betty but 'Queen Elizabeth'.

Artem despises himself for his change in attitude towards Elizabeth as he knows too well what brought it about, but still cannot help but desire her – not as a person but a mean, a utility for getting something he wants. For him, there is no radical difference between Li and Elizabeth. They are both profitable deals but as soon as the deal loses profitability, he is ready to end it and move on to the next one to fulfill his superficial desires. He treats people coldly, as if they were things that can be disposed of when they are no longer necessary and replaced with new ones, more suitable for his needs. Hrymych shows Artem as a collective image of modern people for whom calculative and quantitative aspects replace qualitative aspects of relationships.

We first see Artem as a person captivated by money and consumption but he soon loses his ability to feel satisfied and happy with his achievements. He later realizes that with his money, there is virtually nothing he cannot buy and at that moment, all 'merchandise' loses its attraction for him. But as Artem knows no other means for achieving what he believes is happiness, he starts to slide into depression which becomes severe after the suicide of Elizabeth's father, Sir Charles, with whom Artem had grown very close. Seeing himself in Artem, Sir Charles writes a letter to him before committing suicide. In it, Sir Charles confesses that the reason for his choice is an illness - a growing darkness, an emptiness within his chest. Artem understands all too well that Sir Charles is not talking about physical illness.

> His illness was not that of a body. Sir Charles's body was healthier than that of anyone else Artem knew. Sir Charles's illness was that only rich intellectuals suffer from. Neither just rich people, nor just intellectuals. That was a rare disease striking only rich intellectuals… There was a scientific name for this disease but Artem knew it was a 'disease of the void soul'. The abyss within you. Nothing you cannot have. Everything you have you achieved by yourself. You have built a fortress of wealth. And you know that you could not live without this money, live like an average person. But you also know all too well that it is this money that is holding you back from unfolding your potential. You were not given life to climb to the top of the social ladder and spend your days in narcissistic self-admiration. You were gifted with exceptional intelligence not to achieve success without breaking a sweat just for yourself, you were gifted with it to make the world a better place! ... The abyss inside your soul grows until it becomes incompatible with life…
>
> Trying to escape the fate of Sir Charles, Artem realizes that the only way to do this is to escape from the city which is the center of consumption and calculative deals. In the city, there is nothing a person can do but consume and it is a space where genuine affection cannot exist anymore. His intuition compels him to run as far away from the city as possible until he finally finds himself in the middle of a prairie, living in an old trailer with Dave, who thinks of himself as the scum of society.

Dave lives in the prairie because he tries to escape from the city and its consumerism but his reasons for running away differs from Artem's. Living all his life in a small town in the prairies and working at a gas station, Dave is quite content with his life until one day he goes to the city to see his daughter and her newborn child. Finding himself in the world of consumption, he realizes that his humble way of life was something to be ashamed of. But he also knows that he would never be able to fit into this cruel world of money. After returning to his small town, Dave can no longer be content with his life as he feels he is "the scum of society" and is now convinced that working at a gas station for his humble salary is humiliating. Thus, he quits his job and moves into an old trailer on a bankrupt farm which belonged to his grandfather. For him, it is his only choice as he cannot fit into consumer-based society nor is this society capable of accepting him. As Simmel writes, in a society of consumption, the distinction between oneself and others is only possible through the amount of money we spend. Those spending the least money are doomed to become the outcasts. Dave is a caricature of the typical outcast of a consumption-oriented society.

Living on the farm in the middle of nowhere, Dave and Artem are surrounded by nature but have no connection with it. For them, it is merely background. Their failure to establish a connection with the wilderness is why instead of feeling better after escaping from the city, their depression only worsens. Humans come from nature, return to it, and cannot survive without it. But consumer-based society considers nature as to be property, an object of consumption. Rejecting obsessions for possessions is the only way to reconnect with nature and obtain its vital power. Although Artem gives up all his possessions, leaving them in the city, as a person who spent his all life in a megapolis, he cannot find a way to reconnect with nature by himself. He needs something he knows and understands, a familiar medium to help him. He finds such medium in an old tractor. The moment he turns on the engine, he feels the vibration beneath him, from machine in contact with nature itself. These vibrations become the

impetus that gives him the strength to live and awakes him from his depression. He realizes that as a human, he is not the owner of the nature around him and by letting go of this perceived possession, he frees himself from the grip of consumption society, and now realizes that he can only achieve happiness by sharing his life and his affections with others. At that moment Artem finally seems to find meaning in his life, he suddenly dies from a heart attack and finds himself in a so-called 'second life' – life after death. The reader might be perplexed by such turn of events but it is necessary as Artem has not yet given up his attachment to his one final possession – his life. Thus, death is the only way he can be free. When he first finds himself in his second life, he is full of complaints about why he had to die at the young age of thirty-three. This shows that he still cannot let go of this last possession. He first believes that his death the deliberate work of God as it is God who creates and controls everything. But through his journey in his second life, he soon realizes that he is wrong. He receives the shocking revelation that 'the Creator' is not God, and that anyone can become a Creator. He now understands what Sir Charles meant in his suicide note when he wrote that we are born to make the world a better place – that it is the humans' job, not God's.

Hrymych leaves unanswered in her novel, the question of whether God really exists. She also appears to not own anything. In *Second Life*, she emphasizes that goods and possessions should not be used to satisfy one person's pleasures and desires, but be viewed as mere tools to achieving happiness through the sharing of them with others, without being obsessed with possessing them. She encourages readers to pursue sustainable happiness and continue making efforts to "make this world a better place".

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Signs and Kundera's play *Ptákovina (Nonsense)*

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1. Introduction

This research paper will be analyzing a play written by one of the most famous Czech author, Milan Kundera, in semiotic perspective. His works have been popular research topics not only in Czech Republic, but also in many other countries including South Korea. However, there weren't much research done in the past regarding his play, such as, *Ptákovina*, or any research about the relationship between his works and structure and sign.

Back in his time the study of semiotics of theater in Prague school did not receive much attention. Especially, the theory of Otakar Zich, who gave a lot of impact on Prague school, was not understood, but instead criticized for its pioneering concept. But later on, their works have been receiving attentions: French Theater semiotician, P. Pavis mentioned the impact from J. Mukařovský, and Anglo-American theaters semiotician, Keir Elam praised semiotics of theater in Prague school.

The research about semiotics and its relations with comity and play area done in English, French, and German became known in late 20th century, and now, semiotics is being cited by many books and thesis papers. There activity has become most known was when the translation of Prague school's semiotic research was announced

One of the typical examples, *The Semiotics of Theater and Drama* written by K. Elam, organized the properties of semiotics in plays. Besides that, the most well organized Book regarding semiotics of theater was done by M. Quin in his *The Semiotics Stage: Prague School Theater Theory*. The difference between the two is that Elam did not have any access to resources written Czech, while Quinn David but he did not analyze plays.

Ptákovina was written in 1966, however it was banned after the premiere in 1969 and was re performed in 2008. At first and the play had the name *Dvě uši, dvě svatby* (*Two Ears, Two Weddings*), but later Kundera has fixed the title and the content. The Basic plot is which a principal's funny scribble expands by involving many people which leads to complicated revenge.

Since this literary work is based on history, it causes diverse interpretation, and with the properties in function of the object in this work is very unique. Therefore, this research will first explore the typical properties that the semiotics have, study what kind of properties the things in the plays have as symbols regarding space, time, or people, and then study how these things function in one structure.

2. Sign and sign system

In the communication is always a sender who speaks something and a receiver who listens or receives that message. Of course, receiver can be another man, or he may also become an object, but the recipient can also be speaking man himself or some strength, sprit and so on. The relationships between sender and receiver occur not only in normal communication, but also in different artistic genre. Some genres such as dance or music require the scientific or the professional ability to analyze them. But the works in languages and their messages are usually clear. If signification in literary works based on the relationship between an author and a reader, then the theatre is about interaction between the audience and a stage. Theatre has a special means of signification that cannot be brought out in literary works. Of course, a dramatic text is written by the special means of signification, or leaves door of the signification open. This signification in terms of theatre semiotics is created on the basis of sign system between a stage and the audience.

When the audience decodes the presented signs such behavior is often reached unconsciously. For example, when we meet a person by chance choose from feature just the clothes he wore, or his movements. Of course, cloths or the movements cannot express whole meaning of the codes, it is the automatic response to order of codes. This phenomenon also appears on stage. Also on stage except the first decoding of the unconscious or automatic, there is still a secondary decoding. This secondary decoding is related to the analytical abilities of the audience or a receiver. If it is not a realistic drama the secondary decoding is more important. In addition to the secondary decoding may affect a variety of other elements such as the ambiguity arising from the relationship between fiction and reality. On the stage appears fictional existence as a character. At the same time the figure on stage is a living actor. In the event that a actor is not known or a spectator does not know him at all, it could happened that a spectator cannot distinguish whether a specific motion is a prominent feature of character or a gesture of actor's own from habit.

We meet with a difficulty to understand the sign system of structure and to analyze the process of meaning. As T. Kowzan said, "the general theory of signs is a point of departure that is unavoidable. Equally so are the nature of the sign, its structure, the different kinds of signs their character. Almost all the sign systems, almost all the code as well as the sensory channels, are involved in the semiosis, in the theatrical communication. The metaphorical and metonymical nature of signs, their semantic, esthetic and emotive value, are questions that demand an answer," if we want to analyze the theatre in conjunction with semiotics we have to search not only all the system and the code but also the semantic or esthetic analysis etc. and it is too wide and complicated. Here, however, we will focus on the general concept of sign and its function and the specific characteristics of dramatic signs.

Generally speaking, a sign replaces something else. We live in the world of signs that are all around us. Saussure defined that the sign is correlation between a signifié (signified) and a signifiant (signifier).[1]

[1] Instead of the terms of the 'signifie' and the 'signifiant' many scholars used different terminology, for example R. Jakobson used the terms such as 'singnatum' and 'signans'. O. Zich established the difference between the signans and the signatum in the theatre, especially in acting.

This division is the basis for understanding the structure of signs. Regarding the different types of signs, the well known classification is C. S. Peirce's such as icon, index and symbol. An icon represents its object mainly by similarity between the sign and its signified. Sculptures, photos or portraits are representative examples of the icon but not always necessary be the visual object. For example, if we see the images of trees on stage and hear birdcall, then the images of trees are the icon and birdcall is as well. We can say that all theatre performances are basically iconic because the theatrical act and lines are imitation of our daily life or imaginary facts. Indexical signs are causally connected with their objects, often physically or through contiguity. The best example of the index is personal pronouns. If an actor says "she" and he did not to show us someone or to refer one's name then we cannot recognize who she is. A symbol is a sign which does not have any relevance with an object and the relationship between sign and signified is conventional or arbitrary. With the exception of onomatopoeia, most of words are symbols. These signs exist separately but it should be remembered for their mutual coexistence.

As far as theatrical signs, it is clear that they are artificial and various. Except the general characteristics of theatrical signs, the most important characteristics are integrity and changeability. There are many signs on stage. It is necessary to perceive and understand the linguistic signs and the other signs together. For example, if an actor stands in the snow and says, "I'm so hot to die!" we have to understand why he said so. If he is not crazy, the feeling 'hot' is probably connected with actor's emotion than the physical feeling. Or if a player says "that" or "this" we need player's gesture or movement for the comprehension of situation. In other words, when we connect or integrate in a context of all signs we can understand the meaning and function of dramatic (or theatrical) signs.[2]

Next, we will focus on the changeability of theatrical signs. J. Honzl emphasized on three elements - text, actor and director - of theatre which have influence on balance of structure of theatre. But in history or in some genre one of these tree elements is dominant over the others. For example it was the improvised theatre operates without text or a director did not have a create role before 18th century. But there is no case that one of these elements was not present, in fact it substituted by another elements. This phenomenon one element takes over the function of the others is the 'changeability' of theatrical signs. "There is no music without tones, no poems without words, no painting without color, and no sculpture without physical substance" but the theatrical signs are different. As Hozl said that "an actor participates in the theatrical performance even in the case of theater without actors, that the word is always an essential component of theatrical art even in the case of 'wordless' theater,"[3] it shows us the changeability of the theatrical sighs. This characteristic of theatrical signs is associated with hierarchy of dramatic arts.

When Mukařovský explained the concept of artwork he used the term of hierarchy. "Structure is as the aesthetic construction in complex hierarchy which is united by prevailingness of one component over the others"[4] The one component over the others such as the concept 'the standing of the top of hierarchy' corresponds with the 'foregrounding (the English rendering of the Czech word 'aktualizace')'.

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[2] J. Veltruský comments that "the originality of the Prague School contribution consists in its endeavor to analyze the work of theatrical art in its complex unity, as interplay of meanings called forth by various components." J. Veltruský: "Semitics and Avant-grade Theatre", in: *Theatre Survey*, p. 87.

[3] J. Honzl: "Dynamics of the Sign in the Theater", in: *Semiotics of Art*, p. 86.

[4] J. Mukařovský: "Pokus o strukturní rozbor hereckého zjevu (Chaplin ve světle velkoměsta)", in*: Studie I*, p. 463.

This term is related with the 'defamiliarization' or 'making strange' of formalists. In the drama or theatre the phonetic repetition, the way of presentation, grammatical construction, archaic expression or using the poems would have such an effect as the 'foregrounding' in common sequence of lines.

3. The signification and properties of an object

Usually, when an object appears in the play, readers or audience tend to interpret or understand what the object means in the play. This shows that the object gets to obtain another meaning besides its meaning in real life, when it appears in the play. As J. Veltruský said that "everything on the stage is a sign," the elements or objects that appear on the stage go through signification process and obtains a specificity in the play.

The objects that appear in the plays may have less expression than the objects in the performance, however, the indexical; perspective created by imagination may go beyond the boundaries of sight. For example, if there is a line such as, "there is a warship outside the window," the word "warship" implies many meanings. Because the "warship" is not just a normal ship, but a ship that are used in wars and have indexical functions.

The objects in the Kundera's play, symbolizes many things, which could be explained by the meaning and expression of the symbol. The most typical example is metaphor and metonymy. R. Jakobson claimed that in order to create a successful text, "selection" and "combination" is necessary. In this case, "combination" relates to syntagmatic perspective, and "selection" relates to paradigmatic perspective. In terms of rhetoric, the "combination" leads to metonymy, and the "selection" leads to metaphor. Following this condition, Symbolism naturally relates to metaphor and Realism to metonymy.

Jakobson's definition of metaphor and metonymy makes a strong impact on the signification of a play: metaphor relates to the icon that bases similarity, metonymy relates to the index that bases contiguity. For example, the objects that appear in the play create very intimate relationship with the person, who uses the objects. If a man holds a barber's knife, this will mean that the man is either a barber or a person who does something specifically with the knife, therefore, the object represents the person that uses the object. As studied above, Prague school Structuralists, such as, Jakobson, had great interests in metonymy meaning specific things that represent the whole.

Kundera uses metaphor and metonymy appropriately in *Ptákovina*. Let us explore the some of the symbols that have significant meanings in the play, and what specific roles they play in the plays.

One of the most important things in this play is a drawing of the principal of a school. Same instance happens every day in school with unique and socialist environment. After school, when all the student leave the school, he lines up all the teachers and does physical examination, in order to check whether they are taking out any equipment from school. Completion of the examination is the end of his daily work.

As this daily life becomes tedious to him, he suddenly scribbles on the plaque that has the school's slogan is written on. The happenings that occur due to the scribble is the main story of the play. His scribbled a diamond shape on the plaque, which symbolizes a woman's genital in Czech Republic. The

shape represents the similarity that bases on an icon. However, the iconicity that this symbol implied becomes to symbolize the principal on the next day. Now this shape is no longer an icon, but an index or symbol, because this shape and the principal has no relationship in terms of similarity. As the shape got connected to the principal, the shape became one of the concepts of metonymy. Then, why did a student inferred the shape would mean the principal? This is explained as the play goes on. One of the dialogues shows that the principal is involved with a lot of woman, as he was a Casanova and slept with almost 400 women in his life. Therefore, the principal became a person who has slept with a lot of woman according to the comparison of metonymy.

The cane that appears the first in the play is the next example. The cane that the principal holds is used for punishments, which represents 'authority'. As the scribble becomes a huge issue in the school, a committee is established to capture the suspect and punish with no mercy. The principal suggests to punish the teacher of a student as well, if the student scribbles, in order to the teachers in trouble. The suggestion was to hit the teachers with a stick in their bottom.

But this leads to a totally different direction of what he has expected. One student spoke up that he has done the scribbling. This student was the student who wrote "= principal" next to the diamond shape. The student was pressured by the committee to tell the truth. The principal meets the student in person and pressures him. The student says that even if he hasn't done it, there was no use, and "the confidence of all human beings are based upon what they believe to be true," and insists that he is the one who started. The principal tells the committee and tells the truth, which was denied, the student's ears were cut off, and his teacher, Eva, who was his fiancé, was also punished. The principal suffers from what he has done, and Eva cries and begs him to revenge as she gets hit by the chairman of the committee. After this incident, the principal questions his position and authority that he has: his emotional explosion could be found in the next scene:

> Principal: Ladies and gentlemen, I am not qualified to be the principal …
>
> (He tries to break the cane)
>
> Eva: Oh my, what are you doing? (She runs toward him to stop him)

As the principal tries to let go of his authority, Eva keeps him from doing so, but continues to ask him to revenge. The principal does break the cane to show his love to Eva. This scene also represents that the cane is the authority that the person has, and this cane could be handed over to a different person, which is a great example of metonymy, implying the Law of Jungle.

If there was a sentence "there is a kid with a cane in a room," what would we think? We would think that the kid is trying to play with it instead of thinking the kid would punish someone with the cane." Or if there is a sentence "the conductor is holding a stick," we would think whether the stick is a baton or a stick for punishment. This means "Function Refinement" through the relationship between the object and the owner. Kundera has connected the object and people a lot in his literary works. Comparing look or personality of a person with an object is usually a metaphor. The following are the examples characters compared to objects.

> Paní Spravkyně – zvučný kotel (a resounding kettledrum)

Tělocvikář – napjaté struny (tense strings)

Paní Prušanková – dvě smutné klávesy (two sad keys)

The above comparison is done by the principal in the play, comparing the teachers with specific objects. One strange thing is that he has compared them with musical instruments. Yes, he would have used his knowledge from what he had majored in college, but the comparison is very unique. When he thinks about the three teachers being punished with the cane, he enjoys his thought. He especially, compares the chairman of the committee to a big xylophonist, and thinks that the chairman is creating a divine music on the three-piece instrument.

4. Conclusion

I would like to mention the purpose of the analysis of this play from the perspective of semiotics for my conclusion. The performance of *Ptákovina* is still ongoing in the Czech Republic. Kundera was exiled to France, and now he writes his work in French, and one of his plays *Jacob and His Master* is being performed in France. Kundera explains why the play *Ptákovina* is not performed in France.

> The play hit a strange obstacle. As you can see, this play Ptakovina has its bases on the rhombus shape. I thought that this shape and its meaning were common in the world. But I have learned that the shape does not mean anything to French people, but is probably significant to Czech only. Without the magic of rhombus, this play was forsaken by God.

The above quote represents that a sign is not universally accepted or understood. The meaning of signs would depend on different cultures. The symbolic meaning of rhombus in this play is not accepted in a different culture, despite its iconic characteristic. This phenomenon is not likely to occur in iconicity which is based on similarity. In fact, the phenomenon frequently occurs in language. In language, onomatopoeia is the sign of iconicity. The word used to denote the sounds of animals in Korea differ from Czech one. If Koreans read a Czech word, which indicates the dog onomatopoeia, they may not understand it, and think why they sound different. People from different cultures may have different conception for sounds or shapes. For that matter, if we want to understand a sign properly we should understand that a sign is a combination of who uses the sign and the characteristics of the sign in that their culture. This happens commonly if we want to apprehend a literary work. It is very important to understand who the writer is and what kind of culture he was raised. Especially, as the author has mentioned, the meaning of a sign is very important. Therefore, it is very important to study a literary work, such as plays, in semiotic perspectives.


Epic Singers in Eurasian Turkic Countries

Eunkyung OH, INSTITUTE FOR EURASIAN TURKIC STUDIES, DONGDUK WOMEN'S UNIVSERSITY, KOREA

BELT OF TURKIC PEOPLE



Altai language group



WHY ORAL EPICS?

4

Turkic Oral Epics

- History, culture and society.
- Nomadic people living in the steppes.
- Identity

Heroic Epic Poem

History

Unconsciousness,
Desire

Ideal Type

the hypothesis

- Turkic epics were closely related to primal shamanism
- the heroic epics have derived and evolved from the development process of narrative shaman songs

7

Possible Thesis



-In connection with the genesis of epics

I will figure out the main motifs of epics originated from primitive shamanism

by focusing on Turkic folklores,

especially heroic epics, as well as their correlation with proto-shamanism.

-Heroic epic poems have been evolved from the shaman songs

Epic Singers in Eurasian Countries




"

- Olongkhosut
- Kaychi/gaychi
- Manaschi
- Akyn
- baxshi, jirov, shoir, soqi, yuzbashi, xalfa, qissaxon, oqin
- jirov
- Chichen, Sasan/Sheshen
- Toolchu
- AŞIK

Kaychi in Altay





Olonghosut-Yakut





BAXSHI-UZBEK





F.J. Oinas

- shaman, heroic, romantic, and historic epics .
- the 'shaman epics' is excluded in the epic classification for the Turks.
- the term "shaman" is replaced by 'archaic epics'.

13

Turkish folklorist A. Öztürk

- 1) shaman epics
- 2) the Islamic period Turkic epics
- 3) epics of resistance with ethnic and political inclinations
- 4) epics describing regional and individual behaviors in terms of political system each Turkic country has.

14

Relationship between shaman song and heroic epos in Turkic countries

1. Singer and Shaman

2. Shamanism and Structure of Turkic Heroic Epos

3. Genesis of Hero of Turkic People

15

Structure of Heroic Epos and Shamanism



- <Similarity between shaman and epic singer>

- Dream(ancestor, famous singer)
- Chosen by GOD
- Master and Disciples
- Inspiration

Relationship between Turkic Epic Singer and Shaman



1. Altay 'Kay/Qay'
   magic or spirit of shaman(Chagatay Language)
2. Uzbek 'Baxsh'
   1)Epic Singer
   2)Healer
   3)Shaman
3. Kyrgyz 'Bahsh'
   Shaman



Korean "BAKSU(박수)"

ORIGINATED FROM 'BAXSH'

Turkic Hero, originated from shaman



What is the Hero?

- Collective psychology, Moral values
- Ideal type of society and nation
- Spirit of nation, Ideal value

Turkic Hero, "Warrior (Alp)"



-NOT ONLY SYMBOL OF VALOUR, BOLDNESS, POWER
-CIVILIZED PERSON
-NOMADIC HORSE-RIDING SOCIETY

why Turkic epics with shamanism ?

- in the archaic period shamanism might be their religion and the ideological foundation.
- The shamanism, based on the Tengrianism from ancient Turkic peoples to Central Asian and Siberian Turkic peoples including modern Turkey, represented the Weltanschauung as well as the spiritual culture of ancient Turkic peoples.

21

the research of shamanism motifs of Turkic oral works

- understanding the prototype of Turkic literary works
- tracing back to prehistoric Korean culture
- the Turkic heroic epics could provide clues for figuring out the prehistoric Korean folklore and shamanism since Koreans had lost lots of oral tradition with the introduction of Chinese characters.

22

Study on shamanism motifs of Turkic oral epics



1. Motif of "Kok Tengri" and son of the Heaven
2. Mountain god – Motif of the Cosmic Tree
3. Motif of shamans
4. Motif of naming
5. Motif of marriage
6. Motif of changing clothes
7. Motif of horse
8. Mysterious numbers in shamanism: 3- 7 - 9

Motif of "Kok Tengri" and son of the Heaven



- the main characters are the sons of heaven given by the "sky god"
- the appearance or birth of such children
- Oğuz
- Manas
- Alpamysh
- Bamsi Beyrek, Son of Bay Bure

Mountain god－Motif of the Cosmic Tree



- The idea of the Tengrism leads the Turks to the worship of the mountain god, or the Cosmic Mountain, which is specified as the Cosmic Tree and World Tree. The World Tree is used as a drum, which is a shaman's tool, and functions as the mediator between the sky and the earth.

Motif of shamans



- shamans in Turkic oral tradition appear in the form of shaman-king system
- they appear as tribal chiefs, kings or khans, and they are all heroes
- a combination of king and shaman
- changed into vizirs, ascetics and minstrels as time passed

Motif of naming



- main characters or heroes of epics are given names by the veterans or monks of the society who inherited the role of ancient shamans is a semiotic tool that implies their role and duty as members of the society
- shamans or elders dressed in white clothes performed the ritual of naming a man and making him a solder by tying on a sword and belt around his waist

Motif of marriage



- marriage generally serves as a bridge to the future incidents
- these two people with the same status cannot have children denotes the two people share the same goal. This implies double childbirth as well as fate that the two children that are to be born will fall in love or marry each other 『Alpamysh』 『Bamsi Beyrek』

Motif of changing clothes



- Veterans or mendicant friars who have precognitive dreams and foresight in Turkic oral works like myths, legends and epics could be the transformations of shamans
- The gray-haired elder who names the heroes; Being dressed in white; a perfect and mature human being, an ascetic, and a figure just like a shaman

Motif of horse



- escort of a funeral and a guide of spirit
- used by a shaman as a means to encounter the gods
- Shamans "get out of themselves" through the horse, and set out on the mysterious journey of encountering the gods.

Mysterious numbers in shamanism: 3- 7 - 9



- The number 3 symbolizes three spheres, and their religious value takes precedence over the value of the number 7.
- There is also an indication of 9 skies



IV-3 Social Sciences 2 (in English)

Middle Power Diplomacy & Visegrad Group

Chair: Chul-Min Kim (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ Cultural Interpretation of the Historical Testimony in the Age of Glocalization

Tchi-Wan Park (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ Image Battles between USA and USSR in Olympics during Cold War Period

Wonyong Park (Pukyong National University)

≫ The Transnational Migration for Medical Treatment of Russian Patients in the Far East: With a focus on the phenomenon of medical tourism to South Korea

Beomsoo Kim (Lomonosov Moscow State University)

Cultural Interpretation of the Historical Testimony in the Age of Glocalization

Tchi-Wan PARK1 (Hankuk University of Foreign

"The universe becomes on big hall of mirrors, where any one individual object both reflects and signifies all the others." - U. Eco[1]

"To see ourselves as others see us can be eye-opening. To see others as sharing a nature with ourselves is the merest decency. But it is from the far more difficult achievement of seeing ourselves among others, as a local example of the forms human life has locally taken, a case among cases, a world among worlds, that the largeness of mind, without which objectivity is self-congratulation and tolerance a sham, comes. If interpretive anthropology has any general office in the world it is to keep re-teaching this fugitive truth." - Cl. Geertz[2]

1. Cultural Differences and Clash of Ignorance

For whom the slogan "World is One" exist? Does the concept of the global village contain a solidary vision of human community? or mere representing word for political and economic ideology of neo-liberalism? Today media are busy making great fuss of something symbolize the technology-economy complex such as the age of Iot(Internet of things), AI age, and the 4th Industrial Revolution, and so on with the support of many politicians and economic units claiming everything should be reorganized into digital/computer base to be survivors of the global competition.

What is missing here is the question of inclusion and exclusion problem. In this raging torrent of demand for 'revolutionary' change, is there any consideration for under developed countries, namely, the Third World? Even more, have *history* and *culture*, the core key words of this article, been really preserved, as stated in the <Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions> of UNESCO?

Surely the changed world requires the change of *Weltbild*. Not only individuals but also groups and communities cannot be free from the wave of neo-liberalism and digital revolution. Thus most of the states in a global village have faced troubles and situations those cannot be explained by modern knowledge or ideology. Then, is having relation with this changed reality really necessary to both

[1] Umberto Eco, Stefan Collini, *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.151.
[2] Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge. Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, Basic Books, 1983, p.16.

individual and national community? We may miss something practically, in case we put too much appropriateness on the change itself.

I argue that we should uncover the severity of the problem of the neo-liberalistic globalization which has a tendency of regarding history and culture, common inheritance of humankind, as the volatile fuel of globalization. Cultural inheritance tour everywhere is the very evidence of the commodification of culture and the commercialization of the memories of wars are the striking example of the distorting utilization of history.[3]

In this regard, cultural and economic globalization is an essential pair of globalization. G2, G7 and G20 Global actors, leading world economy, have fixed "economy growth only" as the only policy goal, and have no hesitation nor pricks of conscience on enticing and dominating global market by merchandised local culture. In Tony Blare days, the UK stood on cultural enrichment as a policy stance by outliving creative economy, and it is the starting point of the broad generalization of the slogan cultural globalization like today. Recently America, Japan, China, Korea as well as EU have converted the value of its culture by economic senses. Though claiming democracy, human rights, justice and peace outwardly, but deep down, putting most value on economic protection of own nation, this is the "Paradox of globalization" as everyone knows.[4]

In this article, on the critical, more accurately alternative view point to globalization, the primary objective is to suggest a draft proposal, how a community - narrowly from a local nation and widely a global village -, a local community in a global village can realize the value of coexistence of symbiosis without giving any loss to its trading counterpart, while following the logic of globalization, limitless competition, This will be explained concretely in the main topic, the main reason why *glocal* has been proposed as a new research viewpoint to understand culture.

In the meantime, our cultural view point has been tamed by Western European cultural universalism. However, this cultural universalism is another name of cultural globalization based on *Uni*-verse-*Culture*. In other words, Western European culture have pretended as a *Uni-versal culture* representing various local cultures. As claimed by C. Geertz, a local culture has been representing all local culture. What a confusion is it! Therefore, we now have to dismiss the illusion of universal culture drastically, and to approach on *Pluri*-verse-*cultures* view point to understand culture. This is the first argument I want to share with all readers. Frankly speaking there is no existence of universal culture and global culture. This is the core argument of this article. During recent studies done on this view point the writer reaches the conclusion "Every culture is a local culture."[5] In this writing I intend to go a step further and talk about

[3] How can we explain the phenomenon of past's battlefield has changed into one of the popular touristic attractions? like recent Dark tourism, the whole world has been activated the memories of battle as commercial, so called 'Memory industry'. we can put Nanjin Massacre Memorial Hall(南京大屠杀纪念馆) in China, Hure Maritime Museum(大和ミュージアム) in Japan as close examples, but the problem is nations that went through same war, commemorate differently through contrary memories from each other. In addition, many countries, including Russia, and South Korea are also often using as an ideology of national unity memories of the war.

[4] Cf. Naisbit John, *Global Paradox: The Bigger the World Economy, the More Powerful its Smallest Players*, New York: Willam Morrow & Company, Inc, 1998.

[5] Tchi-Wan Park, "The Cultural Epistemology for Glocal Public Philosophy", *Studies in Philosophy East-West*, Vol. 75, Korean Society for Philosophy East-West, 2015.03; "A New Horizon of Cultural Interpretation in the Era of Glocalization", *Philosophical Investigation* Vol. 38, The Institute of Chung-Ang Philosophical Studies, 2015.05(For more explanation on given <Figure 1> and <Figure 2> on chapter 2, refer this paper's pp.258~265).

narration of historical memory and its testimony of cultural colonial days, which has been newly and reinterpreted by various media(novel, movie, documentary, etc.) from various locals. It is because the writer understands that the discussion about diversity of culture may stay on superficial level if this point is not come under other culture study. This means that simply by "Culture is varied." we may overlook the accumulated layers of each culture in history. This is the second message I want to give.

Global culture, simply a strategy of neo-liberalist and market fundamentalist to justify discipline and punish, in other words universal culture shall no more be an object or model to follow. The recent trend, globalization of culture, is a product of inbreeding modern imperialistic ideology an1d there is little difference on the point of expressing "colonial desire".[6] It is the reason why without epistemological change for multiculture-symbiosis local culture cannot be activated.

As analyzed by S. Huntington, from view point of *Uni*-verse-*Culture,* Culture and Civilization can be seen as clashing. But from the view point of *Pluri*-verse-*cultures,* each local culture takes role of mirror reflection each other as quotation from U. Eco. In other words cultural difference is no more an object to exclude, control and manage but an object to understand and regard. It should be "the background of every existing" as G. Deleuze expressed.[7] There is clash because of cultural difference or civilization. It is simply a "clash of ignorance" of mankind.[8]

2. Globalization of Economy, Fantasy of Global Culture – Could Glocalization account for this Dilemma?

Not managing nor resisting properly to the globalization of economy, it's obvious to be thrown out from the world-system, which is the stern reality. Like the facts, Greece bought such attentions from other outside of European countries by facing the financial crisis and lately U.K. is taking a motion to drop out of European unity(Brexit), are the changes caused by economics which has militated as a fate.

Since "economic domination(l'écorègne)"[9] has emerged in the 21st century ideology, "rational imperialism of the (global) market"[10] is opened extending its power to the global stage by authorizing their own legitimacy. Here is the primal cause why worldwidely de-culturalization, de-nationalization, and de-historization has been accelerated. Not like older generations' weltanschauung and sense of values, now days young generations especially, which country they are belonged or not, nonchalance the nationality nor cultural identity, but only care about their own social and economical success. Therefore community cannot have sense of unity like the old day's regiment bonding, also as time goes each locally based culture's peculiarity and distinct characteristics has been diluted.[11] Like the saying "Misfortunes never come singly", 'Strong culture' from exterior which has been flown by for every possible Media,

[6] Cf. Robert J. C. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*, Routledge, 1995.
[7] Cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968.
[8] Cf. Edward Said, "The Clash of Ignorance", *The Nation*, October 4, 2001.
[9] Jean-Claude Guillebaud, *La refondation du monde*, Seuil, 1999, p.97.
[10] *Ibid*., p.239.
[11] Cf. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Basic Books, 1973.

now has not only destroyed the cultural infrastructure, but also infused fantasy for the global culture.

Didn't we say "After death, the doctor"! Which means before the problem gets worse, local's cultural and economical weak and minor country should take an action. Following is Z. Sardar's analysis on the Third World, as a disproof of what kind of situation would continue if each selves do not try to take care of their local culture.

> "People of the Third World cannot choose what they want to be, what they have always been, because the environment that sustained and nourished them, that allowed them to be what they want to be, has been and is systematically being destroyed. They cannot live as they choose to live, because the sciences, the technologies, the medical systems, the architecture, the natural habitat that sustained their lifestyles have been suppressed and destroyed. They cannot buy, because their mode of production has been replaced by imported Western consumer goods and services. They cannot even choose not to be the victims of the dominant culture: their victimization is embedded in the global economic and political system."[12]

Globalization of economy is the main culprit of such like interaction, communication, mutual understanding pure function and role's to go back to square one. It can be said tragedy of humanity is already predicted throughout the uniformiser of cultural diversity. So therefore, rather than taking advantage of world economy and world politics, shouldn't they try to preserve and conserve the local culture through keeping distance from leading globalizing country. Well expressed by Sardar's announcement from above, today's great deal of cultural community of global village has become the victims of standardized, globalized culture. The more they try to take advantage of globalization, the more damages to endure, and evils will grow. Here is the reason of being urgent why we all, like R. Passet's book title is paying attention, need to get out of *L'illusion néolibérale*.[13]

It means if they don't wake up from the fantasy of economical prosperity and growth, won't be able to deviate from spending America's cultural code, also known as global culture's blind, that is supplied and spread through treacherous way.[14]

> "<Hollywood is the global cultural capital>, American media culture is a <global longua franca>, and that <America presides over a World Bank of styles and symbols, and International Cultural Fund of images and celebrities>."[15]

Then why don't you think considerable amount of scholars equate "global culture as global imperialism."[16] Strong cultures like America, China are not only affecting through cultural section. It's

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[12] Ziauddin Sardar, *Postmodernism and the Other: The New Imperialism of Western Culture*, London: Pluto Press, 1998, pp.19~20.

[13] Cf. René Passet, *L'illusion néolibérale*, Fayard, 2000.

[14] Following C. Rapille, *culture code* is a sort of collective unconsciousness in culture, which means, when culture consumers decide to purchase, they do not purchase through their own decision, but prefer to select through what others prefer - Clotaire Rapaille, *The Culture Code: An Ingenious Way to Understand Why People Around the World Live and Buy as They Do*, Random House of Canada, 2007 참조.

[15] Tod Gitlin, "Under the Signs of Mickey Mouse and Bruce Willis", *New Perspectives Quarterly* 15(2), 1998, p.4.

[16] Dominador Bombongan, Jr., "Cultural Globalization: Beyond the Homogenization Thesis", *Asia-Pacific Social*

even trespassing in every boundaries, like “goods, capital, people, knowledge, images, crime, pollution, drugs, clothing and beliefs.”[17] That Mcgrew pointed out, what attracts my attention is economic and culturally strong country is making weak country as puppet of person and it’s not only replanting but also delivering crime and pollution. So it's a silly question to be questioned “Can we expect corresponding features symbiosis public for whole humanity from them?” However, what makes us even saddened is globalization's irreversible stream of times that has been “phenomenon that is hard to get over in any technical, social changes.”[18]

For this reason, we need to face the truth of the trick from globalization followers, and need to manage or resist to them properly. They are already the super capitalists who reign over the country. Capitalists are the sales man and supplier for goods, they are never “the great men” who considers the cultural mutual exchange, social alienation, economic victim, cultural outsiders. Globalization of economy, this kind of inventory on global culture is in away related to a question how they could revive global village's local cultures in *Pluri-verse-cultures*, and in turn of a century's recommendation of recovering cultural interactions, mutual interchange, mutuality reciprocal relationship from taking international pending issue, the notion of glocalization, which is meeting up with the question asked. I, as an author, the reason why announcing an assertion through several articles of paper about when the concept of connecting and remediating local cultures that is different from each other will be the first take off for proper cultural interaction on 21st century.

Glocalization is a new point of view, and a research methodology for cultural interpretation.[19] For this, first of all, we have to explain the meaning of glocalization. As you see, glocalization is a compound word of globalization and localization. This should not be used as to make the best of the global business strategy, it is highly, effective method of cultural understanding and interpretation. Because, first of all in the notion of glocalization, it in here the meaning of approaching to a community without separating the internal and external, past and present, local and global. Like individuals and others cannot exist by itself, nation also needs to take care for the relation of past and present (for further, future). For instance, as it is impossible to discuss Korea's history, excluding Japan and China, we cannot argue Algeria's history without France nor Czech's history without Russia. It also applies on cultural dimension. For this meaning, glocal aspect has a characteristic of not an aspect of solid matter, but changes of creation aspect. Here is the reason why we need to approach and understand one local's historical memory, not just to testify its epic by relying on the past, but in diverse points.

Second of all, glocalization's note has characteristics of how to keep, protect each local's culture and history form these days' neocolonialism's aspect, not through global perspective but through local perspective. If the local citizens do not have authority to resist nor manage to economics' globalization,

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
Science Review, vol. 6, n° 1, 2006, p.2. The followings are books mentioning critical stance on globalization of culture: John Tomlinson, *Cultural imperialism: a critical introduction*, Continuum International Publishing Group, 1991; Edward Saïd, *Culture and Imperialism*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1993 참조.

[17] Anthony McGrew, “A Global Society?”, S. Hall, D. Held and A. McGrew(eds), *Modernity and its Futures*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, p.65.


[18] John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture*, Polity Press, 1999(존 톰린슨, 『세계화와 문화』, 김승현.정영희 공역, 나남출판, 2004, p.15).

[19] Cf. Mike Featherstone, “Localism, Globalism, and Cultural Identity”, *Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary*, R. Wilson and N. Dissanayake eds., Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.

then they won't be having any culture to inherent, nor history to keep. Therefore, like what UNESCO's <Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions> has faced, we have to seek for the alternatives to keep the cultures that has been captured through dimension of humanity's unbiased view. These kind of major premise means that if the community is stronger enough to resist or manage to the globalization of economy, they need to take responsibility to reject the only first culture in the singular.[20] The factor by looking through the <F.1>, it is not the time to leave the problem, globalization of culture and becoming a hybrid culture, like its somebody else's. Because globalization of economy is going to extend its A1 influence like America by putting culture as a bait through even stronger form and in even more extensive area. Because of globalization of technology and globalization of knowledge, it is not an exaggeration to say we are already in move to the one world. Through the world-system process, it is rather far from putting others or other cultures' altruistic consideration and equality, justice, or common goods into practice, It is putting mankind in to a privatopia's melting pot through spreading one's selfish interests and desires, inequality, injustice and public evil.[21] Even the European Union's started from 2012 <EU2020 Vision>, in other words following the New EU Strategy, that is calling out for "Think Global, Act European!"[22]



<F.2>: Aspects of glocalization



<F.1>: Aspects of globalization

Now every local is taking its inevitable task as a price by protecting and keeping their own culture by themselves. It is also a normative demand and responsibility for humanity in future local descendants, who needs to lead under *Pluri-verse-cultures* a peaceful and free life. As you can spot from the <F.2>, every local culture is composed mainly of *Pluri-verse-cultures*, which unites and interacts with other cultures in needs of pluri-verse-cultural features, it is *culture*. It is pretty small to think like <F.1> as simple combination of simple addition(+). It should occur through multiplication(×) as qualitative and bonding cultures, in the process of mutual

[20] François Jullien, *L'écart et l'entre. Leçon inaugurale de la Chaire sur l'altérité*, Galilée, 2012, p.25: "Il n'y a pas de culture première, en amont, au singulier et servant d'identité commune, don't les diverses cultures rencontrées de par le monde, au pluriel, ne seraient que des variations."

[21] Cf. Collectif, *Penser le XX^e siècle,* Le Monde, 2000(Manière de Voir, Le Monde diplomatique, n° 52, juillet-août 2000.

[22] Elvire Fabry and Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul(dir.), *The contribution of 14 European Think Tanks to the Spanish, Belgian and Hungarian Trio Presidency of the European Union*, Paris: Notre Europe (Website: notre-europe.eu), p.iii.

transition (<BnAn, BnAn, DnAn.... KnAn>), we will at last understand and embrace the culture not as a level of dominance nor intervention, but as level of an exchange and inter-community. However, by following J.-L. Nancy, we haven't experienced the following community, historically. Therefore we have to take these kind of community as 21st century's *pro-ject*.[23]

As stated above, it is "sort of necessity of demand and responsibility" to even before to take an action to protect and preserve the local culture. Also America's culture and China's culture is one of local cultures. Yes, it is true. As various languages have used around the world, culture also has various characteristic and it is its essence. In this sense, following J. Sacks's mention has great implications for us.

> "Culture is like a language. Even each culture has the equal objective perspectives, its way of diversity is almost close to infinity. English is not French, and Italian is not German. (…) Every language (also for the culture) is outcome(product) of sensitivity of community, and also its history, common experience and emotional fruit. Universal language does not exist."[24]

Following what Sacks has stated, there is no such 'standard' existing in culture like digital communication technology or dollar as international currency. Therefore we have to see culture as, what Foucault has mentioned, *heterotopia*.[25] This means, soon paradoxical things will coexist in the same place. Global village, that is represented by cultural diversity, linguistic diversity and religious diversity, can be defined as sort of *heterotopia*. Here is the reason why I emphasized the destruction of one culture and understanding other culture through pluri-verse-cultural perspectives. Identifying the diverse culture, means we need to take it as polychromous life, not estimating things as universalization, but judge as bumpy as it is. Strictly speaking, what glocal age demands on understanding of the world is, we should stop daydreaming on supervising or controlling heterogeneous others through logic of identity like an Uni-verse-cultural theorist with the "eye of wolf" (M. Serres), but it's time to take *Pluri-verse cultures* as an action, which is, repeatedly emphasizing, the 'thesis' for all of us to bring solution by our wisdom in 21st century.

3. Local Culture as a Historical Memory and its Testimony

Culture is not set in stone but living entity that is continuously changing. Culture has been reformed by the movement of intermingling of ins and outs of the space and time, then <*se glocaliser*> both existing and visiting cultures. This is the reason why E. Morin had explained society and culture by the concept of <autopoiesis(autopoietic system, living system, self-producing 'machines')>.[26] So the

[23] Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, *La Communauté désavouée*, Christian Bourgois, 1986.
[24] Cf. Jonathan Sacks, *The Dignity of Diffrence: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations*, Continuum, 2002.
[25] Cf. Michel Foucault, *Les Hétérotopies - Le Corps Utopique*, Éditions Lignes, 2009(미셸 푸코, 『헤테로피아』, 이상길 옮김, 문학과 지성사, 2014, pp.13~24) 참조.
[26] Cf. Edgar Morin, *Introduction à la pensée complexe*, EST Éditeurs, 1990; Francisco Varela, Humberto Maturana, R. Uribe, "Autopoiesis: the organization of living systems, its characterization and a model", *Biosystems* 5, 1974,

epistemological change is needed that "there is no global culture" no less that "there is common language." The American global culture, a symbol of cultural uniformity, is simply a "sterile repetition(répétition stérile)" of Western European universal, catholically, ecumenical.[27] The theory of global culture, that has the object on ruling other country and culture by economy, technology, its culture and knowledge is not different from modern colonial idea. As like objectivism is simply an illusion in front of a historical event(un événement historique)[28], a culture, that can be applied everywhere to everybody, is an illusion as well. There can be a local culture that has stronger influence and ripple effect than other culture, but that culture should not be regarded as the global culture.

By this reason culture has been commonly used to every nation and everybody and it has deeply participated in "form of community".[29] Then, what is the core factor that ties national community? There may be number of subjects, but I would say it is *historical memory and its testimony* that can make community member newly establishing its solidarity. The historical memory cannot be taxidermied as antiquity of past to any nation and community members. The historical memory continuously recall the historical fact, and correct it whenever it is forgotten and distorted by reenact. History is a lifeline that connect community members into one by flowing <past-present-future>. When memory is a living with community members, that memory can testimony the truth of history. By testimony personal memory can be sublimated as a memory of community. The memory of the community, that is, *history*. History will testify to the truth of the past in the present. In particular, we shall see below, the memories and scars of war is characterized not stop until it is restored to testify the truth. So we should have wariness to distortion of history, different memory for same historical fact. It is same like that one should not be quiet for evil thing and injustice.

An example, let us review the Algerian war, between FLN(Front de Libération Nationale) and French Army, for 10 years from 1964. This war has been remembered a war for independence by every Algerian. But most of French and some politicians, like Jean-Marie Le Pen, head of Front National, a new right party, claimed the legitimacy of colonial reign, and denied suppression and massacre done by French, and refused any compensation to Algeria. But in any case the memory of community cannot be covered by political rhetorics. By political way the memory of community cannot be erased. The Algerian war is a disgrace past to French, better to forget, but is a history to Algerian, never to be forgotten. So continuously the films and writings disclosing hidden truth of history have been produced related to Algerian war.

The background of ≪Les Parapluies de Cherbourg≫ (1964), is Algerian war, but did not express the war but simply put its point on the romance of couple, so the historical fact and truth was distorted. The next year a semi documentary film ≪The Battle of Algiers≫ (1965) was produced, and ≪Lost

pp.187~196.

[27] François Jullien, *De l'universel, de l'uniforme, du commun et du dialogue entre les cultures*, Fayard, 2008, p.31.

[28] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Le problème de la conscience historique*, Seuil, 1996, p. 73-74: "La compréhension〔de l'histoire〕 doit être entendue comme un acte de l'existence, et elle est donc un "pro-jet jeté". L'objectivisme est une illusion."

[29] Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987, p.187. To adhere to this position A. Bloom, like Hannah Arendt, says that the commercialized and consumed culture is 'no culture'. To him, "culture is the symbol of the dignity of man, a form of community, and the unity in art and life." - *ibid*., p.188.

Command≫ (1966) was produced a year after, and these films have criticized the irony of French modern history by realistically. So those have meaning on that point. The film ≪Hidden≫, produced in 2005, criticizing the oblivion of French intellectuals on Paris massacre in 1961, and ≪L'ennemi intime≫, reproduced in 2007, the first French film mentioning Algerian war, are in the same line. The purpose these products are to testimony the historical truth to the world, and intended to take role of testimony filing to correct hidden or distorted history.

The memory of Kikuyus, living eastern Kenya, ruled by U.K., would be quite different from general memory of English army, the colonial ruler, described in ≪La ferme africaine≫ (1937), written by Karen Blixen(1885~1962) on the view point of *out of* Africa. Like Algerian war, the memory of outsider shall be restored by the memory of insider, in other words Kikuyus. Because they are owner of their local. Getting out of there(Africa réel), later by recalling there(Africa irréel) and described 'memory narratives', 'romance narratives' have an inevitable gap that can't be filled between testimony narratives of African's suffered life of prejudice and ordeal by colonization.[30] In this regard, Hegel's derogation to Africa and African that they have no history and understanding about human's nature must be reflect.[31] The story of Western is not the story of Africa nor the story of the local culture. We should give the subaltern who has no opportunity to speak for himself the chance to speak.[32]

In the introduction, I spoke that there is no clash cultural difference or civilization, It is simply a clash of ignorance of mankind. The cause of cultural discrimination is the racial prejudice from the stupidity. Nevertheless, in these days, this stupidity is still justifying the discrimination, further it is structuralized. We live on this reality and under the global umbrella that the cultural·racial violence still happen.

Human intelligence is not personal but communal. By the way, this collective intelligence, in other word cooperative intelligence and symbiotic intelligence, is not working, and this is the problem. Of corse, from an economical perspective we can't imagine the trade that makes a benefit to both countries or further countries as like both <A> and <–A> is not logical true at the same time. This is same for political and military aspect. But the symbiotic intelligence can be worked and must be working culturally. If we can't prevent the cultural clash and the war against humanity that happens for our stupidity. What is the meaning of E. Morin's following shouting: "Human spirit is still at the prehistoric ages"[33]?

The dream of *Uni*-verse-*Culture* is already the idea against our times. Many countries including America, China, Vietnam, Indonesia, France are composed of various tribes·people·religions. Also Korea is becoming the multicultural-nation that more than 1,700,000 foreigners lived. The problem is the many people's belief about *Uni*-verse-*Culture* that strongly affects to consciousness and unconsciousness than that of *Pluri*-verse-*cultures*. The culture is considered as the main cause to bring

[30] For further mention refer Tchi-Wan Park, "The Reconstitutive *Out of Africa* on the Viewpoint of the Subaltern", *The Comparative Study of World Literature*, Vol. 52, The Association of Comparative Study of World Literature, 2015, pp.196~197.

[31] For reference, Hegel has sworn like a bargee, "strictly speaking, Africa doesn't have history (Elle n'a donc pas, à proprement parler, une histoire)" in his last seminar (1830~1831), <La Raison dans l'Histoire>. - Serge Audier, "Hegel et l'Afrique. Thèses, critiques et dépassement de Benoît Okolo Okonda: Philosopher en Afrique, avec et contre Hegel", *Le Monde des Livres*, 1 juillet 2010(recitation).

[32] Cf. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg(eds.), *Marxism and the interpretation of Culture*, University of Illinois Press, 1988.

[33] Edgar Morin (1990), *op. cit.*, p.25.

about conflict and war in the nation, furthermore international community by this exclusive belief. This, as I. Wallerstein said, is the inevitable to 'the age of transition'.[34] But we don't forget to inquire and realize the 'the global possibilities' in new way using the symbiotic intelligence.

If so, how can we solve the problem of all sorts that is tangled by globalization and logic of limitless competition of global village? In the *The Age of Transition*, Wallerstein suggests following idea; to create the new historical system according to "more democratic and more egalitarian principles"! Paradoxically Wallerstein's suggestion proves the fomentation undemocratic and unequal relation by world economy system. It is time to improve this relation, to collect our thoughts to create new historical system, to "unify thought, imagination, practice" as he said. And we don't forget the purpose of this unification is "the respect for human intervention and creativity".

If we interpreted actively *human intervention*, it means the demand for serious reflection to human being of the day that is dominated by the economy and technological determinism. Human being is not a buried subject by egoistic·exclusive global economic system but the coexistence maintaining dignity with others at any time. What we need is, as U. Eco said, the mirror that reflects unfeignedly each other.

When we take the mirror-cosmos, in this subject "we" can include "American ethnographers, Moroccan judges, Javanese metaphysicians, or Balinese dancers" as the same human.[35] Like this, when *we* are becoming the *Homo empathicus* that sympathizing others and seeing oneself as another, all colonial scars is cured and the hope of the future is shared by global citizens together. Non-shared thing cannot be the culture. Non-shared thing cannot be the history.

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[34] Cf. Terence K. Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World-System*, 1945-2025, Zed Books, 1996.

[35] Clifford Geertz, *op. cit*., p.16.

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Image Battles between USA and USSR in Olympics during the Cold War Period (1950-1975)

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I. Introduction

In the post-Cold War world sports seem to be hardly connected with ideological purposes. Enjoying sports, either through participation or being spectators, are considered as activities to spend leisure-time with no political or ideological meanings. In the academic world, however, sports and leisure, whether analyzed from Marxist or Weberian viewpoints, are defined in relation to power and hegemony. Sports and leisure seen from this perspective can be defined as cultural consumption with political implications.[1]

Sports definitely had to contribute to political purposes during the Cold War era. Victories in sports competitions were interpreted as clear proofs for the superiority of each social system without being fought on real battle fields. In Soviet Russia, every victory, athletic achievement, and new world record was referred to "as proof of the superiority of the Soviet socialist culture over the rottenness of the culture of capitalist countries."[2] Given the cataclysmic military capabilities possessed by both sides, serious competitions in sports arenas were alternatives to win "the war minus shooting."[3]

For the Soviet Russia, the Olympics were important cultural arenas to prove the superiority of socialist system. After its first appearance in 1952 Helsinki Olympics, Soviet Russia showed remarkable performances. In terms of total medal numbers in the Summer Olympics from 1952 to 1988, it was only two times (1952, 1968) that Soviet Russia occupied second place in those 10 Olympics. Due to the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow being boycotted by America and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics by Soviet Russia, competitions between two countries were not held. In the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Soviet Russia ranked first in the total medal numbers of 132, whereas the numbers for America were 94, which ranked it in the third place.[4] Soviet Russia, as far as the 'Cold War' in the Olympics was concerned, was the winner in that battlefield.

The Cold War in the Olympics between these super powers was not confined to the total medal

[1] For the argument emphasizing the relationship between sports and politics, see Jeffrey Hill, "Introduction: Sport and Politics," *Journal of Contemporary History,* vol. 38, no. 3(2003), pp. 355-361.
[2] С. Л. Акселрод, *Физическая культура и спорт в СССР* (Москва: Физкултура и спорт, 1954) с. 52.
[3] G. Orwell, "The Sporting Spirit," *Tribune* (December, 1945).
[4] James Riordan, "The Rise and Fall of Soviet Olympic Champions," *Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies*, vol. 2 (1993), pp. 32-33.

numbers for which each country strove to get. Each country had also waged wars targeting to proliferate evil images of athletes from its counterpart. The printed and visual media of each country had spread favorable images for its athletes, whereas they portrayed athletes from the other as immoral, selfish. By doing so, each country had tried to gain superiority in morality and legitimacy of its social system.

In this paper, I attempt to portray detailed contents of 'cultural war' in the Olympics during the Cold War era. Though I set up the time frame of the paper from 1950 to 1975, those two years do not mean the beginning and the ending of Cold War era, which is beyond the scope of the paper. I only constitute that time frame, because during that period I could find adequate historical materials which contributed to pointing to another aspect of 'cultural war.' The cultural war during the Cold War era, as David Caute superbly describe in his book, was carried out in the various fields of culture such as ballet, movies and arts. In the process of proving superior quality of various contents of culture of each system, Soviet Russia and America sometimes felt the need to absorb the forms and artistic techniques from the other, the result of which sometimes led to the recognition of cultural contents and values of the opposite system. [5] I mean Caute happened to emphasize the 'soft aspect' of the cultural war during the Cold War era. But in the stage of Olympics, that kind of mutual recognition was far less possible, because the number of medals was only criteria to prove the superiority of the system. As I have already pointed out, the America had gained the lesser medals in several Olympic events. In the circumstance that seemed to show the inferiority of America's system, the American press adopted the strategy to proliferate the evil images of Soviet athletes. In turn, by creating favorable images suited for the ideal of Olympics, the Soviet government had counterattacked the American strategy. In short, I will try to portray 'hard aspect' of the cultural war by describing the detailed images of athletes of each system, which from my perspective could contribute to understating deeper aspect of the cultural war.

I am not trying to trace in the paper who won in this image battle, because contrary to the competitions in the Olympics, the battle did not bring about tangible results like medals. What I want to emphasize here is that the Olympics was the battle ground to demonize the other during the Cold War era, because of which the tension between the two countries was not lessoned. The Olympics during the Cold War era to some extent failed to accomplish the ideal of promoting mutual understanding. The dissolution of demonized images on the other was possible by the time that the ideology ceased to play the role of legitimizing the system.

II. Images of Soviet Athletes propagated by Western Press

Even before the appearances of Soviet athletes in Olympics, the voices of concern had already emerged among the members of International Olympic Committee(IOC). There was consensus among the members that Soviet athletes might violate the cause of Olympic ideals, because they were not amateur sportsmen, but were paid according to their performances in the Olympics. Sigfrid Edstrom, 4th president of IOC from 1942 to 1952, expressed his concern as following: "Soviet athletes who are

[5] David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 3-16.

intended for participation in international sport matches are concentrated in training camps . . . freed from their jobs, are well paid by the governments and receive – with their families – more and special food."[6] But some IOC members opposed to Edstrom's opinion, referring to the Olympic's ideal of being independent from political ideology and thus promoting the harmony of humanity. The Soviet Union managed to send athletes representing its system from 1952 Helsinki Olympics.

The performances of Soviet Russia had deeply damaged the pride of the social system of America if we just count Soviet athletes' medal numbers. The results of Soviet performances in the Olympics could be interpreted as a kind of disgrace to the American public in the Cold War environment. The results could be interpreted, borrowing from the phrase of an American sociologist in 1964, as a testimony that "The Russian gear their system to show that they are as good or better than we are in those areas that we most prize – technology, sports and education."[7] The American public wished to find proofs that the USA was still superior in moral as well as in cultural aspects.

One famous sports journal, *Sports Illustrated(hereafter SI)*, still popular to American sports fans, served as a soothing ground to give comfort to American public dismayed with the results of the Olympic competitions. Through the careful choices of tones and language of its reports on Soviet athletes, *SI* attempted to place Soviet athletes in unfavorable lights. Soviet winners in the Olympics through its portrayal did not deserve the title of Sports heroes respected by peoples living in the 'free world.'

Reports in the *SI* skillfully toned down the achievements of Soviet athletes by implying that their performances were due to the sacrifices of their freedom. The *SI* report notes that a typical Russian skier "under the eyes of Soviet dieticians . . . has crammed down 5,000 calories of food a day (double the intake for an average person)."[8] If we pay attention to the phrase "under the eyes of Soviet dieticians" and "crammed down," we can sense that Soviet athletes did not have free will in the choice of food. In the implicit meaning of the report, they were carefully monitored by Soviet dieticians who forced to consume the food for the benefit of the socialist system. The account tried to give the implicit impression that the number of medals of Soviet athletes was made by the neglect of their free will.

The Soviet athletes described by the article of *SI* also give us the impression that they did not enjoy the Olympic games like their American counterparts. Competitions in the Olympics were of course vital means to enhance the glory of the nation, but the Olympics were considered with official countenance to serve harmony and peace of all nations. *SI*'s description on Soviet athletes was far from this kind of Olympic Ideal. Soviet athletes seemed to have no intention to make friends with athletes from other nations because Soviet teams stayed outside the Olympic village. Living outside the village during the Olympics was a tactic also adopted by other nations, so that the athletes could focus on the games without interference. But when employed by the Soviets, *SI*'s account rather emphasized the negative connotation. SI reported that the Russians "have isolated themselves in a lonely hotel." *SI* additionally notes "that while many participants approach the Olympics 'as something to be enjoyed,' such is not the

[6] Jenifer Parks, " Verbal Gymnastics: Sports, Bureaucracy, and the Soviet Union's Entrance into the Olympic Games, 1944-1952," in Stephen Wagg and David L. Andrews ed., *East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 30.

[7] David Riesman, "The Nylon War," in *Abundance for What? And Other Essays* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1964), p. 39.

[8] Ezra Bowen and George Weller, "The 1956 Winter Olympics," *Sports Illustrated* 20 (Jan., 1956), p. 27.

case for the Russians."[9] The report though did not outwardly point out the Communist ideology, it implies that the citizens in the Communist state did not know the way of enjoying sport events like the Olympics. Another SI account further pointed out the attitudes of Soviet athletes contrasted with Western sportsmen. In addition to the fact that the Soviet athletes lived outside the Olympic village, they are "bivouaced" there.[10] The term "bivouacked" means "a military encampment made with tents or improvised shelters, usually without shelter or protection from enemy fire." The description implies that the Soviet athletes were like soldiers waiting for future battles drawing near, thus having no room for fun in the Olympic games. Contrary to Western athletes being without burdens of order from above, it connotes the militaristic nature of the Soviet Union that tries to utilize sportsmen as military personnel.

SI's descriptions are not always confined to the implicit way to convey the markedly different images of two nations' athletes. There are also more direct expressions displaying the contrast between the athletes from the two nations. *SI*'s caption under the picture of Russians reads like "Solemn Russians Raise the Red Flag." Describing the arrival of American athletes in the Olympic village, the caption goes like "Free-Styling American Arrive in Camp."[11] Whereas "solemn" Russians are not free from military obligation like raising the flag, the Americans without such kinds of duty simply "arrive" with their own "free—style." From the perspective of American public, as the American athletes had nothing to do with the military obligation or strict disciplines, they could enjoy Olympic games and make friends with athletes from other nations.

The Soviet women athletes were further stimulating grounds for spreading negative images on the Soviet system. It is true that gender-based distinction has been greatly weakened in almost all fields of society over the past decades. But in the sphere of sports, the distinction is still strongly maintained because of the belief that female athletes are far behind in biological strength and physical endowment. Some sports fields like ski-jumping, boxing and gymnastic rings at the Olympics are exclusively for men, whereas synchronized swimming just for women.

From the perspective of the American press, the Soviet female athletes with remarkable performances did not comply with this kind of segregation. They were displayed, in some sense, as masculinized females. They were, in short, 'unfemale.' *Los Angels Times* of 2 July 1970 conveyed the following remarks of Dick Bank, an American authority in track and field:

> One thing that held back women's track in the US . . . was the image given the sport by such athletes as Tamara Press of the Soviet Union. In some ways. . . she obviously had more male characteristics than female. Parents in this country would see pictures of her and decide that if that was the kind of people they had in women's track they would get their daughters to go swimming or something else.[12]

Los Angeles Times further pointed out that Tamara Press was "too mannish." The description implied that for the purpose of achieving outstanding results, the Soviet Union was not hesitant to transgress the

[9] Andre Laguerre, "Russia Takes Over," *Sports Illustrated* 6 (Feb., 1956), p. 17.
[10] Bowen and Weller, "The 1956 winter Olympics, " p. 28
[11] "Hui, Hui, Hajara," *Sports Illustrated* 19 (Nov., 1956), p. 23.
[12] *Los Angeles Times,* 2 July 1970, E2.

biological distinction of human nature.

The doubt on the sexual identity of Soviet female athletes might be said a reaction to the outstanding performances from their parts. In the 1960s of Olympic games and other international competitions, there were several female athletes from the socialist countries who scored more medals than any other: Tamara Press (Soviet Union: three Olympic gold medals), her sister Irina (two Olympic gold medals), Maria Itkina (Soviet Union: four gold medals at European Championships), Tat'iana Shchelkanova (Soviet Union: one gold medals at European Championships), Iolanda Balaş (Romania: two Olympic gold medals).[13] Thanks to the contribution from these female athletes, the Soviet Union could be boastful of the success in a new front of the 'Cultural Cold War.'

The press attempted to soothe the American public wounded in national pride by spreading the 'unfemale' identity of Soviet sports women. The reason for the superiority of Soviet female athletes from its perspective was their simply not being woman. The validity for the argument could be derived from Soviet female athletes' refusal of gender verification in track and field European Championship held in Budapest in 1966, In the history of sport, the Budapest Championship in 1966 was the first event practicing the gender verification. *The Times* stated that "the absence, though for firmly stated reasons of injury and family illness, of several leading Russian women athletes from the championships, has caused a great deal of discussion here on the subject of physiologically 'borderline cases' in women's athletics."[14] One year later, the *New York Times* reiterated the accusation in a more general form: "The procedure of gender verification was established last year after complaints that some competitors, principally from Communist countries, were of questionable femininity."[15]

Thanks to considerable achievements of scholarly work, we know that bodies can be "signifiers, metaphors or allegorical emblems." Bodies can shape cultural perception and have public significance.[16] By describing Soviet female Olympians in 1952 as "Amazons from the Russian steppe" who were "unsexed," "mannish," "tank-shaped," the American reporters to some extent implied that the bodies of these athletes were symbolic of communism's failure.[17] They tried to portray Soviet female athletes as an embodiment of a misguided and dangerous culture that, among its many crimes, inverting the gender order. With the description mentioned above, husky Soviet female shot putters were symbols that "routinely transgressed gender boundaries and disfigured the feminine form."[18]

In contrast, the femininity of American athletes had no ground to question. *Los Angeles Times* wrote in 1968:

> The women skiers, among the most *beautiful and feminine* in the Winter Olympics, are both amused and chagrined by directives that they must be subjected to tests to determine if they are really women. "It seems a bit ridiculous and a wasted effort in some ways," said Karen Budge of Jackson, Wyo., a

[13] "Are Girl Athletes Really Girls?" *Life* 7 (Oct., 1966), pp. 63-66.
[14] *The Times* (London), 29 (Aug., 1966), p. 3
[15] *New York Times*, 16 (Sep., 1967), p. 28.
[16] For a thoughtful examination on the body and history see, Kathleen Canning, "The Body as Method? Reflections on the Place of the Body in Gender History," *Gender and History,* vol. 11 (1999), pp. 499-513.
[17] Marshall Smith, "How Reds 'Mobilized' to Win Olympic 'War'," *Life Magazine*, July 28, 1952; H. D. Thoreau, "How Good Are Russian Athletes:" *Saturday Evening Post*, July 19, 1952.
[18] Robert L. Griswold, ""Russian Blonde in Space": Soviet Women in the American Imagination, 1950-1965," *Journal of Social History*, vol. 45, no. 4 (2012), p. 883.

slalom specialist... It certainly is in Karen's case. She is a *willowy blonde*, 5-foot-8, with the *figure of a Las Vegas showgirl*. (Italics added on my own)[19]

As the above account clearly shows, American athletes did not lose the widely-held femininity such as beauty and vulnerability. As the American athletes did not sacrifice their beauty to achieve the victory in the Olympics, they did not have to be ashamed of the losses, the account implies.

The American press, as we have so far examined, had tried to disseminate negative images on Soviet athletes to win the 'Cultural Cold War.' Soviet Russia had also reacted to such attempts, which is the topic of the following chapter.

III. Propaganda of Soviet Russia on its Athletes

When Soviet Russia tried to be a "family of Olympics." it was accused of violating one of the important principles of the Olympics, spirit of amateurism. The Soviet press reacted to such criticism arguing that the American sports did not preserve the spirit of amateurism either. The American sports were something like an "enterprise seeking for profits, in which sportsmen were just treated as properties of several capitalist factions."[20] The argument of "bourgeois press" that American college athletes were amateurs was just a deception from the perspective of Soviet press, because "their top athletes were bought with the payment of huge money and served for the interests of big corporations."[21] On the contrary, the Soviet sports materialized the spirit of Olympics in that it gave the equal opportunities of participation for its citizen and "collective spirit, companionship, discipline" for the young generation.[22] Just before the entry in the Olympics. the Soviet Union had also launched the "cultural war" in the international sports field.

In order to create a favorable atmosphere in the cultural war, it was not enough for the Soviet Union to carry out the counterattack through the press. It also tried to propagate several kinds of propaganda on its athletes as a way of winning moral superiority.

Soviet sports heroes or heroines, from the Soviet leadership's expectation were not just athletes proudly displaying their sporting abilities. They were considered to have confidence in the superiority of the socialist system and to proudly play the exemplary role as its representatives in the international sports arena. They were, in short, expected as "diplomats in tracksuits."[23] By instilling various kinds of propaganda words into the minds of Soviet citizens, the government's leadership could hope to offset the negative images provided by "bourgeois press." The Soviet sports heroes were thus beings committed for the glory of their country and exemplars of new Soviet men.

Vladimir Kuts, Olympic champion in the 5,000 and 1,000 meters race at the 1956 Melbourne

[19] *Los Angeles Times*, 3 Feb.,1968, A6.
[20] *Физкультура и спорт* (янбарь 1952), с. 38.
[21] *Физкультура и спорт* (май 1951), с. 39.
[22] *Физкультура и спорт* (ноябрь 1949). с. 29.
[23] Evelyn Mertin, "Presenting Heroes: Athletes as Role Models for the New Soviet Person," *The International Journal of the History of Sport,* vol. 26, No. 4 (2009), p. 469.

Olympics, and Ludmilla Tourishcheva, the gymnast who won four Olympic gold medals at three Olympic games, 1968 in Mexico City, 1972 in Munich and 1976 in Montreal, were such sports heroes who Soviet Russia strongly wanted to propagate. Based on the facts that both athletes were regularly portrayed in the Soviet press on the eve of Olympic games and had published autobiographies, these two athletes were the best examples that were wholly suited for the ideal of 'diplomats of tracksuits.' With this kind of propaganda machine, Soviet sports heroes were regarded as *homo Sovieticus* committed for the development of the socialist system.

Kuts's family background had an important aspect for propaganda matters. He came from a working class family and due to his love for his motherland served in the military. In reaction to the foreign press that described him as "human machine" or "robot," Kuts in the Soviet printed materials was described as "a single warrior battling for the honour of his home country."[24] By connecting the experience in the front of Second World War to the race in the Olympic field, he equated the winning in the race with defending the motherland threatened by the enemy: "I was a soldier at the front, and I also then felt like the one sent to the an Olympic stadium. And again and again I repeated myself: "Only ahead, only victory!""[25]

To Kuts, victory in the Olympics was like fulfilling the honorable duty as a Soviet citizen. However, Kuts did not owe his success to his superior talents or abilities, which was another typical characteristic of a Communist hero. He just ascribed his success to his will of living up to expectations, according to which the well-being of his motherland and his fellow citizens were the priority in his thoughts and deeds. He was modest about his success and expressed his thanks to fellow citizens sending congratulatory remarks to Melbourne: "I was especially happy about any news from home. . . the young railway workers from Komsomolsk, artists from Leningrad, Turkmen sportsmen and many, many others sent their warm words of greeting to Melbourne."[26] Through such kinds of presentations, the Soviet government tried to make Kuts an exemplary Soviet athletes to embody the ideals of the Soviet system.

Tourishcheva was no exception in the sense that she was also a modest person who recognized the sporting achievements as a duty and the fulfillment of expectations. But she also had qualities that deserved to be a soviet sports heroine: she had a strong will and was hard-working. The description from a Soviet press described her as follows: "Perfection is her motto. Perfection in everything she does. When she went to school or studied at university she always had the best grades. Talking about gymnastics, she wants to be the world's best."[27] Though Tourishcheva had already achieved a fame as a successful gymnast, she did not disregard her duty as a student. By portraying her as an diligent student, the Soviet government attempted to refute the argument by the American press that Soviet athletes were just seeking material advantages awarded by the performances in the Olympics.

Tourishcheva had proved herself as a very talented athletic, but she did not lose her feminity in the presentation of the Soviet press. The hard, cold , strict images of a female athlete were replaced by the soft, lovely images. Tourisheva in front of the Munich audience was presented as "a nice, wide smiling

[24] Mertin, "Presenting Heroes," p. 476.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] В. Светланова, "Праздник, который всегда нами," *Советский спорт* (15 сен. 1972), с.2

flirting girl" without a stony-faced expression in the Western press.[28] The Soviet female athletes were far from the images devoid of feminine beauty. Athletism could exist side by side with feminine beauty. In the film <*Prisoners of Caucasus*> by Leonid Gaidai in 1966, one of characters in the movie introduced another female athlete as follows: "a student, a Komsomol member, a sportswoman, and finally, simply a beauty." Contrary to the images portrayed by the American presses, the Soviet female athletes were not masculinized sports heroine.

The Soviet press pointed out that the questioning of the Soviet female identity came from the poor performances of American athletes in international competitions. From the belief of Americans, remarkable performances of female athletes in 1968 Grenoble Winter Olympics were due to the fact that "some of the muscular Russian and Polish babes were not quite as feminine as they declared in the Olympic registry."[29] The outstanding Soviet team's achievements at the 1976 Montreal Olympics were also explained by masculinized female athletes exceeding other sports women in muscle strength and endurance. Soviet sportswomen contributed 36 of the 125 Soviet medals (almost 30%).[30]

However, the Soviet female athletes were not muscled sportsmen without any feminine peculiarity. Already in the 1930s, official Soviet policy discouraged women from participating in certain sports that male leaders believed to be harmful, or morally degrading. The policy had something to do with women's policy in general during the Stalin period, which reemphasized the traditional role of women as care keepers of the nuclear family. As to the matter of recommendation of sports for girls, the prevailing view in later years was that "in choosing a sport girls should be motivated by a beautiful figure, grace and plasticity; boys by strength, stamina, skill and speed."[31]

Soviet authorities in addition attempted to portray their athletes committed to the mutual understanding of all the peoples in the world in the desire to live together in friendship. Soviet athletes in this kind of description were not selfish seekers caring for material benefits and their personal interests. They knew that victory on the field should be for the glory of the nation. As they had comradely friendship and open hearts, they were fond of mingling with athletes from other worlds. Because of attitudes from Soviet athletes, US athletes, after visiting the Soviet village in 1952 Olympics, said that "We are delighted to find that we are all so alike." The Soviet riposte was, "Convey our greetings to all those in your country who are of good will."[32]

It was true that Soviet athletes were portrayed as beings who valued much more the collective will or glory, nevertheless, they were not just "cog of machines" as were illustrated by the bourgeois presses. Athletes' achievements, as always, were immediately connected to the achievements of the nation, but the athletes themselves stopped being nameless and faceless in the 1960s Soviet visual images. Dmitrii Zhilinskii's painting <*Gymnasts of the USSR 1965*> well deserves the points here. He portrays the team less as a unified machine than as a harmonious union of different bodies and personalities. Each athlete in the painting poses a different gesture according to his needs. Someone listens to advice from the coach, the other preparing for his play, exchanging strategies for the next round play with his team mates. Each

[28] С. Близнок и М. Супонев, "Возьми с собой звезду," *Советский спорт* (30 авг. 1972) с. 3.
[29] *Washington Post*, 5 Feb., 1968, D1.
[30] Jim Riordan, "The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Sporting Women in Russia and the USSR," *Journal of Sport History,* vol. 18, no. 1(1991), p.194.
[31] В. Родиченко, "Физическая культура и женщины," *Советский спорт* (25 янб. 1973), с. 3.
[32] John Bale, ""Oscillating Antagonism": Soviet-British Athletics Relations, 1945-1960," in *East Plays West,* p. 95

player has his own will, and doing his best to make his performances to the top degree. Through the images there is no trace of being unhappy or inactive. Rather all athletes in the images are very active and delightful, recognizing their personal values and contributions, contradictory to the images portrayed in the western press.[33]

IV. Concluding Remarks

The Olympics in the Cold War environments could not be defined as pure sports festivals without political interferences for harmonizing peoples in the world. Leaders of each system recognized the utility of sports in a modern imperial struggle between "the *pax Americana* and *pax sovietica*."[34] In other words, they tried to make sports a vehicle "through which – in the absence of more conventional forms and frequencies of military engagements – the competing communist and capitalist orders sought to assert their civil, ideological, and military ascendancy."[35] Soviet Union outwardly had succeeded in proving its ideological ascendancy based on the numbers of medals in the competition of Olympics.

"Cultural War" in the Olympics, however, was not just ended up in acquiring more medals from Olympic competitions. Each country attempted to propagate hostile images on athletes from the other by utilizing its printed materials. Soviet athletes from the American press were just cold-blooded sportsmen only to care about victories in the Olympic fields. From the description of the American press, they were just tools with no free will serving to the glory of the state. Even worse, the Soviet female athletes in that description were forced to give up their femininity to dominate the competition.

By publishing propaganda materials easily accessible to the public, the Soviet Union tried to negate those images portrayed by the American press. From the standpoints of Soviet propaganda materials, they were not "cog of machines" devoid of any personal pleasure. They were on the contrary warm-heated human beings fond of mingling with other athletes and having open minds. Soviet female athletes were portrayed as ordinary sports person caring very much for the beauty and the shape. It was true that Soviet athletes were competing for the glory of the state, but they did not lose their individuality and their own wills.

In sum, behind the fierce battle grounds of the Olympics, two nations had tried to propagate the images that were favorable to one side and hostile to the other. The continuous battle related to the images was not lessened during the Cold War period, the result of which led to the boycott of each country in 1980 and 1984. The Olympics inflicted with political ideology did not achieve its ideal of contributing to the harmonious and peaceful world.

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[33] Irina Makoveeva, "Soviet Sports as a Cultural Phenomenon: Body and /or Intellect," *Studies in Slavic culture*, vol. 3 (2002), pp. 20.

[34] David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War* (oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.1.

[35] David L. Andrews and Stephen Wagg, "Introduction: War Minus the Shooting," in *East Plays West,* p. 2.

The Transnational Migration for Medical Treatment of Russian Patients in the Far East: With a focus on the phenomenon of medical tourism to South Korea

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Nowdays, as migration between two countries is gradually increasing, we should comprehend the specific needs and purposes for migrants between South Korea and Russia. Also, beyond the interpretation of universal global migration, a great understanding of the migration phenomena and characteristics between two countries can facilitate more detailed regional studies expansion. Generally speaking, since it requires the reflection of various factors and combination of other variables to figure out migration phenomenon, it is not only difficult to generalize the analysis but it also has a limit of the numerical interpretation relying on statistical data. Moreover, transnational migration phenomenon moving abroad from individual living space is significantly affected by individual psychological factors and interaction between two departure and destination spaces. Therefore, we need a qualitative approach, too.

In other words, as previously stated, migration between two countries can be classified into hundreds of different types according to different needs, purpose, length of stay, extrinsic and intrinsic attributes, and so on. Above all, migration for medical treatment, which has a set purpose such as ‘recuperation from illness’ or ‘surgery’, has the easiness of the numerical statistics. Therefore, based on each migrant who choose South Korea and Russia as final destination for specific purpose, it is important to understand their mental imagery and spatial meaning. Furthermore, this research will also play an important role as the fundamental basis of migration between two countries to explain other migrations’ characteristics.

The conditions of a medical environment in a certain region can be understood through its spatial attributes to facilitate the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ of patients. At the same time, they should be examined as a complex phenomenon related to the social and cultural characteristics of patient groups as well as population movement among regions via medicine. In that aspect, today's phenomenon of global medical tourism can be a subject of geographical research since it involves the spatial scope expansion of medical service and the resulting transnational movement of patients. In addition, spatial inequality of the medical service level that was not discussed in the old medical geography and the expansion of medical service area at a global scale present a new research topic of such new type of medical movement. In that sense, this study set out to investigate the deteriorated medical environments of Russia in the Far East through its medical tourists visiting South Korea and the expansion of medical service area globally. The research findings were as follows:

First, the Far East area of Russia is a blind spot for medical service characterized by overall deteriorated medical environments and poor public health. The fundamental causes include the overall social phenomena of the nation following the regime change, the geographical conditions of the Far East, and the limited physical access to top level cities. People's increasing interest in health due to the low life expectancy and rising demands for high-grade medical service due to economic growth have spread the climate of no trust in the medical environments of the region and resulted in dissatisfaction, which in turn directly caused patients to go overseas. The patient groups of certain income level are thus looking for the rationality of proper medical service at high-grade medical institutions in neighboring nations, moving out of the country's medical environments.

Second, the Russian patients in the Far East visiting South Korea for medical tourism display a unique tendency in terms of demand. While medical tourists to advanced nations and South Korea focus on wellness tourism centered around procedures for mild symptoms, relaxation, and resting, the Russian patients from the Far East cross the borders for purely medical purposes with the attributes of tourism excluded. They also occupy space usually in large cities including Seoul and Busan because of the reliability and stability of certain space. Their strong preference for large-scale medical institutions can be understood as an attempt to compensate for the low access to high-grade medical service in their residential areas and restriction of high-grade treatment in their home country.

Finally, the deteriorated medical environments of Russia in the Far East and the geographical limitations of movement among cities in the Russian territory have caused patients to go overseas for treatment. Meanwhile, geographical proximity has served as a powerful judgment for them to set the second best medical service area and endure a movement to the destination for treatment. It should be also highlighted that psychological factors have played decisive roles including the impressions and prejudices of the countries they select since the decision is directly connected to their bodies and health. It means the Russian patients' ongoing visits to a destination for medical service and their transnational expansion of medical service area beyond the Far East. They should thus be differentiated from medical tourists also pursuing travel purposes or one-time patients. The large number of Russian patients in the Far East to South Korea is the result of its advantages to meet their physical access and familiarity needs.

In modern society, the entire world is moving toward localization according to the changes of the times. The phenomenon has reduced time and space requirements in medical service and expanded the spatial concepts of patients. The scope of medical service, which used to be limited to a region or nation, has faced rising demands with the emergence of large medical institutions to accommodate multinational patients. The phenomenon has led to the deconstruction of the fixed concept of adhering to medical facilities within the nation and rational choices among patients. The study claims its significance by dealing with the phenomenon of "patients" movement rather than "tourists" who could be neglected within the framework of medical tourism, a popular phenomenon and by providing a geographical perspective by combining the attributes of medical service with spatial phenomena.

IV-4 Social Sciences 3 (+Linguistics, in Russian)

Middle Power Diplomacy & Visegrad Group

Chair: Liubov Podgornaya (International Academy of Business and Management, Russia)

≫ The Overview of the Natural Gas and Oil Industry of Russia

Youngsik Kim (Gangneung-Wonju National University)

≫ Особенности социального восприятия и положения женщин-мигрантов из России и Центральной Азии в Республике Корея

Seunghyun Seo (Sogang University)

≫ Some Fragments Linguistic World-image within the Context Intercultural Communication

Liubov Podgornaya

(International Academy of Business and Management, Russia)

≫ Дилетант, любитель, профессионал, специалист: от лексического значения к общегуманитарному смыслу.

Nataliia Krashevskaia

(Moscow State University of Geodesy and Cartography)

Родство Алтайского языка с корейским языком: морфологический, семантический и лексикологический аспекты

Ким Гынсик (Университет Chung-Ang)

Уже широко известно, что корейский язык принадлежит к семье Урало-Алтайских языков, но все-ещё корейский и японский языки классифируют независимыми от остальных в схеме УА языков. Это говорит, что КЯ синтаксически однороден особенно с семьей алтайских языков, зато отсутствует лексикологическое соотношение, которое может свидетельствовать о том, что в древнее время были прямые контакты между корейским и, допустим, алтайским языками. Таким образом, сложилась реальность, что два языка далеки друг от друга вопреки своей сходности. Такой феномен проистекает из того факта, что вообще не существует владеющих двумя языками носителями-исследователями. К тому же исследование на данную тему нельзя обойтись без знания русского языка.

Вопреки короткому сроку исследования алтайского языка я нашел лексически немало общего между алтайским и корейским языками. Безусловно, еще рановато категорически определить, что эти найденные мной общие лексики не обязательно разделяют общие корни, но их обнаруживание может послужить новым прорывом в сравнительном исследовании двух яхыков особенно при обстоятельствах, что существует крайне мало материалов, конкретно доказывающих родство алтайского языка с корейским.

Поскольку мало осталось от протокорейских лексик из-за принятия китайской письменности, найти общие корни между алтайскими и чисто корейскими словами требует большого труда. В этом отношении из данного исследования, связанным с чисто корейским языком, исключены те корейские лексики, которые происходили из китайских иероглифов или были заимствованные от моньголского языка после после монгольской оккупации в 13-ом веке. Следовательно, лексики, исследуемые в этом изучении, оказываются, возможно, прототипными как в алтайском, так и корейском языках.

Некоторые лексики имеют не только линвистическое, но и общественно-культурное значение. Возьмем пример с алтайского слова «кам». Оно может дать интересную коннотацию в изучении древней корейской культуры. «Кам» обозначает шамана по-алтайски. Однако, нынешнее время доминирущее в тюркских странах современное значение «шаман» сильно отличается с корейским. В современном корейском обществе дела шамана заключаюся в том, чтобы клоняться перед своими духами, гадать клиентам за деньги и проводить платный ритуал «кут». (Предполагается, что корень последнеднего слова связывается с тюркским языком.) Таким образом, деятельность шамана оказывается довольно комерческой и магической. Зато в странах Средней Азии шаман сохраняет чистые функции древней религии, т.е., общаясь с духами, он или она исполняет

функции знахаря и певца эпических поэм. При учете концепции древней религии шаман, будучи обладателем чрезвычайных способностей, являлся возможным жрецом, в доисторические времена статус «кама» мог равняться божественному существу. В этом отношении предполагается, что в древнее время статус «кама» был высоким и он мог быть объектом почтения. Слово «кам» использовалось в древнее Корее, где распронялся тотемизм. Тотемом древнекорейского народа является медведь, который называется «ком» 〔k∧m〕. В древнем Чосоне значение «ком», возможно, почти равняется божественному существу. В этой связи стоит учесть, что бог произносится 〔ками〕 на японском языке. Если мы учитываем, что в древнейших обществах хоть бы этих трех стран «кам» несомненно располагали высоким статусом и он разделяет общий лексический корень. При прояснении такого предположения можно частично доказать, что в определенный момент прошлого народы этих трех стран жили в одном и том же мировозрении и в одинаком округе культуры.

В данном исследовании те алтайские лексики, которые могут иметь культуро-лингвистическое значение, отобраны из учебника алтайского языка А.А.Черновой и М.Ч.Чумакаевой, где употребляются около 1,000 слов. Из этого запаса слов много современных и займствованных слов, отличающихся от чисто-алтайских или тюркских. В этом отношении отобранные мной 27 лексик имеют общие основы с корейскими эквивалентами довольно многочисленные. Эти слова обоих языков все еще сохраняют форму протоязыка. Они такие: суфикс алтайского языка 1) –chy, 2) -der, наречие 3) ozo, (ozogyda, ozogy)(прежде), 4) örö(ÿstine)(верх), 5) агу(туда), 6) кайкамчылу (удивительно), гоагол 7) busul-,(разрушаться) 8) bus-,(разрушить) 9) jar-, 10) jyk-(срубить), 11) kubul-(перемениться)-kubulbas(неизменно). 명사 12) jan'myr (дождь), urgun janmyr(ливень), 13) kaan(правитель), 14) kajchy(ножницы), 15) mal(malchy), 16) mÿÿs(рог), 17) orom(улица), 18) öbögön(öböön)(супург), 19) emegen(супурга), 20) tuu(гора), 21) ÿst(верх), 22) chyrysh(морщина), 23) yjlaar(плач), 24) kögÿs(ум), 25) örtök(утка), 26)kujruk(хвост). 27) yrym(плохие приметы).

1) Суфикс алтайского языка –чы, который обозначает профессию человека, соответсвует с корейским суфиксом –чи того же значения. см) aŋchy, kajchy АЯ : changsa-chy(trader), yi-chy(this guy) КЯ. Лишь в современном корейском языке-чи имеет более унизительное значение. Было тенденция, что по сравнению с заимствованными китайскими иероглифами корейские знатные обращали свои собственные чисто корейские слова одинакого значения с унизительностью. 2) В алтайском языке суфиксы множественного числа разны также, как в других тюркских языках, что складывалось в процессе грамматизации и систематизации, а также правил сингармонизма. В общей сложности эти суфиксы могут свести к lØr и d(t)Ør. Суфикс множественного числа корейского языка имеет общую черту с алтайским безотносительно к китайскому влиянию, поскольку корейский суфикс имеет d(t)Øl(r). В особенности в алтайском языке на месте Ø размещаются « o,a,ö, e », а на месте корейского Ø размещается гласное «ㅡ»[ə], но в самом деле это гласное произноситься « o, a, ö, e » как в устной речи, так и в диалектах. Тем более, в большинстве случаев последний слог «l» в любом предложении произносится как « r » скорее чем «l». см: 아이들이 잔다~ → [Ai deri chanda], 나무들은 푸르다~ → [Namu deren puruda].

3) Наречие алтайского языка «ozo» (ozogyda, ozogy:прежде) напоминает корейское «어제[əje]: вчера», «어저께 əjəgge: вчера» из запаса малочисленных чисто корейских слов.

4) Алтайское слово «örö(ÿstine): верх» имеет два значения в корейском языке. По произношению оно сходно с корейскими«아래(arö)» и «위로(Ÿro)». Надо учесть, что эти два корейских слова обозначают направление..

5) Как выше указано, алтайское «ary(туда)» похоже на корейское «arö».

6) Наречие алтайского языка «кайкамчылу(удивительно)» и имя существительное «кайкамчыл(чудо, диво)» выражает удивление так же, как корейское выражение «Ай камчак ия!». Оба языка имееют общую основу «-kamchØ».

7) Основа глагола АЯ «busul-,(разрушаться)» и 8) «bus-,(разрушить)» имеет общую основу корейского глагола «busu-da(разрушать)».

9) Основа глагола АЯ «jar-(резать)» соответствует с корейской «jar-da(резать)» и по значению и по произношению.

10) Основа глагола АЯ «jyk-(срубить)» эквивалентна к соответствущей основе КЯ «jik-(рубить))».

11) Глаглол и наречие АЯ « kubul-(перемениться)» и «kubulbas(неизменно)» разделяют общий корень глагола и имени прилагательного КЯ «kubul-kubul-hada(извилистый)». Безусловно, между двумя языками тонький оттенок по значению. Но в самом деле оба слова имеют одинаковое значение в том смысле, что они указывают не на прямоту. см: В турецком языке оно ближе к корейскому по значению.

12) Имя существительного «jan'myr(дождь)» может связаться с корейским«mur(l): вода», поскольку«jan'myr» обозначает «падающая +вода». см: yağ-mur в турецком языке. Тем более, алтайское «urgun janmyr(ливень)» производит сходное впечатление в корейской фразой со звукоподражательным словом «우르렁 쾅쾅 내리는 물(비): *Ur*erong *ku*ang kuang naerinun(падающий) *mul*».

13) Алтайское слово «kaan(правитель)» отражается в названии короллей династии Силла «Марип-гаан», «Каса-гаан», «Часа-гаан».

14) Алтайское слово « kajchy(ножницы)» звучит как «kawy» по-корейскому.

15) Хотя алтайское «mal и malchy» обозачает «скот и пастух», но малчы также имеет значение «табунщик». Это может иметь отношение с корейским «mal(лощадь или конь)».

16) Алтайское «mÿÿs(рог)» имеет общий корень с корейским «musso», который обозначает «рогатого быка».

17) Алтайское «orom(улица)» напоминает как корейское «orem(восхождение)», так и «orom(вершина)».

18) Алтайское «öbögön, öböön (супург)» разделяет аналогичный корень с корейскими «abam» и «æbi» значения «супруг».

19) Алтайское «emegen(супурга)» имеет общий корень с корейским «əmi)», «emi» того же значения.

20) Можно соотносить алтайское «tuu(гора)» с корейским«두메(tume)», который обозначает далекое горное и одинокое место.

21) Первый слог АЯ « ÿst(верх)» совпадает с корейским «ÿ(верх)».

22) Алтайское «chyrysh(морщина)» может иметь отношение с корейским «churym(морщина)».

23) Алтайское «yjlaar(плач)» разделяет общий корень с корейским «ul-da, ulym(urym): плакать, плач».

24) Алтайское «kögÿs(ум)» разделяет общий корень с корейским «꾀(kö): ум, хитрость».

25) Алтайское örtök(утка) звучит как вместе-взятые корейские «ori (утка)» и «tak(курица)» или напоминает «поднимающую курицу».

26) Алтайское «куйрук[kujruk](хвост)» звучит подобно корейскому «kori».

27) Алтайское «Ырым(плохие приметы)» может иметь близкое отношение с корейским «Ырым(угроза)». См: И в других тюркских языках это слово употревляется почти одинаково.

Таким образом, в пределах определенного запаса слов отобраны так или иначе связанные между собой лексики АЯ и КЯ. Характерной чертой этих слов является то, что они могут быть ближе к прото-алтайскому языку. Если мы проанализируем больший запас слов обоих языков, полагаю, что увеличится и расширится количество совпадений и общих основ обоих языков.

Особенности социального восприятия и положения женщин-мигрантов из России и Центральной Азии в Республике Корея

Со Сын Хюн

1. Актуальность исследования

В настоящее время женщины-мигранты из зарубежных стран, в том числе из России и СНГ, находятся в центре внимания науки и корейского общества. Международная женская миграция является неотъемлемой частью современной мировой экономики.

Данные ООН и ученые подтверждают, что в последнее время женщины стали весьма многочисленной категорией в миграционных потоках, т. е. между-народная миграция женщин становится общемировой тенденцией. Сегодня можно говорить о феминизации миграции(feminization of migration).[2]

Данная проблема стала чрезвычайно актуальной, начиная с 2000-х годов. За пять лет количество трудовых и замужних зарубежных женщин с гражданами Республики Корея резко увеличилось - 50%, и держится на высоком уровне - количество семей, имеющих в составе иностранных девушек, составляет 11% от всех семей, проживающих в Республике Корея.[3]

Следовательно, правительство Республики Корея намерено увеличить бюджет на обеспечение женщин-мигрантов и разработан и принят план для решения их проблем. Назрела необходимость проведения кросскультурных исследований с целью изучения проблем социального восприятия и положения женщин-мигрантов из России и Центральной Азии в Республике Корея. В этом смысле рассмотрение данной проблемы представляется нам и Евразийскому сообществу актуальным и востребованным.

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[1] Кандидат социологических наук, лектор университета Соган.

[2] Женщины-мигарнты из стран СНГ в России. Под ред. Е.В. Тюрюкановой. М.: МАКС Пресс, 2011. С. 5.; Sassen, S. “Global Cities and Survival Circuits.” In Global Women: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in New Economy. Edited by Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild. NY: Metropolitan Book. 2002.; Ким Хэ Сон, Глобальная миграция и семейные связи транснационализма. Корейская научная информация. 2014. С. 44-64.; Ли Хэ Кён, Феминизация миграции и семьи транснационализма. Журнал социологии Кореи. 2006. 40(4). 258-298.

[3] http://www.immigration.go.kr/ : Сайт Иммиграционного Сервисного Центра Республики Корея(Korean immigration service) (дата обращения: 11.06. 2016)

2. Женщины-мигранты из зарубежных стран: динамика и причины миграции

Международная миграция стала проблемой глобального масштаба. Вместе с тем миграционные потоки становятся все более разнообразными. По оценкам ООН, в последние десятилетия многие страны Восточной и Юго-Восточной Азии, Южной Америки и Западной Африки, отличающиеся быстрым ростом экономики, стали значительными центрами притяжения миграции.[4]

Начиная с 2000 года из-за прироста числа международных мигрантов в Азии, проблемам миграции уделяется огромное внимание в нашем обществе. Согласно данным статистики, доля мигрантов составляла 3.5%, и общее число мигрантов в Республике Корея 1.8 миллионов.[5]

Странами мигрантов являются Китай (включая корейцев из Китая, 50.3%), США (7.3%), Вьетнам(7.2%), Тайланд(4.9%), Филиппины(2.9%), Япония(2.5%) и Узбекистан (2.5%) и т. д. [6] Так, по последним сведениям базы данных Иммиграционного Сервисного Центра Республики Корея (Korean immigration service), общее число международных мигрантов, т. е. лиц, проживающих в нашем обществе, достигло 1.89 миллионов человек. С 2011 года количество мигрантов увеличилось в среднем на 8.6% за год.

Среди них наблюдается рост доли мигрантов, приезжающих в страну из России и Центральной Азии, вместе с другими азиатскими странами. Численность международных мигрантов из Узбекистана достигла 47,103, в том числе из России 19,384 человек.[7]

[4] Щербакова. Е.М. Международная миграция и миграционная политика. «Демоскоп Weekly». 2014. № 597-598. http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2014/0597/barometer597.pdf (дата обращения: 11.06. 2016)

[5] http://www.wmigrant.org/ : Сайт Центра защиты прав женщин-мигрантов Республики Корея(дата обращения: 12.06. 2016)

[6] Ежегодный статистич. доклад Центра Иммиграционной Службы Республики Корея за 2015 год. С. 43-44.

[7] Там же С. 44-45.

Рисунок 1. Динамика общей численности мигрантов, выехавших из России и Центральной Азии8



(Источник: Ежегодный статистич. доклад Центра Иммиграционной Службы Республики Корея за 2015 год)

Многие из них ищут работу, закончив свое обучение в Корее, или после заключения брака с гражданами Кореи. С конца 90-х и особенно 2000-х годов в нашем обществе количество женщин-мигрантов на основе заключения брака с гражданами Республики Корея постоянно растет.

Этот феномен получил широкое распространение в связи с тем, что правительство Республики Корея заинтересовано как в развитии своей экономики за счет труда мигрантов, так и компенсации демографического дефицита за счет новых граждан.

Таблица 1. Общий объем количества иммигрантов, состоящих в браке с гражданами Кореи по годам(чел. %)9

Год	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**
Количество (чел. %)	144,681 (102.1%)	148,498 (102.6%)	150.865 (101.6%)	150.994 (100.1%)	151.608 (100.4%)

После 2002 года наблюдается число иммигрантов, состоящих в браке с гражданами Кореи, которое увеличилось в среднем на 28% за год. По данным 2015 года число иммигрантов, состоящих в браке с гражданами(marriage migration) Кореи и натурализованных мигрантов(naturalization by marriage) достигло 304,516 человек.[10]В течение последнего пятилетия

[8] * Указаны количественно наиболее значимые потоки мигрантов из СНГ, включая Моголию(как наблюдатель СНГ)

[9] Ежегодный статистич. доклад Центра Иммиграционной Службы Республики Корея за 2015 год. С. 48-49.

[10] Доклад социального положения мультикультурной семьи за 2015 год. С. 2.

доля международного брака составляет более 10% и продолжает постоянно расти.[11]

Весьма четко проявляется также тенденция к увеличению доли таких женщин. Действительно, процесс миграции в Республике Корея все в большей степени приобретает феминизированный характер, так как в миграционном потоке достаточно большой удельный вес составляют трудовые и замужние мигранты – женщины.

Таблица 2. Тенденции иммигрантов, состоящих в браке с гражданами Кореи по полу (2015. 12. 31.: чел. %)12

	Итог	Мужчина	Женщина	Мужч.(%)	Женщ.(%)	Всего(%)
Итог	151,608	23,272	**128,336**	15.4%	**84.6%**	100.0%
Китай	58,788	11,879	46,909	20.2%	79.8%	38.8%
Вьетнам	40,847	894	39,953	2.2%	97.8%	26.9%
Япония	12,861	1,220	11,641	9.5%	90.5%	8.5%
Филиппины	11,367	328	11,039	2.9%	97.1%	7.5%
США	3,192	2,440	752	76.4%	23.6%	2.1%
Тайланд	2,821	75	2,746	2.7%	97.3%	1.9%
Монголия	2,384	104	2,280	4.4%	95.6%	1.6%
Узбекистан	2,244	81	**2,163**	3.6%	**96.4%**	1.5%
Россия	1,305	90	**1,215**	6.9%	**93.1%**	0.9%
Канада	1,295	1,109	186	85.6%	14.4%	0.9%

* Указаны количественно наиболее значимые потоки.

В 1990-х гг. вырос ВНП до уровня развитых индустриальных государств и большинство населения проживает в городах, т. е. на фоне урбанизации корейского общества сельское население резко сократилось. По этой причине в деревне мужчины не могли найти невесту, они хотели найти свою жену из зарубежных стран. В этой связи наше правительство с 1995 года начало специальную программу《найти жену-инностранку для мужика в деревне》. До этого периода в Южной Корее большинство мигрантов - взрослые мужчины для распределение иностранной рабочей силы.

Как видно из таблицы, в нашем обществе заключение брака с гражданами является преобладающей стратегией для женщин-мигрантов, чем мужчин-мигрантов(более 90%). Стоит отметить что, такая тенденция чаще проявляется в странах Восточной Азии.[13] Одновременно сегодня многие женщины из зарубежных стран приезжают в Корею, чтобы трудиться наравне с мужчинами.

[11] Ким Хэ Сон, Глобальная миграция и семейные связи транснационализма. Корейская научная информация. 2014. С. 16.

[12] Ежегодный статистич. доклад Центра Иммиграционной Службы Республики Корея за 2015 год. С. 50-51.

[13] Сон Хёнг Джу Исследование о женщинах-иммигрантах: типология и политики правительства. Корейский журнал общественного управления 2014. 52(4) С. 194-196.

3. Положение женщин-мигрантов из России и Центральной Азии: проблемы и миграционная политика

Начиная с конца 1980-х гг., прирост международной миграции рабочей силы после 2000-х годов является быстрый рост количества женщин-иммигрантов, состоящих в браке с гражданами Кореи, что вызвало волну феминизации миграции.

Следовательно, наше правительство начало обращать более серьезное внимание к проблемам миграции и принимать конкретные меры миграционной политики для женщин-мигрантов. В то же время усиление роли международной миграции в демографическом и социально-экономическом развитии приводит к изменению отношения к ее различным аспектам со стороны общества. В связи с этим, все чаще говорится и о необходимости социальной адаптации и интеграции мигрантов в местное сообщество.

В настоящее время в Южной Корее можно выделить три основные категории международных мигрантов как предмет миграционной политики: первая – трудящиеся-мигранты(большинство мужчин), вторая – замужние женщины-иммигрантки, третья - дети из семей мигрантов. При этом необходимо отметить, что в середине 2000-х годов наше правительство концентрируется на поддержке замужних женщин-иммигрантов. Поэтому нынешняя миграционная политика в Республике Корея в основном направлена на поддержку иностранных женщин, вышедших замуж за Южных Корейцев, а так же рабочих, приехавших по контракту. Важно отметить, что с 2014 года главные требования к иностранным гражданам, которые хотят работать в Корее на законных основаниях, указаны в корейском «Законе об иммиграционном контроле». Профессиональное обучение может быть предоставлено иммигрантам, состоящим в браке с гражданами Кореи, чтобы помочь им овладеть специальными навыками, которые необходимы для получения работы.[14]

Для них созданы центры благоустройства и специальные программы: программа поддержки иностранцев, регулярно проводятся занятия по корейскому языку, лекции по ведению домашнего хозяйства, навыкам корейского фольклора и приготовлению национальных блюд. Кроме этого, при центре можно посещать специализированные курсы по разным предметам для поступления на работу и т. д. И подобные центры поддержки мультикультурной семьи функционируют в разных городах Кореи. Этот центр оказывает различные услуги, такие как предоставление информации о возможностях трудоустройства и о культурных программах для семей мигрантов.

На сегодняшний день такие центры существуют во многих крупных городах Кореи, в особенности там, где сосредоточена основная масса иностранцев. Характерно, что эти центры созданы и финансируются городской и муниципальной администрацией. Наряду с государством помощь нуждающимся оказывают частные предприятия и негосударственные организации, церковь и т. д. Главная цель всех этих организаций – помощь в адаптации иностранных граждан в

[14] Газета МедиаКор http://www.mediakor.com

Корее, а также защита их прав и решение возникающих проблем в чужой стране.[15]

С другой стороны, если оценивать миграционную политику в Корее, то необходимо отметить, что концепция политики формируется в рамках патриархального восприятия и характеризуется принужденной ассимиляцией.

Председатель Центра защиты прав женщин-мигрантов Республики Корея отметила, что в нашем обществе нужны сильные мужчины-мигранты для работы, в то время как иностранные женщины нужны только в семье как жены и матери.

Несмотря на процесс укоренения такого стереотипного социального восприятия, женщины-мигранты из зарубежных стран стремятся работать. По мнению социальных работников центра поддержки мультикультурной семьи, большинство женщин-мигрантов из России имеют высшее образование. И жещины-мигранты из Центральной Азии чаще приезжают к нам, чтобы зарабатывать хорошо и переводить деньги на родину из Кореи.[16]

Дело в том, что зачастую в процессе миграции женщин не считают конкурентно-способными на рынке труда именно по причине их ненадежности в работе, что не выгодно работодателю. Мужчина более свободен от семейных обязательств, нежели женщина. На мой взгляд, это можно обозначить как основную причину второстепенной значимости женщин в процессе трудовой миграции.[17] Заметен невысокий уровень занятости женщин-мигрантов, и мигрантская занятость не отличается стабильностью, в отличие от корейских работников, хотя по данным 2015 года занятость женщин увеличилась на 5.4% по сравнению с 2012 годом.[18]

4. Заключение

Подводя итоги, необходимо еще раз отметить, что в Южной Корее права женщин-мигрантов не защищены в достаточной степени.[19] Это вызвано тем, что женщина, которая приехала в Корею, подвергается двойной дискриминации – как мигрант, и как женщина. Тем более, ей приходится сталкиваться с тяжелой реальностью гораздо чаще, чем мужчине.

Проблема неравенства возникает не только на работе, но и в семье из-за воспитания детей и отношения к мужу и его семьям. Например, жена из центральной Азии, даже в ситуации насилия

[15] http://www.wmigrant.org/ : Сайт Центра защиты прав женщин-мигрантов Республики Корея(дата обращения: 12.06. 2016); Газета Сеульский вестник http://vestnik.kr/life/3043.html

[16] См: Со Сын Хюн Проблемы женщин-мигрантов в России и агенда миграционной политики в гендерном аспекте. Журнал славяноведения. 2015. 30. №2. С. 191-192.

[17] См: Parrenas, Rhacel Salazar. Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work. Stanford University Press. 2001. 10; Piper, Nicola and Mina Roces. Wife or Worker? Asian Women and Migration. Anham Rowman & Littlefield Publisher. 2003. * Паренас отметила, что общемировой процесс глобальной миграции женщин характеризуется как современная «глобальная цепочка заботы» и система международного разделения репродуктивного и домашнего труда.

[18] Доклад социального положения мультикультурной семьи за 2015 год. с. 4.

[19] См: Marshall. T.H., Bottomore. T. Citizenship and social class. London: Pluto Press. 1992.; Margaret R. Somers. Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights, Cambridge University Press. 24 July 2008.; Yasemin Soysal. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-national Membership in Europe. 1994.; Choo Hae Yeon. Decentering Citizenship: Gender, Labor, Migrant Right in South Korea, Stanford University Press. 2016. 1-18.

мужа, не разводится с ним, потому что тогда перед ней стоит сложный выбор. Получается, что такие женщины тоже подвергаются двойной патриархальной культурной дискриминации. В основе нашей миграционной политики лежит гендерное неравенство.[20] По прогнозам ученых в нашем обществе число мигрантов будет продолжать стабильно расти, и в 2020 году составит 5% населения. Сейчас в Республике Корея идет второй этап политики мультикультурной семьи, на котором необходимо направить миграционную политику в русло акцентуации защиты прав человека как гражданина общества.

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Некоторые фрагменты формирования языковой картины мира в контексте межкультурной коммуникации.

Подгорная Любовь Дмитриевна

Язык отображает культурно-национальную ментальность его носителей, поскольку процесс формирования и развития его основных элементов, таких как слово, понятие, фразеологизм, всегда происходил в условиях определенного культурного контекста. В связи с этим в условиях межкультурной коммуникации необходимо знание достаточно широкой языковой картины мира, которую формирует определенная национальная языковая система и её культура.

Ключевые слова: языковая картина мира, язык как система, фразеологические единицы, лингвоспецифичные концепты, метафора.

1. Вступление. Понятие языковой картины мира.

Относительно новое для лингвистики понятие языковой картины мира своими корнями, с одной стороны, уходит к идеям В. фон Гумбольдта, который одним из первых обратил внимание, что органом восприятия окружающего мира и оригинального осмысления его для нации является её естественный язык. И именно он (язык) оказывает влияние на формирование системы понятий и системы ценностей, формирующихся и развивающихся в обществе.[1] С другой стороны, данное понятие находит свое дальнейшее развитие в гипотезе лингвистической относительности американских антропологов и лингвистов Эдварда Сепира и Бенджамина Ли Уорфа, появившейся в 30-ые годы XX-ого столетия. Согласно данной гипотезе структура того или иного языка определяет способ познания реальности и национальное мышление.[2] На сегодняшний день предметом активной дискуссии продолжает оставаться вопрос о возможности влияния языковых категорий на восприятие мира. Такие сферы научного знания как этнолингвистика, психолингвистика, теоретическая семантика и некоторые другие анализируют связи и границы между мышлением (или познанием), языком и культурой, описывают степень и виды их взаимосвязанности и взаимовлияния. Современные российские исследователи также не

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[1] См.: Гумбольдт В. Фон. Язык и философия культуры. – М.: Прогресс, 1985.

[2] См.: Мюллер М., Сепир Э., Уорф Б.Л., Витгенштейн Л. и др. Языки как образ мира. Антология. - М. - СПб.: АСТ, Terra Fantastica, 2003. - 576 с.

остались в стороне от обсуждения данной проблемы. Так, например, согласно О. А. Корнилову, в современной лингвистике можно выделить несколько подходов к тому, что следует понимать под выражением «языковая картина мира», но наиболее острым и дискуссионным является «объективистский» и «субъективистский». Первый возможный подход (т.е. «объективистский») состоит в том, что языковая картина мира, созданная каким-либо национальным сообществом, должна «…неукоснительно (и, естественно, безуспешно) пытаться соответствовать некому единому для всего человечества логико-понятийному миру, который стремиться максимально точно, адекватно отразить мир объективной реальности».[3] Второй возможный подход, автор назвал «принципиально субъективистским». Согласно данному подходу, языковая картина мира представляет собой отраженный в языке вторичный мир, в котором воспроизводятся и передаются не только знания о мире, но и заблуждения, ощущения и чувства, которые он вызывает. Такое восприятие языковой картины мира не требует от неё объективности, поскольку её несоответствия логико-понятийной картине мира «признаются не недостатком…, а вполне нормальным явлением».[4]

Исходя из высказываний другого известного российского исследователя Г.Д. Гачева, национальная языковая картина мира представляет собой «трудноуловимую материю», которая характеризуется как особая структура общих для всего человечества элементов, таких, например, как жизнь, Бог, слово, дом, семья и т.д. В каждом национальном мире эти идеи и понятия осознаются по-разному, поскольку имеют свой акцент восприятия, но именно они, по мнению автора, и составляют национальный образ, а «в упрощенном выражении – модель мира».[5]

Согласно мнению известного специалиста по проблемам межкультурной коммуникации О.А. Леонтович языковая картина мира включает в себя следующих три характерологических параметра: «1)универсальные черты, общие для всего человечества, 2)черты культурно-специфические … и 3)индивидуальные черты, присущие определенной личности».[6] Нельзя также не согласится со взглядами и другого известного российского лингвиста В.Н. Телии, согласно которым языковая картина мира является необходимым продуктом сознания, возникающим в результате взаимодействия объективной действительности, человеческого мышления и языка как основного средства отражения мыслей о мире в процессе коммуникации. Данные определения дополняет еще один авторитетный специалист в области лингвокультурологии В.А. Маслова. Она отмечает, что специфические особенности национального языка, фиксирующие неповторимый общественно-исторический опыт определенной национальной общности людей, создают для носителей этого языка не какую-то иную, неповторимую картину мира, отличную от объективно существующей, а лишь своеобразный колорит этого мира. Такая качественная характеристика объективного мира обусловлена национальной значимостью предметов, явлений, процессов, избирательным отношением к ним, которое порождается спецификой деятельности, образа жизни и

[3] Корнилов О.А. Языковые картины мира как производные национальных менталитетов. Учеб. пособ., 3-е изд. испр. – М.: КДУ, 2011, с. 97.
[4] см.: там же.
[5] См.: Гачев Г.Д. Ментальности народов мира. – М.: Алгоритм, Эксмо, 2008, с. 30-46.
[6] Леонтович О.А. Введение в межкультурную коммуникацию: Учеб. пособ. – М.: Гнозис, 2007, с. 119.

национальной культуры данного народа.[7]

Но что представляет собой язык как социальное явление и какова его структурная характеристика? Каким образом и с помощью, каких средств культурные (религиозные, социальные, бытовые и др.) представления народа о реальном мире и месте человека в нем находят отражение в языке, на котором данный народ говорит? И как изменяются формы и средства общения, прежде всего языкового общения, при переходе от одной модели культуры к другой? Ответы на данные вопросы помогают найти изучение таких наук как лингвистика и межкультурная коммуникация.

Язык представляет собой систему знаков и символов, наделенных определенным значением. В сознание человека знаки и символы замещают собой реальные предметы и образуют определенные понятия (концепты). Благодаря им становится возможным упорядочить опыт людей. Отношения между языком и культурой могут рассматриваться как отношения части и целого. Язык может быть воспринят как компонент культуры, которую мы наследуем от наших предков, но язык представляет собой и основной инструмент, посредством которого мы усваиваем культуру. Поскольку каждый носитель языка, т.е. индивид, одновременно является и носителем культуры, то языковые знаки приобретают способность выполнять функцию знаков культуры. Именно поэтому язык способен отображать культурно-национальную ментальность его носителей. Люди усваивают значение символов и знаков в процессе воспитания и образования. Изучение языка позволяет им ориентироваться в окружающем мире, при помощи использования, отбора и организации своего опыта, понимать других и передавать полученные знания другим поколениям. Но следует также помнить, что язык - только инструмент для передачи форм речевого поведения, он лишь создает среду для осуществления коммуникации. В различных культурно-знаковых системах объективный мир организован по-разному. Понятия, слова, термины, создающие языковую систему, имеют определенное значение, процесс формирования которого всегда шел в условиях определенного достаточно широкого культурного контекста и именно он создает условия для зарождения и дальнейшего развития их культурной специфичности и неповторимого смысла.

Субъект представляет себе окружающий мир в трёх основных формах: как реальный мир, как культурную (понятийную) картину мира, которая отражает окружающий реальный мир через призму понятий, сформированных в процессе его познания, и как языковую картину мира (ЯКМ), воссоздание которой является одной из важнейших задач современной лингвистической семантики. Исследование той или иной национальной ЯКМ может осуществляться в трех основных направлениях, одно из которых представляет собой изучение и восстановление целостной системы представлений о реальном мире, отраженном в языке того или иного народа, безотносительно к тому, является ли данная система специфической для определенного языка или универсальной. Другим направлением анализа ЯКМ является изучение отдельных характерных для конкретной языковой системы понятий, лингвоспецифичных концептов, фразеологических единиц, которые являются ключевыми для заданной культуры, поскольку

[7] См.: Маслова В.А. Лингвокультурология. Учеб. пособ., 2-е изд. – М.: Издательский центр «Академия», 2004, с.66.

могут характеризовать ментальные черты мышления субъекта этой культуры и приоткрывают её отличительные особенности. Одновременно такие понятия и фразеологические единицы плохо переводятся на другие языки, поскольку переводной эквивалент либо вообще отсутствует, либо такой эквивалент в принципе имеется, но он не содержит именно тех компонентов значения, которые являются для данного понятия специфичными. Кроме того в структуру ЯКМ могут входить метафоры, которые необходимо рассматривать в качестве одного из универсальных способов представления определенной культуры.

Понимание в межкультурной коммуникации представляет собой сложный процесс интерпретации, который зависит от комплекса как собственно языковых, так и неязыковых факторов. Для достижения понимания в условиях межкультурной коммуникации ее участники должны не просто владеть грамматикой и лексикой того или иного языка, но и знать культурный компонент значения слова, реалии чужой культуры.

2. Концепты, определяющие уникальность культуры

В русском языке существует такое уникальное понятие как «духовность», которого нет ни в одном европейском языке. Данное понятие сформировалось в древней духовной традиции Православия и нашло свое широкое применение в жизни светской при активном участии русской религиозной философии и её основных авторов.

Оно отражает высшую деятельность души, устремленность к безгрешности, моральному совершенству, преображению души, причем в православной трактовке в такой деятельности нет ни ограничений, ни меры. Для обозначения аналогичного понятия, например, в английском языке используют термины «интеллект» (intellect), «сознание» (consciousness), которые наделены совершенно другим семантическим значением и не могут служить необходимым элементом эквивалентного перевода.

В качестве примера можно привести и такие специфические термины как «удаль» и «воля», выработанные и используемые только в русском языке. Эти чисто русские понятия, находят свое этимологическое объяснение именно в природно-климатических условиях формирования и развития личности русского человека и его языка. Термин «воля» в русском языке характеризует не психический процесс, присущий какой-либо личности, означающий концентрацию усилий, внимания, напряжения на достижение цели, как это принято в западно-европейской культуре, а говорит о том, что русский человек принципиально не признает никаких ограничений ни со стороны людей, ни со стороны закона. Такая трактовка понятия «воля» в корне отличается от соответствующих представлений человека Запада, который в данной ситуации будет употреблять другое понятие – понятие «свободы». Но и оно не может являться эквивалентным переводом, поскольку его семантический смысл включает в себя определенные правила, обязательные для всех и служащие упорядочению общественной жизни в условиях ограниченности пространства, четких контуров ландшафта и плотности населения в Западной Европе. Объективные причины возникновения понятия «воля»

лежат именно в русских природно-климатических условиях: равнинности её территории, степном её характере, где не существует естественных ограничений, препятствий для её протяженности. То же самое относится и к другому термину «удаль», который происходит от корня «даль». Значение термина «даль» можно определить как «далекое пространство, видимое глазом»[8] а интерпретировать как бескрайнюю территорию, не имеющую естественных границ и барьеров, что позволяет человеческому глазу видеть горизонт. В российском природном ландшафте можно найти множество таких мест, а человеку, родившемуся в таких природных российских условиях, могут быть присущи беспредельная, не имеющая границ, смелость, мужество, стойкость.

Для сравнительного примера можно привести пример из корейского языка, где также существует целый ряд понятий, призванных определять уникальность и специфичность корейской культуры. В данный ряд входит понятие (хан), что в вольном (потому что аналогов данного понятия в русском языке не существует) русском переводе означает «терпение». Но в корейской культурной традиции оно имеет существенные и ярко выраженные особенности, которые отражают стойкое и спокойное, накопленное за тысячелетнюю, во многом тяжелую и кровавую историю развития страны, чувство горечи тесно сопряженное с чувством терпения и проявляется оно в желании достичь что-либо недостижимое или труднодостижимое. В традиционном корейском искусстве (в музыке, танцах, песнях) ярко проявляется это чувство (хан). И хотя в русском языке не существует такого понятия, но ощущения, модели поведения и ситуации, описываемые данным чувством (хан), воспроизводятся во многих русских народных песнях (например, «По диким степям Забайкалья…», «Катюша», «Эх, Дубинушка, ухнем…» и др.), а также во многих литературных произведениях русской классики. К таким произведениям необходимо отнести, прежде всего, роман в стихах А.С. Пушкина «Евгений Онегин» и описываемые в нем чувства, которые испытывают главные герои данного произведения Татьяна Ларина и Евгений Онегин друг к другу. В качестве примера можно также привести роман Ф. М. Достоевского «Преступление и наказание» и изображенные там взаимоотношения, сложившиеся между Родионом Раскольниковым и Соней Мармеладовой, а также роман Л.Н. Толстого «Воскресенье» и та модель ситуации, которая складывается между Катющей Масловой и Дмитрием Нехлюдовым. В русской истории также можно найти примеры проявления чувства «хан», которым была переполнена революционно-демократическая деятельность разночинной интеллигенции второй половины XIX века в России.

3. Фразеологические единицы

Особое культурно-детерминированное видение мира в целом или конкретной его ситуации находит свое яркое отражение в разнообразных фразеологических единицах (ФЕ), которые существуют в любом языке и помогают отражать его специфику. По меткому замечанию

[8] Ожегов С.И. Словарь русского языка. – М.: Государственное издательство иностранных и национальных словарей, 1952. - С.128.

известного российского лингвиста В.Н. Телии, фразеологический состав языка представляет собой «зеркало», в котором та или иная лингвокультурная общность идентифицирует свое национальное самосознание[9]. Например, сведения о быте русского народа ярко передаются с помощью таких фразеологизмов как «красный угол», «красный день календаря» или «красна девица», «печки-лавочки», «избушка на курьих ножках», «тришкин кафтан». Для понимания данных фразеологизмов необходимы знания широкого культурного контекста, поскольку слово «красный» говорит нам не о цвете того или иного предмета, явления, а о его красоте или главном предназначении в жизни конкретного человека, некой социальной группы или всего общества. В другом фразеологизме «печки-лавочки» используются два типично русских слова, требующих своего разъяснения для понимания её смысла. В понятие печи входит не только сложенное из кирпичей или битое из глины «сооружение для отопления помещений и приготовления пищи», но и множество дополнительных деревянных пристроек:

всевозможные перегородки, полки, лавочки, голбцы, приставные лежанки и лесенки. Традиционно печь занимала большую долю не такого уж большого пространства русского традиционного дома-избы. В связи, с чем все эти деревянные пристройки настолько тесно соприкасались с печью, что это вошло в поговорку. Обычно в русской деревне о людях, которые имели близкое, короткое знакомство, говорили: «У них печки-лавочки».

В связи с этим при переводе необходимо учитывать широкий социокультурологический контекст отдельных понятий и словосочетаний. Например: «победу» можно только «одержать», «роль» - «играть», «значение» - «иметь». А русский «крепкий чай» по-английски будет «сильным чаем» (strong tea), а «сильный дождь» - «тяжелым дождем» (heavy rain). А в корейском языке русское словосочетание «сильный дождь» приобретет несколько иной оттенок, поскольку корейское слово 장대 비 (чангдэ би) в буквальном переводе будет означать «дождь как длинная палка», а такая устойчивая русская фразеологическая единица как «мелкий дождь» в корейском языке будет означать «дождь росы» - 이 슬 비 (исыль би).

Но в русском языке существует множество определений для характеристики дождя: есть дожди моросящие, слепые, обложные, грибные, спорые, дожди, идущие полосами – полосовые, косые, сильные окатные дожди и, наконец, ливни (проливни). Так, например,

слепой дождик – это дождь идущий при солнце, в народе о нем говорят «Царевна плачет»; спорый дождь означает быстрый, скорый, который льется отвесно, сильно и приближается с набегающим шумом. Обложной дождь представляет собой длительно выпадающие осадки, умеренные и достаточно равномерные по интенсивности, идущие непрерывно или с короткими перерывами несколько часов или даже более суток. А грибным называется мелкий теплый дождик, который как бы медленно и сонно сыплется из низких туч, он в лесу не звенит, а шепчет как будто о чем-то своем и после него, как считают в народе, начинают расти грибы.[10]

Данные отдельные примеры лексико-фразеологической сочетаемости слов естественны и привычны в родном языке, но совершенно непонятны для иностранца (если он будет их

[9] См.: Телия В.Н. Русская фразеология: Семантический, прагматический и лингвокультурологический аспекты. – М.: Языки русской культуры, 1996. – 288 с.

[10] См.: Паустовский К.Г. Золотая роза. Полн. собр. соч. в 6-ти тт. – М.: ГИХЛ, 1953, т.2. – с.567-568.

переводить по словарю).

4. Метафоры и символы как способ представления культуры

В качестве универсального явления в языке также необходимо рассматривать и метафору, которая выступает как орудие представления определенной культуры, поскольку является одним из способов мышления и познания мира конкретного народа, отражает его фундаментальные культурные ценности и основана на его культурно-национальном мировидении. Неслучайно еще Дж. Вико крупнейший итальянский философ эпохи Просвещения и основатель культурной антропологии и этнологии, подчеркивал, что метафора, участвуя в языковом мифотворчестве, становится узлом, связывающим язык с мышлением и культурой. Например, почему в русской литературе часто встречаются фразы, описывающие чувства через образ огня? Примером, могут служить выражения типа «пламень любви», «сгорать от любви», «огонь желаний», «пламя страсти», «жгучая ненависть», «тепло дружбы», «надежда теплится» и др. Этот образ широко распространен в русской поэзии, например, «И очей моих синий пожар» (А. Ахматова); «В крови горит огонь желанья…»; «И сердце вновь горит и любит – оттого, что не любить оно не может» (А.С. Пушкин) и др.

Существуют и такие поэтические тексты (хотя, к сожалению, их не так уж много в русской поэзии), где преобладают слова, употребляемые в прямых своих значениях, но которые в целом составляют уникальное метафорическое целое. Данным искусством виртуозно владел А.С. Пушкин, примером чего могут служить строки «Я Вас любил…». В этом стихотворении читатель не встретит каких-либо ярких эпитетов, особых метафор, кроме, может быть одной «любовь угасла», как гаснет огонь, свеча, свет. Данная метафора употребляется с целью сказать больше, чем просто: «я Вас не люблю» (высказывание «любовь угасла» передает смысловую информацию, равную «я Вас не люблю», но только потому, что таковы обстоятельства жизни). В том и состоит особая привлекательность поэзии Пушкина, что при помощи самых простых слов и образов он передает прекрасное, возвышенное состояние души. Это стихотворение состоит всего из двух предложений, использующих самые обычные слова: «любовь, душа, робость, ревность…», которые в других устах могут прозвучать банальностью, но в строках пушкинского произведения они обладают особой силой и притягательностью. В этих двух предложениях, по сути, уложилась история любви от ее начала до конца, наполненная тончайшей гаммой чувств от робкой надежды до самоотверженности и благородства, от ревности до робости и нежности. Н.В. Гоголь писал, что в поэтической лирике А.С. Пушкина отсутствует красноречие, наружный блеск, здесь есть только одна поэзия. Текст стихов очень лаконичен, слов немного, но они настолько точны, что несут в себе бездну пространства, а потому имеют огромный глубокий смысл.

Метафорический образ русской природы или отдельных её представителей - деревьев, цветов широко применяется в русской прозе, поэзии и живописи. Наиболее глубоко и тонко передают этот образ люди творческие – художники, поэты, композиторы и именно, изображая природу, сходятся такие виды искусства как живопись и литература, которые имеют между собой очень

тесную связь. Глядя на картины И. Шишкина, А. Саврасова, В. Поленова, А. Куинджи, И. Левитана и многих других прекрасных русских пейзажистов вспоминаются подходящие по теме и настроению произведения как русских поэтов-классиков А. Пушкина, М. Лермонтова, Ф. Тютчева, А. Фета и многих других, так современных поэтов. В русской поэзии особенно широко используются различные метафорические приемы, способы создания языковой картины мира на основе уже имеющихся в самом языке значений, которые помогают создавать поэтические картины и яркие образы. Например, с далёких времён рябина была любимым деревом русского народа. По народным поверьям это дерево является символом мира и счастья в семье, также рябина отгоняет все болезни, поэтому её сажали перед домом. Кроме того, она оберегала от злых людей, от беды, поэтому рябина предстояла в народных поверьях настоящим «деревом - воином». Образ красной, горькой, пылающей, на излете осени, в преддверии зимы рябины стал символом судьбы поэта М. Цветаевой, тоже «переходной и горькой, пылающей творчеством и уходящей в зиму забвения» по словам известного критика А. И. Павловского. М. Цветаева использовала данную метафору для сравнения своей судьбы с основными качествами, которыми обладает рябина, и проводя параллель с общей русской судьбой - «рябина как судьба русская». Нельзя не привести, хотя бы два небольших примера из ее творчества:

Красною кистью рябина зажглась
Падали листья, я родилась.
Спорили сотни колоколов
День был субботний Иоанн Богослов
Мне и доныне хочется грызть
Красной рябины горькую кисть. (М. Цветаева «Красною кистью…» (1916г)

***
Рябину рубили зорькою.
Рябина – судьбина горькая.
Рябина – седыми спусками…
Рябина! Судьбина русская. (1934 г)

Многие русские поэты по примеру М. Цветаевой широко использовали в своем творчестве данную метафору. К ним можно отнести и Сергея Есенина, и Николая Рубцова, и Николая Рачкова, и Марию Пархоменко. Но впервые данную метафору в своем поэтическом творчестве употребил Пётр Вяземский – известный русский поэт XIX века. Во время своего заграничного путешествия в одном из своих стихотворений, которое так и называется «Рябина», написанном в 1854 году, он прославил «милую землячку». Поэт называет рябину «русским виноградом», который «сердце греет». В чужом краю она выглядит одиноко:

Тобой, красивая рябина,
Тобой, наш русский виноград,
Меня потешила чужбина,

И я землячке милой рад.

В тебя, родную мне рябину,
Впился мой ненасытный взор.

И предо мною — Русь родная;
Знакомый пруд, знакомый дом;

Образ рябины часто используется и в переносном значении и перерастает в образ русской женщины с её тяжёлой, горькой судьбой, вписываясь в женскую галерею русской поэзии, и предстает как «матушка печальная» или «молоденькая бедная вдова», которая в своей песне «рябину горькую жалела». «Рябиновый» мотив горечи, тоски, грусти проходит через всю русскую поэзию, но одним из первых его запечатлел в своем творчестве русский поэт-самоучка, представитель «крестьянского» направления в русской литературе Иван Захарович Суриков, который в стихотворении «Рябина» (1864 г.) написал такие строки:

«Что шумишь, качаясь,
Тонкая рябина,
Низко наклоняясь
Головою к тыну?»

Это стихотворение несколько позже превратилось в народную песню (из него были убраны только некоторые строфы, а все остальное сохранилось полностью), которую любят и поют до сих пор.

Контекстуальные синонимы такие как рябина - матушка - дом - Россия помогают через образ рябины размышлять и о судьбе Родины, полнее показать картины русской природы и жизни простой русской женщины с её горькой и трудной судьбой, которая как и рябина под влиянием сильных ветров, непогоды и лихолетья гнётся «до самого тына», но держится.

Много прекрасных слов в русской литературе и поэзии сказано и о другом русском дереве – березе. Россия, русская природа издревле ассоциировалась с Березой и это дерево всегда считали русским. Русское название березы лингвисты связывают с глаголом беречь. Это обусловлено тем, что славяне считали березу даром богов, оберегающим человека. Белый стройный ствол, длинные и гибкие, склоняющиеся ветви, мелкие серебристые листочки и по весне золотистые сережки – всё это Береза, которую в поэзии сравнивают с нежным, женственным и немного грустным образом молодой девушки. Многие поэты использовали данный образ в своем творчестве – это и А. Фет, С. Есенин, С. Щипачев, А. Прокофьев, А. Твардовский, Н. Рубцов и многие другие. Одна небольшая строчка из стихотворения С. Есенина «Мой путь» как пример: «Зеленокосая, в юбчонке белой стоит береза над прудом» или строчка из произведения Н. Рубцова «Березы»: «Русь моя, люблю твои березы!»

Еще одно дерево любимо в России не меньше, чем берёза – это сосна. В творчестве и русских поэтов-классиков и наших современников, таких например, как М. Лермонтов, Ф. Тютчев, А. Фет,

И. Северянин, С. Есенин, Н. Рубцов, С. Маршак и других это дерево одухотворяется, наделяется человеческими качествами и предстает как *могучая, суровая, статная, «*непобедимая *сосна» (слова А. Фета). Она стоит наперекор всем ветрам, невзгодам и одиночеству.*

И еще один небольшой литературный пример из повести Л.Н. Толстого «Хаджи-Мурат». Автор сравнивает своего главного героя, его судьбу с таким сорным травянистым *растением как репейник или его в России еще называют лопух. Оно* растет на территории практически всей Европы и в сельскохозяйственных районах с ним борются как с чрезвычайно живучим сорняком. По мнению автора, при взгляде на цветок репейника, в полном цвету раздавленного людьми посреди вспаханного поля, вспоминается история *главного героя и* присущие ему сила жизни, несгибаемость, стойкость и сопротивляемость.

В традиционных культурах стран северо-восточной Азии, к которым бесспорно принадлежат культуры Китая, Кореи и Японии, деревья и цветы также занимают особое место и достаточно широко используются в живописи, литературе и поэзии. Как в древности, так и сегодня во всех этих странах эти растения считаются символами тех или иных качеств человека. Так, например, сосна является символом мужества и непреклонности, ассоциируется с целостностью и независимостью от обстоятельств. Кроме того, сосна – это многолетнее растение, которое растет до глубокой старости, поэтому она также символизирует собой долголетие. Все эти качества позволили сосне стать любимым деревом живописцев данного региона. Бамбук символизирует собой прямоту, силу духа и верность. Изображая бамбук кистью или словом, художники воспевают человека, наделенного высокими моральными качествами. Это вечнозеленое растение растет даже в холода, не гнется и не ломается на сильном ветру, поэтому оно может символизировать стойкость и крепость духа. Цветущая слива мейхуа, как сосна и бамбук, занимают особое место в традиционной культуре Китая, Кореи и Японии. Цветы сливы очень устойчивы к заморозкам, даже таким, которые способны погубить все другие цветы. Они распускаются ранней весной, когда еще стоят холода, поэтому народы этих стран и считают, что она может символизировать почет, очарование, красоту, стойкость и выносливость. Также эти три растения сосна, бамбук и слива мейхуа считаются тремя неразлучными, верными друзьями, потому что остаются зелеными даже в холодное время года. **Хризантема** еще один любимый цветок на северо-востоке Азии. Она наделена буйством красок и, поскольку продолжает цвести до поздней осени, когда все другие растения уже отцвели, способна, по народным поверьям, бросить вызов наступающей зиме. Этот цветок символизирует бодрость духа перед наступающим ненастьем, а также уединение, поэтому может служить символом возвышенного одиночества, в условиях которого хорошо думается о пройденном пути и смысле жизни. Цветы хризантемы являются символами совершенства, осеннего спокойствия и изобилия.

В любой культуре и любом языке существует феномен присвоения растениям, цветам и деревьям особых символических значений, но именно на северо-востоке Азиатского континента эта традиция получила такую тонкую, изящную и детализированную интерпретацию. И именно в Китае появляется уникальная "Книга цветов" известного китайского литератора XIV века Юань Чжунлана. Как считается на Востоке и цветок, и дерево, и человек представляют собой явления единой сущности, требующее своего объяснения и понимания.

И еще один пример значения понимания символа при знакомстве с художественным текстом в условиях межкультурной коммуникации. Известный корейский поэт середины XX века И Хён Ги в своем стихотворении «Опадающий цветок» описывает ощущение увядания цветка хризантемы как увядания жизни человека. Для корейского поэта существует Красота увядшего Цветка, данный процесс в природе сам по себе прекрасен, поэтому и зрелые годы, и даже старость можно изобразить так, чтобы читатели поняли и увидели, будто и на старом растении распустились цветы.

Итак, можно сделать следующий вывод: и в культуре, и в языке каждого народа присутствуют одновременно общечеловеческий и национальный компоненты. Универсальные значения, одинаково осознаваемые всеми людьми в мире или представителями отдельных культур, создают почву для межкультурной коммуникации. Без таких универсальных компонентов межкультурное взаимопонимание было бы в принципе невозможно. В то же время в любой культуре присутствуют специфические культурные значения, закрепленные в языке, моральных нормах, убеждениях, особенностях поведения и т.д., которые придают ей особое уникальное звучание и содержание. В условиях межкультурной коммуникации, чтобы осмыслить эти оригинальные и исключительные, присущие только данной культурной системе, компоненты (значения), а также понять коммуникативное поведение её представителей, необходимы знания не только языка этой культурной системы, но и тонкого понимания её широкого социокультурологического контекста. Именно в таких условиях происходит зарождение и функционирование своеобразных и неповторимых терминов, понятий, концептов той или иной культурной модели, знание и понимание которых освобождает протекание межкультурного контакта от сбоев и ошибок.

Abstract

Some fragments linguistic world formation within the context of intercultural communication.

Language reflects the cultural and national mentality of its carriers, since the process of formation and development of basic language elements, such as a word, a concept and a phraseologies occurred always in a particular cultural context. In this regard, in cross-cultural communication need to sufficiently wide knowledge of the linguistic picture of the world which forms a specific national language system and its culture.

Key words: linguistic picture of the world, language as a system, phraseological unit, lingvospecific concepts, metaphor.

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Дилетант, любитель, профессионал, специалист: от лексического значения к общегуманитарному смыслу

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Обращение к анализу лексических единиц, представленных в теме данного опуса, и соответственно, обозначаемых ими понятий нельзя назвать праздным. В настоящий момент в российском обществе широко дискутируются проблемы профессиональной подготовки кадров и потребности общества в специалистах в той или иной области. В то же время, отсутствие четких критериев в оценке того, кого же следует считать *специалистом* и *профессионалом*, а кого – *любителем* или *дилетантом* – отсутствуют. Всё более очевидным становится, что формальный признак наличия документа о высшем образовании или ученой степени отнюдь не гарантирует высокую степень профессионализма. Человек же, по определению являющийся *дилетантом* и работающий в сфере, далекой от его специальности, со временем либо становится настоящим *профессионалом*, либо, так и не став им, все же считается *специалистом* и продолжает свою деятельность. Общество привыкает к этому, постепенно снижая планку требований к *специалисту* и переставая ценить профессионализм. Часто это случается в силу посторонних или сиюминутных причин, например, финансовых или личностных. Частенько признанные *специалисты* устраняются по возрастному или социальному признаку, их место занимают *дилетанты*, а дать оценку успешности их деятельности должны опять же либо *профессионалы*, либо *любители* в роли *специалистов* – и те, и другие в роли вышестоящих руководителей. В России все эти процессы, в дополнение ко всему, «круто замешаны» на проблемах так называемой реформы образования, которую с очень переменным успехом пытается в настоящее время проводить Министерство образования России, и сам процесс иногда вызывает сомнения в том, что реформа проводится *специалистами* и *профессионалами*.

Как видим, кажущееся на первый взгляд довольно ясным представление о значении и потенциальном контекстном употреблении данных единиц в речи и семантическом поле их смыслового наполнения – это иллюзия. В современном русском языке к настоящему моменту складывается неоднозначное представление не только о разного рода смыслах, которыми наполняется каждая из лексем в том или ином контексте, но и существует масса оценочных коннотаций и смысловых интерпретаций содержания данных лексем. Остановимся подробнее на содержании лексем в том виде, как они толкуются и в какие контексты попадают, а затем через контекстные смыслы попытаемся вернуться к рассуждениям общегуманитарного характера.

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Сравним толкования заданных лексем, которые предлагал Академический словарь в 1981 году, и интерпретации, даваемые более поздними словарями или обычными носителями языка в более поздний период. Для этого воспользуемся материалами интернет-ресурсов, включая Национальный корпус русского языка.

Академический словарь 1981 года, то есть, 35 лет назад, предлагает следующие толкования. ***Дилетант*** – «тот, кто занимается наукой или искусством, не имея специальной подготовки, систематических знаний; любитель» (том 1, с. 400). ***Любитель*** – «тот, кто занимается чем-л. не как профессионал, а из интереса, сочетая эти занятия с основным делом» (том 2, с. 208). ***Профессионал –*** «тот, кто сделал какое-л. занятие, деятельность своей профессией, хороший специалист» (том 3, с. 540). ***Специалист*** – «человек, обладающий специальными знаниями в какой-л. отрасли науки или техники, представитель какой-л. специальности» (том 4, с. 221).

Как видим, смысловое содержание каждой из лексем в основном своем значении (назовём его термином «узуальный смысл») семантически вытекает из значения корня. *Дилетант* - от лат. diligere, почитать, любить – напрямую связано с *любителем* и два слова на первый взгляд кажутся синонимами. Но во-первых, исторически слово *дилетант*, в отличие от *любитель*, довольно долгое время носило книжный оттенок, если верить Толковому словарю под ред. Д.Н.Ушакова. А во-вторых, как показывает дальнейший анализ, две схожие по узуальному смыслу лексемы ощутимо разошлись в смысловом отношении и используются в разных контекстах (назовем это контекстное значение термином «актуальный смысл»[i]). По-видимому, это связано с тем, что *любитель* как человек, занимающийся каким-либо делом, - это не основное значение слова. Основное значение слова – это *любитель* чего-либо, с расширением в род. пад. (например, *любитель театра*), и при этом *любитель* – это не активная, а принимающая сторона, человек не столько занимающийся чем-либо, сколько интересующийся. А вот *дилетант* – другое дело. Идея любви, интереса в узусе давно утеряна, а осталась идея человека, который занимается чем-либо таким, к чему имеет мало отношения. В связи с этим заметим, что еще 30 и более лет назад толкования данных слов не были отягощены оценочными коннотациями. Но со временем в современном обществе[ii] неизбежно накапливался негатив в отношении лиц, с уверенным видом берущихся за дело, которое им нравится, но в котором они мало смыслят. И следует предполагать, что осуждению подвергся не столько *любитель* как достаточно пассивный субъект, а *дилетант* как некомпетентный, но активный деятель.

Обратимся к текстам. Обзор интернет-ресурсов показал, что интерес к содержанию лексемы *дилетант* особенно вырос к началу 2000-х годов, достиг своего апогея к 2010 – 2011 году, а затем резко упал. Именно в эти годы объявлялись форумы по обсуждению того, что такое *дилетант*, радиоканал «Эхо Москвы» в 2012 году открыл исторический журнал под названием «Дилетант», а в Национальном корпусе русского языка зафиксировано наибольшее количество текстов, содержащих слово *дилетант.*

Слову *любитель* повезло меньше. Ни обсуждений, ни споров на эту тему найти не удалось. В интернет-ресурсах по большей части говорится о *любителях чего-либо* (то есть, в первом и основном значении слова), а в Национальном корпусе пришлось даже задать противопоставление *любитель – профессионал*, чтобы отыскать интересующие нас примеры. Интерес к слову *дилетант* резко возрос к первому десятилетию 21 века, в то время, как слово *любитель*, наоборот,

стало довольно мало употребительным.

Что интересного в подобной картине? Обратимся к семантическим процессам. Приведем несколько примеров контекстного употребления.

На вопрос, кто такой *дилетант*, поступали ответы в таком роде[iii]:

- *«человек ничего не смыслящий в каком-то узком направлении деятельности»; «человек, характеризующийся отсутствием требуемого стандартного уровня профессиональной квалификации»; «"Мы все учились понемногу, чему-нибудь и как-нибудь" В итоге и получаются дилетанты»*
- *«человек который берёться за дело, не зная как его делать....или что-то утверждающий и не уверен в том что он говорит, потому что не знает всей сути дела»; «например когда ты приходишь на новую работу и ничег в ней не смыслишь, ты там и являешься дилетатном, то есть чеолвек-который енпонимает в этой сфере нечигошеньки»; «человек занимающийся любым ремеслом, но не спец в своём деле»;*
- *«у кого очень мало знаний и опыта но есть амбиции выставлять свое незнание».* [iv]

Как видим, негатив налицо. По сравнению с прежним толкованием слова появились дополнительные смыслы: а) отсутствие необходимых знаний, квалификации, опыта и т.д. не только в области науки и искусства; б) активная деятельность в малознакомой области; в) достаточные амбиции, чтобы браться за малознакомое дело. Это подтверждается и данными, взятыми из Национального корпуса русского языка (в каестве источника примеров был взят общий корпус, где цитируются тексты из книг, устного общения, газет и т.п.). Например:

- *Министр транспорта РФ Соколов М. Ю. дилетант в области транспорта;*
  диплом, который, кстати, может купить и повесить в своем кабинете любой дилетант;
- *может, это дилетант, а может, и мошенник, который задумал срубить бабки?*
- *Дилетант вызывал смешки подчиненных и недовольство народа;*
- *Дилетант, лох, скотина, чмо.; дилетант не надежен и часто – злобен.* [v]

Однако к моменту, когда резко пошел на убыль интерес к слову *дилетант*, то есть примерно к 2010 - 2012 году, мы наблюдаем обратную тенденцию, а именно, начинается процесс оправдания *дилетанта* и стремление возвысить его, и особенно себя, в глазах общественности:

- *я разбираюсь в особенностях современного маркетинга, хотя я и дилетант;*
  при некоторых особых условиях дилетант может быть выразительнее профессионала;
- *он талантливый дилетант; я дилетант высокой квалификации;*
- *конечно, профессионализм — это хорошо, он значительно облегчает дело, но и*
- *дилетант может справиться с задачей не менее успешно, чем самый*
  натасканный (профессионал) ;
- *дилетант – это не диагноз.*[vi]

Да, в самом деле, *дилетант* – это не диагноз. Это подтверждает текст о Л.С.Выготском и о той дерзости,

«с которой он, выходец из еврейской белорусской глубинки, провинциал и, в сущности, дилетант, берется, без оглядки на авторитеты, за решение сложнейших и почти не тронутых в ту пору проблем психологии…»

Правда, контекст данного высказывания таков, что дерзость и знания

«родом из Серебряного века с его необъятной эрудицией и глубоко впитанным культурным наследием».

Дерзость же современных дилетантов, очевидно, иного рода, и следует только радоваться, что в 2009 году возможны были такие высказывания:

«и хотелось бы совершенствоваться: я ведь понимаю, чем дилетант отличается от мастера»[vii].

Что же касается *любителя*, то основной контекст, в котором встречается слово *любитель* как деятель, - это рассуждения о спортсменах и фотографах – *профессионалах и любителях*. *Любитель* здесь имеет почти терминологическое значение. Остановимся на этом ниже, в связи со словом *профессионал*. Прочие же контексты достаточно позитивны: указывается на то, что деятельность человека как *любителя* связана с его хобби, которым он занимается по зову души в свободное время, не ожидая и не требуя оплаты или вознаграждения, но ожидая похвалы от *профессионала*[viii]. Правда, упоминается, что, например, Шерлок Холмс – по существу, *любитель*, но талантливый, а Лестрейд – *профессионал*, но туповатый.[ix]

В нескольких словах обрисуем ситуацию с *профессионалом* и *специалистом*. Слово *профессионал*, так же, как и *дилетант*, получило довольно широкий контекст, в том числе, это обсуждения, споры и попытки определить, кого называть *профессионалом*. При этом по времени интерес начинает возрастать несколько позже, чем к слову *дилетант*. Слову же *специалист* повезло меньше – контекст его употреблений не столь многочислен и довольно узок. Посмотрим, как это связано с семантическими процессами.

Узуальный смысл слова *профессионал* связан с понятием профессии, от лат. profiteo – объявляю своим делом. Слово *специалист* связано с лат. specialis – особый, особенный. Академический словарь при толковании данных слов выделяет именно эти понятия: человек, который занимается своим делом и имеет для этого особенные знания.

Посмотрим, какие актуальные смыслы наблюдаются в современных текстах. Анализируя попытки разных людей дать определение понятия *профессионал*, находим следующие интересные факты.

Во-первых, профессионалом называют человека, который зарабатывает своим делом деньги. Чаще всего этот оттенок значения подчеркивается, когда речь идет о спортсменах и фотографах – *любителях и профессионалах*. В этом случае профессионал – это человек,

- *занимающийся деятельностью, приносящей постоянный основной доход; продающий результаты своего труда; профессионал, торгующий своими знаниями.* [x]

Однако критерий оказывается вовсе не четким. Отмечается, что фотограф-любитель частенько за хорошие деньги занимается, например, съемкой презентаций и свадеб в свободное от работы время, а до недавнего времени даже на международных спортивных соревнованиях выдвигалось требование, чтобы участники были *любителями*. С другой стороны, и *профессионал* отнюдь не гарантирован от того, чтобы не быть отстраненным от своего дела. Вот такой прогноз на 2015 год был дан в начале века:

- *Профессионал будет вынужден трудиться одновременно на нескольких средне-и низкоопла чиваемых работах, чтобы иметь возможность прокормить себя и свою семью*[xi].

И мы действительно видим, что, если судить по этому признаку, то *профессионалы* частенько вынуждены зарабатывать деньги в тех областях, где они являются *дилетантами*. Все-таки, количество текстов, где семантику слова определяет материальная сторона дела, сильно уступает контекстам иного рода, на которых мы остановимся чуть подробнее. Из множества примеров схожих контекстов хочется привести один, очень яркий – вот такое интересное суждение:

- *Сегодня всё изменилось. Посмотрите на слова «киллер-профессионал» или «вор-профессионал». Есть еще профессиональные вымогатели и нищие. Что за бред? Пусть попробуют публично объявить о своих «делах». Их же сразу повяжут! Если значение слова «профессионал» не вяжется со словами «киллер» и «вор», почему возникли такие словосочетания? Потому что значение слова «профессионал» изменилось. Теперь оно значит не столько «быть представителем профессии», сколько «делать дело без ошибок, на высшем уровне». А какое это дело, полезное или вредное, никого не волнует. То есть дело в данном случае не обязательно является социально «одобряемой» профессией. Вот так всё перевернулось с ног на голову*[xii].

Семантическим ядром лексемы *профессионал* в наше время стала идея высочайшего уровня знаний, квалификации, компетенции, опыта и практических навыков, профессионал – это не новичок:

- *профессионал – это тот, кто может выполнить свою работу на самом высочайшем уровне, даже если ему сейчас и не хочется этим заниматься;*[xiii]
- *это просто какой-то опять же запредельный профессионал;*
- *я профессионал, вы понимаете? Я не хвастаюсь, просто у меня такой разряд.*[xiv]

В этом отношении интересно сопоставить актуальную семантику слов *профессионал* и *специалист* в рассматриваемых контекстах. С одной стороны, утверждается, что *профессионал* – это чрезвычайно компетентный, но узкий *специалист*:

- *профессионал он в чём-то одном; никогда не действует вне рамок своей компетенции;*[xv]

профессионал очень хорошо видит один кусок жизни и может не видеть других вещей;

- *это подготовленный для работы в определённой сфере специалист.*[xvi]

С другой стороны, есть контексты, где, напротив, *профессионал* – это человек с широким кругозором, который должен понимать мир в целом:

- *профессионал должен быть многопрофильно энциклопедичен;*
- *великолепный профессионал, эрудит, человек разнообразных и глубоких знаний*.

При этом отмечается, что *профессионал* всегда находится в процессе совершенствования и своих знаний, и своих навыков. Не здесь ли кроется та грань, перейдя которую *дилетант* превращается *в профессионала*?

Что же касается *специалиста* как такового, то контекстное употребление слова интересно, в основном, эпитетами: *молодой, продвинутый, высококлассный, липовый, ведущий, хороший, главный, грамотный; с 35-летним стажем; в области; по вопросам.* Как кажется, с 1981 года семантика слова мало изменилась и, в отличие от *профессионала*, слово *специалист* имеет более формальный статус – человек, получивший образование выше среднего (в российском понимании, т.е. выше, чем старшая школа).

Контекстов множество, и оттенков смыслов тоже, поэтому сделаем остановку и посмотрим, какие же выводы можно сделать из вышесказанного, рассмотрев описанные семантические процессы в общегуманитарном плане. Как очевидно, чтобы происходили семантические преобразования лексических единиц, нужен запрос со стороны общества: происходят изменения в укладе жизни, поведении, мыслях участников общения, меняются и сами условия общения под влиянием интернета. Какой именно запрос вызвал описанные выше семантические процессы?

Первое, что хочется отметить – это ощутимые смысловые изменения в семантическом содержании лексем *дилетант* и *профессионал* и незначительные – в содержании лексем *любитель* и *специалист*. С чем можно это связать? По-видимому, запрос к этой столь актуальной тематической группе носит принципиальный характер и требует обозначения двух смысловых полей: постоянного и переменного, того, чье содержание в целом принимается и достаточно однозначно понимается всеми членами языкового коллектива, и того, чье содержание стремительно меняется, требует оценок, споров. Эти «помехи и шумы общения» хотя и не способствуют всеобщему взаимопониманию с точки зрения актуальных смыслов, но, как в математике, заставляют стремиться к некоему пределу и искать четких решений, что свидетельствует об активном состоянии общества.

Перейдем к более конкретным соображениям. Слабый интерес к лексемам *любитель и специалист* свидетельствует о том, что, несмотря на все коллизии перестроечного и постперестроечного времени и все усилия нынешних реформаторов, не удалось окончательно разрушить существующее в обществе понимание факта, что специалистами становятся в 99% люди, получившие специальное образование, а высококлассными специалистами они становятся только в том случае, если они грамотные, с хорошим стажем, а не липовые, и к тому же повышают свою квалификацию (не для получения бумаги, а реально). Об этом же, кстати,

свидетельствует и тот факт, что абитуриентов и студентов очень волнует вопрос о том, можно ли считать бакалавров (как они пишут, *бяколавров*) специалистами. И столь же естественным образом любителям не возбраняется в свободное от работы время любить какое-то занятие, а в некоторых сферах даже зарабатывать этим, достигнув некоторых высот мастерства. Эти вещи стары, как мир, и никуда не исчезнут.

Но о чем свидетельствуют описанные выше изменения смыслового содержания лексем *дилетант* и *профессионал* и повышенный интерес к *дилетанту* в начале 2000-х и к *профессионалу* – в начале 2010-х? По-видимому, все началось раньше, в годы перестройки. Предприимчивые дилетанты на волне появления феномена частной собственности начали в массовых масштабах устранять профессионалов практически из всех сфер человеческой деятельности, приносящих доходы. Планка образования и учености упала почти до нуля, а планка предприимчивости поднялась до заоблачных высот, и страна перестроилась. Потребовалось около 20 лет, чтобы результаты подобной перестройки постепенно стали проявляться: люди работают, и работают много, а не только прорыва не намечается ни в одной области экономики, науки, искусства, образования, а даже напротив… И люди в начале 2000 вдруг заговорили о дилетантах. Что именно заговорили – мы описали выше. Однако дилетант настолько прочно вошел в наш быт и занял прочное место в нашей жизни, что даже и разговоры об этом к началу 2010-х годов начали стихать. Но проблема-то осталась!

И вот на смену *дилетанту* приходит *профессионал*. Если не в жизни, то в разговорах. Слово стремительно наполняется новым смыслом, который начинает претендовать на роль основного значения: как мы уже говорили выше, это идея высочайшего уровня знаний, квалификации и т.д. Это свидетельствует о том, что в обществе зреет недовольство всеобщей некомпетентностью, и первый шаг – виртуальный – уже сделан!

Но до понимания реального состояния вещей в обществе пока далеко. Ведь каждый человек склонен считать себя профессионалом! Не случайно сейчас широкое распространение получили такие слова, как *успешный и эффективный: успешный бизнесмен, эффективный менеджер*... Отличная замена профессионализму! А мера успешности и эффективности – деньги. Для себя.

А что там по поводу развития страны?

Abstracts

Dilettante, Amateur, Professional, Specialist: from Lexical Meaning to Humanistic Sense

The article analyzes the thematic group of lexical units: dilettante, amateur, professional, specialist. Reviewing 1981 up to now contexts in dictionaries, internet and National Corpus of the Russian Language it gives some ideas of developments in actual semantic and tries to associate social demand on lexical sense and some re-languaging. The review suggests that units dilettante and professional are widely discussed and thus have been developed in meaning. Meanwhile units amateur and specialist are rather consistent. The articles indicates some exact meaning developments and gives some explanations how it reflects the society.

Key words: dilettante, amateur, professional, specialist, sense developments in contexts, social demands.

[1] Узуальный и актуальный смысл – очень удобные термины, предложенные Г.П.Мельниковым в его многочисленных работах.

[2] В СССР практически невозможно, или, во всяком случае, довольно трудно было получить работу, требующую определенной квалификации, если у человека отсутствовало специальное образование в этой области (за исключением правительственных должностей). Свободное предпринимательство было уголовно наказуемым.

[3] Здесь и далее цитируется с сохранением всех особенностей речи авторов высказываний.

[4] Интернет-ресурс https://otvet.mail.ru/question/1136455. Последнее обращение 12-14.06.2016

[5] Национальный корпус русского языка. Интернет-ресурс http://www.ruscorpora.ru/, основной корпус, поиск по слову *дилетант*, статьи 5, 26, 28, 30, 52, 68. Последнее обращение 14.06.2016.

[6] Там же, статьи 9, 53, 54, 41, 18. Последнее обращение 14.06.2016

[7] Там же, статья 13. Последнее обращение 14.06.2016

[8] Интернет-ресурс: http://cameralabs.org/3095-professionalniy-fotograf-i-liubitel-v-chem-raznitsa. Последнее обращение 13.06.2016.

[9] Национальный корпус русского языка. Интернет-ресурс http://www.ruscorpora.ru/, основной корпус, поиск по словам любитель / профессионал. Последнее обращение 12.06.2016.

[10] Интернет-ресурс http://cameralabs.org/3095-professionalniy-fotograf-i-liubitel-v-chem-raznitsa. Последнее обращение 14.06.2016

[11] Янис Астафьев. Кто будет работать в России в 2015 году? - Интернет-ресурс www.strana-oz.ru/2003/3/kto-budet-rabotat-v-rossii-v-2015-godu. Последнее обращение 14.06.2016

[12] Интернет-ресурс http://chelpro.ru/get-professional/professional-spetsialist. Последнее обращение 14.06.2016

[13] Интернет-ресурс http://www.vothouse.ru/points/pro.html. Последнее обращение 11.06.2016

[14] Национальный корпус русского языка. Интернет-ресурс http://www.ruscorpora.ru/, основной корпус, поиск по словам профессионал / специалист. Последнее обращение 14.06.2016

[15] Интернет-ресурс http://subscribe.ru/digest/business/school/n207334152.html. Последнее обращение 12.06.2016

[16] Интернет-ресурс https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/профессионал. Последнее обращение 12.06.2016

V-1 Session 3

Economic Cooperation and Public Diplomacy

Chair: Jozef Matula (Palacky University Olomouc, Czech)

≫ Economic Development of in Visegrad Countries: A Model of Economic Cooperation among Middle Powers

Sang Joon Lee (Kookmin University)

≫ Investment Policy of the Visegrad Group and Cooperation Directions between Korea and V4

Hyun Sub Byun (Hanyang University)

≫ Hallyu and `Imagined Communities` of Korean Fans: *A Comparative Analysis of the Countries from the Visegrad Group*

Valentina Marinescu (University of Bucharest, Romania)

Economic Development of Visegrad (V4) Countries: A Model of Economic Cooperation among Middle Powers

LEE Sang Joon (Kookmin University)

Introduction

After the collapse of communism and the disintegration of CMEA, much of economical-institutional divergence in the Central and Eastern Europe reflects its structural potential for the economic growth. Over 26 years, the economic achievements of Visegrad (V4) countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, were very impressive and these countries maintained political stability, economic growth and prosperity by strengthening social and economic cooperation among the V4 countries as well as European Union. The economic development of V4 countries has been magnified by accession to EU and international trade which plays a key role in the institutional rearrangements that brings very often new and completely distinguished incentive structures to domestic and international economic actors.

Agreement created a regional alliance to promote Fifteen years later, in 2006, the alliance has successfully supported the establishment of democratic government, and entrenched political stability and economic growth in all four countries, symbolically culminating in accession to the European Union in 2004.

Remarkable success of V4 countries in politics, economy, and international relations creates new opportunities of cooperation among meddle powers in regional and global level. The V4 experiences of reform with minimum level of social conflicts will provide relevant lessons for Korean Peninsula. Korea and V4 countries together make platform of cooperation and ladder for late comers of integration and development.

Reform, Political Stability, and Accession to EU

A phenomenon of globalization of world economy could be not good for the transition economy which was suffered from chaos and political instability since the collapse of old Soviet system. Usually, the appropriate institutional basis of a market economy takes a long time to put in place as the institutions includes an efficient legal system as well as informal codes of behavior. However, these V4 countries have been enjoying solid economic growth driven by external anchor, that is, accession to EU.

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The possibility of EU membership enables V4 countries to have achieved substantial progress in institutional reforms concerning international trade and foreign exchange regime. As a result, the V4 countries have achieved politically stable and economically well-developed post-communist democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and joined in the European Union in 2004.

In reality, the V4 countries experienced large FDI inflows attracted by a business friendly investment climate and preferential conditions for access to the EU to make a successful transition to a market economy. Political and economic liberalization coupled with foreign direct investment averaging some 30 percent of GDP per annum have injected capital, products, new technology and tested risk management processes to both the retail and corporate segments of these growing markets, effectively allowing them to "leap-frog" into the latest banking products and structures.

1) Historical Legacies

"Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia, "Melancholic Revolution" in Hungary, and "*Solidarity* movement" in *Poland* replace totalitarian rule with democratic governments peacefully. Transition led to decentralization of decision, pluralism of thought, and private initiative in economy and reform started with immediate corrective measures, such as relinquishing ideological control of economy.

Of course, it is obvious that Soviet institutional legacies and initial conditions were not favorable but very influential in V4 countries which inherited some unfavorable conditions such as structural malfunctions, and macroeconomic and international imbalances are difficult to reverse past choices and circumstances. The more pervasive the Soviet legacies in place, the more difficult the subsequent institutional development. In V4 countries, Soviet legacies was limited and social conflicts were low compared with other group of transition economies. Visegrad countries strengthened social dialogue to minimize impacts of Soviet legacies and conflicts among public. No matter what minimization of Soviet legacies, the costs of alignment between V4 countries and EU were so high that they matter on the integration into EU.

[Table 1] Duration of Soviet Rule in Transition Economies

Country or Group of Countries	Duration of Soviet Rule	Number of Years
CIS, except Moldova	1928–91	64
Moldova	1940–41 and 1944–91	50
Baltic countries	1940–41 and 1944–90	49
Visegrad and Balkan countries	1947–89	43

Source: Berengaut and Elborgh-Woytek(2005), p. 14

Czechoslovakia differed from other transition economies because she had already a strong democratic record even though the communist regime lasted until the Velvet Revolution of 1989. In detail, in July 1947 the Czechoslovakian government accepted the Marshall Plan but met a strong refusal from the Kremlin. However, Soviet rule in Czechoslovakia was constantly decreased and less severe than other

countries of Soviet Bloc after the Prague Spring. deed Czech and Slovakia separated peacefully.

The classical Stalinist regime prevailed for a relatively short period of time in Hungary. Hungary enjoyed one of the most liberal and advance economies in the Former Eastern Bloc. Therefore, there was no need to apply a big bang approach in Hungary which was chosen by several other CEE countries, especially Poland among V4 countries. In the socialist period, Hungary was the Eastern European country the most open to the western world. This is why Hungary was one of the first to be selected (in 1997) to enter into negotiations for EU accession.

Poland has experimented with the introduction of market socialism in the early 1980s. They learned the hard way that piecemeal reforms of the central planning system did not lead to sustainable increases in efficiency. As a result, the leaders of the Revolution of 1989 in Poland had an outward looking agenda from the start and reform as the opportunity to rejoin the mainstream of Western Europe. The identification of Polish society with Western Europe and the Polish public in a large majority consistently urges to join the European Union as soon as possible even though there were the 16 governments of Poland since the communist relinquished power, obviously, pointing at the relative unstable political landscape.

The path-dependent nature of institutional change more relevant for V4 like the other transition economy[1] but, interestingly, an important impetus for carrying out legal and institutional reforms in many of these V4 countries has been the need to develop a system that conforms to that of the European Union as a prerequisite for accession to the EU and their political and economic reforms were already more advanced than those of the other transition economies.

2) Geographical Distances

One of the most important factors in economic development is geography, in detail, it is believed that landlocked countries, such as the Czech, Slovakia, and Hungary, may be disadvantaged by their lack of access to the sea, because, first of all, these countries unable to develop infrastructure without arrangement of neighbor countries, secondly, landlocked economies cannot access regional and international trade if coastal economies may have military or economic block, which imposes costs on regional and international trade, thirdly, landlocked countries have less opportunities to use full potential production factors as cross-border migration of labor and other relevant factors is more difficult.

Production facilities tend to concentrate in particular regions, some of which enjoy objective advantages in terms of access to sea ports and other gateways to international markets, while others represent pure agglomeration around relatively minor initial advantages. In brief, the coastal countries have much chance to agglomerate capital and enjoy the diffusion of technologies. Physical and institutional barriers has been main obstacles of economic integration, while geographical distances from the center of main market are major incentives to concentrate and specialize economic activities in some regions. In this regards, if these three of V4 countries cannot become the EU member, technology transfer was limited and access to market was restricted and production facilities were not likely to settle

[1] Stark (1992) argues that a decade after transition began to be trendy among socio-economists to say that ‘history matters’’.

down. Interestingly, the importance of economic clusters in V4 has increased since the accession of the V4 to the EU.[2]

While the Western European automotive industry was stagnating in the last decade, the Eastern European, in particular V4, manufacturing was boosting, and today the Eastern European automotive output can be compared to the size of German car industry. As a matter of fact, the creation and growth of new businesses is essential for a successful transition. Most of automotive factories are located in near from Western European market as its proximity to Western Europe, if it measured by the existence of a border with an EU-member country and the distance from the closest EU capital. (See Figure 1)

The Czech automotive industry employs more than 150,000 people and accounts for more than 20% of manufacturing output and 25% of exports. Three major carmakers - Škoda Auto (Volkswagen group), TPCA (Toyota/PSA joint venture) and Hyundai Motor as well as 56 of the top 100 global top tier automotive such as engine and fuel system are located in Czech.

Volkswagen bought an 80% stake in BAZ in the Slovak Republic in 1991. France's Peugeot Citroen (2003) and KIA (2004) decided to invest in in Trnava and in Zilina, respectively. The presence of three major automotive companies in Slovakia has created abundant conditions for development of sub suppliers and in light of this the Automotive Cluster.

Automotive industry gives 19.4% of total industrial production and 20% of Hungary's total exports (16.65 bn EUR in 2012). Audi, Mercedes-Benz, Suzuki, Opel have invested in Hungary and atrract furthermore investment from over 700 automotive component firms to boost regional automotive cluter.

Fiat, Volkswagen and General Motors are the biggest players in Poland in manufacturing of automotive vehicles. Poland plays a major role as a location of numerous OEM suppliers of car components, especially engines as well as of parts. The Polish Statistical Office reports on 437 enterprises employing more than 9 people active in the field of production of automotive parts and components.

Three of V4 countries, landlocked country, was lucky as they are not surrounded by bad neighbors. Simultaneously, anchor to EU membership needs to push ahead with financial, legal, and regulatory reforms which boosted vibrant new private sectors with participation of foreign capital and successfully managed catch up Western car market.

[2] Diamond (1997) argues that technological diffusion naturally works most effectively within ecological zones, that is, in an East-West direction along a common latitude, rather than in a North-South direction.

[Figure 1] 1 Automotive Factories in CEEs



Source: http://manufacturinghungary.blogspot.kr (Accessed June 21, 2016)

Middle Power Consensus as a New Platform for Economic Cooperation

V4 countries aspire to enter, individually or jointly, EU and integration arrangements focused on EU rather than deepening integration among themselves, that is, they are currently far from having formed an effective regional integration arrangement. The Visegrad Agreement as well as the subsequent cooperation and integration among these four countries should be developed as a form of middle powers' cooperation preceding their eventual platform of middle power diplomacy and developmental cooperation in regional and global level.

As mentioned previously, the V4 countries clearly have more favorable geographical factors which can reinforce the connectivity between inside and outside of EU, help to enhance land bridge capacities by the transportation corridor and support the trade and investment. In this regards, many of West Balkan countries want to share of knowledge, experiences and lessons learnt of V4 countries in EU Economic integration process and OECD membership no matter what the Great Britain exit from EU.

[Table 2] Membership of V4 in EU and OECD and EU Presidencies


Country	EU Membership	Entrance to the OECD	EU Presidency
Czech	2004	1995	Jan.-Jun 2009
Hungary	2004	2000	Jan.-Jun 2011
Poland	2004	1996	July-Dec.2011
Slovakia	2004	1996	July-Dec. 2016

Source: www.wisegradgroup.eu

The resurgence of turbulence in global market after Brexit, the importance of the role of V4 countries in EU has been significantly increasing as they can diminish the willingness of hegemonic leaders of Germany and France to play a major role in reshaping the EU order. Moreover, the future of EU will be dependent on the middle power of V4 which has agreement for collective actions. In an era of regional integration, the regional networks and strategic alliances become the main channel of similarity and institutional homogenous, in terms of transition experience, it is important to bear in mind the potential focus and the added value of the V4 Group, which is considered to be a comparative advantage and an added value of democracy promotion and security for late comers from West Balkan countries.

In the real international relations in terms of power, middle power countries are able to do much more than want to do, and moreover, usually middle power countries is likely to have to do by the Great power.


[Figure 2] Capacity of Middle Power Countries in International Relations



Source: Author

Why do we have to consider middle power countries in the international relations? First of all, middle power countries become key players in the global and regional market in terms of their sheer size. This group of economies has essentially been responsible for global economic growth while G7 alone is irrelevant for setting international rules. Second, unfortunately, inequality and large gap between Developed and Less Developed countries (LDCs) in globalization has been widened and intensified so it cannot reduce at easy. This provides a great opportunity to explore the possibilities of cooperation among middle power countries to connect the whole world with the consideration of inequality. Figure 3 has shown the capacities and demand of, so called, Middle Power Consensus which is main goals and direction of Middle Power international policy..


[Figure 3] Capacity and Demand of Middle Power Consensus



Source: Author

The usefulness of Middle Power Consensus is not seeking hegemony but searching the position of aider in the global and balancer in the regional and specific areas. This could be realized by the knowledge sharing and open and equal trade policy which can reduce the inequality and gap between advanced and other countries in the contingent adaptability. Usually, Less Developed Countries suffered from imported institutions and system from Developed countries because it requires social consensus and social context. However, the experiences of Middle power countries is more visible to LDCs. In detail, transition experiences of V4 could be applied to peaceful resolution of Korean Peninsula. Industrialization and open trade policy of V4 and Korea could be relevant for West Balkan countries' EU accession.

[Figure 4] Middle Power Consensus in Global Economy



Source: Author

The main knowledge of V4 for Middle Power Consensus includes institutional basis of market economy from planned economy, good governance without major social conflicts and fighting against corruption, development of private sector and privatization, integration into EU, while Korea has rapid industrialization from agricultural state, open trade policy and link domestic business into global value chain, and state capacity with e-government, human resource development, and economic crisis management.

The overall knowledge of middle power enables to bring more peace and common prosperity. The role of facilitators and middle men between Great Power and the world, is very useful for encouraging equal trade that eventually reduce global imbalance and gap, as a result, the world system will be more secured.

Conclusion

The situation of EU will be very complicated and uncertain after Brexit in near future. The current crisis of EU cannot easily solved as Brexit has triggered rebalancing the members' contributions and resetting regulations in the regime of EU. However, in any case, the role of V4 countries become more crucial, then their efforts will be a powerful stimulant for EU harmonization and development.

Korea's cooperative diplomacy always seeks to further development with EU as well as V4 countries, and then it will serve as strengthening of EU. Identifying the diplomatic basis of Middle Power countries, Korea and V4 countries have large benefit from sharing knowledge and openness to global and regional market.

Investment Policy of the Visegrad Group and Cooperation Directions between Korea and V4

Hyun Sub, Byun (Hanyang University)

Ⅰ. Introduction

Bilateral relations between the Republic of Korea(ROK) and Visegrad(V4) countries developed already in the 90's. However, since the V4 countries joined the European Union (EU), there was a massive mutual relations development in both, trade and investment. We note that mutual trade and investment relations between the ROK and V4 countries are quite significant also in terms of share of the V4 countries on total EU inflows of the FDI from the ROK.

Heads of Government of the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Republic of Poland, and the Slovak Republic and the President of the Republic of Korea met on December 3, 2015 in Prague at the first summit meeting between the V4 and the ROK. The visit of President Pak Geun-hye is the first visit of the President of the Republic of Korea in the Czech Republic after 20 years.

The summit consolidated Korea's commitment to developing multi-level, multi-aspect partnerships with the four nations and, also, its commitment to laying a foundation to expand the nation's horizon of multilateral cooperation, beyond ASEAN and into Central Europe.

Following the talks, the five leaders adopted a joint statement under which they will enhance mutual cooperation across a wide range of areas, including infrastructure and energy, the creative industries, trade and investment, the defense industries, international cooperation and policies concerning the achievement of peace across the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

One of the most important factors influencing trade between the Visegrad region and the Republic of Korea is undoubtedly the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement which entered into force in July 2011 and should eliminate all tariffs in mutual trade until July 2016. This means that institution related to trade established and there is no trade issues between Visegrad countries and South Korea. So in this paper will be focused on the investment issues.

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the investment policy of the V4 countries and investment relations between the ROK and the V4 countries to suggest mutual cooperative directions between the ROK and the V4 countries from the point of view of investment relations in a general overview.

Ⅱ. Visegrad 4 countries' investment policy

1. Investment policy of the Czech Republic

The Czech Republic is a recipient of substantial foreign direct investment (FDI). Since 1990, the Czech Republic has become one of the leading countries in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region attracting most of incoming FDI. Though Poland was the leader by total volume of FDI gained, the Czech Republic and Hungary managed to achieve the highest FDI per capita ratio. While in the early years massive volumes of FDI flowed primarily into the Czech automotive, real estate, and alternative energy sectors, in 2010, the Czech Republic, together with its fellow Visegrad four countries (Slovakia, Hungary, Poland) attracted 70 percent of all FDI headed towards development of services and R&D projects in the CEE region. FDI inflow tripled in 2012 after a sharp drop-off during the economic crisis. 2014 FDI inflow data recorded a year-on-year increase of about 60 percent. The increased activity of foreign investors reflects a gradual recovery of the European market, driven mostly by the automotive industry[1].

Originally the Czech Republic attracted FDI mainly in the engineering industry. New, large automotive greenfield projects emerged in the northeast and central part of the country. These investments especially benefited from lower labor costs (relative to Western countries), the strong tradition of Czech engineering, as well as a central location.

Based on the combination of available empirical data on export intensity, intensity of R&D expenditure, trends in turnover in time, and based on the on-going process of entrepreneurial discovery that was launched in 2013 at the regional level, it is possible to identify the areas of the economic specialization in which the Czech Republic shows above-average growth potential. These include manufacture of transport means, mechanical engineering, electronics and electrical engineering, IT services and software, electricity production and distribution, drugs and medical products[2].

The structure of FDI has changed in recent years, shifting from manufacturing to other high technology sectors, such as information and communications technology. The Czech Republic aims to become a destination for investments with high value added content. Therefore, the Czech Republic focuses on negotiations with investors from the areas of R&D and services, to which it can offer an optimal combination of favorable investment factors, such as a strategic location, and a highly qualified and innovative work force.

The Czech Republic attracts a great deal of FDI for its size, and has taken strides to diversify its traditional investments in engineering into new fields of research, development and innovative technology. In fact, EU structural and investment funds have enabled the country to open a number of world-class scientific and hi-tech centers. Companies from EU member states are the chief foreign investors in the Czech economy, but the government has signaled a desire to seek more export and investment opportunities from non-European regions, including the United States, China, and South

[1] http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241745.pdf
[2] Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, *National Research and Innovation Strategy for Smart Specialisation of the Czech Republic (National RIS3 Strategy)*, October 2014.

Korea.

CzechInvest, the government investment promotion agency, focuses on the support of those sectors in which it sees significant potential for development. These sectors are as follows: Nanotechnology & Advanced Materials, Automotive Industry, Aerospace, Energy & Environment, Life Sciences, High-Tech Mechanical Engineering, ICT, Business Support Services, Electronics & Electrical Engineering, and Data Centers[3].

Government has approved amendment to Act No 72/2000 Coll., on investment incentives on 26.1.2009. The main point of the amendment is to change the focus of investment support in such a way that the provision of investment incentives for production activities in fields of manufacturing is abolished, and a new direction of investment support from the part of the state is created focusing on progressive technology, activities with high added value and great export potential. The amendment creates greater space for the support of technological centers and strategic service centers, which will lead to an increase in the international competitiveness of the Czech Republic in the field of industrial research, development and innovation, information technology and strategic services, to the creation of highly qualified jobs and the development of the knowledge economy[4].

Table 1. Strong and weak points of investment in the Czech Republic

Strong Points	Good access to the European market, a long history of industrial production and the quality of the labor force are part of the positive factors of the Czech Republic. Other notable points include: - A strong and independent central bank and an extremely stable currency - Rapid economic growth - Following a notable drop-off during the economic crisis, FDI tripled in 2012 - In 2014, FDI inflow reported a further 60% year-on-year increase - The current President is strongly in favor of Euro accession
Weak Points	- The Czech Republic is highly dependent on exports and foreign investment, which makes it vulnerable during crises. - The country's history of skepticism towards Europe and the Euro could discourage European entrepreneurs in the long term and make the country less competitive. - The country has also experienced political tension, particularly in 2009, which could undermine its stability in the eyes of potential entrepreneurs. - The slow pace of legislative and judicial reforms, as well as the judges' lack of familiarity with commercial or intellectual property cases. - Few reports exist on corruption practices. - The limited manual labor force limits the country's capacity to fulfill production demands.

Source: https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/czech-republic/foreign-investment

[3] http://www.czechinvest.org/en/target-sectors
[4] http://www.mpo.cz/en/business-support/investment-support/

2. Investment policy of the Hungary

Hungary maintains an open economy and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) remains important for the Hungarian government[5]. Hungary's high-quality infrastructure, labor force, and central location are often cited as features that make it an attractive destination for investment. Hungary had been a leading destination for FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, and FDI inflows reached a 2005 peak of USD 7.7 billion. FDI inflows in 2008 reached USD 6.96 billion, although the pace of inflows has particularly slowed since the 2008 global financial crisis and Hungary's relative advantage compared to regional competitors has diminished. In 2010, FDI had dropped to USD 1.97 billion as companies became more cautious about committing to large investments. Hungary showed some signs of FDI growth, with FDI reaching USD 4.62 billion and USD 4.01 billion in 2013 and 2014 respectively, although this marked inflow of FDI was largely composed of reinvestment of profits by existing investors and recapitalization of banks which sustained losses – few new investors entered the market. As a block, the EU accounted for 77.2 percent of all FDI stock in Hungary, with Germany standing as the most significant country of origin accounting for 24 percent of Hungary's FDI stock in 2013 and 22 percent of all FDI inflow in 2014. The United States is the largest non-European investor, holding 4 percent of FDI. FDI stock in Hungary, as reported by the Hungarian National Bank, amounted to USD 105 billion as of the end of 2014 with a majority of the investing falling within automotive, software development and life sciences sectors.

Attracting foreign investment is a priority for the Hungarian Government. In harmony with the reindustrialization strategy and objectives of the European Union, the Hungarian Government has formulated an industrial policy blueprint of its own. Hungary wants to utilize options offered by the planning period up to 2020 through channeling EU funding to enterprise development and help expand major production-oriented sectors. Within that, special emphasis will be placed on the support of high-tech industrial sectors, due to their multiplier effect. Potent high-tech industrial sectors – thanks to the transformation effect their existence and growth can exert – can and will have a positive impact on stakeholders in supplier chains and the industrial services sector. Eventually, headcount is expected to rise in these sectors, including low-skilled jobs. From the aspect of foreign trade, motor vehicle manufacturing, related sub-sectors as well as pharmaceutical and food industry exports may constitute the axis of future growth[6].

One of the key dilemmas of every industrial development strategy is how to help achieve concurrent employment and high added value growth. This, however, is not an irreconcilable antagonism. The solution lies in the differentiation of various industrial sectors producing high added value. For example, within the motor vehicle manufacturing sector, segments must be identified that produce high added

[5] The Hungarian government established the Hungarian Trade and Investment Agency (HITA) on January 1, 2011 to encourage foreign companies to invest in Hungary, facilitate bilateral trade, and support the activity of Hungarian small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). In 2014, HITA was split into the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA), which encourages and supports inbound FDI, and the Hungarian Trading House, which promotes Hungarian exports abroad. Both HIPA and the Trading House were placed under the authority of the newly renamed Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

[6] Ministry for National Economy, "The Hungarian industrial sector in the present and future options and challenges," http://www.kormany.hu/download/6/0c/90000/The%20Hungarian%20industrial%20sector%20in%20the%20present%20and%20future%20options%20and%20challenges.pdf

value but in the case of which production procedures are typically difficult to automatize and which domestic companies are having hidden potentials. These include the manufacturing of buses, railway, tramway locomotives or rolling-stock, heavy machinery and special vehicles.

It has to be noted that the development levels of Hungarian regions differ greatly, but maintaining the present status quo would be unacceptable from the aspect of both social and economic development policies. Accordingly, one of the main principles in implementing certain investment projects must be that they shall help mitigate regional disparities. In order to reach these goals, special financial instruments must be conceived and used in industrial development, which may lead to some additional gains. The phasing-out of forex loans and an interest rate environment that is favorable also for SMEs require the reconsideration of corporate lending. In the period up to 2020, the Economic Development and Innovation Operative Programme (EDIOP) will be the main instrument for supporting demand arising from the aforementioned factors.

In light of currently available export data and the structure of the Hungarian economy, exports of Hungarian motor vehicle industry products and related machinery and equipment (electrical and mechanic appliances, plastic components and rubber products) are set to rise further. In addition, global economic trend signal potential growth in the exports of, among others, pharmaceutical and food industry products. Currently, some 96 percent of products of domestic pharmaceuticals manufacturers are being exported, while export revenues are steadily rising. The chemicals industry, another key growth engine, also registered impressive trade volume increases.

Since 2010 the government has passed a number of tax changes. Some tax increases, such as so-called crisis taxes to reduce the budget deficit below 3 percent of GDP and exit the EU's excessive deficit procedure (EDP), have adversely affected some businesses[7]. These taxes, along with other regulatory measures and fees passed in 2012, targeted certain sectors including banking, energy, telecommunications, and large-sized retail operations.

Table 2. Strong and weak points of investment in the Hungry

Strong Points	- Hungary is widely considered to be the gateway to Central and Southeast Europe, which makes it an attractive market for foreign investment. - Hungary's labor force is highly educated and skilled with a particular emphasis on engineering, medicine and economics. As of 2015, there is a 99.1% literacy rate. - Despite briefly slowing in 2015, Hungary continues to be one of the fastest growing EU economies. Its financial system is one of the most well-developed in the region. - Its infrastructure, workforce and the framework of its regulations are of high quality with notable supply chain opportunities in the automotive and electronic industries. Since 2004, EU funds have continued to further develop this infrastructure. - Integration in the EU reinforces its political and economic stability, while the support of large international organizations has reduced the effects of the crisis.

[7] Hungary was under the EU's EDP procedure at the time of EU accession in 2004. The European Commission lifted the EDP in 2013, after the GOH budget deficit fell to less than 3 percent of GDP for two consecutive years.

	- As part of the 2014-2020 National Development Plan, EUR 6 billion have been allocated for further tourism, healthcare, infrastructure and environmental protection programs.
Weak Points	- From 2011-2014, the Hungarian Government successfully decreased the 81.0% high debt to GDP ratio to 76.9%. However, in order to do so, several new taxes have been introduced that mostly affect the banking, energy and telecommunications sectors. These changes have been criticized as short-sighted in terms of producing long-term structural reforms. - In 2013, most major long-term ratings on Hungarian bonds changed to BB/Ba1 and these have not significantly improved since. - Foreign accounts are largely and persistently unbalanced. - The country's openness is dependent on the economic situation of its main EU trade partners. - The population has called for loans in foreign currency and the inflation which has followed the crisis has made these loans difficult to repay for the Hungarian borrowers. - Banks have suffered great losses from the financial crisis due to debt repurchase and speculative investments. - Despite recent improvements, the currency has lost its value since the financial crisis. - Since March 2015, most large retails stores are prohibited to open on Sundays, which may result in a setback in turnover and revenue.

Source: https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/hungary/foreign-investment

3. Investment policy of the Poland

Poland's strong prospects for future growth will likely continue to attract new investors seeking access not just to its dynamic local market of over 38 million people, but also to the broader EU market of nearly 500 million. Until now Poland's growth model was based on productivity gains, dynamic exports, strong internal demand, EU funding, and foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI helped to fund Polish economic assets and improve managerial practices through knowledge sharing. Additionally, positive demographics, including the 1980s baby boom and a stable banking system, were strong contributing factors to Poland's growth.

Lately, however, these positive factors have weakened: FDI in Poland has slowed down; EU funding will drop off after 2020; and demographic trends are already showing signs of turning negative: the labor supply will soon be shrinking rather than expanding. The financial crisis gave a glimpse of the challenges Poland will be facing. From 2007 to 2012, FDI flows to Poland narrowed as a percentage of GDP by 4 percentage points, while demand slowed from Western Europe, which accounts for nearly 75 percent of Polish exports[8].

Poland welcomes foreign investment as a source of capital, growth, and jobs, and as a vehicle for technology transfer, research & development (R&D), and integration into global supply chains. The government seeks to expand the economy by encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation through the use of domestic and European Union funding (EU Structural and Cohesion funds[9], as well as EU

[8] Poland 2025: Europe's new growth engine, MacKinsey & Company.
[9] The Structural (and Investment) Funds and the Cohesion Fund are financial tools set up to implement the regional

Horizon 2020 program funds) to support scientific research, technological development, and innovation.

There are growing opportunities for foreign direct investment (FDI) in a number of Polish sectors. In services, business process outsourcing of accounting, legal, and information technology services, as well as research and development, is Poland's fastest-growing sector, and will continue to attract FDI. The defense industry is another promising sector, as Poland prepares to spend up to USD 45 billion through 2022 on military modernization, and will look for domestic production and technology transfer opportunities in awarding tenders. There are also opportunities for FDI in the energy sector (nuclear, renewables and natural gas) as Poland seeks to diversify its energy mix, and in information infrastructure as Poland implements its plan to connect all Polish households to the internet by 2020.

An increasing share of FDI in Poland is in services, although Poland has a large base of manufacturing. According to the Polish Information and Investment Agency (PAIiIZ), the number of new investment projects is growing in the automotive, business process outsourcing (BPO), research & development, aviation and IT sectors.

According to Ernst & Young's European Attractiveness 2014 report, Poland was voted the most attractive country for investments among CEE states. Poland ranked second behind India in KPMG's, IT Outsourcing Service Provider Performance Satisfaction Study 2014/2015.

Poland has a number of government programs and strategies to stimulate investment to targeted sectors including: the Energy Policy of Poland until 2050, the Electrical Power Sector Program, the Policy of the Government of the Republic of Poland with respect to the Oil Industry in Poland, and Coal Mining Activities in Poland 2007-2015. Large investments in priority sectors may qualify for the "Program for Supporting Investment of Considerable Importance for the Polish Economy for 2011-2020" which offers grants to large investments that create jobs in sectors, including automotive, electronics, aviation, biotechnology, food processing, and modern services (finance, information and communication, professional business services). The program also supports research and development (R&D) with grants for creation of new jobs and investment grants[10].

In April 2002, the Polish Parliament passed a law addressing financial support for investments. A company investing in Poland may receive assistance from the Polish Government:

- Investment assistance in Special Economic Zones (SEZ);
- Entrepreneur access to European Union structural and investment funds;
- Creation of industrial and technological zones that enable a synergy of companies working in the same sector;

In order to face the economic crisis and support long term foreign investments, the Polish Government has formulated a stabilization and development plan of 24 billion Euros, particularly to grant credit to small and medium sized enterprises and invest in renewable energy sources.

In July 2011, the Act Limiting Administrative Barriers for Citizens and Businesses went into effect, introducing a series of measures designed to diminish the burden of Poland's state bureaucracy. Since

policy of the European Union. They aim to reduce regional disparities in income, wealth and opportunities. Europe's poorer regions receive most of the support, but all European regions are eligible for funding under the policy's various funds and programmes. The current Regional Policy framework is set for a period of seven years, from 2014 to 2020. The budget of the Structural Funds is €454 billion and Cohesion Fund allocates a total of € 63.4 billion for 2014-2020. http://ec.europa.eu/contracts_grants/funds_en.htm

[10] You can see more information at: http://www.paiz.gov.pl/governmental_grants

2007, several measures were made in order to improve attractiveness of Poland for foreign investment. Since 1st January, 2012, a company can be registered as a limited liability company in 24 hours[11].

Table 3. Strong and weak points of investment in the Poland

Strong Points	- A fast-growing economy, a location in central Europe, a multilingual and skilled workforce whose productivity is rising rapidly and cheap labor costs make Poland an internationally attractive country. - Poland also enjoys a well-managed economy, which was able to withstand the crisis better than other European countries. Unlike other Central European countries, its population did not have to resort to loans in foreign currencies, in particular Swiss loans, a fact which has protected the population from maximum debt.
Weak Points	- Slow administrative procedures (according to the World Bank, it takes 30 days to form a company) and a deficit in the current account are the negative points of the Polish economy. - The adoption of the Euro, initially planned for 2012, has been compromised by the financial crisis, thus delaying the potential benefits of the Euro to the Polish economy.

Source: https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/poland/foreign-investment

4. Investment policy of the Slovakia

With a population of 5.4 million, the Slovak Republic[12] is a small, open economy, with exports accounting for as much as 92 percent of GDP. In recent years exports served as the main driver of GDP growth. Slovakia has been a regional FDI champion for several years, attractive due to a relatively low-cost yet skilled labor force, reasonable tax rates, and a favorable geographic location in the heart of Central Europe.

According to a recent EC study, FDI inflows to Slovakia as a percentage of the country's GDP fell from nearly 9 percent in the 1999-2003 period to the current level of 2 percent. The stock of FDI reached over 42 billion Euros in 2012. Inward flow of FDI to Slovakia was 670 million Euros in 2013. Most recent FDI has been focused on the expansion of businesses already operating in Slovakia (including investments in production facilities and job creation), as opposed to new investors entering the country.

The flow of FDI into Slovakia has declined since 2007 due to changes in the government's investment policies which decreased the attractiveness of the business environment. Among the most pressing domestic issues potentially threatening the attractiveness of the Slovak market are the recent increase in corporate taxes, increasing labor costs, changes to the Labor Code that reduced labor flexibility, as well as ongoing corruption issues and an inadequate judiciary. The energy sector in particular is characterized by high costs, unpredictable regulatory oversight, and growing government interference. A low rate of investment in R&D, poor infrastructure, and lack of interest in technical education also threaten Slovakia's position as top FDI destination in the region.

After Prime Minister Fico's center-left Smer-SD party gained majority in the 2012 Parliamentary elections, the flat 19 percent tax - introduced during a comprehensive 2004 tax reform - was abolished,

[11] https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/poland/foreign-investment
[12] Slovakia joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 and the Eurozone in 2009.

and personal and corporate income taxes, as well as the value added tax (VAT), increased. Corporate income tax increased to 23 percent, decreasing in 2014 to the current 22 percent. The rate is below the OECD average of 25 percent and in line with comparable small OECD economies; however, it is 3 percentage points higher than in the other V4 countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). According to a recent OECD tax review, Slovakia's tax system relies heavily on social security contributions, making labor cost less competitive than its neighbors. VAT is currently at 20 percent, with the exception of 10 percent for pharmaceutical products and books. Efficiency of VAT collection is low, although there has been some recent progress due to the government's efforts to fight tax fraud.

The automotive industry, including auto manufacturers and the extended supply chain, continues to play an important role in the Slovak economy. Slovakia still ranks as the world's top per capita producer of passenger cars, with an output of 183 cars per 1,000 inhabitants. Two of the three car makers based in Slovakia announced additional investments in their production facilities for 2015.

The Economy Ministry[13] most recently published its Industrial Strategy of Slovakia in 2012. According to the strategy, manufacturing sectors will continue to dominate Slovak industry, accounting for 90 percent of total employment and 80 percent of GDP production. The key industrial sectors include automotive, electro-technical, chemical, machine industry, and metallurgy. In 2014, industry and industrial production together accounted for nearly 40 percent of GDP[14].

The Slovak Government passed the Smart Specialization Strategy for the Slovak Republic (the RIS3 document) via the Government Resolution no. 665/2013 on 13 November 2013. The document identifies four key areas of economic specialization: (1) Automotive and mechanical engineering industries; (2) Consumer electronics and electrical equipment; (3) Information and communication technologies and services, and (4) Production and processing of iron and steel. The document also lists 'prospective areas of specialization', such as (a) automation, robotics and digital technology; (b) processing and increasing the value of light metals and their alloys; (c) production and processing of plastics; (d) creative industry, and (e) increasing the value of domestic raw material base[15].

A new amendment to the Act on Investment Incentives (561/2007 Coll.) became effective in May 2014. The law regulates the conditions under which investment incentives are made available to foreign and domestic investors, such as eligible sectors (including industry, technology centers, strategic services, and tourism) and specific requirements per sector, such as minimum volumes of investments and underlying conditions for receiving incentives in the form of tax breaks or other forms of stimuli for both new investments and expansion. The amendment introduced a preference for high added value investments, sustainability of created jobs and education requirements for employees. The Act on Investment Stimuli from the EU structural and investment funds covering the 2014-2020 period, valid as of November 1, 2014[16].

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[13] The Economy Ministry is in charge of negotiating with potential and existing foreign investors. A specialized government agency - the Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO) is in charge of attracting foreign investments to Slovakia.

[14] http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241950.pdf

[15] https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/regional-innovation-monitor/policy-document/slovenska-republika/smart-specialisation-strategy-slovak-republic-period-2014-2020

[16] http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241950.pdf

Table 4. Strong and weak points of investment in the Slovakia

Strong Points	The country's main advantages are: - A strategic geographical position: the country is situated in the center of Europe; - A workforce that is inexpensive and well qualified; - its advantageous tax system, with a single tax rate of 19%; - The existence of several financial aids favoring foreign investment and can range from 20 to 50% of investment costs, depending of the projects; - A large growth potential; - The adoption of the Euro since January 1st, 2009, which has made disappear the risks of foreign exchange; - A low cost of living in relation to the rest of Europe.
Weak Points	The main weak points of the country are: - Important technical and administrative barriers: requirement of import licenses especially for raw materials, energy and some agricultural products; - High energy costs: Slovakia must import 90% of its energy needs. - Deficient infrastructures. Although, governmental reforms have been set up, the infrastructures are not yet well developed and the country has no access to the sea. - The small size of its domestic market with a population that has a low purchasing power.

Source: https://en.portal.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/slovakia/investing

Ⅲ. Directions of investment cooperation between Visegrad 4 countries and ROK

V4 unites four of the six most advanced CEE(Central and Eastern European)[17] economies which account for 2/3 of gross domestic product (GDP), 3/4 of industrial production, 1/2 of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and 1/2 of population 20 of the whole CEE region. According to the surveys of the World Economic Forum (WEF), Institute for International Management Development (IMD) and the World Bank for 2006–2014, the V4 countries (listed top 30s–60s in competitiveness rankings) belong among the most competitive economies in the CEE region, which makes them attractive for foreign investors, among other the Hyundai Group, LG Electronics, Samsung and other Korean companies.

South Korea’s Investment for Visegrad 4 countries is most closely associated with the automotive

[17] In modern definition, the CEE region consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, (partly recognized) Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR of Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine are referred to as the Eastern Europe (EE). Martina Jiránková, Ilya Bolotov. “BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP 2004 – 2014: A TEN-YEAR PERSPECTIVE,” *Conference Proceedings International Scientific Conference and Workshop: Mutual Relations between the Republic of Korea and V4 Countries in Trade and Investment*. 2015.

industry. Because current competitiveness of Visegrad 4 countries is in manufacturing, it is particularly focused on the automotive business. It is a natural phenomenon that South Korea's investment focused on the automotive industry.

Table 5. Korea FDI for Visegrad 4 countries, million dollars (March, 2016)*

		New Incorporation	Investment Amount	Manufacturing Investment ratio
Czech Republic	Total	64	1,187	
	Manufacturing	41	1,104	93.0
Hungary	Total	78	418	
	Manufacturing	45	269	64.4**
Poland	Total	163	1,444	
	Manufacturing	105	1,298	89.9
Slovakia	Total	113	1,230	
	Manufacturing	81	1,208	98.2

Source: Korea Eximbank (2016)

* Total amount is from 1989 to 2016

** Low ratio resulted from the case of financial services investments, which is identified as the most KDB (Korea Development Bank) Europe.

As for the future prospects of South Korean FDI inflows to V4 countries, we see a decline of large of Greenfield projects in the region in the last years. This trend is also reflected in the investment activities of the South Korean companies. All the major Korean corporations already established their production base in the V4 countries and in the future we see only limited possibilities for new big Greenfield projects.

It means it is necessary for diversification strategy to increase investment in Visegrad 4 countries. The V4+Korea platform should concentrate on projects that will suitably complement and enrich other levels of cooperation, i.e. bilateral relations and the strategic partnership between the V4 and the ROK. These projects cover areas such as research, modern technology and construction.

The main areas of V4+Korea cooperation are summed up in the Joint Statement on the occasion of the First Summit of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group and the President of the Republic of Korea. The follows are related to economic cooperation between Visegrad Group and the Republic of Korea[18]:

8. The V4 and the ROK intended to promote the sustainable increase and development of trade and investment to their mutual advantage.

9. The V4 and the ROK considered to explore the possibility of establishing a partnership for building the innovative and creative economy through cooperation in the fields of R&D, science, technology and innovation, and agreed to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on establishing a V4–Korea

[18] http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements/joint-statement-on-the

multilateral joint research programme in this regard.

10. The V4 and the ROK recognized the usefulness of strengthening energy cooperation between the two sides in a mutually beneficial way, and would consider dialog opportunities to exchange views on global and regional energy situation as well as energy policies.

11. The V4 and the ROK acknowledged the importance of further developing infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe to facilitate economic growth and decided to consider establishing a 'V4–Korea Ad Hoc High-level Meeting on Infrastructure', which would explore opportunities for transport and infrastructure cooperation, including highways, railways and ITS (Intelligent Transport System), among others.

12. The V4 and the ROK acknowledged the necessity to promote partnership of their Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) based on a broad consensus on the need to share the best practices that would strengthen SMEs.

16. The V4 and the ROK expressed their commitment to reinforce their cooperation in the field of tourism to their mutual advantage (e.g. Winter Olympic games 2018, National Tourism Organizations' cooperation), which is an important element of their economic relations between the participating countries.

Based on the Visegrad countries' investment policy and agreement among The V4 and the ROK leaders, we can deduce the common perspective investment cooperation areas such as infrastructure consturction, energy, R&D and ICT.

First, the attractive business expansion sector of South Korea's investments for V4 countries is infrastructure project. Infrastructure projects say that participating in a large-scale public projects market that put EU Cohesion Fund[19]. EU Cohesion Fund allocated approximately about 41.5 billion euros (65.5% of total 63.4 billion euros) to V4 countries for transport infrastructure and environmental programs in the programming period 2014-2020. Up to now Korean companies' amount of construction ordered from EU is USD 18.5 billion, which only consists of 2.6% of total foreign construction ordered[20].

Korean companies have to consider the participation in public services in cooperation with the EIB as well as EU structural and cohesion funds, in particular privatizations and private-public partnerships in transport and municipal and environmental infrastructure projects.

Second, the cooperation of the Visegrad Group in the energy sector is an extremely important part of their economic policy. The energy sector plays a pivotal role in shaping the competitiveness of the economy as a whole, through the increasing role of electricity prices in industrial manufacturing. Regional cooperation in the energy sector is a key priority in the context of recent developments that affect the security of natural gas supplies in Central Europe. One of the V4 countries' focusing issues related to energy security is cooperation in the nuclear field.

[19] The Cohesion Fund is aimed at Member States whose Gross National Income (GNI) per inhabitant is less than 90 % of the EU average. It aims to reduce economic and social disparities and to promote sustainable development. For the 2014-2020 period, the Cohesion Fund concerns Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/cohesion-fund/

[20] Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. December 21, 2015.

Most central European countries have been expanding the nuclear power proportion. It is expected that South Korea's companies enter the V4 nuclear power industries. For example, there are total 6 units of Czech nuclear power plant and the Czech government has announced plans to expand nuclear power generation over the next 50 years the proportion from 80% to 90%. The demands for equipment maintenance of 6 nuclear power plants also are expected to be substantial. Since South Korea's investment entered the Czech Republic, the investment is expected to expand to neighboring countries.

Third, it seems that investment in R&D sector is actively done to take advantage of the excellent human resources of basic science and network in V4 countries. It is expected to increase scientific and technological capabilities through the joint venture and be available this entry based on joint research practices, because the Visegrad countries' policy incentives are granted to the R&D sector.

V4 countries are in the process of transforming into a knowledge-based economy to increase economic competitiveness. For example, Poland plans to spend 1.7 percent of GDP on research and development by 2020. During 2014 – 2020 Poland will receive approximately USD 88.85 billion in EU Structural and Cohesion funds that the Polish government is dedicating to research and development (R&D). In April 2014, the Polish government approved the Enterprise Development Program 2020 to create a friendly business environment and support R&D, innovation projects, and cooperation between business and academia. The Enterprise Development Program and the National Strategy for Smart Specialization were adopted on April 8, 2014. These programs focus on promoting an innovation-friendly business environment and improving R&D support system financing with better financial instruments and tax incentives[21]. Businesses may also take advantage of the European Union's primary research funding program, Horizon 2020.

Fourth, the adoption of new and digital technologies is an objective at each of our export partners and one of the cornerstones of the EU's competitiveness policy. The use of digital technologies is expected to boost high added value-producing activities. V4 Group included the digital agenda to the long-term priorities of the V4 region and will in particular look into the area of digital learning, improving the regulatory environment for cross-border e-commerce, supporting research and development of digital technologies. South Korea's ICT enterprises have a sufficient competitiveness in technology and will be able to enter in the field of broadband network, intelligent transportation systems (ITS), e-government, disaster prevention systems, e-learning and Smart City.

Finally, Republic of Korea has good experiences in economic and industrial development. Decades of export oriented economic development lifted South Korea into the group of most developed countries and made it a top 10 exporter in the global scale. Korea can share its experiences in closer cooperation, including meetings at expert level under new program, so-called 'Knowledge Sharing Program' to exchange industrial innovation and investment policy know-how.

[21] There are tax incentives for R&D: the New Technology Tax Relief and the Tax Deduction for R&D centers. These incentives have been in place for almost ten years, but are infrequently used. In 2013, only 75 companies claimed the technology tax relief, with an average pretax credit of $1.3 million per company. Design of the technology tax relief is targeted at supporting the purchase of technology and not in-house development. Eligibility criteria for the R&D centers tax deduction are considered too restrictive, especially for newly opened firms. Only 34 R&D centers benefitted from this tax incentive in 2014.

Ⅳ. Conclusion

The sources of the V4 competitiveness, as defined in (Nečadová and Soukup 2013) and (Paličková 2013), are their a) location in the geographical center of Europe, b) educated labor force, less expensive than the advanced economies' average, c) the ability to adapt to changes in the world economy, as well as d) an important consumer market of 65 million people (2014). Significant improvement in the business environment of V4 took place after their accession to the EU on May 1, 2004, which unified the V4 legislation with the Community acquis and EU norms, standards and procedures under the Copenhagen criteria[22].

From the point of view of investment climate of Visegrad four countries, I think that there is no significant difference in investment climate based on the data provided by table6. Visegrad countries just have a little common problem in corruption. Korea should note that it is opaque public administration by bureaucracy in the Visegrad countries. Administrative transparency of the V4 is low about 30~50th country of the 168 countries on the mere in the CPI(Corruption Perceptions Index) that TI(Transparency International) has released by 2016. Even after entering the market economy, the unique former communist bureaucracy remains. Public procurement, subsidies related administration is opaque and communication is not smooth. It may act as an investment obstacles when Korea enter into the Visegrad countries.

So, it is necessary to reduce administrative burdens to attract foreign investment and improve business climate in V4 countries. The deregulation-focused attitude in the legislative process will result in a homogenous, unambiguous, pro-competitiveness regulatory environment. And the regulatory environment must be overhauled along the lines of improved economic transparency, which will in turn boost fiscal revenues.

Table 6. Index or Rank related to investment climate of Visegrad 4 countries and ROK

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Korea, Rep.
Population(mil.), 2015	10.64	9.89	38.56	5.44	49.11
TI Corruption Perceptions index, 2015	37 of 168	50 of 168	30 of 168	50 of 168	37 of 168
World Bank, "Ease of Doing Business", 2016	36 of 189	42 of 189	25 of 189	29 of 189	4 of 189
Global Innovation Index, 2015	24 of 141	35 of 141	46 of 141	36 of 141	14 of 141
World Bank GNI per capita (US$), 2014	18,350	13,340	13,680	17,750	27,090
Corporate income tax/VAT (%), 2015	19/20	10~19/25	19/23	22/20	10~22/10

Source:

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#downloads,

http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings,

[22] Martina Jiránková, Ilya Bolotov. "BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP 2004 – 2014: A TEN-YEAR PERSPECTIVE," *Conference Proceedings International Scientific Conference and Workshop: Mutual Relations between the Republic of Korea and V4 Countries in Trade and Investment*. 2015.

https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/content/page/data-analysis/
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD

Current South Korea's investment for Visegrad is concentrated in the manufacturing industry. Therefore, diversification of the investment project is directly connected to the investment expansion. It is necessary to seek diversification of the business in the parts of infrastructure, energy, R&D and ICT depending on national circumstances and government policy in Visegrad 4 countries.

Table 7: Status and Implications South Korea's Investment for Visegrad

	POLAND	CZECH	HUNGARY	SLOVAKIA
Existing Korea Investment	Automotive, electronics	Manufacturing	Manufacturing and finance	Manufacturing (Automotive)
Promising investment industry	(1) Infrastructure (2) Mechanical and Automotive (3) Energy	(1) Automotive Parts (2) Nuclear Power Plant and Equipment (3) Chemistry	(1) Mechanical and Automotive (2) Medical and pharmaceutical (3) Science and Technology R&D	(1) Automotive Parts
Investment obstacles	(1) Transport infrastructure deviation (2) Rapid wage increase	(1) Public institutions opaque administrative	(1) Frequent revision tax system (2) The foreign worker recruitment difficulty	(1) Lack of translation human resource and interpretation human resource of Slovak (2) Public institutions opaque administrative
Investment Strategy	(1) Investment incentive policy leverage (2) Establishment own brand (3) Building local networks	(1) Mutual investment	(1) Government policy leverage for trade diversification (2) Large investment projects with financial support or advance accompanied	(1) Bridgehead in the European market

Source: Sang-Hoon Nam, "Attractiveness of the Visegrad region for trade and investment development: the Korean perspective," *Conference Proceedings International Scientific Conference and Workshop: Mutual Relations between the Republic of Korea and V4 Countries in Trade and Investment*. 2015. p.85.

Hallyu and `imagined communities` of Korean fans
A comparative analysis of the countries from the Visegrad Group

Valentina Marinescu (University of Bucharesst – Romania)

My analysis starts from the concept of 'social identity' – and here uses the theories that explore the relationship between an individual's personal identities and their group identities, and the ways in which this relationship is evident in everyday talk (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Holmes, 1997). In general, the individual identity is conceived as a unique complex of interacting aspects of different group and personal identities (Holmes, 1997). In any interaction, while all facets of an individual's social identity are potentially relevant resources, individuals tend to present or focus on particular aspects of their social identity, sometimes emphasizing gender, sometimes ethnicity, sometimes power, authority or professional status, and sometimes organizational or institutional identity.

'Identity' is an extremely complex construct (De Fina, 2004) and the study of this issue has 'attained a remarkable centrality within the human and social sciences' (du Gay et al., 2000) in recent years. According to Zimmerman, there are three main types of identity that can be discerned in a person: transportable, situational and discourse identity (Zimmerman, 1998). The first type could be seen as the essence of a human being, which a person carries, or 'transports' along with him/her and which is present in any context. The second type is the identity that emerges depending on a specific situation and that change in different contexts. Finally, there is the discourse identity, which is constructed locally in every single stretch of talk or text that a person produces. Bauman describes this final type of identity construction as follows (Bauman, 2000, 1):

> '…in this perspective identity is an emergent construction, the situated outcome of a rhetorical and interpretive process in which interactants make situationally motivated selections from socially constituted repertoires of identificational and affiliation resources and craft these semiotic resources into identity claims for presentation to others.'

Many sociologists and psychologists still assume that identities are solid structures, built in a more complex way, from a variety of 'building blocks' (Cohen, 1997). However, writers such as Bhabha challenge this assumption and state that the articulation of the difference between 'spaces' is where we need to focus our attention (Bhabha, 1994). In the same vein, Bourdieu (1994) talks of the 'biographical illusion' that describes life as a coherent path according to culturally available interpretive patterns and

* Draft paper only.

images.

In the case of the fans of the popular culture's product the exteriority of the relations individuals have with their 'object of fandom' is in a continous dynamic. To offer a more comprehensive view we make appeal here at the concept of 'assemblage' as developed by Giles Deleuze (Stivale 2005). The key idea in Deleuze's formulation of the 'assemblage' is the exteriority of relations. Such an exteriority suggests that not only relations are external to their terms, but also that 'a relation may change without the terms changing' (Stivale 2005). In an assemblage components have certain autonomy – a relative autonomy – which means that they can be detached from and plugged into other existing social and cultural assemblages – such as new nations, new dorms of popular culture and so on.

The paper presents the results of the Research Grant granted by Academy of Korean Studies in 2013 – 2014 (AKS-2013-R 71).

The project seeked answers at the following research questions:


RQ1. What are the main characteristics of the consumers (publics/audiences) of South Korea popular culture in the case of the countries from the Visegrad Group?

RQ2. What are the ways in which members of groups of fans from the countries of theVisegrad Groups build their (online and offline) communities of fans of the Korean popular culture?

RQ3. What are the means through which fans granted the passage between the 'real' existences of local groups of Korean-fans their membership to the 'imagined communities' of Hallyu consumers?

The main research methodology used is a sociological one. The research universe of the project covers four countries – that is, four distinct societies, which constitutes the Visegrad Group: The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary – and four distinctive, national samples of South Korean fans are analyzed: nineteen (19) respondents were from the Czech Republic, thirteen (30) from Hungary, fifty-one (51) from Poland and fifteen (15) from Slovakia.


Figure 1. Gender of the respondents



The samples were made mainly from young women (aged 13-30 years). In the case of the Czech respondents all the interviewees were women and 83% were aged 13-19 years old. 90% of the Hungarian sample was made of women (only 10% were men) -42.90% of them are 13-19 years old while 46.40% were 20-30 years old. The Polish sample comprised 96.1% women - 52% of them were

13-19 years old and 44% were 20-30 years old. In the Slovak sample's case 86.7% of the respondents were women, 66.7% aged 13-19 years old and 26.7% aged 20-30 years (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).


Figure 2. Age of the respondents



As the majority of the respondents were young (13-30 years old) I was interested to see how they started to be interested and attarcted by the South Korean cultural products. One can notice some interesting differences among the countries analysed. Thus, 53.3% of the Slovak respondents had become interested in Hallyu due to the fact that they listen to K-pop while only 21.1% of the Czech interviewees were at the begining attracted by K-Pop. In the same vein, while 23.3% of the Hungarian respondents had declared that they were attracted by Hallyu after they had watched K-dramas, only 17.6% of the Polish respondents had 'started to be Hallyu-fans after they watched South Korean TV series.

At the same time, as the data shows (see Figure 3), although movies, TV dramas, music (in general) and K-Pop (in particular) were the main 'gates' for the majority of the South Korea fans in all four countries, there are some national differences according to the national sub-sample of respondents. Thus, 10.5% of the Czech respondents started to be interested in South Korea after they played Korean PC games while 3.9% of the Polish interviewees were at the beginning attracted by the Japanese popular culture (manga, anime and Japanese TV dramas) and, after that, had shifted their intered towards South Korean popular culture. Also, 10% of the Hungarian sample and 7.8% of the Polish respondents had become attaracted by the South Korean culture while they learn the Korean language and litterature at the University.


Figure 3. The begining of the respondents' interest in South Korean culture



When asked how they can characterise Korean culture in brief, the Hallyu fans from the four countries had used a common vocabulary which contains words such as: 'amazing', 'colorful', 'fascinating', 'beautiful', 'exotic', 'interesting', 'special', 'unique' (see Figure 4).

One can also notice local, national variations among group of fans. Thus, the Slovak respondents used in a greater degree – 13.3% - the word 'amazing'when they referred to South Korea, while 16.7% of the Hungarian fans had assessed South Korea as 'unique' and 11.8% of the Polish interviewees defined it as 'interesting'. A percent of 10.5% of the Czech fans briefly described South Korea using the word 'pride' and another 10.5% of them had referred to it as 'beautiful'. Only the Polish fans had associated South Korea with a specific cultural product – 7.8% of them defining it through the word 'K-Pop".

Figure 4. Characterisation of South Korea through a single word




The similarities among the four groups of fans had been recorded also in the case of positive traits of South Korea they had identified when answered at the question: 'What are the main positive traits of the South Korean culture and society?'.

According to the descriptions of the South-Korean fans from Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 'respect' was the main characteristic of South Korea (see Figure 5) – 6.7% in the case of Hungarian fans and also in the case of Slovak respondents, and 2% for the Polish intervievees.

At the same time, local variations were recorded among the groups of fans: the Czech fans differentiated themselves by naming 'Confucianism' (10.5%) and 'The importance of family' (10.5%) as the main positive characteristics and 'Hardwork' (3.9%) plus 'Politeness' (3.9%) were used only by the Polish respondents with reference to positive aspects of South Korean culture and society (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Main positive characteristics of South Korean popular culture



Due to the fact that the research project was centered on Hallyu fans from the Visegrad Group it was quite normal that among their activities related to South Korea one could notice the exienece of a 'common set' of group and individual involvement: 'fan meetings', 'listening to K-pop', 'watching K-dramas', 'learning Korean language' and 'writing and translating articles for the internet-based communities' (see Table 1).


Table 1. Main individual and group activities related to South Korea in which the respondents were involved

	Czech Republic	**Hungary**	**Poland**	**Slovakia**
Fan meetings	31,6%	24,0%	11,9%	6,7%
Watching K-dramas	31,0%	10,0%	23,6%	2%
Listening to K-pop	**47,4%**	**45,4%**	**45,2%**	**33,4%**

Learning Korean language	21,0%	30,1%	15,7%	**46,7%**
Watching Korean movies	21,0%	10,0%	9,9%	6,7%
Writing and translating articles related to K-culture for the Internet	15,8%	13,2%	2%	6,7%

In this case, once again, I can notice local-national variations and differences among the four groups of South Korea-fans. The Hungarian fans mentioned among their activities related to South Korea 'playing Korean PC games' (6.7%), 'enjoying Korean food' (11%) and 'performing traditional Korean dance and music' (6.6%). The Polish fans were the only ones who mentioned 'reading Korean literature' (5.9%) among their South Korea-related activities and some of them also had declared that they attended 'Korean concerts' (2%) and 'korean cultural events' (2%) (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Activities related to South Korean culture in which respondents were involved




As the respondents were already members of South Korean fan groups I was interested to see what they know about the (national and international) fan groups'activities. At the question 'What do you know about the activities of South Korea fan-groups?' the answers recorded in the case of respondents from the Visegrad Group countries showed the 'online activities of South Korea's fans groups' were the mentiond by almost half of each national sample (47.4% in the case of Czech fans; 46.7% by the Hungarian repsondents; 39.2% by the Polish interviewees and 40% in the case of Slovak fans). In the same vein, fans mentioned 'activities of the fan clubs of K-pop' (with a 'peak' for the Slovak respondents – 40%), 'activities on the Facebook' (in this case the maximum was recorded by the Hungarian interviewees – 40%) and 'offline meetings of fans' – which was mentioned mainly by the Czech fans (57.9%) and Slovak respondents (40%) (see Table 2).

Table 2. Activities of the Hallyu fan groups known by the interviewees

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Activities of the fan clubs of K-pop	21,1%	26,7%	30,8%	**47,8%**
Activities of the Facebook pages of South Korea's fan groups	26,8%	**40,0%**	27,2%	20,0%
Online activities of the fan groups (forums, blogs etc.)	**47,4%**	**46,7%**	**39,2%**	**40,0%**
Events and flashmobs related to Korea culture	10,6%	20,0%	15,7%	13,4%
Offline meetings of South Korea's fan grops	**57,9%**	32,4%	35,3%	**40,0%**


Apart from those commonly know activities throughout all four countries considered the analysis of the results showed again the existence of national differences among fans of Hallyu. Thus, only the Czech fans had mentioned 'meetings in common with Japan's fans' (5.3%) and the Polish fans differentiated themselves by naming 'making translations from Korean language into Polish language' (2%) as known activity of Hallyu's fans (see Figure 7.).

Figure 7. Activities of South Korea fan groups known by the respondents



As it is well kown, South Korea exports not only cultural products (movies, TV series, K-pop, traditional dance and music etc.) but also other types of materials goods, being one of the leading world economic powers. In the research project I was interested to see what knew the Hallyu's fans about South Korea's economic and cultural presence in their country (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Knowledge about the types of South Korean products which exist in each country



Due to pecularity of the four samples analysed (all of them comprising Hallyu fans from the countries of the Visegrad Group) the majority of respondents had mentioned cultural products as the main types of South Korean goods which they noticed in their country.


The analysis of the results showed not only the widespread of Hallyu-related information but also the public perception of the South Korea's main exports in each country – such as 'cars' (mentioned by 6.7% of the Solvakian repondents), 'electronics' (mentioned by 5.3% of Czech fans, 3.9% of Plish fans and 6.7% of Slovak respondents) and 'cosmetics' (mentioned by 15.8% of the Czech interviewees, 3.3% of the Hungarian respondents and 2% of the Polish fans) (see Table 3).

Table 3. South Korean goods present on the national markets as they were identified by the respondents

	Czech Republic	**Hungary**	**Poland**	**Slovakia**
The advertisments of different South Korean products and goods		3,3%	6,0%	
South Korean cars				**6,7%**
South Korean cosmetics	**15,8%**	3,3%	2,0%	
South Korean electronics	5,3%		3,9%	6,7%
South Korean technology	5,3%		**9,8%**	**6,7%**

In the interview-guide used have also introduced a prospective question related to the ways in which South Korea could play the role of a 'model' for the own country of the respondents. The answers at this question showed that 'importance of education', 'love of the country' and 'importance of respect'were assessed by the interviewees from all four samples as the South Korean 'key-features' which could be successful borrowed and used in their own country (see Figure 9).

Figure 9. Assessments of the things that the respondents' country can learn from South Korea



At the level of each sample's peculiarities the data shows that national groups of fans assessed in different ways the main characteristics that their country can 'borrow' or 'learn' from South Korea. According to the opinions of the Czech fans 'politeness' was the main traits which can be learnt from South Korean society and culture, while the Polish respondents declared that 'ethics' was the 'key-charactersitics' which can be borrowed by the Polish society from the South Korean one (see Table 4).

Table 4. National variations regarding the things that the respondents' country can 'learn' from South Korea

	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia
Ethics	5,3%		**5,9%**	
Politeness	**10,5%**	3,3%		
The way in which Korean men treat Korean women			3,9%	
Balance in attitudes and values			3,9%	
Culture	5,3%	3,3%		
Search of the progress		3,3%	2,0%	

At the end of this analysis I can offer some answers at the research questions stated in the beginning.

RQ1: In the case of the main characteristics of the consumers (publics/audiences) for Hallyu products (TV series and/or K-Pop music) I can say that in the case of the countries from the Visegrad Group I have witnessed both the practical validation of Liebes and Katz theories (Katz & Liebes 1985: 188; Katz

&Liebes 1986; Katz & Liebes 1988) regarding the cultural motivations involved in media consumption and the validation of the theories emphasizing globalism and the hybridity of these cultural products (Chan & Ma, 1996; Cho, 2005; Dator & Seo, 2004).

RQ2: The results of the research project also showed that the groups of fans from the four countries (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) lived a 'double-life'. My result confirm boyd's (2007a, 2007b) thesis according to which for computer-mediated communication a series of 'imagined communities' emerged through the articulation of virtual 'friends' networks. Those communities have a rather more 'egocentric' character (boyd 2007a, 2007b) but they do allow their participants to express themselves – to rebuild their personal selves in a virtual way – and to locate themselves culturally so that they interact with other users within the network. In the case of Hallyu's fans from the Visegrad Group those 'imagined communities' were both socially built and imagined (boyd 2007a, boyd 2007b).

RQ3: The fans made the 'passage' between the real communities and the virtual and online ones is granted throgh the pure act of consuming the South Korean cultural products. The 'cultural assemblages' which build their social and national identities are *artefacts* of cultural processes whose existence was preceded rather than followed by the creation of a sense of belonging to a certain geographical space.

However, the present paper has several limits: the quasi-absence of previous academic research regarding the influences of Hallyu on the audiences from the Central and Eastern Europe and the descriptive character of the present text. From here, for me it is obvious that in the near future the analysis should be refined and deepened with the help of existing data sets and a more detailed analysis of the reseach project.

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V-2 Linguistics & Literature 4 (in Russian)

Economic Cooperation and Public Diplomacy

Chair: Tamara Kaplan (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ Язык и власть - новый новояз постсоветского периода

Hye Hyun Nam (Yonsei University)

≫ Проблемы передачи корейских имен собственных при переводе на русс кий языка

Tamara Kaplan (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

≫ Родство Алтайского языка с корейским языком: морфологический, сема нтический и лексикологический аспекты

Keunsik Kim (Chung-Ang University)

≫ Об ономасиологической грамматике чешского языка

Milan Hrdlička & Mariia Dobrova

(Charles University in Prague, Czech)

Язык и власть: "новый новояз" постсоветского периода

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Слова в России больше чем слова

1. Введение

Язык нельзя рассматривать в отрыве от его носителей. Данный тезис особенно значим в русской истории, где прослеживается довольно тесная связь языка с властью, политикой и идентичностью (Gasparov 2004). Петр Первый счел важнейшей задачей модернизации России активное внедрение научных, технических и торговых терминов из европейских языков и упразднение старых церковнославянских букв (Живов 1996: 69-154). Также известные споры А.С. Шишкова и Н.М. Карамзина о модели создания русского литературного языка в начале XIX века происходили на фоне обсуждения идентичности Российского государства (Лотман, Успенский 1975).

Особенно уникальную роль языка подчеркивают по отношению с Советской Россией. После Октябрьской революции язык стал важнейшим фундаментом строительства советского государства и «воспитания» его граждан. По этому поводу А.Б. Григорьев пишет: "Мысль о всевластии языка, как нигде, важна в применении к нашей стране, имеющей опыт тоталитаризма с его двумя страшными орудиями господства и принуждения – языком (тотальной, всепроникающей пропаганды) и террором" (Григорьев 1998: 372).

В связи с этим настоящая статья посвящается связи языка с властью, манипулированием в советском и постсоветском политическом дискурсе.[1] На западе проблемы языка и власти, языка и идеологии, языкового манипулирования, роли мифа в политической коммуникации достаточно давно находились в фокусе исследовательского интереса, а в России ими стали интересоваться преимущественно с начала перестройки (Шейгал 2005).

Появились исследования, осмысляющие языковое существование в тоталитарном прошлом, и также активно анализируются изменения языка, происходившие в новых политических и общественных условиях. Особенно многие работы по политической лингвистике посвящаются

[1] Политический дискурс — это класс жанров, ограниченный социальной сферой, а именно политикой. Правительственные обсуждения, парламентские дебаты, партийные программы, речи политиков — это те жанры, которые принадлежат сфере политики. Т.е. политический дискурс — это дискурс политиков.

выявлению языковых дифференциальностей, связанных с политическими переменами в России. А в данной статье в фокусе оказываются прежде всего соотносительность, преемственность политического дискурса в советской и постсоветской России, т.е. воспроизведение новояза в современном политическом дискурсе.

Как известно, в советское время язык рассматривался в качестве важного идеологического инструмента и средства разрушения старых норм и создания нового порядка. Следовательно употребление языка особенно в официальной сфере полностью регулировалось требованиями советского языкового стандарта, и в результате сложилась устойчивая система норм, охватывающая все уровни русского языка. Этот новый язык тоталитарного общества получил название «советский новояз».[2] Главные его цели – манипуляция сознанием пользователей, скрытие реальности и затем создание иллюзорной реальности. Эти цели достигались различными путями, например, широким использованием скользких эвфемизмов, затасканных идиом, эксплуатацией понятий, не имеющих предметного значения, обилием аббревиатур и т.д.

Как мы попытаемся показать ниже, после низвержения тоталитаризма и с воцарением демократии специфические черты новояза продолжают присутствовать и в современном политическом дискурсе, лексика и фразеологии которого во многом напоминают лексику и фразеологии советского новояза (Васильев 2000). Дело дошло до того, что филологи и интеллигенты многократно выражали опасение по поводу возвращения советского новояза или появления «постновояза» в современном российском обществе.[3] Однако, данный феномен часто упускается из виду исследователями или его отмечали лишь в употреблении типичных советизмов и советских прецедентных текстов(Земская 2004, Пихурова 2005, Резанова 2008, Голомидова 2009 и т.д.).

В настоящей статье мы будем рассматривать схожесть советского новояза и постновояза не столько в употреблении советизмов и советских претендентных текстов, но и в активизации специфицических приемов новояза, таких как эвфемистическая риторика, ритуализация языка, десемантизация, аббревиатуры и т.д.. Поскольку преемственность советского и постсоветского политического дискурса очень широка, этот аспект нуждается в более объемном анализе, здесь же мы ограничимся лишь в представлении общей картины данной проблематики.

Итак, ниже во второй части статьи вкратце перечисляются наиболее характерные черты новояза. В третьей части прорисовываются некоторые проявления новояза в современном политическом дискурсе. В четвертой части будут представлены выводы.

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[2] Для его обозначения применяются разные термины: "советский язык", "язык советского общества", "ложный язык", "казенный язык", "русский советский язык", "ритуальный язык", "деревянный язык", "тоталитарный язык советской эпохи", "советский вариант русского языка", "язык лжи", "жаргон власти" и др.

[3] См. статьи, интервью и заметки критически мыслящей интеллигенции по поводу возвращения советского новояза. http://www.svoboda.mobi/a/1730479.html http://tumasoff.blogspot.kr/2008/12/blog-post_13.html http://www.utro.ru/articles/2006/11/03/598409.shtml
http://www.krotov.info/yakov/2_chlvek/6_commnktio/novoyaz.htm/
http://ejnew.com/?a=note&id=8685

2. Воплощение новояза в советское время

Как известно, новояз – это калька с английского слова «newspeak», появившегося в романе-антиутопии Джорджа Оруэлла «1984», изданном в 1948 г.[4] В романе новоязом называется язык тоталитарного общества, искаженного партийной идеологией и бюрократическими оборотами. Как автор объясняет в эссе «О новоязе», включенном в сам роман, новояз был разработан для того, чтобы сделать невозможными любые иные течения мысли, и это достигалось не столько изобретением новых слов, сколько путем исключения нежелательных слов и очищения оставшихся слов от неортодоксальных значений (Оруэлл 1989: 200-201). Поэтому новояз описывается как единственный на свете язык, чей словарь с каждым годом сокращается. Моделью для построения этого языка послужили официальные документы тоталитарных режимов Третьего рейха и сталинского СССР.

Сегодня определение новояза как термина весьма расплывчато. Обычно выделяют два вида: новояз как политический подъязык и новояз как подъязык определенных субкультур. В первом смысле он обозначает язык власти, пропаганды, идеологии тоталитарного общества, в частности, Советского Союза. А во втором значении новояз представляет собой жаргон определенной субкультуры, чаще всего, язык участников интернет-коммуникации или «язык падонков». В обоих случаях новояз представляет разновидность языка, образованную путем преднамеренного искажения слов литературного языка. Здесь мы ограничимся первым смыслом этого термина.

В работах по советскому новоязу к наиболее ярким его чертам относятся следующие: высокая степень клишированности, эвфемистичность, ритуализация речевой деятельности, десемантизация языковых единиц(Broński 1979, Seriot 1985, Rathmayr 1991, Земская 1996a, 1996b, Głowiński 1991, Вежбицкая 1993, Купина 1995, Романенко 2000, Нам Хе Хён 2014a). Все они призваны замаскировать и скрыть реальное положение вещей.[5]

Перед тем, как рассмотреть каждый из них подробнее, сразу же оговоримся, что любому языку власти присущи агитационность, пропагандичность, лозунговость и идеологизация всех сторон жизни, так как именно посредством языка власть стремится создать псевдореальность и иллюзорную действительность(Михеев 1991: 131). Поэтому вышеперечисленные признаки можно найти не только в советском новоязе, но и в любом другом политическом дискурсе, но, безусловно, в различной степени.[6] Как нам представляется, именно в советском новоязе они

[4] См. однотипные переводы сделаны и на другие языки: новогор (болг.), навамоўе(белорус.), nowomowa (пол.), Newsprech, Neusprache (нем), novlangue(франц.), neolengua, nuevahabla (исп.), neolingua (итал.).

[5] В данной статье не рассматривается историческое формирование новояза. По мнению Н.А. Бердяева, начальную стадию развития новояза можно проследить в подпольной мыслеречевой деятельности российской интеллигенции XIX в., которая закономерно превратилась в бурный поток советского дискурса(Бердяев 1990). Д. Вайсс считает, что корни советского новояза можно искать в пролетарских песнях таких, как «Варшавянка». http://nashagazeta.ch/news/15216 По нашему мнению на создание советского политического выверенного языка также повлияла борьба за унификацию речи, против ярких вербальных проявлений человеческой индивидуальности, ужесточенная в послевоенный период с 1940-х годов. Об этом см. Нам Хе Хён 2014a, 2015.

[6] Отвечая на вопрос, насколько черты новояза были новыми для русского языка, В.А. Чудинов констатирует, что многие приемы, использованные при конструировании новояза, являются естественными для некоторых языков. Например, использование сложносокращённых слов характерно

проявляются в большей степени в силу политической ситуации в СССР, где социализм, строившийся в течение 70 лет, как метко отметил Б.Ю. Норман, в значительной мере был социализмом на бумаге и обслуживался огромным количеством слов, за которыми в реальной жизни ничего не стояло (либо стояла их полная противоположность) (Норман 1994:55-56). В связи с этим О. Лейбович утверждает, что мир социализма – это застывшие слова, управляющие людьми (Лейбович 1998: 93).

1) Эвфемистичность

Эвфемизмы – слова и выражения, смягчающие грубый смысл речи. Эвфемистичность речи объясняется стремлением автора притупить критическую остроту высказывания, при описании негативных явлений жизни(Кузина, Малервейн 2007: 19). Если вспомнить, что одна из функций новояза заключается в завуалировании реальности и создании иллюзорного мира, то можно понять, почему эвфемистичность является характерным явлением этого языка. Например, в советское время «взял» – значит, украл, «дал» – значит, дал взятку, «приписал» – обманул государство, «сорвался» (с работы) – прогулял, «отписался» (в ответ на претензию) – проявил бюрократизм (Бурлацкий 1989: 8). См. еще другие примеры: *изолятор* (тюрьма), *проработка* (грубая критика), *компетентные органы* (органы государственной безопасности), *вышка* (расстрел), *для служебного пользования* (о секретных документах), *вести себя нескромно* (о коррупционере) и т. п. Продуктивными эвфемизмами этого времени были и слова *недочеты, недовес, недосбор* (урожая) вместо *ошибки, воровство, разгильдяйство, халатность*. Также показательно использование слов с диффузной семантикой, в частности, неопределенных местоимений типа *некоторый*, *кто-то, кое-кто*... Пример: Если *кто-то кое-где* у нас порой честно жить не хочет…. (фраза известной советской песни)

По поводу советских эвфемизмов Г.О. Винокур писал: "Штампованная фразеология закрывает нам глаза на подлинную природу вещей и их отношений… Поскольку мы пользуемся ничего не значащими лозунгами и выражениями, то бессмысленным, ничего не значащим становится и наше мышление" (Винокур 1925: 84-86).

Эвфемистичность проявляется не только на уровне лексики, но и на уровне синтаксической конструкции. С целью маскировки истинного положения дел широко употреблялись и предложения с абстрактными существительными в роли подлежащего и безличные конструкции, отстраняющие субъект действия. В результате употребления таких конструкций происходит устранение реального субъекта, и затем дальнейшие идеологические манипуляции с поименованными сущностями.

для русского и немецкого, словообразование путём добавления к слову префиксов и суффиксов - для агглютинативных языков и т. д. Также образование эвфемизмов само по себе не может служить признаком новояза, так как оно является естественным языковым процессом. http://chudinov.ru/oruell/1/ (accessed: 10.05.2016) Что касается ритуальности, как мы посмотрим дальше, она свойственна не только советскому новоязу, но и вообще политической коммуникации с фиксированной формой и без установки на новизну содержания.

(1) *Сколько раз,* например, *говорилось,* что *огромное количество металла расходуется* у нас нерационально? (Из газет 1960-х)

(2) *Переход от прапрадедовской формы хозяйствования к формам социалистического развития промышленности* на базе ее *индустриализации* по последнему слову техники, а также *развития земледелия и скотдоводства* на базе крупного совхозного и колхозного хозяйства, является легким делом. (Полярная звезда 22.05.1930)

2) Аббревиатура

Изобилие аббревиатур и большое количество сложных слов было одним из советских языковых нововведений, повлекших за собой долговременные тяжкие лингвокультурные последствия. Примеры: *Ревком, ликбез, рабфак, Коминтерн, «Самиздат», «Тамиздат», угрозыск, главсахар, главбумага, главтабак.* [7] Многочисленны были названия синдикатов (*Ростоп, Продаруд, Продамет, Лензото* и др.).

А почему в советское время появилось столь много аббревиатур? Дело в том, что сокращение значимых корней затемняет их первоначальный смысл и придает слову нужное идеологическое содержание. Однако расшифровка аббревиатур порой доходит до абсурда, что формирует эзотеричность, т.е. подлинный их смысл понятен лишь немногим. [8] Примеры: *Мособлжилуправление* (Московское областное управление жилищного хозяйства), *Мосремэлектробытприбор* (Московский завод по ремонту электробытовых приборов), *Союзглавцветметуглекомплект* (Главное управление по комплектованию предприятий цветной металлургии и угольной промышленности Госснаба СССР).

3) Десемантизация

Новояз был изобретен прежде всего для манипуляции сознанием его пользователей. Поэтому многие слова в нем теряли свое первоначальное значение и приобретали новое, предусмотренное властью значение. К ним относятся такие, как *мир, равенство, братство, разоружение, социальная справедливость, слуги народа.* Затем эти слова в жестких конструкциях превращались в клише. Эти идеологические клише, которыми был насыщен советский новояз, ориентированы либо на абстрактный, условный референт, либо на референт, отсутствующий в действительности (Земская 1996b: 23). Примеры: *Народ и партия едины; Экономика должна быть экономной; Союз нерушимый республик свободных; Партия – ум, честь и совесть нашей эпохи; Коммунизм – это есть советская власть плюс электрификация всей страны* и т.д.

Такие слова и обороты Б.Ю. Норман называет «лексическими фантомами». Он объясняет, что эти лексические фантомы, лишенные предметного значения, возникают, когда отрыв слова от денотата обусловлен идеологической деятельностью человека, разработкой той или иной

[7] Подобное словотворчество повлияло и на образование новых оригинальных имен в советское время. Примеры: *Ноябрина, Тракторина, Владлен, Агитпроп, Велиор, Даздраперма, Донэра, Исталина, Индустрина, Лениниана, Марэнленст, Пятвчет, Товарищтай, Электрификация*…

[8] http://chudinov.ru/oruell/ (accessed: 06.05.2014)

социальной утопии, поддерживанием определенных социальных иллюзий (Норман 1994: 55-56, 2006: 19).

4) Ритуальность

В публичном политическом дискурсе советской эпохи существовали особые правила политической коммуникации как ритуала: всем посвященным было известно, кто, что, когда и в какой форме должен сказать, а также кто и как должен отреагировать на слова выступающего, т.е. бурные аплодисменты, просто аплодисменты, выступления в прениях, последующая организация собраний для выражения поддержки и др.(Чудинов 2006: 53). Типичный пример советской ритуальной коммуникации – партийные съезды или сессии Верховного Совета. Там каждый ход коммуникации был заранее тщательно спланирован, и делегаты и депутаты превращались в участников грандиозного спектакля. Выступления начинались с обращения типа "*товарищи", "граждане*" и цитат из наследия "великих вождей". В этом можно заметить ритуальность, или даже театральность политического языка.

Такая ритуальность языка характерны для коммуникации с фиксированной формой и без установки на новизну информации. Ритуальная коммуникация наиболее ярко проявляется в религиозной сфере. Не зря Н.А. Бердяев писал, что большевизм — это лже-религия и потому преследовал все религии как конкурентов (Бердяев 1990: 29).[9] Философ Б. Рассел тоже указал на то, что марксизм и большевизм – это полноценная религия.

В связи с этим публичные речевые действия в советское время воспринимались как некая ритуализованная деятельность. А для проведения ритуала в зрелом социалистическом обществе уже не требовался обыденный русский язык, он даже в какой-то степени мешал ритуальным действиям(Кронгауз 2015:134). Следствием непригодности нормального языка для осуществления ритуала является появление новояза. Иными словами, в советский период в официальной сфере общения употреблялся новояз как высокий язык, в то же время в неофициальной сфере продолжал существовать собственно «русский язык». Тем самым в советское время формировалась своего рода диглоссия.[10]

[9] В связи с этим интересно привести цитату М. Горбаневского: "Большевикам же было важно сакрализовать своих героев. (...) В сознание масс и была внедрена схема: вместо поклонения святым мощам — вот вам мощи, которые до сих пор лежат на Красной площади; вместо икон — пожалуйста, портреты вождей; вместо крестных ходов — манифестации; вместо литургии и псалмов — партсобрание и «Интернационал». Большевики поступили очень хитро: сакрализовали свои лозунги." http://afirk.ru/?bdi=78502 (accessed: 22.07.2014)

[10] В связи с этим можно поставить вопрос о статусе новояза. Многие ученые квалифицируют его в качестве подъязыка или социолекта. Например, Э.И. Хан-Пира убеждает, что новояз не может быть назван языком в лингвистическом значении этого слова, так как не имеет собственной фонетической и грамматической системы. По его мнению, новояз скорее лексико-семантическая система, социолект, классовый жаргон (Хан-пира 1994: 16-17). Для характеристики новояза М. Гловиньский предлагает термин «квазиязык». На основе наблюдения над языковой ситуацией в Польше он считает, что хотя nowomowa родилась в политической публицистике и приобрела черты функционального стиля, однако она претендовала на универсальность, стремясь подчинить себе другие сферы языка как образец более широкого общения (Głowiński 1991: 9-10). Присоединяясь к вышеупомянутым позициям, мы характеризуем новояз как политический социолект, хотя, в отличие от всех прочих социолектов, новояз охватывал довольно большую сферу употребления, проникая в официально-деловой и научный стили литературного языка.

Советский новояз как высокий ритуальный язык претендовал на абсолютную истину, поэтому в нем превалировали триумфализм, лозунговость и монологичность. См. пример, взятый у Горбаневского (Горбаневский 2009:6).

(3) XXIV съезд КПСС, 31 марта 1971 г., речь товарища А.В. Смирновой (ткачиха Яковлевского льнокомбината Ивановской области): Все выступавшие до меня с этой трибуны горячо одобряли *неутомимую преобразовательную деятельность Центрального комитета партии*. Вот и я счастлива сказать свое сердечное слово. *Высокая должность ткачихи* побуждает меня сделать одно профессиональное сравнение: наша партия как опытный ткач день за днем ткёт *прочное полотно нового общества*, имя которому - коммунизм. (Аплодисменты.) *Нынешний советский рабочий - подлинный хозяин страны и творец*, активно участвующий в управлении производством, как справедливо говорил в своем докладе Леонид Ильич Брежнев. Советский рабочий – образован и воспитан. Труд для него не только источник заработка, но и могучее средство приобщения к *светлому товариществу, созидающему самый справедливый общественный строй на земле*. *Это большое счастье быть частицей советского рабочего класса!* И хочется высказать большую сердечную благодарность ленинскому Центральному комитету нашей партии за высокую оценку роли рабочего класса, которую дал в отчетном докладе Леонид Ильич Брежнев. *(Аплодисменты)*

Итак, тоталитарный язык был перегружен идеологическими штампами, лозунгами, на базе которых формировались мифы тоталитарной эпохи. Описанная высокая степень эвфемистичности, клишированности и аббревиатур приводит к десемантизации, так как они подразумевают под собой искажение, завуалирование первоначального смысла. А десемантичность языковых единиц является необходимым условием формирования ритуальности коммуникации, так как последняя минимально информативна. См. как эвфемизмы, десемантичные единицы служат ритуализации речи в примере (3).

3. "Постновояз" в постсоветской России

Как известно, после падения советского режима Россия шла по сложному пути от социализма к капитализму, от забытья к воспоминаниям, от демифологизации к ремифологизации (Нам 2014b: 87). Разнонаправленные отношения к советскости и советским символикам, конфликты вокруг них действительно прослеживаются и в употреблении языка.

С одной стороны, наблюдается быстрый уход в пассив большого количества слов, связанных с советскими временами. Безусловно, самые яркие изменения языка в рамках десоветизации произошли на лексическом уровне. За короткий срок с лексики снята идеологическая окраска, и целые пласты лексики эпохи социализма ушли в пассив. К десоветизации можно отнести еще и

доминирование устной, диалогичной речи над письменной, монологичной. Об этом уже много было сказано в ряде научных работ (Данн 2009, Крысин 2008, Нам Хе Хен 2011).[11]

С другой стороны, в русском языке еще остаются следы советского новояза.[12] Особенно в современном политическом дискурсе для манипулятивной функции активно используются приемы советской пропагандистской риторики. Некоторые филологи указывают на первые признаки возврата к советскому языку уже в конце правления Б.Н. Ельцина и в начале правления В.В. Путина. По их мнению, к разряду новоязовской лексики XXI века можно отнести прежде всего "*вертикаль власти*" и "*суверенная демократия*", которые маскируют авторитаризм, диктатуру. Каждое слово в них вполне осмысленно, но словосочетание в целом не имеет никакого смысла, и поэтому они считаются своеобразным мостиком от советского новояза к новому новоязу (Горбаневский 2009:10). Для обозначения последнего предлагается термин «постновояз» (Васильев 2000).

Для наглядности соотносительности советского новояза с постновоязом приведем два примера из работы М.В. Горбаневского (Горбаневский 2009): один принадлежит эпохе бреженевского развитого социализма, а другой относится к современному российскому времени.

(4) XXV съезд КПСС, 26 февраля 1976 г., речь товарища А.Ф.Ерофеевой (прядильщица Ивановского меланжевого комбината им. К.И. Фролова): «Леонид Ильич Брежнев сердечно поздравил наш коллектив с этой трудовой победой. Если бы вы, дорогой Леонид Ильич, могли видеть, каким источником нового вдохновения стало ваше приветствие, и не только на нашем комбинате, но и на всех предприятиях области!.. Мы, рабочие, горячо одобряем, когда Центральный комитет КПСС, Совет министров СССР направляют приветствие трудовым коллективам и отдельным передовикам. Нас восхищает, как тонко Центральный комитет и советское правительство чувствуют особенность работы коллективов, как верно находят те единственно правильные и нужные, полные глубокого уважения к рабочему человеку слова, которые зовут нас к новым трудовым победам».

(5) VIII съезд партии «Единая Россия», 1 октября 2007 г., речь товарища Е.Н. Лапшиной (ткачиха Родниковской текстильной фабрики Ивановской области): «Годы вашего президентства, уважаемый Владимир Владимирович, стали временем перемен к лучшему для очень многих. И для таких простых рабочих людей, как я, и для таких сельских тружеников, как мои родители. (Аплодисменты) Спасибо. И мы бы, конечно, хотели, чтобы эти перемены к лучшему продолжались и дальше. При этом при всем, к сожалению, мы не уверены, что и дальше все будет меняться к лучшему, потому что вы, Владимир Владимирович, отказались выдвигаться на третий

[11] По поводу состояния современной русского языка Д. Вайсс высказал интересную мысль. Он полагает, что современный русского языка можно представить как триаду: язык литературный, язык советский и уголовную «феню». Последняя уже вошла в разговорную речь и в речь политиков, пытающихся достичь речевой сближенности с народом. Достаточно вспомнить знаменитое путинское «мочить в сортире». http://nashagazeta.ch/news/15216 (accessed: 12.05.2016)

[12] В последнее время в русском языке в целом наблюдается активное воспроизведение советских вербальных маркеров. Особенно в рекламных текстах и коммерческой номинации наблюдается ностальгическое употребление советских прецедентных текстов (Нам 2014b: 90). Например: «кафе «Правда», рестораны «Зов Ильича», «Столичный» и «Советский Союз», «Квартира 44», «Столовая №57» и др.

президентский срок. И я вот вижу на этом съезде так много больших начальников и просто умных людей. Я обращаюсь ко всем вам: давайте вместе что-нибудь придумаем, чтобы Владимир Владимирович Путин оставался нашим президентом и после восьмого года...» .

В обоих текстах присутствует пропагандистский триумфализм, лозунговость и безапелляционность. Ниже мы рассмотрим, как конкретные новоязовские черты, такие как высокая степень эвфемистичности, десемантизация языковых единиц и ритуализация речевых актов воспроизводятся в современном политическом дискурсе.

1) Эвфемистичность

Постновояз не менее, чем советский новояз прибегает к эвфемизмам. Казнокрадство именуется *нецелевым расходованием бюджетных средств,* две чеченские кампании – "*восстановлением конституционного строя*" и "*контртеррористической операцией*". По мнению Б. Сарнова – автор книги «Наш советский новояз: Маленькая энциклопедия реального социализма» "*удвоение ВВП*" и "*страхование автогражданской ответственности*" являются такой же словесной оболочкой пустоты как советское "пятилетку в четыре года". Особенно в последнее время появились многие слова и обороты, скрывающие за внешним наукообразованием не что иное, как экономический кризис: *дефолт, нулевые темпы роста, монетизация, волатильность рубля* (частое резкое значительное падение курса рубля), *экономическая стагнация* и т.д.

(5) Добавим, что по итогам 2015 года в Архангельской области *нецелевое расходование бюджетных средств* составило 8,9 млн. рублей или 1,4% от общей суммы выявленных нарушений. (Regnum.02.06.2016)

(6) Именно в тот момент, когда политологи, торжествующе возвестили всему миру, что они наконец-то нашли особенную форму для российской демократии, а именно: *суверенную демократию.* (Forum.Msk.Ru. 11.09.2015)

(7) На Острове Мужества и Скорби в столице открыли памятный камень в честь воинов, исполнявших *интернациональный долг в Афганистане*. (Телеканал ОНТ. 28.05.2016)

(8) Поэтому *непопулярная мера* – повышение акцизов на бензин – была принята. .... эта мера, хоть и нелюбимая водителями, позволит наполнить стремительно пустеющую казну государства и избежать еще более *непопулярной меры – секвестирования бюджета* (Новая трибуна, 07.06.2016).[13]

Что касается аббревиатур, и сегодня аббревиация остается продуктивным словообразовательным процессом. См.: *Центробанк, Госдума, ЦИК (Центризбирком), Генпрокурор, АО "Газпром", РАО ЕЭС, НДР, НДС, МЧС, ОРТ, НТВ* и мн. др.

[13] Кстати, по мнению М. Горбаневского слово «секвестр» тоже является эвфемизмом, появившимся, когда не хватало бюджетных средств для покрытия расходов (Горбаневский 2009: 6).

2) Десемантизация

Как и раньше в современном русском языке наблюдается активная десемантизация, т.е. использование слов и устойчивых словосочетаний с ослабленным или совершенно отсутствующим денотативным компонентом. К таковым А.Д. Васильев относит слово *реформа*; словосочетание "программа реформ" вследствие своей частотности стало устойчивым, однако его семантика остается туманной. Программа реформ воспринимается для россиян как звуковой комплекс, ничего не обозначающий так же, как *стабилизация экономики, равноправное партнерство, секвестирование бюджета, реструктуризация долга, успехи макроэкономики, депрессивная отрасль* и проч (Васильев 2000).[14]

Еще в рамках десемантизации можно обсуждать смену коннотаций. Особенно показательны примеры со сменой идеологических доминант, т.е. негативизация оценочности существительных *коммунизм, социализм, Советы, советский*, *совок и совковый*, *совковость, советикус* и т.п. Наглядным примером служит употребление прилагательного "*советский*". В советское время оно имело высоко положительную оценочность: *советская молодежь, советский человек, советская наука, советский образ жизни.* А теперь в нем возникло новое качественно-оценочное значение, которое впервые было отмечено в «Толковом словаре русского языка конца XXI века: Языковые изменения» под ред. Г.Н. Скляревской (1998: 596). Здесь оно имело помету «неодобр.» и формулировалось как «свойственный чему-л. в СССР или кому-л., жившему в СССР».

3) ритуальность

Казалось бы, что современная политическая коммуникация гораздо менее ритуальна, чем в советские времена, однако язык продолжает использоваться в ритуальной функции, изменились лишь ритуальные правила и соответствующие им роли. Если в советский период, когда официально существовала одна партия, ритуальная коммуникация была ориентирована на поддержку властей и доминировала монологичная письменная речь, то современный ритуал имеет плюралистическую направленность: в нем существует несколько ролей «патриота», «центриста», «рыночника», «ортодоксального коммуниста», активиста движения зеленых и др. Согласно этому формируются некие правила игры. При оценке любого действия правительства правая оппозиция характеризует его как ущемляющее права личности и экономическую свободу, а левая (национал-патриотическая и коммунистическая) критикует его как противоречащее национальным традициям, ведущее к обнищанию народа и отказу от социальных завоеваний советской эпохи(Чудинов 2006:53).

[14] Некоторые слова и словосочетания, включенные А.Д. Васильевым в список лексических фантомов постновояза, как нам представляется, не могут быть явлением десемантизации исключительно современного русского языка. Например, он относит к разряду постновояза "*средний класс*" и "*миротворческий*". Однако, оба выражения являются кальками из английского языка: *middle class* и *Peace Keeping Operation*, и их расплывчатое употребление и употребление, противоположное первоначальному смыслу, наблюдается не только в русском, но во многих других языках, где употребляются подобные кальки.

Хотя современная политическая коммуникация плюралистическая, но она все же сохраняет специфический налет официозной стилистики; ее основная цель заключается в подтверждении своей социальной роли, и потому в ней не происходит дискуссии в подлинном смысле (Рыклин 1992: 5; цитата по Ворожбитова 2000). С этой точки зрения современный постновояз как и предшествующий советский вариант противопоставлен диалогу как свободному обмену мнениями. В качестве примера приведем фрагмент разговора между сенатором и членом «Высшего совета правящей партии «Единая Россия» Евгением Викторовичем Бушминым (Е.Б.) и бизнесменом Дмитрием Валерьевичем Потапенко(Д.П.).[15]

(9) Е.Б.: Поэтому Норвегия присоединилась к этим санкциям.

Д.П.: После того, как мы это сделали (ввели экономические санкции против Норвегии)

Е.Б.: И только... Ещё раз это говорю... *Норвегия присоединилась к этим санкциям и только после этого мы ввели ответные санкции. Норвегия присоединилась к этим санкциям до того, как мы ввели ответные санкции. Причём мы против Норвегии санкции не вводили. Мы ввели санкции против тех стран, которые присоединились к санкциям. Поэтому мы не могли ввести против Норвегии, если она не вводила санкции.* Именно так звучала формулировка. *Против тех стран, которые уже ввели санкции.* Видите, значит, здесь неправильно.

Д.П.: (с иронией) Велика и могуча русская языка.

Е.Б.: Это, это русский язык, нормальный, нормальный.

Д.П.: Нет, это новояз чиновничий. Ещё называется.

Е.Б.: (кричит, не давая говорить собеседнику) Нет, нет, ничего подобного! *Те страны, которые ввели, подпадают под действие...*

Д.П.: (пытается вставить слово). Ну, про экономику давайте.

Е.Б.: (опять срывается на крик) А *если бы Норвегия не ввела, она бы не попала под санкции.*

Д.П.: Ближе к экономике. Про продажи и про...

Как мы видим, представитель власти, чтобы не допустить дискуссии, использует прием механического повторения, прием «заезженной пластинки»: только в этом фрагменте сенатор механически повторяет одно и то же бюрократическое клише, не давая собеседнику вставить ни слова. Не случайно его собеседник охарактеризовал речь сенатора как «чиновничий новояз». В таких условиях абсолютно невозможно осуществление диалога, чего и добивается политик.

Итак, проведенный короткий анализ подтверждает, что риторичные приемы, применяемые в современном политическом дискурсе, во многом напоминают черты советского новояза, что оправдывает характеристику современного политического подъязыка как постновоязка.

[15] Полный интервью см. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b-VaVGe3zYM (accessed: 05.06.2016)

4. выводы

Язык политика всегда нацелен на борьбу за власть и удержание власти в своих руках в случае овладения ею. При этом политики часто пытаются завуалировать свои цели, используя различные риторичные приемы, как номинализацию, эллипсис, метафоризацию и другие приемы воздействия на сознание публики(Синеокая 2012). Соответственно смысловая неопределенность и фантомность являются характерными признаками любого политического дискурса.

Поэтому можно смело утверждать, что новояз — непременный атрибут языка власти как такового. И не только язык власти, но и любой язык содержит в себе отдельные элементы новояза, поскольку языку свойственна регулятивная функция. Просто со временем меняются конкретные слова и обороты, но риторичные приемы повторяются. Итак, получается некий цикл: новояз постоянно возникает, затем становясь обыденным, уступает место новому новоязу в качестве старояза.

Данный тезис подтверждается проведенным анализом преемственности советского и постсоветского новояза. Последний стремится, как его оруэлловский прототип и как его советский предшественник, активно реализовать такие приемы как эвфемизацию, аббревиацию, десемантизацию, смену коннотаций, ритуализацию речевых актов и тем самым отдаляет слушателя от критического мышления.

Однако постновояз все-таки отличается от советского новояза. По мнению М. Горбаневского, советский новояз был сакральным, поскольку коммунизм для многих являлся некой религией, и, соответственно, употребление новояза носил ритуальный, сакральный характер. В то же время постновояз прежде всего призван фальсифицировать и завуалировать реальное положение вещей. Поэтому можно сказать, что последний более эвфемистичен, прагматичен но менее сакрален.[16]

Все сказанное еще раз подтверждает многовековые тесные связи языка с властью, политикой в российском обществе. Не даром говорят, что *слова в России больше чем слова*.

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[16] http://afirk.ru/?bdi=78502 (accessed: 22.06.2014)

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Проблемы передачи корейских имен собственных при переводе на русский язык

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Имя собственное (калька с лат. *nomen proprium*, которое в свою очередь является калькой с греч. ὄνομα κύριον) — это имя существительное, обозначающее слово или словосочетание, предназначенное для именования конкретного, вполне определённого предмета или явления, выделяющее этот предмет или явление из ряда однотипных предметов или явлений. В отличие от других слов, имя собственное не связано непосредственно с понятием, его основное значение заключается в его связи с обозначаемым. К именам собственным относятся: имена людей, географические названия (топонимы), названия произведений литературы и искусства, периодических изданий, радио- и телевизионных программ, товаров и торговых марок, организаций, предприятий, учреждений, праздников, уникальных искусственных объектов и сооружений, уникальных природных объектов и явлений. Во всех европейских языках и в большинстве языков мира, имеющих алфавит и различие между строчными и прописными буквами, имена собственные пишутся с заглавной буквы.

Имена собственные на русский язык в общем случае не подлежат смысловому переводу — они передаются с помощью транскрипции, транслитерации или принципа этимологического соответствия (транспозиции).

Имена и названия имеют большое значение в межкультурной коммуникации. При переводе заимствуемого собственного имени в письменном языке возможны три способа: транслитерация, транскрипция и непосредственное включение в текст иностранного имени с сохранением его графики. Транслитерация не подходит для передачи иноязычных имен кириллицей, и она практически невозможна для записи слов тех языков, в которых не используются латинские буквы, в частности, корейского. Здесь возможна только транскрипция. Однако фонемы корейского языка и русского значительно отличаются. Если даже считается, что ни один звук в английском языке не произносится точно так же, как в русском, то это тем более относится к корейскому языку. В корейском языке есть два звука «о» - огубленный и неогубленный, два звука «е» - закрытый и открытый, два звука «н» - переднеязычный и заднеязычный, придыхательные и сильные согласные, специфический звук «ч», который на слух значительно отличается от русского «ч» и т.д.

Прямое включение в текст корейских имен и названий, как это делается для английских,

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невозможно из-за того, что корейцы используют уникальную систему письменности под названием хангыль.

Первыми, кто начал записывать по-русски имена корейцев, переселившихся на территорию русского Дальнего Востока около 150 лет назад, были царские чиновники. С тех пор русские корейцы носят фамилии Цой, Дэн, Тэн, Тё, Дё, Тя, а также фамилии, окачивающиеся на –гай, Лигай, Тягай, Югай, которым нет соответствий в корейском языке. Русский вариант фамилии Цой происходит от корейской фамилии 최 Чхве. В Россию, в основном, переселялись корейцы из провинции Хамгён, для диалекта которой характерно так называемое «цоканье», т.е. звук «ч» литературного языка там произносится ближе к «ц», дифтонгоид 긔 «ве» во времена переселения корейцев произносился как «ой», а аспирированный характер звука «ч» просто не характерен для русского языка, и поэтому его не отразили, таким образом, и получилась фамилия Цой. Все корейские фамилии, начинающиеся в русском на Т и Д, по-корейски начинаются на ㅈ «ч», что тоже произошло из-за несоответствия произношения русского и корейского звуков «ч» и ㅈ. По поводу элемента –гай нет определенного мнения в кругах кореееведов, однако я соглашусь с точкой зрения В.Д. Аткнина, высказанной им на одном из кореееведческих форумов, о том, что КА (ГА) - фамилеобразующий иероглифический элемент (китайского происхождения) и восходит к китайскому однослогу КА 家 со значением "дом", "семья". Таким образом, ЛИ=ГА 이가 (李家) означает "дом, семья Ли", МА=ГА 마가(馬家) "дом, семья Ма" и т.д. 이 И - окончание именительного падежа, которое в среднекорейском и, по-видимому, в ряде более поздних северных диалектов, вело себя своеобразно в морфонологическом отношении, и не вело в случае присоединения к открытым слогам к монофтонгизации, как это было позднее, в новокорейском. Своеобразие этого И в этих диалектах заключается и в том, что это падежное окончание часто выступало как своеобразный словообразовательный элемент [7]. Таким образом, когда кореец приходил к чиновнику и сообщал ему о том, что он, например, из семьи Ю, то в результате получал русскую фамилию Югай.

Первая система научной транскрипции корейских слов была разработана в СССР в пятидесятые годы. Автором ее был ленинградский лингвист А.А.Холодович (несколько позднее она была модернизирована Л.Р.Концевичем и Ю.Н.Мазуром). Назвать эту систему идеальной нельзя, однако она предлагала более или менее стандартную схему транскрипции, при которой одно и то же корейское имя или название всегда записывалось одинаково.

С тех пор кореееведы пользовались двумя разновидностями русской транскрипции: так называемой «практической» и «научной». Практическая транскрипция оперирует лишь буквами русского алфавита и их узаконенными сочетаниями («незаконным», например, считается твердый знак в конце слова); эта транскрипция ориентирована на широкого читателя. Научная транскрипция, более точная, допускает использование букв и знаков, отсутствующих в русском алфавите, ненормативных сочетаний букв и диакритических знаков; она ориентирована на специалистов и обычно используется в лингвистических работах.

Можно сказать, что ситуация с транскрибированием корейских имен и названий была относительно нормальной, так как транскрипцией пользовались, в основном, кореееведы, а в широких средствах массовой информации употреблялись лишь несколько корейских имен и названий, такие как Ким Ир Сен, Пхеньян, Сеул, которые хотя и не отражали их реального

звукового облика в корейском, но всегда были унифицированы.

Однако ситуация изменилась после заключения дипломатических отношений с Республикой Корея, когда в России появилось много корейских фирм и товаров и стали приезжать корейские бизнесмены. Тогда-то и возникли и до сих пор наводняют наши СМИ такие названия, как Хьюндай, Хёндай, Хундай, Хендай, представляющие собой неправильно прочитанные с английской транскрипции и транслитерации названия корпорации 현대 Хёндэ, означающего «современность», а также Самсунг и Самсонг, которые правильно было бы записывать как Самсон. Русские теперь уверены, что есть такая корейская фамилия как Парк, произошедшая от английской транскрипции Park, которая на самом деле представляет собой знакомую фамилию Пак и т.д. Эти названия и фамилии, когда они произносятся русскими, вряд ли сможет «опознать» кореец.

Положение еще ухудшилось после 2000 года, когда в Южной Корее была введена система так называемой «новой романизации», что совпало со временем широкого распространения интернета. Против «новой системы романизации» резко выступал Л.Р. Концевич, говоря о том, что она нарушает или искажает все принципы, которые лежат в основе любой транскрипции. Для нее характерен афонетизм, афонологизм, аграфизм и алогизм [4, 65-66]. В результате того, что глухие фонемы в начале слова в ней записываются буквами для звонких, корейская фамилия Ким, записывается, как Gim, аэропорт Кимпхо – как Gimpo, старое название Кореи Чосон – Joseon и т.д. После того, как эти названия перетранскрибировали на русский, появились совершенно неузнаваемые имена и названия. Автору данной статьи довелось стать свидетелем анекдотичной ситуации в аэропорту города Владивостока, где хорошо известен южнокорейский порт Пусан. Пассажиры никак не реагировали на объявление посадки рейса «на Бусан», прозвучавшее несколько раз. И в ответ на возмущение дежурной, люди ответили: «Тут объявляют посадку на какой-то Бусан, мы туда не летим, нам нужно в Пусан».

В самой Корее также в результате смешения старой системы Маккюна – Рейшауера и новой «романизации» появилось много путаницы. Например, в интернете можно найти десять! вариантов написания фамилии и имени бывшего (ныне покойного) президента Ким Дэ Чжуна – Gim Dae-jung, Kim Dae Jung, Kim Daejung, Kim DaeJung, Dae-jung Kim, Dae Jung Kim, Daejung Kim, DaeJung Kim, Kim, Dae-jung, Kim, Dae Jung.

Также вследствие этого появилось много вариантов написания на английском языке названий известных письменных памятников, что беспокоит корейских ученых, и они ищут пути решения данной проблемы [6].

В российских СМИ и интернете теперь уже даже нет единообразного написания имен политических лидеров КНДР и Республики Корея. Например, лидера КНДР 김정은 Ким Чжон Ына именуют Ким Джонын, Ким Чен Ун, Ким Чон Ун, Ким Чжен Ын и другими вариантами, о чем подробно написал в своей статье в газете «Сеульский вестник» известный кореевед А.Ланьков [2].

Российские кореееведы обеспокоены ситуацией, которая сейчас сложилась с транскрибированием корейских имен и названий, и прилагают усилия, чтобы ликвидировать разнобой в транскрипции. Например, в СПбГУ в 2004 г. состоялось заседание семинара, посвященного проблемам русской транскрипции корейского языка, на котором выступил Г.Е.

Рачков, результаты обсуждения были представлены в виде статьи в Вестнике Центра корейского языка и культуры [5]. Также на сайте Российской ассоциации университетского кореееведения даны подробные рекомендации по русской транскрипции корейского языка [8], однако проблема в том, что этим рекомендациям следует лишь узкий круг специалистов.

Такая путаница с транскрибированием корейских имен собственных при переводе на русский оказывает влияние и на корейских переводчиков. При подготовке данной статьи автор провела анкетирование 20 магистрантов русского отделения самой престижной в Южной Корее переводческой магистратуры Университета иностранных языков Хангук. Им было предложено написать на русском языке 18 корейских имен собственных, среди которых были широко известные географические названия, имена известных людей, названия достопримечательностей. Результаты анкетирования представлены в двух таблицах (см. табл. 1 и табл.2). Проанализировав их, можно сделать следующие выводы:

1. При передаче корейских звуков наибольший разнобой наблюдается в отсутствующих в русском языке или произносящихся по-другому звуков. Особенно это видно на примере слов с буквами ㅈ, ㅊ, которые магистранты передают буквами ч, ж, з или сочетаниями букв чж, дж, причем в различных вариантах в одном и том же слове. Отсюда многочисленные варианты написания города Чечжу (제주), такие как Чжечжу, Джезу, Джечу, Чечу, Жезу, Чжэчжу, Джэчу, Жеджю и т.д.; города Чханвон (창원) - Чанвон, Чангвон, Чан Вон, Чжанвон; города Чхончжин (청진) – Чёнчжин, Чжончжин, Чончжин, Чхончин, Чонгджин; имени короля Сечжона (세종대왕) – Сэджон, Сечжён, Сэджён, Седжонг, Се Чон; бывшего корейского президента Ким Дэ Чжуна (김대중) – Ким Тэ Чун, Ким Дэ Чунг, Ким Дэжун, Ким Дэ Чжунг, Ким Даэжун. Причина этого в том, что корейский звук **[ʧ] произносится мягче и качественно отличается от русского ч, а придыхательного звука [tɕʰ] в русском нет.**

2. Нет никакой системы в передаче глухих и звонких согласных на русский язык. Это видно в переводах названий гор Кымгансан (금강산) – Ким Ган Сан, Гымганг, Кымкан, Гымгансан, Кымканг; дворца Кёнбоккун (경복궁) – Кёнбокгунг, Гёнбук, Кйонбук, Кён Бок. Это объясняется тем, что в корейской фонетической системе глухие и звонкие варианты согласных фонем не имеют смыслоразличительной функции, т.е. значение слова не меняется, если вместо глухих согласных произносить звонкие, и наоборот. И поэтому, неосознанно, магистранты переносят это и в русский язык, где глухие и звонкие согласные такую функцию имеют. Кроме того, в «новой романизации» предписано при транскрибировании на английский язык корейских слов, начинающихся на глухие согласные, использовать звонкие согласные, что оказало влияние и на русскую транскрипцию.

3. Нет единообразия в слитном и раздельном написании многосложных имен собственных, и прописных и строчных буквах. Все вышеприведенные примеры и другие примеры в таблице наглядно это демонстрируют. Горы Чирисан (지리산) – горы Чи Ри Сан, гора Чжирисан, гора Чири, гора Зири, гора Джири, гора Жири, гора Джи Ри.

Объясняется это тем, что в корейском языке слитное и раздельное написание морфем сложных слов не имеет особого значения, а понятие прописных и строчных букв отсутствует.

4. При транскрибировании топонимов, номенклатурные термины чаще всего переводятся, но не всегда повторяются в транскрипции. Особенный разнобой наблюдается в названиях

провинций. Например, провинция 경상남도 - Южный Кенсанг, южная провинция Кёнсан, провинция Кёнгсангнамдо, Кёонсан-намдо, провинция Кенсан Намдо и т.д. Примечательно, что в топониме «побережье Кёнпходэ» почти никто не перевел номенклатурный термин «побережье», по-видимому, из-за того, что он неизвестен магистрантам, хотя некоторые неверно перевели его как «море». Хотя существует положение о том, что при транскрибировании терминов корейской топонимики номенклатурные термины (гора, река, остров и т.д.) должны сохраняться и в транскрипции, и повторяться в переводе, например: 한강 *река* Хан**ган**, 백두산 *гора* Пэкту**сан**, 제주도 *остров* Чечжу**до**, 평안도 *провинция* Пхёнан**до**, 동대문 *ворота* Тондэ**мун** и т. д., но оно постоянно нарушается переводчиками не только на русский, но и на английский языки. Об этом часто упоминают и корейские переводчики английского языка, говоря о том, что транскрипция, которая должна способствовать коммуникации между людьми, наоборот, затрудняет ее, т.е. если англоговорящий иностранец скажет корейцу, что ему нужно добраться до Han river или Namdae gate, то кореец его, скорее всего, не поймет.

5. Разнобой в передаче корейского звука ㅇ[ŋ] в конце слога. Практически во всех словах в таблице, в которых есть слоги, заканчивающиеся на ㅇ. Это вызвано тем, что при переводе на английский язык его передают сочетанием букв ng, аналогично которому он звучит. Однако сочетание русских звуков нг имеет совершенно другое звучание, поэтому по правилам практической транскрипции предписано употреблять в этом случае букву н.

Вышеприведенный анализ говорит о том, что на занятиях по переводу нужно уделять особое внимание вопросам перевода на русский язык корейских имен собственных и объяснять студентам и магистрантам особенности принятой практической транскрипции, и эта задачу должны решать преподаватели-носители русского языка.

По образному выражению Ермоловича Д.И. имена собственные исполняют функцию межъязыкового, межкультурного мостика. [3, с.3]. Однако очевидно, что при незнании и несоблюдении правил и принципов передачи иностранных слов на русский язык, этот мостик становится весьма шатким, и может, напротив, стать преградой для межкультурной коммуникации, что на наш взгляд, происходит сегодня с передачей корейских имен и названий на русский язык.

В наш век информационных технологий в качестве решения данной проблемы, по нашему мнению, нужно создать простую в употреблении компьютерную программу, в которой можно было бы вводить в поле написание латиницей и корейским алфавитом корейских слов, а в другом окне бы происходило автоматическое транскрибирование их на русский. По нашему мнению, если объединить усилия программистов и корееведов - специалистов по транскрипции, вполне возможно справиться с решением этой задачи.

Таблица 1.

금강산	지리산	한강	대동강	경상남도	경상북도	제주시	제주도	미륵사
горы Кым Ган	горы Чи Ри Сан	река Ханган	река Дэ Донган	провинция Кёнсаннамдо	провинция Кёнсанбукдо	Город Чечжу	острова Чечжу	буддийский храм

Сан								Мирык
гора Кым ганг	гора Чири	-“-	река Дэ донг	-“-	-“-	город Чеджу	остров Чеджу	-“-
-“-	гора Зири	-“-	-“-	провинция южная Кёнсанг	провинция северная Кёнсанг	-“-	-“-	Мирыкс а
Кымка нсан	Чжирис ан	-“-	-“-	Кёнсаннамдо	Кёнсанпукдо	-“-	остров Чжэджу	-“-
гора Гымган г	-“-	река Хан	река Тэдон	-“-	провинция Кёнсан-букдо	-“-	-“-	-“-
Гора Кым ганг	Гора Джири	-“-	Река «Дэдон г»	-“-	Кёнсан букдо	Город «Чеджу»	Остров «Чеджу»	-“-
Кымган сан	Гора Жири	-“-	Дэдонга н	провинция Кёнсан-намд о	-“-	Чжеджуси	Чжеджудо	0
Гора Кымка н	-“-	-“-	Тэдонга н	Южная провинция Кёнсан	Северная провинция Кёнсан	Город Чжечжу	Остров Чжечжу	0
Гора Гымган сан	Гора Жириса н	Ханга н	Река Даэдонг ган	Южная провинция Кёнсанггам до	Северная провинция Кёнсанбук до	Город Жеджю	Остров Жезудо	Храм Мирукс а
Гора Кымка нсан	Гора Чжири	Река «Хан»	Река Дэдонга н	Южная провинция Кёнсан	Северная провинция Кёнсан	Город Чжэчжу	Остров Чжэчжудо	храм Мирык
г. Кымка нг	г. Чири	р. Хан	р. Дэдонг	Провинция Кёнгсангнам до	Провинция Кёнгсангпукдо	г.Чечжу	о.Чечжу	Буддий ский храм Мирыкс а
Гора Кымган	-“-	-“-	-“-	Кйонсан-нам до	Кйонсан-букдо	Город Чечу	Остров Чечудо	Буддий ский храм «Миры кса»

Гора Кым Канг	Гора Джи Ри	-“-	Река Дэдон	Провинция Южный Кен Санг	Провинция Северный Кен Санг	Чжэджу	остров Чечжу	Храм Ми Рык
Кым Кан сан	Гора Джи Ри сан	Ханкан	-“-	Провинция Кенсан Намдо	Провинция Кенсан Букдо	Город Джезу	Остров Джезу	Мирыгса
-“-	-“-	-“-	-“-	-“-		Город Джечу	Осторов Джечу	0

Таблица 2.

경복궁	경포대	부산	청진시	창원시	김대중	노무현	세종대왕	이순신 장군
дворец Кёнбокгун	Кён Пхо Дэ	город Пусан	город Чхончин	город Чханвон	Ким Тэ Чун	Ро Му Хён	великий король Се Чон	генерал Ли Сун Син
дворец Кён Бок	Кёнподэ	-“-	город Чён Джин	-“-	Ким Дэ Чунг	-“-	король Сэ Чжон	-“-
-“-	-“-	-“-	город Чонзин	город Чанвон	Ким Дэ Джун	-“-	великий король Сэзон	-“-
-“-	-“-	Пусан	Чёнжин-си	-“-	-“-	Но Му Хён	король Сечжон	-“-
-“-	-“-	-“-	Город Чонжин	-“-	-“-	-“-	Великий король Сэджон	-“-
Королевский дворец «Кёнгбок кунг»	-“-	-“-	-“-	-“-	Ким Дэчжунг	-“-	-“-	-“-
Королевский дворец Кёнбоккунг	0	-“-	-“-	-“-	Ким Дэ Чжун	-“-	Сэджондэван	-“-
дворец Кёнбок	Кен Пхо	-“-	Город Чончжин	Чанвон-си	-“-	-“-	Король Сэчжон	0
Дворец Кёнбокгун	Кёнпо	-“-	Город Чёнчжин	город Чанг вон	Ким Даэжун	-“-	Король Седжён	Генерал Ли сунсин

Дворец Кёнбокгунг	«Кёнгподэ»	-“-	Город «Чонг джин»	Город «Чангвон»	Ким Дэжун	Но му Хёнг	Великий король Сэжон	Генерал Ли Сунсин
-“-	Кёнпходэ	-“-	г. Чонгджин	г. Чангвон	-“-	Но Мухён	Великий король Седжонг	-“-
Дворец Кйонбук	Море Кйонпо	Город Бусан	Чжончжинсин	-“-	Ким Дэ Джунг	-“-	Императо р Сэжон	Генерал Ли Сун Шин
Кёнбоккун	Кёнг По Дэ	г. Пусан	Город Чен Джин	Город Чан Вон	-“-	Ро Мухён	Король Сэ Джонг	-“-
Кёнбокгун	Кёнгподэ	-“-	Город Чхонгджин	Город Чхангвон	-“-	Но Мухен	Сэджонг Великий	Ли Сун Син чжангун
Дворец Гёнбук	Гёнпо	-“-	Город Чонджин	Чжанвонси	Ким Дэджунг		Сэджондэванг	

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Родство Алтайского языка с корейским языком: морфологический, семантический и лексикологический аспекты

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Уже широко известно, что корейский язык принадлежит к семье Урало-Алтайских языков, но все-ещё корейский и японский языки классифируют независимыми от остальных в схеме УА языков. Это говорит, что КЯ синтаксически однороден особенно с семьей алтайских языков, зато отсутствует лексикологическое соотношение, которое может свидетельствовать о том, что в древнее время были прямые контакты между корейским и, допустим, алтайским языками. Таким образом, сложилась реальность, что два языка далеки друг от друга вопреки своей сходности. Такой феномен проистекает из того факта, что вообще не существует владеющих двумя языками носителями-исследователями. К тому же исследование на данную тему нельзя обойтись без знания русского языка.

Вопреки короткому сроку исследования алтайского языка я нашел лексически немало общего между алтайским и корейским языками. Безусловно, еще рановато категорически определить, что эти найденные мной общие лексики не обязательно разделяют общие корни, но их обнаруживание может послужить новым прорывом в сравнительном исследовании двух яхыков особенно при обстоятельствах, что существует крайне мало материалов, конкретно доказывающих родство алтайского языка с корейским.

Поскольку мало осталось от протокорейских лексик из-за принятия китайской письменности, найти общие корни между алтайскими и чисто корейскими словами требует большого труда. В этом отношении из данного исследования, связанным с чисто корейским языком, исключены те корейские лексики, которые происходили из китайских иероглифов или были заимствованные от моньголского языка после после монгольской оккупации в 13-ом веке. Следовательно, лексики, исследуемые в этом изучении, оказываются, возможно, прототипными как в алтайском, так и корейском языках.

Некоторые лексики имеют не только линвистическое, но и общественно-культурное значение. Возьмем пример с алтайского слова «кам». Оно может дать интересную коннотацию в изучении древней корейской культуры. «Кам» обозначает шамана по-алтайски. Однако, нынешнее время доминирущее в тюркских странах современное значение «шаман» сильно отличается с корейским. В современном корейском обществе дела шамана заключаюся в том, чтобы клоняться перед своими духами, гадать клиентам за деньги и проводить платный ритуал «кут». (Предполагается,

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что корень последнеднего слова связывается с тюркским языком.) Таким образом, деятельность шамана оказывается довольно комерческой и магической. Зато в странах Средней Азии шаман сохраняет чистые функции древней религии, т.е., общаясь с духами, он или она исполняет функции знахаря и певца эпических поэм. При учете концепции древней религии шаман, будучи обладателем чрезвычайных способностей, являлся возможным жрецом, в доисторические времена статус «кама» мог равняться божественному существу. В этом отношении предполагается, что в древнее время статус «кама» был высоким и он мог быть объектом почтения. Слово «кам» использовалось в древнее Корее, где распронялся тотемизм. Тотемом древнекорейского народа является медведь, который называется «ком» 〔k∧m〕. В древнем Чосоне значение «ком», возможно, почти равняется божественному существу. В этой связи стоит учесть, что бог произносится 〔ками〕 на японском языке. Если мы учитываем, что в древнейших обществах хоть бы этих трех стран «кам» несомненно располагали высоким статусом и он разделяет общий лексический корень. При прояснении такого предположения можно частично доказать, что в определенный момент прошлого народы этих трех стран жили в одном и том же мировозрении и в одинаком округе культуры.

В данном исследовании те алтайские лексики, которые могут иметь культуро-лингвистическое значение, отобраны из учебника алтайского языка А.А.Черновой и М.Ч.Чумакаевой, где употребляются около 1,000 слов. Из этого запаса слов много современных и займствованных слов, отличающихся от чисто-алтайских или тюркских. В этом отношении отобранные мной 27 лексик имеют общие основы с корейскими эквивалентами довольно многочисленные. Эти слова обоих языков все еще сохраняют форму протоязыка. Они такие: суфикс алтайского языка 1) –chy, 2) -der, наречие 3) ozo, (ozogyda, ozogy)(прежде), 4) örö(ÿstine)(верх), 5) агу(туда), 6) кайкамчылу (удивительно), гоагол 7) busul-,(разрушаться) 8) bus-,(разрушить) 9) jar-, 10) jyk-(срубить), 11) kubul-(перемениться)-kubulbas(неизменно). 명사 12) jan'myr (дождь), urgun janmyr(ливень), 13) kaan(правитель), 14) kajchy(ножницы), 15) mal(malchy), 16) mÿÿs(рог), 17) orom(улица), 18) öbögön(öböön)(супург), 19) emegen(супурга), 20) tuu(гора), 21) ÿst(верх), 22) chyrysh(морщина), 23) yjlaar(плач), 24) kögÿs(ум), 25) örtök(утка), 26)kujruk(хвост). 27) yrym(плохие приметы).

1) Суфикс алтайского языка –чы, который обозначает профессию человека, соответсвует с корейским суфиксом –чи того же значения. см) aɳchy, kajchy АЯ : changsa-chy(trader), yi-chy(this guy) КЯ. Лишь в современном корейском языке-чи имеет более унизительное значение. Было тенденция, что по сравнению с заимствованными китайскими иероглифами корейские знатные обращали свои собственные чисто корейские слова одинакого значения с унизительностью. 2) В алтайском языке суфиксы множественного числа разны также, как в других тюркских языках, что складывалось в процессе грамматизации и систематизации, а также правил сингармонизма. В общей сложности эти суфиксы могут свести к lØr и d(t)Ør. Суфикс множественного числа корейского языка имеет общую черту с алтайским безотносительно к китайскому влиянию, поскольку корейский суфикс имеет d(t)Øl(r). В особенности в алтайском языке на месте Ø размещаются « o,a,ö, e », а на месте корейского Ø размещается гласное «ㅡ»[ə], но в самом деле это гласное произноситься « o, a, ö, e » как в устной речи, так и в диалектах. Тем более, в большинстве случаев последний слог «l» в любом предложении произносится как « r » скорее

чем «l». см: 아이들이 잔다~ → [Ai deri chanda], 나무들은 푸르다~ → [Namu deren puruda].

3) Наречие алтайского языка «ozo» (ozogyda, ozogy:прежде) напоминает корейское «어제[əje]: вчера», «어저께 əjəgge: вчера» из запаса малочисленных чисто корейских слов.

4) Алтайское слово «örö(ÿstine): верх» имеет два значения в корейском языке. По произношению оно сходно с корейскими«아래(arö)» и «위로(Ÿro)». Надо учесть, что эти два корейских слова обозначают направление..

5) Как выше указано, алтайское «ary(туда)» похоже на корейское «arö».

6) Наречие алтайского языка «кайкамчылу(удивительно)» и имя существительное «кайкамчыл(чудо, диво)» выражает удивление так же, как корейское выражение «Ай камчак ия!». Оба языка имееют общую основу «-kamchØ».

7) Основа глагола АЯ «busul-,(разрушаться)» и 8) «bus-,(разрушить)» имеет общую основу корейского глагола «busu-da(разрушать)».

9) Основа глагола АЯ «jar-(резать)» соответствует с корейской «jar-da(резать)» и по значению и по произношению.

10) Основа глагола АЯ «jyk-(срубить)» эквивалентна к соответствущей основе КЯ «jik-(рубить))».

11) Глаглол и наречие АЯ « kubul-(перемениться)» и «kubulbas(неизменно)» разделяют общий корень глагола и имени прилагательного КЯ «kubul-kubul-hada(извилистый)». Безусловно, между двумя языками тонький оттенок по значению. Но в самом деле оба слова имеют одинаковое значение в том смысле, что они указывают не на прямоту. см: В турецком языке оно ближе к корейскому по значению.

12) Имя существительного «jan'myr(дождь)» может связаться с корейским«mur(l): вода», поскольку«jan'myr» обозначает «падающая +вода». см: yağ-mur в турецком языке. Тем более, алтайское «urgun janmyr(ливень)» производит сходное впечатление в корейской фразой со звукоподражательным словом «우르렁 쾅쾅 내리는 물(비): *Ur*erong *ku*ang kuang naerinun(падающий) *mul*».

13) Алтайское слово «kaan(правитель)» отражается в названии короллей династии Силла «Марип-гаан», «Каса-гаан», «Часа-гаан».

14) Алтайское слово « kajchy(ножницы)» звучит как «kawy» по-корейскому.

15) Хотя алтайское «mal и malchy» обозачает «скот и пастух», но малчы также имеет значение «табунщик». Это может иметь отношение с корейским «mal(лощадь или конь)».

16) Алтайское «mÿÿs(рог)» имеет общий корень с корейским «musso», который обозначает «рогатого быка».

17) Алтайское «orom(улица)» напоминает как корейское «orem(восхождение)», так и «orom(вершина)».

18) Алтайское «öbögön, öböön (супург)» разделяет аналогичный корень с корейскими «abam» и «æbi» значения «супруг».

19) Алтайское «emegen(супурга)» имеет общий корень с корейским «əmi)», «emi» того же значения.

20) Можно соотносить алтайское «tuu(гора)» с корейским«두메(tume)», который обозначает далекое горное и одинокое место.

21) Первый слог АЯ « ÿst(верх)» совпадает с корейским «ÿ(верх)».

22) Алтайское «chyrysh(морщина)» может иметь отношение с корейским «churym(морщина)».

23) Алтайское «yjlaar(плач)» разделяет общий корень с корейским «ul-da, ulym(urym): плакать, плач».

24) Алтайское «kögÿs(ум)» разделяет общий корень с корейским «꾀(kö): ум, хитрость».

25) Алтайское örtök(утка) звучит как вместе-взятые корейские «ori (утка)» и «tak(курица)» или напоминает «поднимающую курицу».

26) Алтайское «куйрук[kujruk](хвост)» звучит подобно корейскому «kori».

27) Алтайское «Ырым(плохие приметы)» может иметь близкое отношение с корейским «Ырым(угроза)». См: И в других тюркских языках это слово употревляется почти одинаково.

Таким образом, в пределах определенного запаса слов отобраны так или иначе связанные между собой лексики АЯ и КЯ. Характерной чертой этих слов является то, что они могут быть ближе к прото-алтайскому языку. Если мы проанализируем больший запас слов обоих языков, полагаю, что увеличится и расширится количество совпадений и общих основ обоих языков.

ОБ ОНОМАСИОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ ГРАММАТИКЕ ЧЕШСКОГО ЯЗЫКА

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Уважаемые коллеги,

позвольте в начале своего выступления сердечно поприветствовать Вас и пожелать успешного заседания и приятного пребывания в Праге. На сегодняшней конференции, организованной Корейской ассоциацией славистических и евразийских исследований, будет рассмотрен целый ряд интересных и разноплановых тем. Нам с коллегой Марией Добровой хотелось бы сосредоточить внимание на одной важной лингводидактической теме – на дидактической грамматике, а конкретнее на одном из ее видов – грамматике ономасиологической. В начале доклада мы дадим обзор разных пониманий термина «грамматика», затем опишем специфику грамматики дидактической, а в заключение представим достоинства ономасиологического подхода при описании грамматической системы флективного языка. Надеемся, что многое из сказанного будет действовать как для чешского, так и для русского языка.

Под понятием «грамматика» часто подразумеваются различные вещи. В настоящее время термин «грамматика» обычно понимается как свод имплицитных, объективно существующих правил и законов языкового кода, а термин «грамматическая система» естественного языка – как интернализованное (языковое) знание формальных и функциональных (речевых) правил в речевых центрах мозга говорящего. Чаще всего грамматика связана с описанием действующей грамматической системы конкретного языка.

В действительности ситуация несколько сложнее. На протяжении времени, особенно с 19 столетия, грамматика начала «специализироваться» и сосредотачивать свое внимание на анализе отдельных явлений грамматической системы естественного языка. Таким образом последовательно сформировались дивергентно-ориентированные грамматики. Понятие грамматики в таком случае может показаться слишком общим и расплывчатым, в связи с этим обычно принято говорить об отдельных видах грамматик.

Различают *грамматики синхронные*, наиболее важные для лингводидактики, и *грамматики диахронические (исторические)*, описывающие возникновение и законы развития грамматической системы конкретного языка. Конечно, и исторический подход может быть полезен для преподавания языка, поскольку объясняет сущность грамматических форм, кажущихся с точки зрения синхронного подхода нерегулярными (исключения, отступления), но имеющих системный

характер с точки зрения развития языка.

Согласно количеству описываемых языков выделяются *грамматики одноязычные* и *грамматики сопоставительные*, обеспечивающие контрастивный подход к грамматическим системам двух и более языков. Компаративная точка зрения на язык имеет свои преимущества, в шестидесятые годы 20 века приведшая к развитию контрастивной лингвистики и введению понятий позитивного и негативного переноса. Однако следует отметить, что таким образом описано лишь несколько (пар) языков и что нельзя в полной мере механически сравнить языковые системы неродственных языков: чешский генитив – это не то же самое, что родительный падеж в финском языке. Данная концепция не привела к успешному преодолению структурных различий между грамматическими системами сравниваемых языков.

Исследоваться также могут и языковые универсалии (*универсальные грамматики*), что мы считаем очень ценным, поскольку данные грамматики указывают на генетически обусловленную языковую (и речевую) способность человека, выявляют и описывают универсальные принципы и значения, которые могут создавать основу грамматических структур отдельных естественных языков.

Замечательные результаты приносит применение описательного подхода, который в настоящее время опирается на материал национальных корпусов (*дескриптивные,* а также *корпусные грамматики*). В этом случае можно говорить о новой вехе в развитии лингвистики. В то же время нам хотелось бы обратить внимание на неоднозначный и достаточно проблемный вопрос репрезентативности текстового материала. С лингводидактической точки зрения как осложнение выглядит «чрезмерное количество» полученных вариантных форм, по-разному расположенных на оси «литературность – нелитературность», «устность – письменность», форм, которые являются фактически невозможными для активного использования носителями других языков (особенно для неславян с неиндоевропейским родным языком).

Отдельно следовало бы сказать о прескриптивном (предписывающем) подходе, отраженном в *нормативных грамматиках*, которые в лингвистической богемистике страдают от нерешенности базовых проблем (среди которых, например, роль узуса при кодификации нормы, положение обиходно-разговорного чешского языка в современной коммуникации и дрю), поэтому здесь мы сталкиваемся со значительной опасностью, связанной с возможным применением субъективистских подходов, с неоднозначными последствиями языковой политики, с историческими и региональными разногласиями.

При описании грамматической системы чешского языка на данный момент ключевыми являются *грамматики семасиологические*, построенные на принципе «от формы – к содержанию». Это связано с тем, что смысловая плоскость грамматических категорий и явлений известна и понятна носителю языка. Определенные проблемы может создавать неустойчивая ситуация, касающаяся кодифицированных форм престижной разновидности национального языка (в данном случае, литературного чешского языка). Свою роль в данном случае играет как традиция, так и сам факт того, что с этой точки зрения грамматика значительно легче для восприятия. В том случае, когда грамматические формы четко разграничены, они кажутся более простыми и конкретными.

Неиспользованные возможности предлагает нам недооцененная *грамматика функциональная*,

ономасиологическая, реализующая подход «от значения (функции) – к способам его формальной реализации», заключающийся в установлении того, в скольких языковых формах выражается определенное конкретное значение, каковы данные формы и отношения между ними.

Вышеупомянутые виды научных подходов описывают грамматическую систему конкретного языка во всей ее сложности. Для них характерны следующие типичные черты: научный характер, формулирование обобщающих заключений и правил, адресованность специалистам, филологам.

Дидактическая грамматика, на которой нам бы хотелось остановиться в данный момент, наоборот, подходит к описанию с лингводидактической перспективы. В связи с учетом уровня коммуникативной компетентности говорящего она носит спиралевидный характер (речь идет о цикличном представлении основных грамматических категорий, о последовательном нарастании сложности грамматического учебного материала). Дидактическая грамматика представляет собой модифицированную форму общепринятых грамматик, удовлетворяя при этом требованиям практики преподавания. Но данный факт не говорит об одностороннем влиянии. Новые знания о грамматической системе естественного языка приносят не только сугубо «лингвистические» грамматические описания, но и дидактическая грамматика, увиденная глазами иноязычного пользователя, часто носителя типологически и генеалогически иного языка и социально-культурного кода. Благодаря этому создается пространство для инновационных подходов и новых импульсов, для нетрадиционных решений, которые при интерпретации грамматики родного языка не выступают на первый план.

Грамматическая система иностранного языка в дидактической грамматике специально упрощена, ее объем в той или иной степени уменьшен. Форма обучающей грамматики и характер изложения в идеале должны учитывать родной язык пользователя. Такой вид грамматического описания является в значительной мере практически и прагматически ориентированным, показательно для него и стремление к ясности толкования, к наглядности. Дискуссионным при этом остается вопрос об оптимальном уровне упрощения грамматического материала.

Можно утверждать, что сама природа коммуникативного акта определяет ключевую роль пропозиционного содержания высказывания. Говорящий (пишущий) намеревается высказаться о «состоянии мира», о своих чувствах, настроениях, взглядах, а с учетом соответствующих факторов коммуникативного контекста высказывания его первоначальный замысел реализуется (кроме лексики) также и при помощи формальных грамматических средств соответствующего языкового кода. Лексическая и грамматическая стороны тесно связаны между собой. Данную ситуацию отражает и утверждение В. Скалички о том, что «языки – это разные попытки решения одной и той же проблемы». В связи с этим мы предполагаем, что было бы полезным исходить не от грамматических форм, то есть семасиологически, а от «сообщаемой действительности» (от содержания высказывания, от семантики) в направлении к способам формальной ее реализации в рамках конкретного языкового кода.

В случае существования аналогичных (или же универсальных) значений представляется целесообразным двигаться от семантической составляющей к ее формальной речевой реализации, исходить из того, что различные языки объединяет, и продвигаться к тому, что языковые системы отличает, или же к формально-морфологической и синтаксической реализации соответствующих значений, функций, вышеупомянутых грамматических категорий и явлений.

Применение семантического «измерения», впрочем, зарекомендовало себя в различных сферах преподавания иностранного языка, в том числе и при определении падежей и уточнения адвербиальных значений. Несомненно легче к предложению *Přijel minulou sobotu* задать вопрос *Kdy přijel?*, а не *V koho, co přijel?*; нечто подобное происходит и при определении обстоятельства ограничения, например, *Ta země je bohatá na ropu* (не *je bohatá na koho, co?*, а *V jakém směru je ta země bohatá? Pokud jde o co? Ve vztahu k čemu?*) или обстоятельства цели, например, *Jde do restaurace na oběd* (вместо не слишком подходящего *Jde do restaurace na koho, na co?* следует спросить *Proč, s jakým cílem, za jakým účelem jde do restaurace?*).

Подобные «непадежные» вопросы являются естественными, универсальными, легче усваиваемыми и неносителями славянских языков.

Давайте вернемся к ономасиологически ориентированной грамматике. Понятно, что определение ряда ключевых семантических комплексов, их внутренней иерархии и коммуникативных функций является трудной задачей. Сложным представляется и решение ряда вопросов, связанных с различиями в коммуникативных (коммуникативно-цивилизационных) системах, с вопросами речевого этикета и др.

Несмотря на это, ономасиологический подход характеризуется следующими положительными моментами:

1) он может создавать соответствующие предпосылки для наглядного представления конкурирующих способов выражения некоторых грамматических категорий (с различной частотностью, стилистической окраской, формальной сложностью и др). У формальной реализации чешского повелительного наклонения следовательно могут быть с соответствующими комментариями приведены и следующие формы *Napište to! Psát! Tohle napíšete! Budete psát! Tak píšeme, píšeme! Koukejte to napsat! Kdybyste raději psali*… и т.д.

2) он предлагает существенно больше возможностей для учета речевого аспекта (см. недостаточно удовлетворительное описание и представление чешских предлогов в учебниках чешского языка для иностранцев – в данном случае их лингводидактическое представление на основе семантических комплексов было бы очень полезным).

3) он способствует более эффективному толкованию так называемых непараллельных грамматических категорий и явлений, поскольку наиболее наглядным способом иллюстрирует соответствующие межъязыковые субституции – например, категорию глагольного вида (выражение завершенности действия или выражение процессуальности) сложной системой времен или компенсацию отсутствия определенного артикля использованием указательных местоимений и т.д.

Таким образом, мы уверены в том, что ономасиологический подход является перспективным и полезным, а также считаем, что он требует дальнейшей разработки не только для преподавания чешского (или русского) языка как целевого (иностранного), но и для самого широкого спектра лингводидактических целей.

V-3 Social Sciences 4 (in English)

Economic Cooperation and Public Diplomacy

Chair: Duckjoon Chang (Kookmin University)

≫ Korea's New 'Nordpolitik' and Eurasian Cooperation: With a Focus on its Prospects for Promoting Unification of the Korean Peninsula

Duckjoon Chang (Kookmin University)

≫ Communication and Boundaries: Texas and Europe at the Era of Mass Immigration through the Perspective of Personal Letters

Eva Eckert (Anglo American University, Czech)

≫ A Narrative Approach to Identity Construction: The Case of the Korean Diaspora in Volgograd, Russia

Chaimun Lee (Kyungpook National University)

≫ The Orientation of Islam in Dagestan

Sejin Jung (Hanyang University)

The Eurasia Initiative as a New, Upgraded, Version of the Nordpolitik: With Implications for the Korean Unification

Duckjoon Chang(Kookmin University)

I. Introduction

As the Park Geun-hye government started in 2013, it adopted a series of foreign policy initiatives. Along with the "trust-building process" or "trustpolitik" with North Korea and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, the "Eurasia Initiative" constitutes one of core elements of foreign policy line of the Republic of Korea (ROK). While there existed occasional policy proposals for promoting cooperation with the North and expanding Seoul's diplomatic scope up to its northern neighbors before—for example, the *Nordpolitik* of the late 1980s and the early 1990s and "Sunshine Policy" under Kim Dae-jung—the Eurasia Initiative is practically the first comprehensive, long-term, policy vision for the future of the Korean people. It not only comprises political, economic and cultural cooperation with Eurasian countries on the basis of mutual benefits, but also lays out long-term vision for the unification of the two Koreas and even national strategy of the unified Korea.

However, the Eurasia Initiative came across a formidable obstacle. Amid grave concerns in the international society, North Korea pushed ahead with its fourth round nuclear weapons test in January 2016 followed by long-range missile test in February. Such a nuclear adventurism of North Korea not only aroused tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but also brought about geopolitical instability in the Northeast Asian (NEA) region. The international society including the United Nations harshly criticized the North's nuclear test for a serious challenge to international security.

Despite mounting tensions on the Korean Peninsula and geopolitical upheaval in the Northeast Asian (NEA) region in the wake of North Korea's nuclear adventurism, peace and stability of the NEA region as well as the Korean peninsula seems largely dependent on cooperation with Eurasian countries. In this context, 'the Eurasia Initiative,' the ROK's recent policy agenda for Eurasian cooperation, should be continuously pursued as a backbone of ROK's foreign policy. This study will shed light on the ROK's '*Nordpolitik*' of the 1980s and the 1990s. Then, compared with the previous policy, the Eurasia Initiative, a new, upgraded, version of the '*Nordpolitik*,' will be analyzed. Further, the vision and strategy with which the ROK should seek for Eurasian cooperation and its prospects will be discussed from the perspective of the Korean unification.

II. *Nordpolitik* during the Roh Tae-woo Government

Since the Korean Peninsula is surrounded by great powers in Northeast Asia, the ROK's diplomatic autonomy has fundamental limitations. Nonetheless the "*Nordpolitik*" of the 1980s is considered as an exceptional success story in Korean diplomatic history. Maximizing opportunities left by the falling apart of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the ROK government embarked on a new foreign policy line mainly directed toward normalization of diplomatic relations with communist countries including East European countries, the Soviet Union and China. By doing so, the Roh Tae-woo government was intent to induce North Korea to open the door to its southern neighbor and the world, which the ROK considered was a first step toward peaceful unification of the two Koreas.

On July 7, 1988 President Roh Tae-woo unveiled a new foreign policy line. In the so-called "the July 7th Declaration," President Roh said that South Korea would actively promote visits between the people of South and North Korea, would allow for trade with the North, and help the communist nation improve relations with the United States and other Western countries[1]. For the purpose of cooperation and reconciliation between South and North Korea as a prerequisite to prosperity and peace and further unification of the Korean Peninsula, Roh argued that South and North Korea should recognize each other's place in the international community and cooperate with each other in the best interests of the entire Korean people. Roh went on to maintain that to this end his government would actively promote exchanges of politicians, businessmen, journalists, religious and cultural leaders, artists, academics, sportsmen and students and will ensure that Koreans residing overseas can freely visit both Koreas. Furthermore, President Roh announced that with a view to creating an atmosphere conducive to durable peace on the Korean peninsula, the ROK would not only promote the existing friendly relationship with the United States, Japan and other nations, but also establish diplomatic relationship with communist countries including the Soviet Union and China. Such a policy line in which the ROK government would make endeavor to make friendly relationship with its northern neighboring countries came to be referred to as "Northern Politics" or "*Nordpolitik*."[2]

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[1] Major points in the July 7th Declaration are as follows: First, the ROK government will actively pursue mutual visits of residents in the two Koreas and will allow Koreans residing overseas to visit the North. Second, Seoul will confirm life and death and addresses of divided families and make effort to realize their mutual visits. Third, the ROK government will open up the doors to trade between the North and the South, recognizing the inter-Korean trade as a domestic trade. Fourth, the ROK government will not object to a third country's transactions with the North as long as they are not related with the military sector. Fifth, the ROK government suggests that both Seoul and Pyongyang should terminate diplomatic rivalry and antagonism on the international stage. Sixth, while the ROK is willing to help the North to ameliorate relations with ROK's partners, it also will seek for establishing friendly relations with socialist countries including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. See Roh Tae-woo, *The Roh Tae-woo Memoir* [Volume 2] (Seoul: Chosun News Press, 2011), pp.144-146.

[2] Obviously the term "*Nordpolitik*" was derived from West German "*Ostpolitik*" policy with East Germany. In June 1983, in his lecture at Korea National Defense University, Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk for the first time dubbed a new diplomatic approach toward North Korea and its communist allies as *"Nordpolitik*." Lee said that the ROK government would make effort to normalize relations with communist countries including the Soviet Union and China, which he called "*Nordpolitik*." See Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p.187. For a brief explanation about the meanings and background of "*Ostpolitik*," see Hope M. Harrison, "The Berlin Wall, Ostpolitik, and Détente," *German Historical Institute Bulletin Supplement 1* (2003), pp.5-18.

Despite the July 7th Declaration of the Roh government, North Korea's response remained still negative toward the inter-Korean dialogue, and even antagonistic against the South's policy initiative, rendering the cold war structure in the NEA region intact.[3] Thus, the ROK government chose a roundabout strategy rather than a direct contact with the North. That is, by approaching Pyongyang's long-standing allies such as the Soviet Union, China and other communist countries, Seoul wanted those countries to play a mediating role in persuading the North to open up its door to the South.

As a result of the *Nordpolitik* of the Roh government, the ROK managed to establish diplomatic relationship consecutively with East European countries during the period of 1989-1990. Beginning with Hungary in February 1989, the ROK government established diplomatic relationship with Poland in November and with Yugoslavia in December 1989. Next year, Seoul went on to establish diplomatic relationship with Algeria in January and with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Mongolia in March. South Korea, after numerous unofficial contacts[4] between the two sides, succeeded in establishing diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union. At last, Seoul concluded negotiations on establishment of diplomatic relationship with China in August 1992.

The *Nordpolitik* of the Roh Tae-woo government is regarded as one of the most outstanding achievements in Korean diplomatic history because it contributed to the expansion of the horizon of Korean diplomacy by normalizing relations with communist countries. In addition, the *Nordpolitik* of the ROK produced an atmosphere of 'peaceful coexistence' between the two Koreas. Obtaining UN membership simultaneously in September 1991, Seoul and Pyongyang agreed on de facto mutual recognition of each other. Furthermore, on December 13, 1991, representatives from the two Koreas signed "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and North."[5] Further, the signing of the "Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" was followed on January 20, 1992.[6] However, due to Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons with the announcement of its intention to withdraw from the International Atomic Energy

[3] Tae Dong Chung, "Korea's Nordpolitik: Achievements & Prospects," *Asian Perspective*, Vol.15, No.2 (1991), pp.149-179.

[4] After the 1988 Olympic Games held in Seoul, as restrictions on the travel to the Soviet Union were lifted, many South Korean industrialists including Chung Ju Yung of Hyundai, visited Moscow, while Moscow was reaching out to Seoul through the activities of its party-dominated think tanks. Thus unofficial and opposition leaders of South Korea were invited to the Soviet Union. The Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada (ISKAN) hosted Kim Dae-jung in February 1989, whereas the Institute of World Economic and International Relations (IMEMO) invited Kim Young Sam in June. In return for those visits by renowned South Korean politicians to Moscow, Anatoly Dobrynin, former Soviet Ambassador to Washington, visited Seoul in May 22, 1990 as an unofficial special envoy of Mikhail Gorbachev. During his meeting with President Roh, Dobrynin conveyed the Soviet leader's message that Moscow was ready to improve relations with Seoul and keenly interested in economic cooperation between the two countries. Additionally at that time they apparently discussed about the possibility of a summit meeting between Presidents Gorbachev and Roh Tae-woo. See Obedorfer (1997), pp.207-211.

[5] This comprehensive inter-Korean agreement stipulates the renunciation of political and military antagonism between the two Koreas, the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the promotion of exchanges and cooperation between the two parties. In this pact are also included declarations for economic cooperation and humanitarian contacts. The North agreed on direct trade and investment from the South and the two countries reached an agreement on the restoring of rail and road connections destroyed during the Korean War. See Dan C. Sanford, "ROK's *Nordpolitik*: Revisited," *Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol.7, No.1 (Winter/Spring 1993), pp.1-31.

[6] Under this declaration, both countries agreed not to "test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons" or to "possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." They also agreed to mutual inspections for verification.

Agency (IAEA) in March 1993, such pacts between the two Koreas all of sudden became virtually invalidated.

Notwithstanding such a remarkable achievement, the Roh government's *Nordpolitik* was not successful enough to bring about North Korea's open door policy and a breakthrough of inter-Korean relations thereof.[7] Furthermore, the *Nordpolitik* of the ROK, which was designed to encourage Moscow and Beijing to play a significant role in the Korean issue, failed to induce Russia and China to exercise influence on Pyongyang during the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the mid-1990s. For instance, when North Korea revealed its nuclear weapons program by declaring that it would leave the Non-proliferation Treaty in 1992, the ROK government did not take an active measure to launch a multilateral cooperation among those countries concerned including 2+4 format. As a matter of fact, the ROK's *Nordpolitik* at first was focused on bilateral relations with former communist countries based on economic cooperation as an impetus to the establishment of diplomatic relationship, which turned out to be not so much effective in making those countries exert substantial influence on Pyongyang in such a critical security issue. In short, the *Nordpolitik* of the late 1980s and the early 1990s was successful only in expanding its diplomatic scope by normalizing former communist countries. Yet, with an optimistic instrumentalism in which Seoul expected that it would be able to exercise influence on Pyongyang through those former communist countries, the *Northpolitik* showed its intrinsic limitations.

III. The Eurasia Initiative: a New, Upgraded, Version of the *Nordpolitik*

Undoubtedly, the *Nordpolitik* of the Roh Tae-woo government is considered as one of the most significant achievements in Korean diplomatic history in the sense that it for the first time paved the way for a cooperative relationship with continental powers—Russia and China, for example—in addition to maritime powers—the United States and Japan, for example—by establishing diplomatic relationship with former communist countries, thus expanding the horizon of the ROK's diplomacy. The *Nordpolitik* of the Roh government, however, fell through in the midst of geopolitical turmoil caused by the first North Korean nuclear crisis by the mid-1990s. As Pyongyang challenged the international society by developing nuclear weapons program, the *Nordpolitik* policy in South Korea became virtually overwhelmed by hard-line policy toward North Korea. In the aftermath of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the Kim Yong-sam government failed to show any vision for a new version of the *Nordpolitik* at all. In contrast to the preceding regime, in the early 2000s, the Kim Dae-jung government vehemently pushed for an engagement policy toward the North under the rubric of "sunshine policy," culminating in the 2000 summit between President Kim and his North Korean counterpart Chairman Kim Jong-il. Such

[7] Indeed, there was some progress in the relationship between the two Koreas during the Roh government. For instance, in December 1991 Seoul and Pyongyang jointly signed the "Basic Agreement between the South and the North Koreas" as an institutional base for the loosening of political tension on the Korean Peninsula. In this particular document are included such items as mutual recognition of the other regime, stoppage of antagonistic activities, and exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North.

an engagement policy was succeeded by the Roh Moo-hyun government. Additionally the Kim Dae-jung government expressed its interest in Russia's so-called "the trilateral cooperation projects" among the two Koreas and Russia including the linkage between the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) and the construction of trans-Korean gas pipeline through which Russian natural gas will be supplied to South Korea. Yet, because of Pyongyang's lukewarm response to such mega-projects and subsequent outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis such as the North's implementation of its first nuclear test in 2006 and military conflicts on the Yellow Sea between the South and the North including the sinking of ROKS Cheonan, a Pohang-class corvette of the Republic of Korea Navy, in 2010, cooperation between the Koreas based on a new, comprehensive, version of inter-Korean relationship, to say nothing of a new version of the *Nordpolitik*, was not realized.

It is President Park Geun-hye's "Eurasia Initiative" that the first time unveiled the ROK government's comprehensive, long-term vision for the Eurasian cooperation—an expanded and upgraded version of the *Nordpolitik*. In October 2013, President Park announced Eurasia Initiative at the 'Conference on International Cooperation in the Era of Eurasia.' At this conference, she declared *Eurasia Initiative* as a continent-oriented foreign policy of Korea, suggesting for a "Silk Road Express (SRX) and energy infrastructure linking South Korea with Europe via North Korea, China, Russia, and Central Asia based on logistics and energy complex including railways, roads, airports, pipelines and electricity grids.[8] According to the Eurasia Initiative policy idea, the Korean government is ready to play an active role in the formulation of an economic cooperation scheme connecting Europe and Asia. The orientation of the Eurasia Initiative boils down to three points: a single continent, a creative continent and a continent of peace.

First, with respect to 'a single continent,' the Korean government is committed to cooperation with Eurasian countries for the purpose of building networks of logistics, transportation, and pipelines for petroleum and natural gas. With such complex networks of energy, transportation and logistics, Eurasian countries are expected to proceed toward economic integration. President Park emphasized that "[t]he severed network needs to be linked to overcome the physical barriers preventing exchange." President Park suggested that "win-win Eurasian cooperation must be developed, such as linking energy infrastructures including electricity grids, gas and oil pipelines, and co-developing China's shale gas and eastern Siberia's petroleum and gas."[9]

Second, the Eurasia Initiative is aimed at Eurasian cooperation toward a 'creative continent.' The Park Geun-hye government proclaimed its willingness to cooperate with such Eurasian countries as Russia, China and European countries by drawing together efforts for economic innovation based on the development of new technologies including information and communication technology. Also, in the idea of the Eurasia Initiative, the Park government suggests that Eurasian countries should cooperate with each other for the purpose of creating new businesses, exchanging various ideas and sharing the common vision on a 'creative' or innovative economy. On the other hand, the Eurasia Initiative is

[8] Yong Kwon, "South Korea's Eurasia Ambitions: The Park Geun-hye administration is using Inter-Korean Relations to Bolster its Larger Regional Strategy," *The Diplomat*, August 20, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/south-koreas-eurasia-ambitions/ (Accessed: June 18, 2016).

[9] *The Korea Herald*, October 18, 2013, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131018000620 (Accessed: June 18, 2016).

designed to accelerate cultural and human exchanges among diverse peoples in the continent. In particular, diverse peoples in the Eurasian continent may find their identities by tracing back to the origins of Eurasian cultures in foods, languages, costumes, and so on.

Third, the Eurasia Initiative stresses peace in the continent. Threats to peace and security in Eurasia, President Park maintains, are major obstacles to economic and trade cooperation and cultural exchanges among Eurasian countries. By consolidating a peace structure in the continent, it is expected that cultural diversity and economic prosperity will be enhanced. In this context, peace on the Korean Peninsula, an important node between Eurasia and the Pacific region, is a key to peace in the world as well as a peaceful Eurasia. A peaceful, nuclear-free, unified, Korean Peninsula, President Park stresses, will be a robust link connecting Europe and Asia.[10] In this sense, the Eurasia initiative is closely related to '*trustpolitik*' with the North, another major pillar of the Park government's foreign policy.

What are unique characteristics of the Eurasia Initiative compared with the ROK's previous *Nordpolitik*? First of all, the Eurasia Initiative is much wider in scope and complicated than the northern policy of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The *Nordpolitik* under the Roh Tae-woo government was devoted to obtaining political leverage over North Korea by approaching Moscow and Beijing—Pyongyang's patrons. In contrast, the Eurasia Initiative is not just instrumental in approaching particular countries with narrow and specific goals. Through the Eurasia Initiative, the Republic of Korea raised a significant vision for peace and prosperity of the Eurasian continent and the entire world. In this sense, while the previous northern policy was aimed at exerting influence over Pyongyang to adopt open-door policy and reform through rapprochement with Russia (then the Soviet Union) and China, the Eurasia Initiative, in contrast, is considered as a long-term foreign policy orientation and vision of the Republic of Korea with a view to expanding its own 'economic territories,' making preparations for unification of the two Koreas, and contributing to prosperity and peace in the Eurasian continent. .

Meanwhile, through the Eurasia Initiative the Republic of Korea may play a significant role on the international stage.[11] That is, as a middle power state, Korea has an opportunity to prove itself prepared to advocate international cooperation agendas which may be applicable to both the great powers and lesser power states. As is widely known, the role of middle power states has been expanded as a result of changes in geopolitical environment since the 1990s. United States' hegemonic power has become dwindled and the influence of other actors has been enhanced since the late 1990s and the early 2000s. And as the scope of international relations became interdependent and diversified—not confined to the issue of security and the economy—the international order allowed lesser powers to prompt policy responses and initiatives. In other words, the role of a middle power has substantially increased over the past two decades. Middle powers tend to avoid risks of being engaged in a wide range of issues

[10] At the 2014 ASEM summit in Milano, President Park again advocated her Eurasian Initiative vision, underlining that peace and cooperation on the Eurasian continent requires North Korea's participation with abandonment of its nuclear program. *The Chosun Ilbo*, October 17, 2014.

[11] Being one of 12 biggest economies in the world in terms of nominal GDP as of 2015, the Republic of Korea has already reached a middle power state status. Furthermore, according to the Hyundai Research Institute, for the foreseeable future the ROK is likely to become the 7th member of "the 30-50 Club" composed of those countries with more than thirty thousand dollars of GDP per capita coupled with 50 million in population. *Chosun.com*, October 6, 2014, http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/10/06/2014100600326.html?Dep0=twitter&d=2014100600326 (Accessed: June 17, 2016).

including international security. Instead, they try to find niche places in international issues in pursuit of coalition-building and cooperation-building through "energetic and creative use of their diplomatic talents.[12]

As a middle power located at the crossroad where the interests of continental powers and maritime powers crisscross, the Republic of Korea is in a position to advocate a mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation model for those nations concerned. Being a member of the G-20 major economies and also a middle power, South Korea is no longer a reactive follower; Sometimes Seoul also plays a proactive role in raising major regional and global issues. Over the last few years, for instance, Seoul has already hosted major summit meetings where heads of major countries in the world took part: to take some examples, the 2010 G-20 Summit and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. Particularly, in the 2012 nuclear summit, in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, in addition to such issues as cooperative measures to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, protection of nuclear materials and related facilities, and prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, the Republic of Korea added the new issues of radiological security and nuclear security-safety interface to the agenda.[13]

In this context the Park government's Eurasian Initiative not only laid out its own mid-term and long-term diplomatic vision for Korean citizens, but also showed a possibility of 'niche diplomacy' by a middle power to the world. As noted above, the Eurasia Initiative proposes a series of policy visions and agendas mainly covering economic and cultural cooperation issues in which countries in the Eurasian continent work together for mutual interests on a non-zero-sum game basis and thus seek for consensus-building. In this process, the Republic of Korea seems to be able and poised to play a major role in the process of agenda-setting and consensus-building in certain issue areas.

Under the Eurasia Initiative, the Park government has attempted to strengthen ties with Eurasian countries. For instance, President Park met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Seoul to discuss diverse issues on bilateral cooperation. Among other things, during the Seoul summit the Republic of Korea for the first time jumped in a pilot trilateral cooperation project by joining a consortium concerned with Rajin-Khasan transportation and logistics cooperation.[14] Furthermore, in 2014 President Park paid a series of state visits to Central Asian countries including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. By doing so, the Park government not only tried to upgrade bilateral cooperation with former Soviet states, but also made efforts to create favorable atmosphere in which cooperation with Eurasian countries based on the Eurasia Initiative may be promoted. Furthermore, for the purpose of promoting public understanding and support for Eurasian cooperation, the government and non-governmental organizations held some cultural events, attracting considerable attention from both Koreans and peoples in Eurasian countries. Among other things, during the period of August-November 2014, a bicycle expedition team organized by *The Chosun-Ilbo* travelled from Berlin via East European countries, Russia, Mongolia and China to Seoul, which drew a keen attention from citizens of the transit

[12] Andrew F. Cooper, "Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview," in Andrew F. Cooper (ed.), *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), pp.1-24.

[13] Sharon Squassoni, "Nuclear Safety and Security at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, Working Paper, March 2012, US-Korea Institute at SAIS.

[14] During the summit the signing of MOUs including the establishment of a consortium among Posco, Hyundai Merchant Marine and Korail to acquire nearly half of the 70 percent stake that Russia owns in a five-year-old joint venture called RasonKonTrans was held.

countries.[15] In the summer of 2015, the Korean government together with several civilian organizations prepared for 'Eurasia Friendship Express 2015," a train expedition team, with a view to propagating the idea of Eurasian Initiative and promoting cultural and personnel exchanges with Eurasian countries. This expedition team composed of some 250 people from all walk of life in South Korea is to travel from Vladivostok and Beijing via Ulaanbaatar, Irkutsk, Yekaterinburg, and Moscow to Berlin, covering 14,400 ㎞.[16] As follow-up events of the Eurasia Friendship Express 2015, in June 2016 the Korea-Russia Dialogue (KRD) held an international conference on the regional issues in Northeast Asia including the North Korean nuclear issue, ROK-RF bilateral cooperation and the prospects of cooperation in the Arctic Sea in Saint Petersburg. Also, in the same month, under the auspice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROK, a special international conference on Korea-Russian cooperation for the Arctic Sea was held in the northern Russian city of Murmansk. In this conference various ideas about utilizing the Northern Sea Route, which constitutes one of major elements of the Eurasia Initiative aimed at building comprehensive transportation and logistics networks in the Eurasian continent, were discussed. In addition, it is reported that Korean music and dance performance held in Murmansk won the hearts of the Russian audience.[17]

IV. Eurasian Cooperation: A Catalyst for the Korean Unification

Soon after her inauguration President Park set forth the discourse on unification preparations under the slogan that "Unification is a bonanza." President Park unveiled her own unification model in a speech in the former East German city of Dresden in March 2014. In her speech delivered at the Dresden University of Technology, Park pointed to three visions of unification preparations. First one is "the humanitarian issue" including the family reunion and health care support for North Korean pregnant women and children. Second vision is "co-prosperity," which can be achieved through the development of inter-Korean infrastructure projects and improvements to be made to the livelihoods of all people in Korea. The third one constitutes "integration of the people" of North and South Korea—promotion of people-to-people contact, joint scholarly works, etc.—constitutes the third vision of unification preparations.[18] In this speech President Park addressed the ROK government's visions on meticulous preparations for Korean unification in the hope that a unified Korea will not only bring about enhanced wellbeing and happiness for the Korean people, but also contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Eurasian region in general and in the NEA region in particular.

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[15] *The Chosun-Ilbo*, August 15, 2014.

[16] *Korea.net* , May 21, 2015, http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Poliltics/view?articleId=108026 (Accessed: May 30, 2016).

[17] *The Yonhap News*, June 17, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/06/17/0301000000AEN20160617002600315.html (Accessed: June 19, 2016); *The Yonhap News*, June 22, 2016, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/06/17/0200000000AEN20160617002400315.html (Accessed: June 19, 2016).

[18] *The Korea Herald*, March 28, 2014, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140328001400 (Accessed: June 18, 2016). Such proposals pointed out in this speech came to be called "the Dresden Declaration" of the Park government.

It is undisputable that the Korean people should play a major role in the unification preparations as seen in such visions of the ROK government. Yet, there is no denying that international cooperation is also essential to the process of unification between the two Koreas as well. Among other things, cooperation with Eurasian countries is of much importance, because cooperation with "northern neighbors" of Korea such as Russia and Central Asian countries is essential not only for unification preparations, but also for the long-term development strategy for the 'unified Korea.' In particular, Russia seems to be more flexible toward the Korean unification than China who is more sensitive to the changes in geopolitical environment to be caused by unification of the two Koreas. While China considers the survival and stability of the North Korean regime as its vital interest, Russia seems more tolerant about Korean unification in the expectation that a unified Korea will be a terrific partner for the development project in Siberia and the Russian Far East (RFE).[19]

As a matter of fact, Russia will be one of those nations which will be benefitted from Korean unification. In addition to the participation of the unified Korea as in the above-mentioned Siberian and RFE development project, Russia and the unified Korea may promote various forms of economic cooperation including long-awaited mega-projects that Russia has been advocating for many years: linkage of the TSR with the TKR, construction of trans-Korean gas pipeline to supply Russian gas to Korea, and connection of electricity grids between the two neighboring countries. Through cooperation with the unified Korea, Russia will be placed in a better position to be integrated with economies in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and thus the Asia-Pacific region in general.

For now the Russian Federation is seeking to promote development in the RFE and Siberia, relatively backward regions in the nation. To this end, Russia has been shifting the importance in economic cooperation and diplomacy toward the Asia-Pacific region, which is frequently called the "New Eastern Policy." In particular, as Russia's relationship with the European Union and the United States became worsened, Moscow enhanced its diplomatic importance toward Asia as an alternative to relations with the West. In this context, in 2012 the Russian government established *the Ministry of Development of the Far East*, a new federal ministry entirely in charge of the development the RFE. At the same time, Moscow has been seeking to construct oil and gas pipelines in the RFE and Siberia, while establishing the Territories of Priority Soci-economic Development in the RFE and the Free Port of Vladivostok to induce foreign investment in the region. Meanwhile Russia has recently strengthened ties with China, North Korea, and ASEAN countries to bring up its own influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Since such 'pivot to Asia' policy of the Russian Federation seems to be harmonized with the ROK's Eurasia Initiative policy, collaboration between the two policy initiatives is expected to produce positive synergy effects. First, Korea will be able to realize Eurasian transportation and logistics networks—one of the major pillars of the Eurasia Initiative—by promoting cooperation with Russia. In 2011 under the auspices of Russia, renovation of the 54 ㎞ railway between Rajin and Khasan, the gateway to the TSR,

[19] Of course, it is well known that the Russian Federation is supportive of Korean unification as far as it is not detrimental to Russian interest. For example, Russians mostly are concerned about the possibility of the stationing of U.S. troops after unification of the two Koreas becomes realized. Thus, some Russian experts argue for a Unified Korea as a neutral state without any political and military alliances. For example, M. V. Afonin, "Rol' politicheskikh partii v ob'edinenii Korei," Vestnik, Tsentra koreevedeniya DVGU (Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii <100 let koreivedeniya DVGU>, Tezisy in doklady), Vladivostok: Bzd-vo DVGU, No.1 (2000), s.106-111.

was completed. North Korea and Russia launched a joint logistics project in which Russian mineral resources including coal transported to the Asia-Pacific region from the 3rd Pier of the Rajin Port through the Rajin-Khasan railroad.[20] In an effort to launch a pilot project concerned with Eurasia Initiative South Korea also joined the Rajin-Khasan transportation and logistics project, which constitutes a part of the Seoul-Pyongyang-Moscow trilateral cooperation.[21] At the outset, the ROK government joined such a preliminary trilateral project in the expectation that it would be conducive to larger scale of trilateral projects such as the TKR-TSR linkage, construction of the trans-Korean gas pipeline, and connection of electricity grids between Russia and the Korean Peninsula, which in turn will be a backbone of Eurasian cooperation under the aegis of the ROK government's Eurasia Initiative, a new version of *Nordpolitik*.

Such a trilateral cooperation is likely to bring about not only mutual benefits for the countries concerned, but also the lessening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and further changes in North Korean society, which will ultimately serve as a favorable environment for preparations for unification by reducing costs for unification of the two Koreas. In this sense, the Eurasia Initiative as a new, far-sighted version the *Nordpolitik* is believed to be an important policy vision serving as a cornerstone for national development strategy for a unified Korea in the future and today's unification preparations.

For the time being, because of North Korea's nuclear adventurism, the ROK's drive toward Eurasian cooperation is likely to make slow progress. Right after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution on sanctions against North Korea's nuclear test of January 6, 2016 and the launching of long-range missile in February 2016 (UNSC-2270), the ROK government decided to impose its own unilateral sanctions against the North by shelving the Rajin-Khasan transportation project with Russia, rendering the trilateral cooperation frozen for a certain period time. However, regardless of the North Korean nuclear crisis, Eurasian cooperation should be continued in various formats and directions: development of bilateral cooperation between the ROK and the RF, the conclusion of free trade agreement between the ROK and the Eurasian Economic Union, and the ROK's cooperation with Central Asian countries. In short, from the long-term perspective, Eurasian cooperation will be quintessential foundation for peace-building on the Korean Peninsula and a valuable asset for the Korean unification and after.

[20] In July 2008, RasonKonTrans, a joint venture company between Russia (70% of shares) and North Korea (30% of shares), was established in the Rason special economic zone to implement a logistics project exporting Russian coals from the Rajin Port via the Rajin-Khasan railroad. See the website of "RasonKonTrans," http://rasoncontrans.ru/ (Accessed: June 18, 2016).

[21] Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea for the first time jumped in a pilot trilateral cooperation project by joining a consortium concerned with Rajin-Khasan transportation and logistics cooperation. During the November 2013 summit between Park and Putin, the signing of MOUs including the establishment of a consortium among POSCO, Hyundai Merchant Marine and KORAIL to acquire 49 percent of the shares that Russia owns in the RasonKonTrans was held. After the summit, until December 2015, as a pilot project, Russian coal and other products shipped at the Rajin Port were successfully transported to Pohang and other South Korean ports. See KBS News, December 7, 2015, http://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view.do?ncd=31976408&ref=A (Accessed: June 18, 2016). Such pilot program, however, was never developed into a full-fledged logistics project due to North Korea's nuclear weapons test in January 2016.

V. Conclusion

While the ROK government occasionally advocated rapprochement with North Korea, it was the Roh Tae-woo government that for the first time unveiled comprehensive diplomatic vision to induce the North to make soft-landing through normalization of relationships with the latter's formerly allies, which is called the "*Nordpoliti*k." Yet, while the *Nordpolitik* of the 1980s and 1990s was driven by instrumental considerations focused on bilateral economic cooperation and the garnering of political leverage to put pressure on the North to open the door to its southern neighbor, the Eurasia Initiative, a new, longer-term, version of the *Nordpolitik* under the Park Geun-hye government, if implemented strenuously, will not only serve as useful resources for peace-building, and unification preparations, but also become an effective driving force for sustainable development even after the Korean unification.

Yet, the ROK's Eurasia Initiative at the moment is faced with a tremendous challenge: the North Korean nuclear issue. As noted above, in the aftermath of the North's fourth nuclear test, in an effort to impose extra sanctions against the North, the Park Geun-hye government, temporarily at least, suspended the Rajin-Khasan logistics project which is an important initial project in the South Korea-North Korea-Russia trilateral cooperation.[22] Additionally, it is reported that the ROK government tentatively stopped the reconnecting project of the Gyeongwon Railroad Line, linking Yongsan in Seoul and Wonsan in Gangwon Province, North Korea.[23]

Some commentators argue that due to the ROK government's such decisions, the Eurasia Initiative is at risk of being scrapped.[24] Indeed, in the middle of the North Korean nuclear crisis, the pace of the Eurasia Initiative slowed down. However, it should not be halted or even abandoned, because the Eurasia Initiative as a new version of the *Nordpolitik* should be pushed forward as a long-term national strategy for the future of the unified Korea as well as unification preparations. While the current situation on the Korean Peninsula is at a critical juncture, it is not desirable that the destiny of the new *Nordpolitik* is dependent on the short-term considerations related with the current issues. Rather, it behooves the Republic of Korea to maintain and develop the vision for Eurasian cooperation at a steady pace, regardless of short-term current issues by promoting cooperation with Russia, Central Asian countries, and European countries. By doing so, the ROK will create a favorable condition for unification preparations and further lay down a firm foundation for national development strategy of the Unified Korea.

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[22] This move taken by the ROK apparently frustrated Russia's aspiration for the trilateral cooperation. In fact, Russia, before the ROK's unilateral sanctions, had leveraged its veto power as a member of the UN Security Council to make sure that the UNSC-2270 would not prohibit exports of Russian coal via the Rajin Port. *Voice of America*, March 08, 2016, http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/3225395.html (Accessed: June 19, 2016).

[23] In August 2015, less than one year before the cancellation, the Park government launched a project to restore the South Korean section of the 223.7 ㎞ Gyeongwon Line. At the launching ceremony, President Park demanded that North Korea should participate in her Eurasia Initiative. *The Korea Times*, August 5, 2016.

[24] *The Korea Times*, March 9, 2016, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/03/120_199968.html (Accessed: June 19, 2016).

Communication and Boundaries: Texas and Europe at the Era of Mass Immigration through the Perspective of Personal Letters

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A Narrative Approach to Identity Construction : The Case of the Korean Diaspora in Volgograd, Russia*

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I. Introduction

The year 2014 is very significant in the history of the Korean diaspora in that this year marks the 150th anniversary of the Soviet Koreans' migration to the Soviet Far East. For the first time, 65 Koreans (14 families) from the Hamkyoung Province in the northern part of Korea first settled in Tizinkhe, a small village in the Maritime Province, Russia, in 1864. As years went by, Korean migrants increased to 60 families in 1864 and to 165 in 1868.[1]

Today the ethnic Soviet Koreans amounts up to about 530,000 in the CIS countries. Currently, they are scattered all over the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Korean diaspora is meaningful in that it is one of the first Korean migration groups abroad. In addition, it played a significant role in expanding the Korean cultural, economic and political spheres over large areas of Eurasia.

Against this background, this study is focused on the Korean diaspora in southern Russia, particularly in the lower region of the Volga River. The Korean diaspora in the region is different from that in other parts of the Soviet Union. A significant part of those Koreans migrated from Central Asia, where they had to flee their resident countries for this and other reasons. In addition, many of them have been engaged in farming before and after the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

This study aims to explore the experiences of the Soviet Korean diaspora in the lower parts of the Volga River through oral histories. The paper investigates the lives of the ethnic Soviet Koreans in the following aspects: deportation from the Soviet Far East, resettlement in the region from Central Asia, chain migration, tenant farming (Gobonjil), Confucian way of thinking, citizenship issues, labor records and pension.

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* This is a working part of the paper by Chaimun Lee, "Life Histories of the Soviet Korean Re-Migrants in the Lower Volga River," *the Journal of Northeast Asia Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1(2015), pp. 269-294.

[1] Hang Joon Lee, "Russia's East-Asian Policy and Korean Migration" *Korean Experience in Russia and Central Asia*, vol. 1(2008), pp. 14-15.

II. Historical Background of the Ethnic Soviet Koreans in the Lower Volga River

It was about in the 1960s to 1970s that the Soviet Koreans first arrived in the lower Volga River in the Soviet Union. The settlement of the ethnic Koreans in the region has been unfolded mainly both in Volgograd oblast (region) and the Republic of Kalmykia, in specific. Currently, about 30,000 to 35,000 ethnic Koreans are presumed to reside in Volgograd region[2] and about 1,300 Koreans in Kalmykia.[3] Here it is necessary to describe a detailed migration process of the Soviet Koreans in the region.

The Soviet Koreans in Volgograd oblast mostly re-migrated from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in Central Asia. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Uzbek Koreans have been subjected to economic hardship due to a socialist-oriented economic policy in Central Asia. In addition, ethno-nationalism, which has been favorable to the Uzbek, the local people, was pretty discriminative against ethnic minorities including the ethnic Koreans in language, employment, and education. This disadvantage has prompted a mass exodus of the ethnic Koreans out of Uzbekistan.

Similarly, among those Soviet Koreans in the the lower Volga River are also the ethnic Koreans from Tajikistan, who had led relatively prosperous lives in the southern part of Central Asia until the civil war (1992~1997) bitterly escalated. By the end of the civil war, the number of the Koreans decreased from 13,431 in 1989 to 3,000 in 1998 in the country.[4] Following the civil war, the Tajik Koreans were forced to flee to the lower Volga region in Russia to escape the 7-year internal war in the area.

In addition to Volgograd region, the ethnic Koreans in the Kalmyk Republic in Russia need not to be ignored. They had been clustered in the northern part of the Republic of Kalmykia since the 1960s. They were motivated to resettle in the region due to the Soviet policy to encourage rice farming in the lower region of the Volga River. As is well known, the Koreans in Central Asia were famous for their excellent skills for rice production. In implementation of the Soviet Policy, those Korean were guaranteed a high salary for their participation in a campaign for rice production increase in a barren and dried step area in Kalmykia, where a drive for rice production was imperative for the Soviet authorities. Since the first five Korean families migrated from Uzbekistan in the 1960s, the number of Korean re-migrants increased to 1,500 in 1979. They played a crucial role in a drive for rice production in the Oktyabrskii raion, Kalmykia. They were engaged in cultivating rice fields, paving the way for rice production in the step region where water had been irrigated from the Volga River quite far away in the north.[5]

In sum, re-migration of the ethnic Koreans in the Lower Volga River is related with such factors as a sudden change in the political and economic situation in Central Asia as well as the government policy in the former Soviet Union.

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[2] Chaimun Lee, "The Civil War in Tajikistan, Refugee Migration of Ethnic Koreans and Their Settlement in Volgograd, Russia," *Korean Journal of Siberian Studies,* vol. 16, no. 1(2012), p. 166.

[3] Hyung-Ken Lee, "A Paper on Korean Community in Republic of Kalmykia" *The Korean Journal of Multicultural & Diaspora Studies,* vol. 3 (2013), p. 12.

[4] Chaimun Lee (2012), op.cit., p. 161.

[5] Л. В. Намруева, «Корейцы в Калмыкии: общество и трудовая деятельность» КОРЕЙЦЫ ЮГА РОССИИ И НИЖНЕГО ПОВОЛЖЬЯ: ИСТОРИЯ И СОВРЕМЕННОСТЬ, Волгоград: Первое Марта (2011): Hyung-Ken Lee (2013), op.cit., p. 12.

III. Literature Review on the Korean Re-migrants and the Use of Oral History

In this section, the existing studies on the Korean re-migrants in the Lower Volga River would be critically reviewed. In addition, why oral histories are useful in identifying the construction of the Korean re-migrants' memories will be described.

Destinations of Korean re-migrants in the Lower Volga River are divided into two regions including Volgograd oblast and the Kalmyk Republic. Most studies on the ethnic Koreans in these areas consist of academic research and policy reports funded by public or private organizations.

First of all, academic studies on the ethnic Koreans in the Volga River consist of a certain articles and policy reports. Hyejin Kim's study[6] is concerned with the formation process of Korean-Russian communities in the Rostov area, analyzing the current problems of the ethnic Korean community. It categorizes the ethnic Korean communities according to the previous residence and the re-migration time. Kim's research utilizes personal materials, interviews and survey.

In a similar vein, an account of Jai-Gi Kim and Bom-Chel Lee[7] of Korean re-migration from Central Asia to Volgograd is also notable. They identify the hardships faced by the Korean re-migrants, suggesting measures to solve their ethnic problems in the Russian region. Documenting existing literature on the ethnic Koreans in Volgograd oblast, Russia, this research urges the Korean government as a motherland to come up with the policy to solve the problems of the Korean diaspora.

In addition to academic studies on the ethnic Koreans in the Volgograd area, Hyung-Ken Lee's focus is on the basic report on the current situation of the ethnic Koreans in Volgograd.[8] Funded by the Foundation for Koreans Overseas, a public semi-governmental organization, the policy report was written, based upon field surveys in the region for 5 months from October 25, 2000 to March 31, 2001. The report consists of the following sections: a general survey of the Korean re-migration in Volgograd, analyses of the human and physical environment of the southern agricultural region in Russia, documentation of regional situation and legal conditions to build the Korean village, investigation of an example of Russian-German resettlement in Saratov oblast in Russia.

In a similar study, Chaimun Lee (2012) focuses on the settlement process of the ethnic Koreans in Volgograd, as they fled from the civil war waged in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997. Using the existing literature on the subject, he describes the detailed escape and resettlement process of the relocated Koreans in the southern Volga River as farmers.[9]

In contrast to the previous research on the ethnic Koreans in Volgograd, L. V. Namrueva (2011) and Hyung-Ken Lee (2013) explain the situations of the Korean diaspora in Kalmykia Republic, a unique Buddist region adjacent to the southern part of Volgograd oblast. L. V. Namrueva, a native scholar in

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[6] Hyejin Kim, "The Formation Process and Characteristics of Korean-Russian Community in Rostov of Russia" *Journal of Northeast Asian History*, vol. 28(2010), pp. 337-366.

[7] Jai-Gi Kim and Bom-Chel Lee, "Re-migration Phenomenon of Central Asian Koreans to Volgograd, Russia," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, vol. 40 (2006), pp. 237-265.

[8] Hyung-Ken Lee, *A Basic Survey Report on the Support for Resettlement of the Ethnic Soviet Koreans in Volgograd, Southern Russia.* Uriminjok Seorodopgi Undong (The Korean Sharing Movement, 2001).

[9] Chaimun Lee, op.cit., pp. 147-183.

Kalmykia, presents the historic overview of the ethnic Koreans who re-migrated to do farming for rice production, according to the Soviet Policy in the 1960s. She used archivist materials and surveys to account the origin as well as contemporary lives of the Korean re-migrants in the Buddist republic at the end of the Volga River.

On top of Namrueva's study, Hyung-Ken Lee (2013) reviews history and culture of the Korean communities in the Kalmyk Republic. Relying on the existing books, papers, and some interviews, he suggests how the Korean minority came to be engaged in rice agriculture and to contribute to close friendship among Russians, Kalmyk people and the ethnic Koreans in the area.[10]

Despite their contribution, however, those studies above on the re-migration of ethnic Korean in the Lower Volga River carry their limitation in that most of them relies on published materials and reports. Although they were helpful in elucidating the unknown situations of the ethnic Koreans in the area, most studies disregard the significance of the relationship between migration and oral history. These studies with the use of the existing literature make no effort to explain migration phenomenon beyond moving between two points (origin and destination). They are just focused on the motivations for migration only by taking into account push and full factors, overlooking the importance of migrant memories. We need to look beyond the migration process from traditional and narrow economic point of view, heeding to the nature of migration as a multi-faceted phenomenon.

Oral history is a useful way of delving into memories of migrants. Contrast to the orthodox history, which usually is written in favor of those with vested rights, oral history is well suited to demands and needs of ordinary or non-elite people. In this sense, Rina Benmayor and Andor Skotnes were right in suggesting "oral histories could reveal far more than simple empirical data and accounts of experience. They can be used to examine migrant behavior and attitudes, subjectivities and identities. In other words, they can explore migrant mentalities and their shifts over time."[11]

The use of oral history method is also well proven in the study of immigrant Filipino nurses in Canada by Ronquillo et al (2011). They try to retrieve and shed light on historical experiences of 'ordinary or undistinguished' nurses rather than focusing on the 'elite or well-known' nurses. Their study shows that oral history can provide an important channel for recording and retrieving valuable experiences of unrepresented nurses and their patients in the literature.[12]

In the study of the ethnic Soviet Koreans in the Lower Volga River, oral history can also serve as a useful tool to track down on deeply embedded experiences of the Korean migrants stayed for 150 years in the Soviet Union. Deported and discriminated against based on their nationality, the Soviet Koreans are one of numerous ethnic minorities in the CIS countries. That is, from historical point of view, about 172,000 Koreans were forcibly relocated to Central Asia from the Soviet Far East in 1937 for no other reason than that the infiltration of Japanese spies into the Soviet Far East.[13] In addition, the Soviet

[10] Hyung-Ken Lee (2013), op.cit., pp. 1-23.
[11] Mary Chamberlain and Selma Leydesdorff, "Transnational families: memories and narratives," *Global Networks*, vol. 4, no. 3(2004), p. 228.
[12] Charlene Ronquillo, Geertje Boschma, Sabrina T Wong and Linda Quiney, "Beyond greener pastures: exploring contexts surrounding Filipino nurse migration in Canada through oral history," *Nursing Inquiry*, vol. 18, no. 3(2011), p. 264
[13] Ассоциация корейцев Казахстана, *Корейцы Казахстана: Иллюстрированная История* (Seoul: STC Co., 1997), pp. 57-69.

Koreans also have been faced with numerous discriminative measures of newly independent Central Asian states following the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Here, oral history method could be one of effective means to retrieve deep-seated memories of the ethnic Soviet Koreans, who weathered unending political or historical turmoil in the Soviet empire.

The study is aim "not to provide an objective, positivistic account of events, but rather to elucidate how experiences are remembered and reconstructed by individuals."[14] Thus, the goal of this paper is to examine the narratives of 10 Korean re-migrants, using oral history method to retrieve memories of the ethnic Korean re-migrants in the Lower Volga River. In specific, it addresses the following question: how social, economic, political, cultural, and family contexts mold ethnic Koreans' experiences in their process of re-migration in the Lower Volga River. The result will be analyzed in the following categories: (i) Forced deportation from the Soviet Far East, (ii) Korean resettlement due to the Civil War in Tajikistan, (iii) Social Networks for resettlement, (iv) Gobonjil: Typical lucrative farming for the relocated Soviet Koreans, (v) Tenacity of Confucian Ethics, (vi) Citizenship , (vii) Labor records and Pension.

IV. Methodology

This study was conducted in the Primorsk village in Volgograd Oblast, Russia where many ethnic Koreans have clustered. The ethnic Koreans in the region mostly came from the Central Asian region, including Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Especially Tajik Koreans managed to migrate in the region in the midst of the civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997. In addition, not a few Koreans also arrived from Uzbekistan where ethno-nationalism by Uzbeks, local people, was on the rise and the authoritarian rule by the Uzbek government was increasingly harsh.

The participants of this study were 10 Soviet Koreans (4 males and 6 females) resided in the Primorsk village. Those participants were selected on the basis of snowballing sampling, since researcher was not acquainted with the research area. In snowballing sampling, participants were introduced to researchers by key informants who are very familiar with the research area and the ethnic Koreans residents there. Thus, subjects for this study were recruited among acquaintances of key informant. Given its characteristics of nonprobability sampling to identity members of rare ethnic population,[15] snowballing sampling has been widely used for network studies, for instance, ethnic minorities around the world. In the studies of diaspora where social networks are essential, snowballing sampling has been useful for the study of the Egyptian[16] and Indian diaspora,[17] even though it is subject to numerous statistical biases.

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[14] Charlene Ronquillo, Geertje Boschma, Sabrina T Wong and Linda Quiney, op.cit., p. 264; P. Sugiman, "Memories of internment: Narrating Japanese Canadian women's life stories," *The Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie*, vol. 29(2004), pp. 359-88.

[15] Steven K. Thompson, *Sampling* (2nd ed.) (New York: Wiley, 2002), p. 183; Mark S. Handcock and Krista J. Gile, "On the Concept of Snowballing Sampling" *Sociological Methodology*, Vol. 41, No. 1(2011), pp. 376-371.

[16] IOM (International Organization for Migration), *A Study on the Dynamics of the Egyptian Diaspora: Strengthening Development Linkages* (2010, July).

[17] Gabriela Tejada, Uttam Bhattacharya, Christiane Kuptsch, *Migration, Scientific Diasporas and Development: Impact of Skilled Return Migration on Development in India,* Final Research Report (April, 2013)

Oral history interviews were applied in my research so that the ethnic Korean participants could construct and describe their life histories and their experiences. Thus, oral history interviews are useful in that "The construction of who they are must come from themselves, from their own historical perspectives, told in their own voices with their own interpretations," as was described by Alder in her study of Japanese American women's experiences.[18]


Interviews were carried out with the ethnic Koreans residents in 2013. All dialogues including questions and answers were recorded. Analyses of the dialogues were focused on identifying common themes or generative ideas in the course of delving into 'meaning' out of each participant's memories[19]. In doing so, interview transcripts were probed, interpreted, and compared in order to obtain common themes and similar patterns,[20] as seen often in a qualitative research.

Table 1. List of Research Participants

Number	Name	Age	Sex	Occupation	Birth Place	Year of Remigration to Primorsk, Volgograd
1	Laura	60	Female	Farming (Gobonjil)	Tashkent, Uzbekistan	1996
2	Ilya	64	Male	organic farming	Angren, Uzbekistan	1994
3	Svetlana Li	60	Female	organic farming	Angren, Uzbekistan	1994
4	Nadezhda	80	Female	farming	Primorsk Krai, Russia	1998
5	Eleora	68	Female	church deaconess	Karatal, Kazakhstan	1997
6	Rima	60	Female	farming	Tashkent, Uzbekistan	2000
7	Yugai	60	Male	farming	Tashkent, Uzbekistan	2000
8	Khegai	64	Male	Farming (Gobonjil)	Kustanai, Kazakhstan	1996
9	Paik	88	Female	irrigation (farming)	Ussurisk, Russia	1996
10	Yi	49	Male	farming	Gurlen, Uzbekistan	1996

[18] S. M. Adler, *Mothering, Education, and Ethnicity: The Transformation of Japanese American Culture* (New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1998), p. 169.
[19] M. Q. Patton, *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990)
[20] A. Strauss and J. Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998).

Figure 1. Map of Research Areas[21]



V. Findings

In this section, findings are discussed, based on the data analysis with oral history method, which is involved in dialogues with research subjects, transcripts of the dialogues, coding and reading the transcripts, and final examination of the transcripts. Presentation of discussion is summarized in identifying several 'generative themes', constructed in various social contexts. That is, among seven 'generative themes' identified in examination of the transcripts are (i) Forced deportation from the Soviet Far East, (ii) Korean resettlement due to the Civil War in Tajikistan, (iii) Social Networks for resettlement, (iv) Gobonjil: Typical lucrative farming for the relocated Soviet Koreans, (v) Tenacity of Confucian Ethics, (vi) Citizenship , (vii) Labor records and Pension. My findings are discussed around these 7 generative themes.

1. Forced Deportation from the Soviet Far East

Mass deportation of the Soviet Koreans from the Soviet Far East to Central Asia in 1937 remained a nightmare for the remainder of the Korean survivors' lives. Although the ethnic Koreans were not the only victims of Stalin's deportation policy, their experiences proved to be physical or spiritual torment for them in the narratives of these old migrants. The narratives of the former Korean migrants show that individual memory could be "social construct".[22] That is, the individual memory of deportation during

[21] Map of Volgograd adapted from the following site: http://russiaprofile.org/bg_places/resources_territory_districts_volgograd.html (Retrieved on 2014. 9. 25)

[22] Andrei Cusco, Vasile Dumbrava, Christian-Daniel Strauch, "Victims' Lives: Traumatic, Forgotten, Mythologized? The Memory of the Soviet-Era Deportations in the Republic of Moldova" (2012) (http://www.geschichtswerkstatt-europa.org/media/projekte/Methodenpapier/MP_Lebenswege.pdf, retrieved on 2014-09-28)

Stalin's era is not unchanging, but variable and fluid depending on their current situations. Thus, their narratives showed that individual memory of their bitter experiences, coupled with their current economic hardship in their societies, led to an active revival of deep-seated psychological trauma.

> I am going to talk about my parents. Kang Elena, my mother was born in 1936 and Kim Vladimir, my father, was born in 1928. I heard that my father was asked to hurry up on that [deportation] date. It was autumn and very dark. Koreans in the Soviet Far East were told to get on freight trains with a small window only. They hurriedly had to take the train with bundled clothes and goods in rush. Relocated Koreans were too many and most of them had to stand on their feet in trains all the way. When people died in trains on their way to Central Asia, bodies were thrown out of the train on the move.[23]

In addition, rice farming in Central Asia was activated mostly by Koreans, as was suggested by some scholars. In relation to rice farming by Koreans in Central Asia, it is necessary to describe briefly. In the late 1920s the Soviet Union implemented cotton plantation in Kazakhstan for cotton self-sufficiency policy. Due to the emphasis on the cotton production, rice farming was ignored and nudged in the second place. In order to recover rice production, the Soviet authorities implemented a policy for rice farming in the Almaty and Semirechinsk Okrug, the northern limit for cotton plantation. Faced with lack of skills for rice farming, however, the Kazakh Agricultural People's Committee invited 300 Korean rice farmers from the Vladivostok Okrug in 1928. Soon the Korean rice farmers from the Soviet Far East organized Kazris, the Korean Agricultural Cooperative, putting a lot of efforts in turning Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic into a republic with the largest rice farming field in the Soviet Union.[24]

2. Korean Relocation due to the Civil War in Tajikistan

The civil war in Tajikistan, which lasted from 1992 to 1997, played a crucial role in motivating the ethnic Koreans there to migrate in the Volgograd oblast. In the Tajik turmoil more than 50,000 to 100,000 civilians were dead and 80,000 residents in the country had to leave their hometowns. The ethnic Koreans were not an exception. In the process of their escape from the civil war, the number of the Koreans decreased rapidly form 13,431 persons to 1,696, showing a sharp decline by 87%.[25] As shown in the narratives, the Soviet Koreans in Tajikistan made a pretty comfortable living before the civil war. Most of Koreans especially in Dushanbe, a capital city of Tajikistan, took high level of government posts.

> We made a pretty good living in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. Dushanbe is an excellent city where all staple foods were provided from Moscow. We lived in the central part of the capital city,

[23] Interview with Laura Kim (female, 60 years old) at her residence on January 15, 2013.
[24] Г. В. Ганг, В .Н. Ан(фотограф). Ким Г. Н., Мен Д. В.. *Когейцы Казахстана: Иллюстрированная История* (Корея: Фирма «STC», 1997), pp. 51-55. Cited in Chaimun Lee, *Diaspora in a Frozen Land* (Kyungpook National University Press, 2007), pp. 288-289.
[25] Chaimun Lee(2012), op.cit., p. 160.

> where all convenient facilities including schools and hospitals were located. In 1993, however, a civil war broke out. Following the civil war we moved to Zhambyl, Kazakhstan before moving here again in 1998. We had been here on the Gobonjil farming for 4 years while we have been staying in Katarau near Zhambyl.[26]

The Ethnic Koreans from Tajikistan are living together in the Sredne-akhtubinskii Raion in Volgograd. The largest group is Tajik Koreans living in the Krasnyi Sad village in the Sredne-akhtubinskii Raion. About 125 Tajik Koreans (35 families) are residing in the area, followed by 56 Tajik Koreans (27 families) in the Kolkhoznaia Akhtuba village, 48 Tajik Koreans (16 families) in the Raigorod, and so on.[27]

Most Tajik Koreans in the Lower Volga River are engaged in the Gobonjil, forming their own Brigade (farming group). Among their hometowns in Tajikistan are Dushanbe and Khujand for the most part, where they had lived before the outbreak of the Civil War. Thus, Tajik Koreans are living united themselves solidly and very exclusive or cliquish against Soviet Koreans from other countries in Central Asia.[28]

3. Chain Migration for the Second Settlement

As most literature on international migration suggests, personal networks play an important part in decision of their mobility across countries. In specific, family, friends, community members and relatives support crucial networks for new migrants, providing valuable information regarding job prospect, employment, new migrants' adjustment and adaptation, settlement and so on in destination.[29] Thus, importance of personal networks is getting more attention during the era of transnationalism, as stated in the narrative of this study.

> Now there are many ethnic Koreans here in Primorsk, Volgograd. In the year 2000 when we arrived here for the first time, there were only three ethnic Korean families. Now the number of the Soviet Korean families increased to as many as 100 families currently. Once new Soviet Korean immigrants from Central Asia came and adapted themselves here, their relatives, neighbors, and friends in their home countries were inspired to come here with the help of their acquaintances earlier arrived. When my husband came here in Primorsk, there were already a agricultural brigade composed of 14 ethnic Koreans (10 families) from Fergana and Samarkand in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan where a domestic conflict broke out.[30]

Thus, migration process of the Soviet Koreans is characterized as 'chain migration' in which in which "prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial

[26] Interview with Nadezhda Kim (female, 80 years old) at her residence on January 15, 2013.
[27] Hyung-Ken Lee (2001), op.cit., p. 67
[28] Chaimun Lee (2012), op.cit., p. 171.
[29] Nasra M. Shah and Indu Menon, "Chain Migration Through the Social Network: Experience of Labor Migrants in Kuwait," *International Migration*, vol. 37, no. 2(1999), pp. 361-378.
[30] Interview with Rima Ban (female, 60 years old) at her residence on January 14, 2013.

accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants."[31] The pattern of chain migration of the ethnic Koreans is formed among social networks between Korean immigrants in Volgograd, Russia and their families in previous countries in Central Asia.

4. Gobonjil – A Typical Tenant Farming for the Relocated Soviet Koreans

The Gobonjil is a special form of tenant farming by the Soviet Koreans. Usually the Soviet Koreans, who were very good at farming for a long time, have participated in this kind of farming in order to maximize their agricultural profits. For Gobonjil, after selecting an area usually in the southern Russia near large cities, ethnic Korean farmers lease large farmland far away from their residences. They organize a brigade consisting of brigadier (a leader) and other working group members. After harvesting in autumn, they repay the debt with the money they earned by working in a field for a year and by selling their products at cities nearby. And then they are going back to their hometown with profits earned from their sales of agricultural products with material cost and rent for leased land deducted. This kind of lease farming has been very popular even during the era of the Soviet Union, helping many ethnic Koreans accumulate their commercial assets.

> The reason I began the Gobonjil farming is due to the advice of my sister's husband named Anton. He, 5 years younger than I, is clever and the richest Soviet Korean in the region. He brought in 400 to 500 here Korean families from Uzbekistan for the tenant farming. He is very famous in the region. At first when he advised me to come here to do the Gobonjil farming I had refused. Once I got drunk, I accepted his offer for the Gobonjil farming in Volgograd. For the first 2 years, I have been back and forth between Russia and Uzbekistan. Afterwards, I earned a lot of money from the Gobonjil and could buy this house.[32]

Gobonjil has been one of means to accumulate their capital in the era of the Soviet Union. It began in 1960s according to the testimony of the ethnic Koreans. A typical pattern was for a brigadir [farming group leader] to lend farmland in the local area for the Gobonjil near urban area. At the time, he organized 10 to 40 ethnic Korean families before engaging in commercial farming in total 130 to 140 hectares of land. Each family was supposed to do farm work in two to three hectares of agricultural land. Each family cultivated the soil leased according to their financial abilities. In the season of harvest, wholesale dealers came in several large trucks and carried crops to cities for sale. In Volgograd area, Azerbaijan dealers usually came and bought our harvested crops including watermelons, tomatoes, melons and so on. Many ethnic Soviet Koreans could earn a lot of money in the Gobonjil enough to repay our debts.[33]

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[31] John S. MacDonald and Leatrice D. MacDonald, "Chain Migration Ethnic Neighborhood Formation and Social Networks". *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* vol. 42 (1964). pp. 82–97.
[32] Interview with Yugai Miron (male, 64 years old) at her residence on January 14, 2013.
[33] Interview with Khe(gai) Alexander (male, 62 years old) at her residence on January 9, 2013.

5. Deep-rooted Confucian Ethics

Confucianism has dominated the Korean way of life for a long time. It usually emphasizes harmony, hard work, saving among the people in China, Japan and Korea under the influence of Confucian heritage. Even though the Soviet Koreans have been living in Central Asia and Russia far away from their motherland for more than a century, they still retain Confucian heritage such as filial piety and taboo on marriage of couples with the same surnames and the same family origins.

In the field survey, I also could confirm such Confucian heritage as filial piety and taboo on marriage of couples with the same surnames and the same family origins, as shown in the following narrative transcripts.

> At the beginning, we thought it's impossible to get married since my family origin is the same as my husband's, the Park clan. My family origin is from Gosun and my husband's from Milyang at the South Kyongsang Province. Thus, our marriage ran into opposition from the parents of both families on a wedding occurrence. Accordingly, my husband and I began to associate with each other and secretly registered our marriage. We lived separately since our parents had been unnoticed about our marriage. My husband lived with his parents and I with my older sister. By the way, however, grandfather of my husband happened to discover our marriage certificate in filing papers. Thereafter, he called in us, suggesting that we should live together following our formal wedding ceremony because we had already been in de facto marriage. Thereafter, he allowed us to hold formal wedding ceremony.[34]

Field survey in the research site showed that funeral service was conducted with the Confucian rites, although the Soviet Koreans almost could not speak the Korean language, their mother tongue, and their way of life was predominantly Russian, even though traditional funeral service based upon Confucian values is no longer observed in Korea, their motherland.[35]

6. Citizenship Issues

According to recent press coverage, the number of the stateless Soviet Koreans is almost 50,000 persons.[36] This number amounts to be almost 10% of the ethnic Soviet Koreans in the former Soviet Union. This stateless Soviet Korean issue has been a hot item of debates in the Korean Parliament. The problems faced by the stateless Koreans are various, ranged from discrimination in education and

[34] Interview with Eleora Park (female, 68 years old) at her residence on January 14, 2013.

[35] In a similar context, Rosana Pinheiro-Machado, in her study of the Confucian ethic among Chinese immigrants overseas, showed that the Confucian ethic, which emphasizes frugality, hard work, savings and accumulation, stimulates the capitalist spirit. Rosana Pinheiro-Machado, 'The confucian ethic and the spirit of capitalism': narratives on morals, harmony, and savings in the condemnation of conspicuous consumption among chinese immigrants overseas" *Horizontes Antropológicos, Porto Alegre,* vol.13, no.28 (2007), p. 145-174.

[36] Chaimun Lee, "Statelessness of Overseas Koreans and Its Policy Agenda": A Study on the Stateless Koreans in the CIS," *Journal of Diaspora Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2 (2012), p. 33.

medical treatment to employment. The narrative described in this study also points to the agony of those Koreans without their citizenship in the Volgograd oblast.

> A long time ago, we could manage to get along, one way or another when we were engaged in farming. These days we don't have money because we do no longer agricultural affairs. We do not have any relative around here. We have neither out passport nor nationality, while our children keep their nationalities and passports. When we came here, our documents were fraught with numerous problems. Now we do not try to solve the problems since a settlement of a problem takes so long time. That is, we lost our Uzbek passports. Thus, we were not covered by the national pension plan. Our life has been bitter, as we were neither able to work in a formal way nor receive any allowances.[37]

Sometimes a certain Soviet Koreans, who were born in the Primorskii Krai in the Russian Far East, often apply for their citizenship there. It is because they could obtain easily their certificates of birth at their birthplaces. This process, however, requires a long and rugged journey.[38] A certain ethnic Koreans often appeal to the court for a formal trial to get nationalities since they could not obtain them for a long time in Russia. Some could win the suit and recovered our citizenships, but others fail to get it because they lived too long in the Russian territory without her citizenship.

7. Labor Records and Pension

It is very difficult for ethnic old Koreans without citizenship to make a living in Russia since they have to maintain their existence without pension. Even a small portion of pension could have been pretty helpful for them. Generally speaking, the Soviet-era labor records of those ethnic Koreans in Central Asia have been recognized by the Russian authority and then those immigrants with those records could have received their pension in Russia. Therefore, the Soviet Korean migrants from Central Asia who worked in organizations, not in the fields, were entitled to such a pension. Among those ethnic Koreans from Central Asia, however, are few those who worked in the organization during the period of the Soviet Union. Most of the Soviet Koreans worked in the fields. Those people without their labor records receive only a basic pension, 5,500 rubles a month.[39]

> For instance, even if a Soviet Korean who immigrated from Central Asia in the year 2000 have worked for 13 years in Russia since then, he or she is not entitled to pension in future, since his labor records were not archived. Currently my grandson is working in a Japanese Sushi Bar without labor notebook. Those workers were paid their salaries, but their work records were not provided to concerned governmental organizations. Those cases are pretty typical for the ethnic Koreans from Central Asia.[40]

[37] Interview with Paik Soon Ae (female, 88 years old) at her residence on January 13, 2013.
[38] Interview with Yi Bisarion Ilych (male, 49 years old) at his residence on January 12, 2013.
[39] Interview with Eleora Park (female, 68 years old) at her residence on January 14, 2013.
[40] Ibid.

During the era of the Soviet Union, labor record books were not provided easily. Ordinary people exerted their utmost efforts to apply for their labor record books. In this context, poorly educated common people only labored hard without knowing the usefulness of the labor records book. Currently many people work only for money without appreciating its real worth. Workers engaging in private business usually do not have their labor records books. In specific, those Soviet Koreans who participated in the Gobonjil, the tenant farming, did not think about their labor records books. They could not keep such a record, since they usually did not owned, but rented farmland from the owner. When renters try to keep their labor records book, the owners of the farmland have to pay their taxes. Thus, the Gobonjil, a system of tenant farming where many Soviet Koreans were engaged in for making money on a short-term basis, was illegal from a different standpoint. Neither the owner nor renters did pay their taxes for their profits from a lucrative farming.

VI. Conclusion

This study shows a variety of experiences by the Soviet Koreans, who have resided in Volgograd area in the lower Volga River. Their narratives are pretty meaningful and suggestive in filling up a blank left in official histories of the Soviet Koreans. In this sense, "Uncovering deep memory is essential to understanding an ethnic group's history."[41]

Numerous stories of the Soviet Koreans were narrated by participants in this study. Not only their own experiences but stories of their parents or grandparents regarding immigration and adaptation to a new country were stated. They talked about early settlement in Central Asia, difficult processes of adaptation to a new destination, re-migration due to civil war and economic hardship in their previous settlements and the characteristics of chain migration by the ethnic Koreans. In addition, their economic activities including Gobonjil, a typical tenant farming for the ethnic Koreans, their efforts to recover their citizenships, current situations about labor records and pension were also described. In their tortuous way of lives, their identities were not completely obliterated as evinced in their Confucian way of thinking.

What to be noted in this research of remigration of the Soviet ethnic Koreans from Central Asia the Primorsk village in Russia is the difficult and long process of adaptation in a new residential area. Remigration is involved in various steps including physical and environmental adaptation as well as spiritual reorientation. As numerous ancestors of the Soviet Koreans from the Soviet Far East had already get used to difficult and time-consuming adaptation in Central Asia in 1937, current relocating Koreans also need to follow suit.

This study shows also well thorny and protracted reorientation experience by ethnic Koreans. Especially for many Korean families, who migrated from Dushanbe following the civil war in Tajikistan, their re-adaptation process was pretty difficult. Only having worked as public officials at Dushanbe, they

[41] Jessica Clark and Thomas D. Isern, "Germans from Russia in Saskatchewan: An Oral History," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, vol. 40, no. 1(2010), p. 76.

did not know how to do farming in Russia. They had very difficult time burning charcoals at furnace and gathering firewood at mountains in a rural area, Russia.

Their deeply embedded individual experiences could not be disclosed easily otherwise. Thus, oral history method could be an excellent tool to decipher deep memories, known as a multi-layered document,[42] of the Korean migrants. In order to grasp hidden history of the Korean diaspora properly, it is necessary to unveil their deep memories. It is because life of Soviet Korean diaspora is not so simple, but complex, as they have been moving around between Korean and Russian culture since their birth. Thus, narratives could reveal the construction of ethnic identity rooted in mentalities of a Korean diaspora (Russia to Central Asia or Central Asia to Russia) or a double Korean diaspora (Russia to Central Asia to Russia).[43]

In this sense, this study implies that further studies on life histories of the Korean diaspora are required to fill up a void in the current ethnic literatures in South Korea and other countries.

[42] Mary Chamberlain and Selma Leydesdorff, "Transnational families: memories and narratives," *Global Networks,* vol. 4, no. 3(2004), p. 232.

[43] In their study of Germans from Russia in Saskatchewan, J. Clark and T. D. Isern talk about a double diaspora (Germany to Russia to Canada) and a triple diaspora (Germany to Russia to the United States to Canada). Jessica Clark and Thomas D. Isern, ibid., p. 76.

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The orientation of Islam in Dagestan

Se-jin Jung1*

During the Caucasian war, Muridism has been repeatedly described and investigated in a wide range of literature: religious, historical, journalistic, political and philosophical. Until the beginnin g of the seventeenth century, "lots of Circassians" continued "to stick to their old semi pagan, s emi Christian beliefs".[1] Naqshbandi Imams Gazi-Muhammad (1828-1832) and Shamil (1834-185 9) headed the national struggle of mountaineers in Muridism. Mountaineers rebelled against the i mperial authorities in the North Caucasus in the nineteenth century during the expansion of the Russian Empire. In order to understand the causes and nature of the Caucasian war, the charact eristics of the muridism that was formed with it as a basis need to be carefully considered. Islam was the dominant form of religious ideology of mountaineers in the Caucasus.

Creation of the Arab Caliphate in the seventh century was an extremely important event in w orld history. It marked the beginning of a new chapter in the lives of the peoples of the Near and Middle East countries and has played an important role in the lives of the peoples of the Caucasus, especially those in the eastern region.[2] Islam became the important factor in the comp letion of the process of economic, political, ethnic and cultural unification in Arabia.[3] In the his torical development of the North Caucasus, Islam has played an important role. It became not j ust a religion, but a peculiar bridge connecting the North Caucasian people with the Arabian Eas t. The spread of Islam in the North Caucasus began in Dagestan.[4] In the middle of the seventh century, the territory of Dagestan became part of the Khazar Khanate, one of the largest early f ounded states that played a significant role in the historical, socio-economic and cultural life of the Caucasus.

In 642, having passed through the territory of modern Azerbaijan, Arab-Moslems entered the l and of Dagestan. The first Arabian expeditions directed against the Khazars marked the beginnin g of the period of Arabian rule. The expansion of the Arab Caliphate led to the spread of Islam in the conquered territories, a highly developed culture that adopted the language and ideological basis of Arabic - Islam, the new monotheistic religion with a peculiar system of ethical-legal co

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1 *Dokumental'naia istoriia obrazovaniia mnogonatsional'nogo gosudarstva Rossiiskogo* – Book 4. *Rossiia i Sevenyi Kavkaz v XVI-XIX vekakh, ed. Bondarevskii G. L.,* (Moscow: MERISSA, 1998), 27.

2 *Istoriia Dagestana s drevneishikh vremion do nashikh dnei*. Vol. 1, ed. Hajiyev M.G (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), 176.

3 *Islam: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (Moscow: Nauka, 1991), 103.

4 *Narodi' Dagestana,* ed. Arutyanov *C.A. (* Moscow:Nauka, 2002), 29.

ncepts and religious-political institutions.[5] Derbent, one of the largest ports of the Caspian Sea, became the center of the Islamic extension in the North Caucasus. In that time, Arabs had a special connection to Derbent and called it 'Bob al-Abwab' or 'the Gate of Gates".[6]

The Arabs constructed the first mosque in Derbent, which exists to this day. In earlier times, Dagestan was one of the regions in the sphere of influence of Christianity, which penetrated int o the region in the fourth–fifth centuries. The Christian influence came from Byzantium, Armeni a, Georgia and the Caucasian Albania. The Arabian population of Derbent("soldiers of Isla m" , or "defenders of Islam borders") received continued financial support from the Caliph. Derbe nt was full of Ghazis ("fighters for the faith") who quite often originated from the local declass ed elements.

The Islamization of Dagestan and the entire North Caucasus region continued for an extended t ime. The Arabs captured sections of Transcaucasia during the years of 640–651. The main obsta cle blocking the Arabs from Transcaucasia and to the North Caucasus was the political and mili tary alliance of the khazars with the North Caucasian peoples. In 651, troops of Arabian cavalry under command of Suleiman invaded Southern Dagestan and passed through the Caspian gates to the north. Their goal was to conquer the Khazar Khanate, which at that time extended "from near-Caspian steppes to the Azov Sea".[7] The mountaineers resisted the invasion, and the Dages tan people together with the khazars successfully defended Derbent. The troops of the Caliphate lost forces without having achieved a decisive victory. The Arabs repeatedly attempted to occup y Derbent but were defeated each time; as a result, the control of Derbent has often been passe d from country to country.

In the beginning of the eight century, a large-scale movement of Arabs to the eastern areas of the North Caucasus began. In 708, they occupied Derbent, during which time Sheikh Maslama was the main preacher of Islam in Dagestan during that period. In 725, Maslama was appointe d as a governor of Armenia and Azerbaijan and began an intense struggle for a conquest of the Eastern Caucasus. He made peace with the "tsars of the mountains" – the governors of Shirvan, Meran, Tabasaran, Lakz, Filan, and Mascat. As a result, Maslama besieged and occupied Derben t, which was the home of thousands of khazar families. Having conquered Derbent, Maslama str engthened the city and used it as a bridge to conquer of the rest of Dagestan, Chechnya and a further move to the north. Many areas of Dagestan, Chechnya fell under the control of Maslam a, who appointed his vicars as heads of this region. Realizing the strategic importance of the fo rtress Derbent, which is the northernmost bastion of Arab rule in the Arabian Caucasus, Maslam a devoted great significance to its strength both as a military and spiritual-cultural center which, in subsequent years, played a leading role in the peaceful spread of Islam in the North Caucasu s. Arab settlements around Derbent subsequently became the centers of further spread of Islam t hroughout the territory of Dagestan.

The spread of Islam to Upland Dagestan was slow. This process continued for centuries, and a considerable part of the population remained adherents of the traditional beliefs up to the end

[5] Bolshakov,O.G. *Istoriia Khalifata*. vol. 1(Moscow, 1989) : 3.
[6] Dunlop, D.M. Al-Abwab' Bab, *Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961), 58-9.
[7] Grjunebaum, G. E. *Klassicheskii Islam. Ocherk istorii (600-1258)* (Moscow, 1986), 63.

of the fifteenth century. The first stage of Islamization is a result of the military expansion of the Arab caliphate in the Caucasus. Derbent played a role as the political center in the spread of the new religion and ethical-cultural values.[8] However, it should be noted that the Islamizatio n of the region was of a protracted nature despite the military and political successes of the Ar abs. By the tenth century, "the Arabian period" of Islamization of Southern Dagestan as a whole was complete.

The following stage of Islamization of Dagestan is connected with emergence of a Turkic ele ment.[9] V. Bartold noticed that "the victory of a Turkic element was accompanied by a victory of Islam and Muslim culture".[10] In the eleventh – twelfth centuries, Turkic influence in Derbent was very significant. Up to the first half of the twelfth century, the power here belonged to the Selzhuks who persistently and stubbornly adhered to the ideology of Islam.

The Mongol invasion and the collapse of the Arab Caliphate in the middle of the thirteenth century led to the evolution of local forms of Islam. In the thirteenth century, the spread of Isla m in Dagestan and Chechnya was interrupted because of the Mongol invasion in the North Cauc asus. Mongol campaigns initially had a negative impact on the Muslim and Islam positions in Derbent. However, later, when the rulers of the Golden Horde accepted Islam, the situation shar ply changed.[11]

A new stage of Islamization of the peoples of Dagestan is associated with conquests of Timu r (Tamerlane). The state of Timur, with its capital in Samarkand, arose in the second half of th e fourteenth century in Central Asia, in place of a former Mongolian possession. Prior to the in vasion of Timur in 1395, Islam in the North Caucasus was not widespread. Islam was affirmed in some regions, while traditional pagan beliefs continued to dominate in other areas. As noted by V. V. Bartold:

> Timur's campaigns were accompanied by no less cruel beatings than campaigns of Genghis Khan, the refined, painful atrocity joined rough cruelty. Magnificent buildings were erected, especially in Timur's capital – Samarkand to where the conqueror, sometimes violently brought masters and scientists from the devastated by him lands.[12]

During this period, the Islamization process had clearly taken on a violent character. The foll owing wave of Islamization which began in the fifteenth century was associated with an establis hment of Turkish domination in the territory of the Western Black Sea Coast. The expansion of the Turks in the North Caucasus proceeded under the tenets of Islam. In Dagestan, Islam was established at the end of the sixteenth century. In parallel with the establishment of Islam in th e south-eastern part of the North Caucasus, there was a strengthening of the processes of Islami zation in the western parts of the region, associated with the increased influence of the Ottoman

[8] About gaziya and «the Islamic centers», their meaning and Islamization.
[9] *Islam i islamskaia kultura v Dagestane*, ed. Shikhsaidov, A.R. (Moscow:Vostochnaya Literatupa, 2001), 17.
[10] Bartold,V.V. *Istoriia turetsko-mongol'skikh narodov* (Tashkent, 1928), 19.
[11] Lavrov, L.I. *Epigraficheskie pamiatniki Severnogo Kavkaza* (Moscow, 1966), 120.
[12] Bartold,V.V. *Islam i kul'tura musul'manstva* (Moscow, 1992), 97.

Empire and Crimean Khanate on these lands. In the sixteenth century, the Ottomans attempted to extend Islam among the Abazans and Circassians, a considerable number of whom accepted Islam. In the sixteenth- eighteenth centuries, Islam spread among the populations of mountainous Chechnya, Ingushetia, Balkaria and Karachay, including some social groups in South Ossetia (mostly nobility). The strongholds of the spread of Islam were Dagestan in the one region and Kabarda in another.[13]

Noting the peaceful spread of Islam among the Vainakhs, a Chechen specialist in religious studies, V. Gadayev, states that "since the sixteenth century, missionaries from Dagestan began penetrate actively into Chechnya, where Islam had become the dominant form of ideology".[14] According to his opinion, Islam in Chechnya was spread by Dagestan feudal lords who wanted to include Chechens in the sphere of their political and economic influence. M. Muzhuhoev considers the first successes of Islamization in the mountain areas of East Chechnya to have occurred in the eighteenth century.[15] In contrast to the mountaineer-Ingushs, the Ingushs living on the plains started to convert to Islam in the sixteenth century, and it was widely distributed by the eighteenth century. This successful spread is connected with activity of Sheikh Mansur who campaigned Ingushetia with the assistance of Muslim-Ingushs for the establishment of Islam. It is also necessary to underline once again that, taking into account the time difference among the acceptance of Islam by different groups of Vainakhs, this process proceeded very slowly over several centuries. In the XV - XVII centuries, the Vainakh mountain communities were at an earlier stage of development than their neighbors, the Dagestanis and Kabardianis, whose process of feudal relation development was considerably longer. The Islamization in this region generated deep religious contradictions. The preachers of Islam aspired to exterminate the memory about pre-Islamic beliefs; however, a considerable segment of the population remained in the ranks of adherents to both local cults and other earlier monotheist religions.

An example of the periodization of spreading of Islam in North Caucasus proposed by V. Bobrovnikov distinguishes three stages of Dagestan's Islamization that, in his opinion, traveled from south to north and from plains to mountains. In its first stage (in the middle of the seventh-tenth century), Arabs forced the people of Azerbaijan, Lezgins, Tabatarants, Rutuls and Tsakhurs to accept Islam. In the second stage (at the end of the tenth – sixteenth century), Islam was further spread by local missionaries. In the eleventh – thirteenth centuries, Aguls and Lakts, Kaytags and Dargins as well as Nogays became Muslims. In the thirteenth – fourteenth centuries, the majority of Dagestan's mountaineers became Muslims under the influence of military campaigns and the preaching of local missionaries. Kumyks and Avars accepted Islam in the fourteenth – fifteenth centuries. Islam had established itself throughout most of the North Caucasus territory by replacing previous religious beliefs and legal systems including Christianity and Judaism. In the third stage (seventeenth through the beginning of the nineteenth century), Dagestanis gradually abandoned pre-Islamic traditions (such as the absence of wide trousers in women's wear, eatin

[13] Alikberov, A.A. "*Severnyi Kavkaz," ed. Prozorov, S.M. Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiiskoi imperii,* vol. 3 (Moscow:Vostochnaya Literatupa, 2001): 92.
[14] Gadayev, V.Y. *Za chastokolom miuridskikh propovedei* (Grozny, 1987), 6.
[15] Muzhukhoev, M.B. *Proniknovenie Islama k chechentsam i ingusham* (Grozny, 1971), 92.

g meals forbidden for Muslims, and drinking alcohol)[16]. Final affirmation of Islam in the North Caucasus took place in the seventeenth – nineteenth centuries.

The appearance of the Nakshbandi tariqa in the North Caucasus did not occurr earlier than 3 0 years from the date of capture of Sheikh Mansur. The Nakshibandiyya brotherhood which in t he nineteenth century came to Dagestan is known in the scientific literature as Nakshbandiyya-M udzhaddidiya-Halidiya. It has received two epithets on behalf of two tariqa reformers: the Indian mystic of the sixteenth – seventeenth centuries, Ahmad al-Faruki, who was known as Mudzhad did and the Turkish Sheikh Maulana Khalid al-Kurdamiri. In the North Caucasus, according to I. P. Petrushevsky, the order was affirmed at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. A distinctive feature of the clothes of the members of this order is the san dy yellow colored hirka. A few of the provisions from a long list of sheikh obligations accepte d by the provision of guidance about strength and solidarity of this brotherhood and about the s evere discipline required.

The appearance of Naqshbandi tariqa in Dagestan began with the religious concept of "true b elief." Naqshbandi tariqa arrived in the North Caucasus in 1820s from the Ottoman Empire by way of Azerbaijan,[17] at the height of a political, military, economic, social and moral crisis caused by Russian encroachment. According to Michael Kemper, "Gradually spreading from the South to the North of the country, this brotherhood found adepts in most parts of mountainous Dagestan during the jixad period".

It offered to return "true" Islam to the Dagestan's and Chechens by full enforcement of the Sharia and jihad against the "infidels" and their local collaborators.[18] Political views and activity of the sheik hs of Naqshbandiyya-Halidiya during the period of gazawat are still not clear.[19] The Nakshbandi tariqa provided an ideology and social base to the jihad movement.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, i.e., immediately prior to the beginning of the perio d of anti-colonial struggle of the mountaineers against tsarism led by Shamil, as already mentio ned, the ideology sermon of Naqshbandi-oriented tariqa muridism gained popularity. When the qu estion about the independence movement arose, the first leaders of Caucasian muridism had to d ecide which path to follow for this goal. Initially, Shamil disagreed with Gazi-Muhammad and d id not act the way he was ordered; however, he eventually changed and become his proponent. Gazi-Muhammad appealed directly to the instructor of Dzhamal-Edin, Magomed Jaragsky, and G azi-Muhammad and Shamil went together to Magomed Jaragsky in Kyurin Khanate to study the tariqa. Magomed Jaragsky was offended by oppressions of the Kyurin's Khan, one of the Musl im rulers in Russian service, and without hesitation, agreed to the gazawat.[20] After a ten-day sta

[16] Bobrovnikov V.O. "Dagestan," *Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiiskoi imperii* vol. 1(Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 1998) : 30-33.

[17] Kemper, Michael, "An Island of classical Arabic in the Caucasus: Dagestan," *Exploring the Caucasus in the 21th century. Essays on culture, history and politics in a dynamic context.* Ed. Companjen, Francoise, Maracz, Laszlo, Versteegh, Lia(Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2010), 71.

[18] Gammer, Moshe "The road not taken: Daghestan and Chechen independence," *Central Asian Survey*, 24(2), (June 2005) : 102.

[19] Kemper, M. "K voprosu o sufiiskoi osnove dzhikhada v Dagestane," *Podvizhniki islama. Kul't sviatykh i sufizm v Srednei Azii i na Kavkaze* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literature, 2003) : 278.

[20] Magomed Jaragskiy shared his knowledge with them, allowed the spread of Tariqa in Dagestan and married his daughter to Mohammed Ghazi.

y in Yaragi, Gazi-Muhammad resolved his internal struggle of whether to devote himself to tari qa or to introduce the ideas of the "liberal" societies of Sharia and gazawat ideologies into the life. This decision for Gazi-Muhammad was a difficult matter; however, after a meeting with M agomed Jaragsky, Gazi-Muhammad chose to adhere to the new ideas of muridism.[21]

[21] Runovski, A.I. “Dnevnik Runovskogo,” : 1496.

V-4 Lnguistics & Literature 5 (in English)

Economic Cooperation and Public Diplomacy

Chair: Janna Ballod (Seokyeong University)

≫ The Interlanguage Features of the Errors in the Russian Curriculum Vitae(CV) of Seokyeong University Students

Byung Pal Ahn (Seokyeong University)\

≫ Teaching Russian Language in Changing Educational Environment in South Korea

Janna Ballod (Seokyeong University)\

≫ The Color Symbol in Hungarian Folk Ballade

Kyeng Min Han (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

The Interlanguage Features of the Errors in the Russian curriculum Vitae(CV) of Seokyeong University Students

Byung-pal Ahn (Seokyeong University)

Interlanguage refers to the language of the intermediate system between native(L1) and target(L2) language systems, which is not completely acquired by L2 language learners in language acquisition. Selinker(1972) holds the five causes of the interlanguage(IL). First, <L1 transition> is that the language system and the categories of L1 transit to L2 learning, causing the errors. And the other causes are <transition training>, <learning strategies>, <communication strategies>, <overgeneralization of L2 language elements>. Park Hyeok(2014) divides a language transitions from the perspective of contrast analysis to five levels from level 0 to 4 according to order of difficulty in L2 learning: coincidence, integration, empty category, new category, differentiation. And adds to them two kinds of categories: <one-to-one correspondence> and <similar but different categories>. Spelling errors in the writing appears as an aspect that is characteristic of the transition to the L2 phonemes from L1. This aspect is subdivided into <sound replacement>, <Non-differentiated phonemes>, <overdifferentiation>, <reinterpretation of the differences>. Unlike 'mistakes' in writing, systematic and typical errors can be continuously generated by L1 interference to L2. This study analyzes the errors in the CV of the Seokyeong University students to search the causes and types of language transitions, which show the characteristic features of interlanguage. If errors occurred in L2, it could be seen what the causes were through the analysis. If this kind of the research big data will be reflected to the types and frequencies of the errors in writing learning, and the typical errors of Korean learners will be displayed as the error-prone parts in teaching materials for them, it will contribute to prevent the fossilization of the typical errors. The list of errors through this research method can be the basic materials to divide errors to the communicative <critical errors> and <non-critical errors> for standardizing the scores in writing test and the further study of writing teaching methods.

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Teaching Russian language in South Korea: Adjustment to the new educational environment

Janna Ballod, Ph.D (Seokyeong University)

Abstract

In the paper the author analyses components of the higher education system in South Korea and describes formation of the new education environment in the result of rapid economic, social and technological changes. She defines current challenges to teaching Russian as one of humanitarian disciplines in the university in the context of new educational environment in South Korea and also offers recommendations for teaching Russian in particular education environment.

1. Introduction


South Korea also commonly referred to as "an economic miracle on the Han river" astonishes with its achievements in economic, social and cultural development. The country which had a per capita gross national product of $80 equaling to African Ghana or Sudan in the 1960s, became the world`s eleventh economy by 1996. In the end of 2014 South Korea`s GDP per Capita reached $ 27,970 (Table 1).[1] Mark L. Clifford notes that "boys who grew up working in rice paddies found themselves building oil tankers and designing semiconductor chips".[2] Rapid economic development necessitated huge social and demographic changes which in turn lead to transformation of education environment. In the given paper the author describes recent changes in South Korean higher education and how they affect teaching Russian as a foreign language in the universities.

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[1] World bank at http://www.multpl.com/south-korea-gdp-per-capita accessed on 20.06.2016 accessed on 20.06.2016

[2] Clifford, Mark. *Troubled tiger: Businessmen, bureaucrats, and generals in South Korea*. ME Sharpe, 1998.

Table 1. South Korea GDP per Capita 1960-2014.



Source: World bank at http://www.multpl.com/south-korea-gdp-per-capita accessed on 20.06.2016 accessed on 20.06.2016

In 2015-2016 the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea initiated implementation of the Program for Industrial Needs-Matched Education aimed at stage-by-stage restructuring of the universities. The core of the program is to encourage the universities when they place emphasis on development of engineering and science, and also on fostering the programs focused on acquisition of practical skills. Universities which will carry out structural reforms according to requirements of the Ministry of Education and will increase the number of engineering and science major graduates, will receive within three years a bonus in the amount of $ 166.4 million.[3] The reform which resulted in closing or downsizing many humanity studies departments including Russian majors is seen as a necessary step to respond to changes in the labor market. The Korean news agency on problems of employment predicts by 2024 a shortage of 219 000 experts in technical and medical fields while 318 000 specialists with background in human studies will be unclaimed in the labor market.[4]

In addition to the above mentioned structural changes in the Korean educational institutions one can't ignore a shift in the learning environment due to technical progress. Contemporary students live in the reality where not books and texts but electronic gadgets became the prevailing method of obtaining information. E-learning and other innovative teaching methods increasingly become an integral part of contemporary educational process.

In the paper I attempt to initiate a discussion on current challenges to teaching Russian as a foreign language (RKI) as one of humanitarian disciplines in the context of new educational environment in South Korea. How teaching Russian language can be adjusted to particular education environment? After analyzing the features of the contemporary educational environment in South Korea I will define challenges to teaching Russian language as a humanitarian discipline in this country and offer recommendations for organization of teaching Russian in particular education environment.

The theoretical framework of my research is based on the analysis of the education system components presented in the O.P. Bykova`s doctoral dissertation "Teaching Russian in the

[3] *The Prime rat race on campus*. Korea JoongAng Daily 08.03.2016 http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3015930&cloc=joongangdaily%7chome%7conline accessed on 01.06.2016.

[4] *The Prime rat race on campus*. Korea JoongAng Daily 08.03.2016 http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3015930&cloc=joongangdaily%7chome%7conline accessed on 01.06.2016.

foreign-language environment (on the example of South Korean universities)". The author points at three major components of education system: 1) social control and statewide planning; 2) traditional education system of the country; 3) current education system; 4) academic manpower. O. Bykova emphasizes that for effective teaching of Russian as a foreign language "the farther from Russia the country is located, the more attention has to be paid to an education system of this country ".[5]

2. Influence of a traditional education system on formation of contemporary Korean education

Since the Koryo period (918-1392), the higher education served as an effective tool for social advancement in Korea. The purpose of the higher education was not in "seeking the truth" but in achieving concrete results –namely preparation for civil service examination. The first Korean higher education institution Kukchagam was established in 992 in Seoul along with spreading of Confucianism thought.[6] The National University Kukchagam consisted of several colleges where students studied Chinese classics, calligraphy, law and accounting. Each of the colleges differed not by curriculum but by social status of the students that were enrolled. The zeal of education was on preparation of young aristocrats for civil service examination *kosi*.[7] Thus "The rhetoric of the Lun Yu", one of the major Confucius analects, stresses applicable knowledge explaining that "those who become scholars should study various laws and prohibitions". [8]

The system of higher education in Korea was further developed during the period of the Choson dynasty (1392-1897) when the civil service examination system became more complex. The universities introduced teaching foreign languages as a part of technical education *chaphag* (various sciences). After mastering Chinese, Mongolian, Jurchen and Japanese languages the students could pass examination for a civil position in Chamber of translators.[9]

The Korean system of the higher education underwent considerable changes in the end of the 19th century with Kabo's reforms. During the Japanese colonization period in the beginning of the 20th century, the Korean education was profoundly influenced by the Japanese educational system which, in turn, was based on elements of the German model of modern universities.[10] Important feature of the modern time universities was a shift from teaching methodology and theoretical disciplines to teaching

[5] Быкова, Ольга Петровна. "Обучение русскому языку как иностранному в иноязычной среде (на примере южнокорейских университетов)." *М.: ГИРЯП* (2011). http://www.dissercat.com/content/obuchenie-russkomu-yazyku-kak-inostrannomu-v-inoyazychnoi-srede-na-primere-yuzhnokoreiskikh-#ixzz4AJ7m5Vhh accessed on 01.06. 2016.

[6] Kim Jongchol traces the origin of the Korean higher education institutions to establishment of Tae Hak of Koguryo in 4rth century which followed the model of education. Kim, Jongchol."Historical development." *Higher education in Korea: Tradition and adaptation* (2000): p.7.

[7] Carter, Eckert, et al. "Korea old and New: a history." *Seoul: Ilchokak* (1990), pp.70-74.

[8] *The Confucian analects, the great learning & the doctrine of the mean*. Cosimo, Inc., 2009.

[9] Ёнъу, Хан. "История Кореи: новый взгляд." *М.: Восточная литература*(2010), с.170

[10] Shin J. C. Higher education development in Korea: western university ideas, Confucian tradition, and economic development //Higher Education. – 2012. – Т. 64. – №. 1. – С. 59-72.

technical subjects and sciences.[11] According to S.Shin and M.Koh, education in Japan and Korean peninsula in the beginning of the 20th century was built on unitary principles and provided for teaching subjects and disciplines which were considered important for the economic development.[12] After the end of the Japanese colonial rule in 1945 and establishments of the Republic of Korea, the education system in the Sothern part of the Peninsula was organized after American model to which it adheres till now.

From the aforesaid we can draw the following conclusions. The modern system of the higher education in South Korea was formed under the influence of Confucian doctrine and ideas on purpose of learning and later under the influence of German (universities of modern times) and American education systems.[13] Importantly the Confucian thought with its zeal for result-oriented education was the defining vector of the Korean education for more than 10 centuries (!). M.Koh, S.Chin and J.Shin agree on complexity of the Korean education system which preserves characteristics of the entire periods of the development – orientation on certain results, unitarity (education being considered as a consumer product), emphasizes on teaching technical disciplines.[14]

3. Higher education in Korea and a shift in statewide planning

According to O.P. Bykova, another important element in the analysis of the education system is a statewide planning (социальный заказ государства) in response to social and economic changes in society.[15] Demographic shift is one of the significant factors that exert direct impact in statewide planning in the education in the Republic of Korea.

By the second decade of the 21st century South Korea became a country with one of the lowest birth rate with just 8.6 babies born per 1000 people in 2014.[16] Considering slowing birth rate (in 2015 it hit 8.1 births per 100 people), South Korea expects sharp reduction of the potential support ratio (including numbers of youth age 15-65).[17] So, in 2015 the number of population younger than 15 years who are to enter the universities in the next 5 - 10 years, constitutes just 15.7% of the total population.[18]

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[11] Feingold, M. (1991). Tradition vs novelty: universities and scientific societies in the early modern period. In P. Barker & R. Ariew (Eds.), Revolution and continuity: essays in the history and philosophy of early modern science, Studies in philosophy and the history of philosophy. Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, pp. 46-50.

[12] Shin S., Koh M. Korean education in cultural context //Essays in education. – 2005. – Т. 14. – С. 1-10.

[13] Shin J. C. Higher education development in Korea: western university ideas, Confucian tradition, and economic development //Higher Education. – 2012. – Т. 64. – №. 1. – С. 59-72.

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
[15] Быкова, Ольга Петровна. "Обучение русскому языку как иностранному в иноязычной среде (на примере южнокорейских университетов)." *М.: ГИРЯП* (2011). http://www.dissercat.com/content/obuchenie-russkomu-yazyku-kak-inostrannomu-v-inoyazychnoi-srede-na-primere-yuzhnokoreiskikh-#ixzz4AJ7m5Vhh.Accessed on 01.06. 2016.

[16] http://nonews.co/directory/lists/countries/birth. Accessed on 01.06.2016.

[17] http://nonews.co/directory/lists/countries/birth. Accessed on 01.06.2016.

[18] http://countrymeters.info/ru/Republic_of_Korea. Accessed on 01.06.2016.

Picture 1. Disproportion between the number of student's places and the number of entrants.



Source: http://namu.wiki/w/%EB%8C%80%ED%95%99%EA%B5%AC%EC%A1%B0%EA%B0%9C%ED%98%81%ED%8F%89%EA%B0%80. Accessed on 01.06.2016.

Against sharp demographic recession the government of the president Park Geun-hye started to implement the structural reform of higher education which provides for reduction of 16 000 student's places by 2023.[19] The reform is to balance a disproportion between the number of student's places and the number of entrants. If in 1989 as many as 800 000 entrants applied for 200 000 places in the universities, it is expected that by 2020 the number of entrants will be insufficient to fill places at universities.[20]

Table 2. Criteria for evaluation of the Korean higher education institutions under the "Program for Industrial Needs-Matched Education"

Criteria	**Additional criteris**
Условия для обучения **Learning environment**	Кол-во штатных преподавателей **Number of full time lecturers**
	Кол-во внештатных преподавателей **Number of part time lecturers**
	Плата за обучение Education fee
Образовательный процесс **Education process**	Проведение занятий Conduction lessons
	Студенческая аттестация **Assessment of the students**
Оказание помощи студентам	Помощь по усвоению учебного материала

[19] http://namu.wiki/w/%EB%8C%80%ED%95%99%EA%B5%AC%EC%A1%B0%EA%B0%9C%ED%98%81%ED%8F%89%EA%B0%80. Accessed on 01.06.2016.

[20] Sunwoo, and Myung-sook Koh. "Korean education in cultural context."*Essays in education* 14 (2005): 1-10 accessed on 01.06.2016.

Proving assistance for students	**Assistance in comprehension of education materials**
	Психологическая помощь **Psychological help**
	Стипендии **Scholarships**
	Помощь в трудоустройстве **Employment Assistance**
Результаты образования **Results of the education**	Набор абитуриентов **Enrollment of applicants**
	Процент трудоустройства среди выпускников **Employment rate among graduates**
	Удовлетворение учащихся полученным образованием **Students satisfaction with the education they received**
Организация образовательного процесса **Organization of the education process**	Общие предметы, обучающие базовым навыкам будущей профессии **General subjects teaching basic skills of future profession**
	Предметы по специальности, обучающие практическим навыкам **The major subjects teaching practical skills**
	Практика на рабочих местах **Vocational training**
Специализация обучения **Specialization of the education**	План по специализации и его исполнение **The plan for specialization and its implementation**

Source: http://namu.wiki/w/%EB%8C%80%ED%95%99%EA%B5%AC%EC%A1%B0%EA%B0%9C%ED%98%81%ED%8F%89%EA%B0%80 accessed on 01.06.2016.

According to the reform program, the universities are allocated with students quotas according to efficiency of educational institutions. (The least effective universities will have to reduce the biggest number of students or to close the doors at all). So in 2015 the Ministry of education conducted assessment of performance of the universities which were divided into A, B, C groups (most effective) and D+, D- (least effective), E (which are subject to closing).

The assessment of efficiency of the Korean higher education institutions was based on the following criteria which are illustrative for our research. (Table 2) As we see from the Table 2, the core criteria for evaluation of efficiency of the Korean universities are connected with acquisition of the practical or employment relevant skills by students. ("The general subjects teaching basic skills of future profession", "the major subjects teaching practical skills", "vocational training", "the plan for specialization and its implementation"). Thus, the shift in the statewide planning which is manifested in the “Program for Industrial Needs-Matched Education” is aimed at increase of effectiveness of the higher education.

The social state planning in South Korea, in our opinion, coincides with the expectations of the society. It should be noted that education in Korea continues to play a role of the social ladder which guarantees upward social mobility. Until now a female without University diploma can`t hope for marriage with the groom from a "decent" family. Also there is a rigid hierarchy among Universities in Korea (they are divided into most or less prestigious groups such as SKY top universities which includes Seoul National

University, Yonsei University, Korea University, – top ten universities - universities of Seoul – top Universities of provinces, etc). This system ensures social mobility in the egalitarian society.

However, recently the value of the higher education has diminished due to its availability. If in 1987 just 32% of high school graduates could enter the university, then in 2010 this number reached 85%.[21] In the shrinking labor market the Korean graduates of the universities often have to perform low-qualified work –they stand at counters of shops, information desks of hotels. Even students of the upscale universities from the SKY group can't be sure about their professional future. Therefore not fundamental or general knowledge but acquisition of specialized skills started to play a key role in employment and social mobility.

One more aspect of demographical changes in South Korea that has implications on state policies in the education and statewide planning is a shift from homogenous to multicultural society as a number of foreigners permanently residing in Korea is growing at a high pace. According to Dong-A Ilbo, in 2015 there were 1.9 million foreigners who are accounted for 4% of country`s population. [22]Among them 207 693 are children of mixed marriages. It is foreseen that in the nearest future the Korean educational system should be adjusted to a higher number of multicultural students. It is important to note that in Korea the term "children from multicultural family" refers both to families when one of the parent is a Korean and also to families of " dongpho" or oversees Korean who have right to reside in the Republic of Korea. Often children in these families are not proficient in Korean or don't speak Korean at all. The Korean government responds to a growth of multiculturalism with new language policies in education including support of bilinguals.

Finally it is impossible to ignore the technical progress and changes in the innovative sphere which affects teaching and learning methods. Describing correlation between education as a driving force of social and economic changes and the need of modernization of education in the result of these changes, M. V. Zakharchenko emphasizes formation of information society which imposes new requirements.[23] Thus economic changes lead to formation of the new educational environment in South Korea. One should stress availability of technical devices, emergence of new types of information transfer that, certainly, demands new approaches to implementation of educational process – e-learning, use of innovative technical means in the classroom, etc.

4. Teaching Russian as a foreign language in the new educational environment.

Thus, having analyzed the new educational environment in South Korea in the context of social and economic transformations, we can identify the following characteristic features:

[21] *"South Koreans Consider the work Over University Education". Public Radio International.* http://www.pri.org/stories/2011-11-18/south-koreans-consider-trades-over-university-education. accessed on 01.06. 2016.

[22] http://news.donga.com/3/all/20160613/78623244/1#

[23] Захарченко М.В. *Социальный заказ на образование и образовательные ресурсы общества.* Образовательный портал Слово http://www.portal-slovo.ru/pedagogy/37904.php accessed on 01.06.2016.

1) Orientation for results;
2) Unitarity (compliance to the social planning);
3) Orientation on acquisition of practical skills;
4) De-emphasizes of humanitarian disciplines.

Table 3. The number of announcements of employment of specialists with Russian languages for the period February-March, 2015

Fields of professional activity	**Число заявок Number of posts**
Export, marketing, management	**52**
Hotel business, tourism, aviation companies	**14**
Translation, research, teaching of Russian	**31**
Logistics	**10**
Legal service	2
Recreation and sports	1
UN, International organizations	1
Government organizations	6
International conferences, events	3
University, school, Research center	5
Medical institutions	**15**
Technical field	3
Industry	8
Projecting	6
Programming	**11**
Aviation industry	**1**
Large major companies	2
Total	**171**

Source: http://blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=smckc&logNo=220662465646 accessed on 01.06.2016.

What can be the future of the subjects connected with Russian language in the context of the new educational environment? Contrary to apparent challenges of contemporary Korean policy in education, teaching Russian language has bright prospects. According to data of the Center of development of career of the Ministry of Education[24], the employment rate of the Russian language major graduates exceeds 60% - it is quite a good result for the country (the employment rate below 40% is considered unsatisfactory). At the same time data include also lower indicators of provincial universities where it is more difficult to find work.

In what areas will demand for experts with Russian language remain? If we analyze the number of

[24] Центр развития карьеры министерства образования https://www.career.go.kr accessed on 01.06.2016.

employment postings for experts with Russian language for the period February-March, 2015 (Table 2), we will see that the most popular areas are export, marketing, management (52 applications); transfer, researches, teaching (31 applications), medical institutions (15); hotel business, tourism, airlines (14 applications), logistics and programming (10 and 11 respectively). Thus, the employment problem is not particularly acute for graduates of the Russian faculties.[25]

In our opinion, teaching Russian as a foreign language (RFL) in South Korea at the present stage demands some reconsideration and adaptation to the new educational environment. How RFL program can be organized according to a new educational paradigm? We will give some recommendations below.

1) Applied aspects of Russian language specialists training should be prioritized. For example, the curriculum should include the subjects aimed at developing ability to apply language in practical fields (ex. Theory and practice of translation/interpretation, methodology of teaching Russian as a foreign language, Russian language for communication).

2) The subjects related to "specialization" such as "business Russian", "Russian for tourism", "Russian for medical translators" etc. also will fit into the new educational environment.

3) The subjects preparing students for Russian language proficiency exams such as or FLEX adhere to achieving results through education.

4) It is possible to introduce subjects that would increase students` motivation for learning of foreign language and helps to build career (for example, acquaintance to the Russian-Korean cooperation in different areas and specific joint projects).

5) Finally, new course aimed at heritage speakers or methodological courses on teaching Russian to heritage speakers should be developed to meet challenges of multicultural society in Korea.[26]

Table 4. Russian educational organizations in Korea

	Russian educational organization	**Status**	**Established**	**Location**
1	Russian Embassy School http://schoolkor.ucoz.ru/	Russian school	2001	Seoul
2	Russki Dom http://www.russkydom-seoul.com/	Educational organization	2010	Seoul
3	New way academy http://www.nwrusacademy.com/	Educational organization)	2014	Seoul
4	Solnishko	Kindergarten (preschool)	2007	Seoul
5	“Apple tree” school	Educational	2014	Kyeonggi

[25] Баллод Ж.О. *О мотивации к изучению русского языка: перспективы для специалистов с русским языком в Южной Корее*. Материалы V-ой всекорейской конференции российских соотечественников в Республике Корея «Поддержка русского языка в мультикультурных семьях».23 апреля 2016 года, университет Сокен

[26] Thus as of 2015 the Russian speaking diaspora in South Korea consists of 78 675 people from 5 CIS countries: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Uzbekistan. There are 11 Russian educational organizations operating on the territory of the Republic of Korea (4 in Seoul, 5 in Kyeonggi province, 1 in Taegu and 1 in Pusan) which educate Russian speaking children from Russia, CIS countries and Korean multicultural families according to Russian State Program of Secondary level education.

	http://appletreeschool.net/	organization		province, Dongtan
6	“Apple tree” kindergarten http:/http://appletreekorea.livejournal.com/	Educational organization	2010	Kyeonggi province, Dongtan
7	Noane http://www.noane.org/	(Educational organization)	2014	Kyeonggi province, Ansan
8	Russki Obrazovatelni center (https://sites.google.com/site/vernerifkonsultant/	Educational organization)	2011	Kyeonggi province, Ansan
9	New way academy http://www.nwrusacademy.com/	(Educational organization)	2015	Kyeonggi province, Incheon
10	New way academy http://www.nwrusacademy.com/	(Educational organization)	2016	Daegu
11	New way academy http://www.nwrusacademy.com/	(Educational organization)	2016	Pusan

Source: http://ksorskorea.org/

In this paper I abstain from a valuable assessment of the recent changes in the educational environment in South Korea. It is obvious that the balance between fundamental and practical components of scientific disciplines which are taught at the Korean universities has to be found. The question remains open.

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The Color Symbol in Hungarian Folk Ballad

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I. Introduction

A German philosopher Ernst Cassirer developed symbolism. He defined man as a <symbolic animal> rather than a <rational animal>.[1] In the beginning of the history of mankind, symbolic system of paintings and colors rather than letters mediated communication. Each cultural area associated paintings and colors with distinct meanings. Paintings and colors were a more effective means of communicating meanings than letters in that they were understood by all members of a community beyond age and generation. This, in fact, makes man a symbolic animal.

"The operation of human culture is inseparable from the use of symbol and emblem. The existence of human community presupposes a continued communication that builds the present."[2] In such a statement, the color and its role as a means of communication is revealed. This paper will deal with color symbols in Hungarian folk ballad, drawing color symbolism unique to Hungarian ethnicity.

Orally transmitted literature, by its nature, preserves the most primitive and original ethnic characters and cultural uniqueness. Folk ballade was chosen as a subject of study for "folk songs hold various meanings that describe man's inner world and emotions."[3] From the late 20th century, Zsuzsanna Erdélyi and others have begun their study of color symbolism in folk songs. Shortly after, Marcell Jankovics, Sándor Király, and Klára Gazda have continued developing a study on color.

Hungarian scholars generally focus on color symbolism in Hungarian traditional community, oral literature, and traditional art, relating too many objects in explanation of a single color, as a result defining an unclear color symbolism. Therefore, this paper hopes to find a simple and clear color symbolism by sorting meanings of a single color in oral literature.

A study on color symbolism in Hungarian folk ballad and a follow-up study on that of Korean

1) 에른스트 카시러, 『인간이란 무엇인가』, 최명관 옮김, 창, 2012, p.59.
2) Hoppál Mihály & Jankovics Marcell & Nagy András & Szemadám György, *Jelképtár*, Budapest, Helikon Kiadó, 1997, p. 5.
3) Küllős Imola, *Közkézen, közszájon, köztudatban*, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 2012, p. 545.

oral literature will be a foundation for a study on a relationship between a symbol and meanings unique to an ethnicity. Therefore, this study can be used for a further study on color symbolism in Hungarian and Korean oral literature, providing a forum for discussion on two ethnicities' unique or common symbolism.

II. Color Symbolism

Color holds direct and clear meanings to members of a community through a long continuation of a cultural community. In primitive age, only colors that were available in nature or in daily lives could be referenced due to a limited environment in comparison to today. For example, colors found in nature included colors of flowers, soil, and cloud, while colors found in daily lives included colors of man's skin, eyes, and that of fire.

Therefore, the fact that a language area lacks a word for a certain color, or has more than one word for a single color relates to the community's natural environment of way of life.[4] Among colors holding significance from the primitive age, colors of white, black, and red will be dealt in this paper, focusing on what they mean in folk ballad. Each color will be studied individually to reveal what it symbolizes in folk ballad, and what meaning it conveys.

1. White Color

In every culture, white-black are a contrast color representing a basic contrast. If two colors appear concurrently, white symbolizes virtue and cleanliness, while black symbolizes vice and dirtiness in general. Cleanliness and dirtiness in this sense are not only in a physical level but also in a mental level, connecting existence beyond humans as well as humans themselves.

White, symbolizing purity, is used on a character's surname to reveal his or her pure and righteous character. In <A Sister of a Condemned Criminal A halálraítelt húga> a main character László Fehér and his sister Anna Fehér have white as their surnames.

<A Sister of a Condemned Criminal>

1. László Fehér stole a horse
   Beneath the hill of Fekete.
   There was a loud whipping sound,

4) The following are the examples. West-European and Ural-Altaic languages make no distinction between the colors of green and blue. In Hungary, breeding of horse resulted in a diverse lexicon for the color grey. For reference: Erdélyi Zsuzsanna, "Adatok a magyar népköltészet színszimbolikájahoz", *Ethnographia*, Vol. 69. 1961/II. p. 175-6.

Everyone in the city of Gönc heard the sound.
Fehér László lovat lopott,
A fekete halom alatt.
Nagyot pattant az ostora,
Meghallotta Gönc városa. 5)

Here, the main character László Fehér steals a horse not for his own greed but to fight against the judge's accumulation of wealth and corruption. His name is white, and the place he steals a horse is black- feteke, meaning the place prevalent of corruption and injustice. In other words, the name "white" signifies that the cause behind the stealing of a horse is to correct corruption and injustice at a place where they are committed.

Using the color of white to women, especially young women, is to symbolize purity and innocence. In <Red and Beautiful Elisabeth *Piros szép Örzsébet*> the main character Örzsébet, a pure and clean young woman, cleans her body near Danube.

There she washes, there...
Her beautiful and white arms,
Her beautiful and white legs,
Her red and pretty face.
Rajta mossa, rajta…
Két szép fehér karját,
Két szép fehér lábát,
*Piros szép orcáját.*6)

The color of white which expresses the girl's beauty and purity in this poem is a color symbolism. In <Márton Szép Ilona,> the main character Ilona weaves a garland out of white lily rather than colorful flowers.

She weaves a garland
out of white lily.
She weaves a garland
out of white lily.
Köti koszorúját
Fejér liliombúl.
Köti koszorúját
*Fejér liliombúl.*7)

5) Vargyas Lajos(Ed.), *Magyar népballadák*, Budapest, Európa könyvkiadó, 1994, p. 49.
6) Ortutay Gyula(Ed.), *Magyar népballadák*, Budapest, Szépirodalmi kiadó, 1976, p. 151.
7) *a.a.O.*, p. 59.

"White flower such as lily and lily of the valley is always an attribute of purity and cleanliness ."[8] The garland of white lily that she weaves represents her pure body and clean soul. She holds pure and clean body and soul enough to take her to heaven, so she arises to heaven without experiencing death.

The sublime white also connects to godly character, relating animism in traditional society by the appearance of snow-white deer and white horses in tales associated with Hungarian migration such as <Mysterious Deer,> and <White Horse>. 삼국유사에 나오는 박혁거세 신화에서도 흰 말이 등장하는데, 영웅의 탄생을 알리는 신비하고도 상서로운 전령의 역할을 하고 있다. Such character, in fact, is similar to the worship of white tiger in Korea.

However, white that represents purity, innocence and naivety often symbolizes death for white is found in the process of healthy complexion changing due to age and illness near death. In <Szegszáli Mariska,> a different version of <Lady Dragged Until Death,> Mariska, who rejects the husband she does not want and dies after being dragged by the horse the husband rides, is symbolized with white bed.

> "(She) already fell asleep on the bed white as snow."
> *"Nyugszik már, alszik már hófehér ágyába."*[9]

Here, 'white bed' is beyond a literal meaning describing mere color of a bed. Rather, it relates to the fact that the lady's complexion turned white. In Hungarian funeral, family members used to wear white mourning, while the dead was covered in a white cloth. Therefore, 'white bed' in this folk ballad can be interpreted as a bed covered in a white cloth, directly showing the lady's death.

In <Three Orphans, Where Are You Heading *Hová mégy, te három árva*,> another version of <Hit the Grave *Verjétek meg a temetőt*> the dead mother talks to the children who come to her grave.

> "If your stepmother
> dresses you in white,
> When she dresses you in white,
> A blood will be shed on your backs,
> *Vagyon nektek mostohátok*
> *Ki fejért adjon rátok*
> *Mikor fejért ad reátok*
> *Vérrel virágzik hátatok,*[10]

8) Borsi Ferenc, *Mi vagyunk a rózsák - Az érzékiség képi ábrázolása népdalainkban*, Dunaszerdahely, 2003, p. 35.
9) Kallós Zoltán & Szabó T. Attila, *Balladák Könyve - Élő hazai magyar népballadák,* Bukarest, Kriterion, 1971, p. 128.
10) *a.a.O.*, p. 255.

Here, the stepmother's abuse is represented as 'white clothes,' symbolizing 'white face,' 'white death', or mourning. Hungary's acceptance of black mourning was post-modern times, parallel to Korea's change of mourning from white to black in late 20th century due to Western influence.

2. Black Color

In general, black and white are a contrast color, white for bright and shiny and black for dark and dim. "In every generation and in every civilization, a contrast between white and black is often times a contrast between good and evil."[11] In reference to the aforementioned godly and sublime character of white, black in white-black contrast represents the evil creatures and the ill-minded spirit.

In <Lady Dragged Until Death *A halálra hurcolt menyasszony*> the left-alone mother has to sell her daughter to the bar owner's son for her accumulated credit on drinks. The following is 6-7 stanzas where a group of thieves show up on the girl's door.

"Mother, mother I love, mother who gave birth to and raised me,
Who are those people, those people in black clothes.
Coming from where the sun sets, and going to where the sun sets?"
Anyám, édösanyám, Kedves szülődajkám,
Micsoda sereg az, A fekete sereg:
Napkeletről jönnek, Napnyugatra mennek.

"Daughter, daughter I love, Bodor Katalina,
They are coming after you, those people in black clothes!"
Lányom, édös lányom, Bodor Katalina,
Az teérted jön az, A fekete sereg:[12]

Here, 'those people in black clothes' express the people's mean and evil minds, beyond literal description about the color of clothing. In the same vein, 'where the sun sets' shows the group's tendency to work at night, habitually involving evil intention. The mother, however, urges the daughter to marry the evil man.

In <*Bíró Katalina*> another version of <The Girl Given in Marriage *Az eladott leány*> 'black color' in the first stanza alludes a dark development of plot.

Bíró Katalina
sat by the window,

11) Erdélyi Zsuzsanna, 1961/II. p. 180.
12) Vargyas Lajos(Ed.), p. 16.

embroidered a design,
with black silk thread,
Bíró Katalina
Űl vala ablakba,
Varrja vala hímit
Fekete selyemvel,[13)]

It is rare to embroider a design with black silk thread as described in the above folk ballad. A typical Hungarian embroidery consists of white cloth with colorful threads for flowered patterns. Black cloth is used from time to time, but only to assist other colors in their beauty.

Therefore, Katalina's black thread is not literal, but symbolizes an unfortunate aura cast upon Katalina's life. Katalina, whose family is wealthy enough to provide silk thread, becomes a main character of tragedy due to an unwanted marriage.

A white-black contrast and its dramatic effect are shown in <Rumanian Mary *Oláhul Merinka*> a different version of <Cruel Mother-in-law *A kegyetlen anyós*>. The mother-in-law who rejects the woman her son loves, kills the woman with fire in the son's absence. Upon returning, the son looks for her with desperate cry, and kills himself when he hears her answer beneath the rose bushes. Disliking them together after death, and in an attempt to separate them, the mother-in-law buries them like the following.

To one body
A white marble tomb,
To another body
A black marble tomb.
Egynek csántatának
Fehér mármulykő koporsót,
S a másiknak csántatának
Fekete mármulykő koporsót.

And buried one body
Beside the altar inside,
Buried another body
Beside the altar outside.
S egyiket temették
Z ótár mellé belül,
S mtásikat temették
Z ótár mellé kivül.[14)]

13) Kallós Zoltán, Repeated in p. 291. stanza 1/ p. 292. stanza 7/ p. 293. stanza 13.
14) Ortutay Gyula(Ed.), p. 107.

Here, white-black contrast represents two ununitable extremes, rather than a contrast between the good and the evil. However, pure love between the two makes ‘blossom as a white lily above the altar/ to become one’ possible. It is clear that the noble and pure love is what unites the ununitable.

3. Red Color

Red is a color encountered in nature through fire, blood, sunrise and sunset. Fire in red means passion or rage, while the blood, especially that of man, symbolizes sacred sacrifice or love. On the other hand, red hue in sunlight and sunset represents the beginning of a day or life, and the end of a day and darkness respectively.

“According to primitive beliefs, overflowing red blood during a sacrament holds a protective power.”[15] This is why a priest or a shaman performing a sacrament wears red, while the witch is described with red hair or red stockings. It also accounts for the idea that “prevalent in ancient times and famous in Hungary ‘red dog, red horse, and red man’ are not at all beneficial.”[16]

Red is usually employed in oral literature to describe love, or the blood of a man. In <Lady Dragged Until Death *A halálra hurcolt menyasszony*>, there is a three stage plot development where the main character rejects her unwanted husband *Rákóci,* the angry husband drags her by riding a horse, thereby sacrificing her. Expressions in 12-16 lines summarize the lady’s injury worsening from her feet to her body and head.

12. “Slow down, slow down, Sir *Rákóci,*
The hill of my red shoes turned half-red with my blood!”
Lassúl járgy, lassúl járgy, Rákóci kis úrfi,
Már piros cipellőm Sarkig vérben úszik!

14. “Slow down, slow down, Sir *Rákóci,*
My red, pretty silk clothes turned half-red with blood!”
Lassúl járgy, lassúl járgy, *Rákóci kis úrfi*,
Már szép selem ruhám Félig vérben úszik!

16. “Slow down, slow down, Sir *Rákóci,*
My red, gold garland turned half-red with blood!”
Lassúl járgy, lassúl járgy, *Rákóci kis úrfi*,
Már aran koszorúm Félig vérben úszik! [17]

15) Erdélyi Zsuzsanna, “Adatok a magyar népköltészet színszimbolikájahoz II.”, *Ethnographia*, Vol/ 63. 1961/III. p. 405.
16) Fél Edit, "Adatok a gyász-színek és párhuzamatok", *Ethnographia*, 1935. p. 14.
17) Vargyas Lajos(Ed.), p. 17.

The lady's shoes, silk clothes, and garland are all 'red.' Two interpretations are possible on the repetition of 'turned half-red with blood.' The first interpretation is that her shoes, silk clothes, and garland turned red by absorbing blood, and the second is that she had worn red shoes, red silk clothes, red garland from the beginning. If the first view correlates red with the lady's blood and sacrifice, the second perspective implies red clothing for wedding, and therefore bringing about mysterious and protecive power.

<Szőllősi Erzsi,> another version of <Lady Who was forced to dance Until Death *A halálra táncoltatott lány*> is a story of the lady who goes to a ball with red dress. Here, the lady dances continuously at the men's request, and her feet are covered in blood.

"Get me out, get me out,
So I can get some air,
So I can spill out my red blood
filled in my shoes made of Italian leather!"
„Eressz ki, eressz ki,
Hülepedni menjek ki,
Bagariás két cipőmből
Piros vérem öntsem ki!"[18]

The lady, with these very red shoes, or rich and high status, hurt men's pride, and in response trigger their revenge. Men continuously ask her to dance, and the exhausted lady dies at dawn. Here, 'red shoes' dually imply the lady's high status and a cause for the poor's sacrificial offering of her.

Comical folk ballad whose subject matter is red shoes is <I married a Rich Daughter *Gazdag leányt vettem*>

Went to a market, bought red boots,
Brought them home, and put them on the table.
"Call me your husband, my love, my darling!"
"I will never call you that in my lifetime."
Elmentem városba, piros csizmát vettem,
Azt én hazavittem s az asztalra tettem.
„Híjj uradnak ingem, kincsem, feleségem!"
„Soha nem én téged teljes életemben."[19]

18) Kallós Zoltán, p. 126. 'Bagariás cipő' in the original text means Italian cowhide, made from tanning of calf skin. It was widely used for the upper part of shoes, boots, and ornaments for the ease of shaping and its waterproof quality. Reference: http://meszotar.hu/keres-bagaria (June 18th, 2016). These shoes were not common as leather shoes, and were enough to draw attention with their vivid red color.

19) *a.a.O.,* p. 395.

The poor man marries a rich woman, and shows his affection in the best way he can, but the woman rejects, or does not love him just because the man is poor. Every time there is a market the man brings ‘silk clothes’ or expensive ‘red boots’ for his wife in vain. The infuriated husband uses violence, when the woman finally calls him her husband.

According to Héra Erzsébet(1874), the wife of János Gazdag in Vas (the city of Cák), called red boots as ‘a type of demon’ shoes. The testimony that “There used to be only neat black, leather shoes and no type of demon shoes.”[20] unveils the negative correlation between red and demon. In addition, the girl wearing red boots instead of common leather shoes gave an impression of ill-conducted, or demon-possessed girl living thoughtlessly.

However, it is common for red in folk ballad to symbolize ripe and mature love. It is common for “folk ballad to start with the color of red most favored in oral literature.”[21] This is to directly show the character’s love through vivid red. In <I Was Not Born from My Mother *...Nem anyámtól lettem...*> the main character strongly expresses his love long kept in his heart by employing ‘Whitsuntide’ and ‘red light of the dawn.’

I was not born from my mother,
I blossomed beneath the rose tree,
I was born at the dawn of
red Whitsuntide.
Nem anyámtól lettem,
Rózsafán termettem,
Piros pünkösd napján
Hajnalban születtem.[22]

The color of the rose, although not mentioned directly, is assumed to be red based on ‘red’ Whitsuntide and the color of dawn on lines 3-4. The three-time repetition of the color of red makes certain of destiny-like, never vacatable or forgettable love rather than simple and casual love.

“The metaphor of flower is moving flower to man, in a more limited sense looking at the flower in the mind of a loving youth. In other words, looking at something as beautiful and attractive as a flower in the climax of young and loving life.”[23] Comparison of a lover and a rose in <I Was Not Born from My Mother...> also shows love as a beautiful and attractive state.

Red, unlike white or black, represents two aspects: piros and vörös. The use of the two adjectives are restricted by the following nouns. “Although vörös originates from vér (blood), the fact that dark red hue in complexion due to blood rush is called elpirulás needs to be considered.

20) Erdélyi Zsuzsanna, II. p. 412.
21) Móser Zoltán, "Szerkezetek, színek, fények", *Tiszatáj*. 2005/5. p. 62.
22) Ortutay Gyula(Ed.), p. 432.
23) Erdélyi Pál, "A virágének", *Ethnographia,* Vol. 10. 1899/IV. p. 264.

In contrast, nobody calls vörösrez (copper) as piros réz (red coper), bricks piros, and vörös hagyma (red onion) piros."[24]

The two words refer to the same color, but hold different connotations. In <Two Flowers at the chapel *A két kápolna-virág*> a different version of <Lazarus and Elisabeth *Lázár és Erzsebet*> the two lovers commit suicide at their parents' opposition, are buried across the chapel. Thereafter, the two flowers grown and merged into one are described in the following 7-9 stanzas.

From one growed the red rose bush
From another tomb growed the white rose bush.
Egyikből is nőve vörös rózsabokor,
Másikból is növe fehér rózsabokor.

Growed, and growed for three years,
In three years flowers blossomed from the two bushes.
Nőttek, növögettek három esztendeig,
Három esztendeig mind csak virágoztak.

From the red rose bush blossomed the white rose,
From the white rose bush blossomed the red rose.
Vörös rózsabokor a szép fehért virágzik,
Fehér rózsabokor vöröset virágzik.[25]

Here, vörös is more suitable than piros in showing sentimental and passionate love. Also, the word implies more tragic and dark ending of a story. It can be concluded that piros in Hungarian flag hints a more bright, cheerful, and happy ending.

III. Conclusion

The colors of white, black, and red found in oral literature, especially folk ballad are beyond literal level, and symbolize unique connotation and image. If 'white pigeon' is an universal emblem for peace, 'red rose' in Hungarian folk ballad represents a lover, a meaning unique to Hungarian ethnicity. Therefore, color symbolism holds a unique meaning only in the context of each ethnicity and culture.

Viewing study of oral literature as a subfield of a customs study, the argument that "our customs study proceeds with application of ethnology and psychology."[26] holds validity. Understanding of

24) Csapodi István, Vörös és piros, *Magyar Myelvőr*, Vol. 28. 1899. p. 203.
25) Ortutay Gyula(Ed.), p. 31.

Hungarian ethnology and psychology needs to precede the study of Hungarian oral literature. This paper, in studying unique Hungarian color symbolism, encountered Hungarian psychology and traditional Hungarian life patterns.

This paper assorted only three colors from folk ballad: white, black, and red. The next study will deal with colors excluding the three, brown, blue, green, and yellow and their associated meaning to Hungarians. Study of basic colors will allow for comparative study of Hungarian and Korean color symbolism, and drawing of conclusion on the two ethnicities' unique world view, thinking system, and psychology.

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26) Gunda Béla, "Műveltségi áramlatok és társadalmi tényezők", *Ethnophia*, Vol. 69. 1958/IV. p. 576.